Re: [xmca] dťjatelíností

From: Wolff-Michael Roth <mroth who-is-at>
Date: Sun Aug 31 2008 - 06:51:37 PDT

Hi Andy,

and here from "Problems in the Development of Mind", p.37

Thus, the principal 'unit' of a vital process is an organism's
activity; the different activities that realise its diverse
vital relations with the surrounding reality are essentially
determined by their object; we shall therefore differentiate
between separate types of activity according to the difference
in their objects.

I think you have enough fodder for the unit question.

On 31-Aug-08, at 6:27 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:

OK, thanks for that Michael. I understand Tätigkeit, so that settles
some questions, though not all.

I have another question about Activity to add to these.

Vygotsky, Davydov, Engstrom (to take just three) all talk about "unit
of analysis", "germ-cell" or single instance (as in Pavolv's study of
the reflex), but in the works of AN Leontyev that I have access to
(on he makes no reference to any of these terms. This
seems not accidental to me actually. Can anyone clarify this?

Did Leonteyv (a) think that "activity" passes as a "unit of
analaysis", (b) disagree with the idea that a science should begin
from a Unit of analysis, or (c) define subject-activity-object as the
"unit of analysis somewhere?

And I need citation, I'm afraid.

Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> Hi Andy,
> it's not just the Russian. In German there is the parallel
> distinction between "Tätigkeit" (deiatel'nost') and Aktivität
> (aktivnost'). In the former there is an orientation----toward
> object/motive, which is not in the latter, and the former is
> oriented toward and a result of society (Gesellschaft), whereas the
> latter is not (necessarily). When Leont'ev is translated into
> German, you find the words Tätigkeit and the adjective
> "gesellschaftlich" (societal) whereas in English there is activity
> and social----and that has made all the difference, to quote Robert
> Frost.
> Cheers,
> Michael
> On 31-Aug-08, at 4:18 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> I wonder if our Russian speakers could indulge me again with a
> point of clarification. d√©jatel'nost' (or –ī–Ķ—Ź—ā–Ķ–Ľ—Ć–Ĺ–ĺ—Ā—ā—Ć)
> is the Russian word for "activity".
> 1. I understand that in Russian the use of definite and indefeinite
> partcles (a and the) is rare, so in the title to AN Leontyev's
> famous book, does déjatel'nost' mean "an activity" or "activity" -
> with the connotation of substance that a word has in English if
> used without a or the. When we have "act, action and activity," is
> that third category the same word, déjatel'nost'?
> 2. déjatel'nost' can also be translated as "work". How strong is
> the connection between "work" and "activity" in the Russian mind
> when talking of "activity theory"? Does that sound like "work
> theory"? Or is this just like any ambiguous word. I mean, English
> speakers would not think that in this context "activity" referred
> to autonomous physiological processes, which can also be called
> "Activity". When "Theses on Feuerbach" is translated into Russian,
> can Russian readers see the diffrence between "work" and "activity"?
> Andy
> Andy Blunden wrote:
>> Fascinating response, Robert. So let's see if I understand you
>> right. A mass of interconnected actions can be understood as some
>> *whole* (and not just an arbitrary collection of individual
>> things) if we can perceive some kind of *constraint*, operating
>> over the domain, which limits the domain of possible
>> configurations? Is that it?
>> Andy
>> Robert Bracewell wrote:
>>> Hi Andy and all,
>>> I agree with Michael that the relationship between activity and
>>> action is a
>>> constitutive one, but I think this points to a big theoretical
>>> gap in CHAT
>>> generally. If actions are the constituents of activity, then the
>>> issue
>>> arises as to how the constituents are arranged in order to
>>> constitute
>>> activity (and there may be other types of constituents in
>>> activity also). As
>>> Leont¬Ļev said, this arrangement cannot be serial (e.g., chains of
>>> s-r
>>> pairs), nor additive in the sense of accumulative (as contrasted
>>> with the
>>> mathematical sense). So how are we to theorize the arrangement?
>>> The issue of
>>> arranging constituents to achieve higher order structures has
>>> been treated
>>> by both linguistics and artificial intelligence. The general
>>> approach is to
>>> constrain the possible relationships between constituents--in
>>> linguistics
>>> this usually done via a grammar, in AI via a program. For CHAT I
>>> think our
>>> task may be to build on Leont¬Ļev and figure out these constraints.
>>> Regards,
>>> --Bob Bracewell
>>> On 8/29/08 1:24 PM, "Wolff-Michael Roth" <> wrote:
>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>> I think he expresses the constitutive relation between actions and
