Re: [xmca] ego, self, etc.

From: Paul Dillon <phd_crit_think who-is-at>
Date: Fri Feb 01 2008 - 23:47:31 PST

  To me such an attempted subsumption doesn't make much sense either. But Law as a FIELD of practice generative of and generated by habitus, a field with a corresponding habitus whose pracitcal logic (subsuming morality and ethics) is oriented to the control and rreproduction of private property,, the social control needs of the state, and perhaps to a lesser degree, out of the HUMAN NEED for justice in general, Habitus facilitates and retains the imaginative transformations of the relations in a FIELD, along with associated traditions, such as lawyers adopting similar patterns of dress, judges wearing robes or even wigs -- habitus the ritual/normative framework to a FIELD of practice whose objectives exist independently of the dispositions, logics, patterns of taste, etc. that corresond any specific habitus; i.e. multiple possible habitus for the same FIELD, say dancing, cooking, or gardening. Actually that thought makes me feel happy. Lots of colored threads
 except in courtrooms perhaps.
Andy Blunden <> wrote:
  I try to incorpo-rate Bourdieu's habitus into my reading of Hegel by taking
Bourdieu's habitus as a more concrete and defensible description of what
Hegel called "Subjective Spirit". I think "Objective Spirit" (Right,
property, morality and ethics, system of production, civil society,
government, world history, etc.) cannot be subsumed into a Bourdieuian habitus.

At 09:21 PM 1/02/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> I enjoyed your synopsis of habitus and field very much. However I
> think that Bourdieu's framework actually can provide for developmental
> understandings and I'm not sure Bourdieu would have viewed theoretical
> compatibility with Hegel's philosophy of history qua spirit as a
> theoretical necessity or desirable objective.
> As I understand it, the concept of habitus only acquires theoretical
> meaning in relation to a specific field of activity developed around the
> acquisition of different types of capital. Habitus would be totally
> abstract without field and of course incapable of providing an
> alternative to anything.
> I think a case can be made for studying activity systems as fields and
> vice versa. Activity systems/fields have become more complex over since
> proto-hominids began using tools and the creation of new needs and
> systems for satisfying them have accompanied the extinction of old
> activity system/fields as this social differentiation has unfolded. The
> "unfolding of the spirit" within this dialectical field-habitus unity
> within a specific object oriented practices as the resolution of
> contradictions of different kinds. It would not be found in some
> abstract, free-floating habitus detached from reference to any specific
> field of practice.
> Paul.
> I'm not completely convinced that habitus provides an adequate
> alternative account of the human subject - alternative to the Kantian
> one, I mean.
> It doesn't seem to have room for some of the complexities of, for example,
>Hegel's account of the unfolding of the subject.
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Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
mobile 0409 358 651

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Received on Fri Feb 1 23:49 PST 2008

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