Re: [xmca] my conjecture

From: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei who-is-at>
Date: Tue Jul 15 2008 - 04:07:17 PDT

Dear Marjanovic-Shane , Thank you for the explanation ; though it did confirm I should think about the whole thing more deeply . On my view , many things (categories) , firm and established as they are in their proper places , have got mixed up/blended/intertwined quite skilfully and should be sought for in their origins/movement/development . I mean categories from linguistics , speech acts , activity theory , cultural-historical , socio-historical etc. I'm reading it for the second time now , however . I hope I can write another message more understandable . And I think a spam caused the whole trouble , my own neglect not ruled out ! Thanks again ! Best Haydi haydizulfei who-is-at  P.S. And what about the metaphor reference I'd asked for ? Don't you think it might help more understanding ? ----- Original Message ---- From: Ana Marjanovic-Shane <ana who-is-at> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca who-is-at> Sent: Sunday, July 13, 2008 9:31:19 PM Subject: Re: [xmca] my conjecture Hi Haydi, Your message came a bit garbled (some of the lines have mingled into  other places!) but let me try to guess what you asked and to answer. I  must first ask back: You say: "Now, am I right  in my conjecture you're somehow trying to  bridge a gap between supposedly two way of thought?" -- I am not quite  sure what you meant by "two ways of thought", but I can say the  following: If under "two ways of thought" one thinks of two distinct acts: a)  creating a certain way to relate to the world (objects); and b)  creating a certain way to relate to others -- then our intention was  to investigate how these two acts become coordinated through mutual  processes of co-mediation. Our goal was to describe the way certain  dynamic acts become part of a new system of acting: how people's  relationships change, how they can be changed deliberately; how these  processes start to produce a new quality in the way people understand  and feel. One can call this "ways of thinking", because in a way they  are that, but our unit of description and analysis was always a unit  of acting that produces new meanings. We distinguished acting that creates a play situation from acting  otherwise -- and described the construction of meaning as using the  relationships created in play situations to make comments about  aspects of the non-play situations. In other words -- we assumed that  interaction between the two frames of reference -- is necessary to  produce what otherwise is known as "meaning". In this article, we did  not discuss the difference that can be described as the difference  between "meaning" and "sense", as David K. implied might be necessary  to do.  That is a whole different topic. However, what was important  for us in this article was to start exploring possible routes that  creation of new meanings can take as a dynamic process: From a.  creating a bifurcation point in relationships; though b. exploring  different ways of seeing the TOPIC (a communicational object) and at  the same time changing interpersonal relationships by creating  different rules of relating between characters in play/games; though  c. creating new ways of referring to new play creations (new symbolic  tools), to making new connections between the imaginary and the real  planes. I don't know if I answered your question.  But thanks for asking...  Tell me if that was ot what you meant to ask. Ana __________________________ Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane ana who-is-at 267-334-2905 On Jul 13, 2008, at 4:29 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Dear Marjanovic-Shane , > As I'm always thinking of the convergences and divergences between  > the Activity Theory and the Cultural-Historical ( Activity  > Theory ) , while reading the article , I found this part of the  > article very fascinating and very close to my taste and hope : > [Like Cole, we have assumed that symbols, signs, and other semiotic  > mediating artifacts (texts) gradually gain their referential (object- > oriented) dimension within interactive communicative acts. However,  > we have also assumed that the object orientedness of communicative  > acts themselves represents a novel step in the development of  > communicational skills too. Langer (1979) discussed different ways  > in which some communicative devices are referential. She  > distinguished between signals and symptoms, on one hand, and  > symbols, on the other. The referentiality of signals and symptoms  > originates out of their internal relatedness to the objects they  > represent: They are an intrinsic part of them, or in some other way  > they are essentially > related to the objects they signify. Like the sound of thunder and  > the lightning, they cannot be separated. Symptoms and signals are a  > part of an immediate situation they share with the referents. In  > contrast to symptoms and signals, according to Langer, symbolsare  > not a proxy for their objects, but are > or a situation is not the same as to ‘react toward it’ overtly, or  > to be aware of its presence. In talkingvehicles for the conception  > of objects. To conceive a thingabout > the things, that symbols directly “mean.” > Now , am I right in my conjecture you're somehow trying to bridge  > the gap between the supposedly two ways of thought ? Now , I won't  > deal with *forms of thought* and whether the conjecture could go so  > far as to reach that point , too . And what about this reference of  > yours : > Based on the analysis of metaphor development in children  > (Marjanovic-Shane, 1989) > Best > Haydi > haydizulfei who-is-at yahoo.comthings we have conceptions of them, not the  > things themselves; and it is the conceptions, not(italics added; pp.  > 60–61)] > > > > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > xmca who-is-at > > _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca who-is-at
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