>>>> activity. Activity is not just the sum of actions, it presupposes
>>>> them but is itself presupposed by the actions that constitute it. I
>>>> am pasting the definition from OED, which appears to be consistent
>>>> with this (my) reading of Leont'ev. Leont'ev and Vygotsky want
>>>> to do
>>>> unit analysis, not element/al analysis. That is, even if you can
>>>> identify structures within activity, these cannot stand on their
>>>> own
>>>> like elements. What they are is dependent on all the other
>>>> structures
>>>> that can be identified, with which they stand in a constitutive
>>>> unit,
>>>> and which are subordinate to activity. :-)
>>>> molar, adj.3
>>>> 2. Psychol. Designating a large-scale unit of behaviour, esp. an
>>>> integrated set of responses serving to bring about a common
>>>> goal, as
>>>> distinguished from an elementary unit of behaviour such as a
>>>> physiological response (cf. MOLECULAR adj. 5); of or relating to
>>>> (the
>>>> study of) such behaviour.
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> Michael
>>>> On 29-Aug-08, at 7:11 AM, Michael Glassman wrote:
>>>> Andy,
>>>> This is just my perspective, but I still believe Activity Theory
>>>> goes
>>>> back to roots in work done by Stanislavsky - in particular "On
>>>> Being
>>>> an Actor" and his book on character development. I think the
>>>> argument that Stanislavsky makes is that you should never consider
>>>> each scene individually, as encapsulated and whole, I guess you
>>>> could
>>>> say there should be no reification of a scene. You have to
>>>> consider
>>>> a scene, and the actions of a character, not only in terms of the
>>>> entire play, but in terms of what has come before and what comes
>>>> after - that activity is part of an ongoing process. Stanislavsky
>>>> was working off the new form of playwrights such as Ibsen,
>>>> Strindberg
>>>> and especially Chekhov of course. To give an example, when Nora
>>>> walks out on Torvald and her father at the end of "A Doll's House"
>>>> the scene makes little sense in an of itself, and if you think
>>>> of the
>>>> scenes of the play as simply being additive you are shocked.
>>>> But if
>>>> you consider it as part of a moral activity, with a building
>>>> motivation that leads to a choice of action it is extraordinarily
>>>> complelling.
>>>> Anyway, that's my two cents.
>>>> Michael
>>>> ________________________________
>>>> From: on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>> Sent: Fri 8/29/2008 9:53 AM
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>> Subject: [xmca] Molar, Molecular and Additive behaviour
>>>> Can anyone help me out here. Leontyev says:
>>>> "But human practice is not just a series or a sum of
>>>> actions. In other words, 'activity is a molar, not an
>>>> additive unit'."
>>>> OED says:
>>>> Molar, Psychol. Designating a large-scale unit of behaviour,
>>>> esp. an integrated set of responses serving to bring about a
>>>> common goal, as distinguished from an elementary unit of
>>>> behaviour such as a physiological response (cf. MOLECULAR
>>>> adj. 5); of or relating to (the study of) such behaviour.
>>>> 1932 E. C. TOLMAN Purposive Behavior "On the one hand,
>>>> Watson has defined behavior in terms of its strict physical
>>>> and physiological details, i.e., in terms of
>>>> receptor-process, conductor-process, and effector-process
>>>> per se. We shall designate this as the molecular definition
>>>> of behavior. And on the other hand, he has come to recognize
>>>> that behavior is more than and different from the sum of its
>>>> physiological parts. Behavior has descriptive and defining
>>>> properties of its own. And we shall designate this latter as
>>>> the molar definition of behavior."
>>>> Am I missing something. By "not additive" does Leontyev
>>>> simply mean that there's more to it than S -> R ?
>>>> Andy
>>>> David Preiss wrote:
>>>>> based on the work made by max plank and run by san francisco's
>>>>> exploratorium
>>>>> David Preiss, Ph.D.
>>>>> Subdirector de Extensión y Comunicaciones
>>>>> Escuela de Psicología
>>>>> Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
>>>>> Av Vicu√Īa Mackenna - 4860
>>>>> 7820436 Macul
>>>>> Santiago, Chile
>>>>> Fono: 3544605
>>>>> Fax: 3544844
>>>>> e-mail:
>>>>> web personal:
>>>>> web institucional:
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> --
>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> -----
>>>> Andy Blunden +61 3 9380 9435
>>>> Skype andy.blunden
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> <winmail.dat>_______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list

Andy Blunden +61 3 9380 9435 Skype  
xmca mailing list
xmca mailing list
Received on Sun Aug 31 06:52 PDT 2008

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Oct 01 2008 - 00:30:04 PDT