Re: [xmca] artefact 3

Scripts are imported into this discussion from many sources, Paul, which is
but one additional challenge to our using them consistently enough to help
each other.
In my own professional history they were introduced as "event schemas" via
the 1980's development of cognitive science where people like Rumelhart and
Norman
were employing them as a part of a reintroduction of Kant (whom most had not
read) to get at "story grammars." Then there is the route through dramatism
with its
many connections to different parts of our discussion and is to be found in
LSV's writings, to links to contextualism and "events" as basic units of
analysis for some
for some purposes.

I do not think we have to go all the way to Alice in Wonderland as we
struggle with the polysemy of our key concepts and the incredible
heterogeneity of entering
understandings with which we approach them.
mike

On Jan 11, 2008 8:56 PM, Paul Dillon <phd_crit_think@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Andy,
>
> Well, maybe I'm Alice and you're the caterpillar, words meaning what you
> want them to (like most Amerindian languages ) mean. (or was it the Red
> Queen who said that?) I'm fairly loose about this innoculated by Quechua
> whose morphemic constructions break down the barriers of Indo-European
> syntax and the apparent relationship between morphemes and concepts. But
> let's not forget that we scored 97% on the 19th century philosopher ranking
> and we both agree that the definition of culture isn't really what your
> paper is about. Following the wonderland metaphor along to the Mad Hatter,
> it's seeming more like a Tempest (ah laudable Caliban) in a Tea Pot (both
> words finding metaphorical application in the lexxicology of those
> preferring to bypass class struggle in their pursuit of an awakening from
> the nightmare of History).
>
> Mmmm, Hey Doc, dere's a wabbit over dere. Yeah. I don't think mike was
> referring to Hollywood screenplays when using the term "script" as a type-2
> artefact. The term "script" refers to a key concept among
> ethnomethodologists, with roots in the work of Husserl's student Alfred
> Schutz; and key contributors including Berger, Luckmann , and Garfinkel,
> along with untameables such as Carlos Castaneda. All key to "sociological
> situationalism".(Castaneda bending or perhaps better said "warping" the
> boundaries of possible situations or maybe being bent and warped by them).
> But scripts are definitely not used as a metaphor but as a key concept
> imported from phenomenological sociology or sociological phenomenology to
> flesh out the meaning of context as that which contains.
>
> Paul
>
> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> Paul, you refuse to deal with my use of the word culturd. You take
> anything
> I say about the "mass of artefacts" as referring to "social practices
> characteristic of particular communities," or one of the other 35 meanings
> of the word "culture'.
> So we go round in circles.
>
> Re "script" as a metaphor. Perhaps I don't express myself well, but I am
> sure we both know what Mike was talking about whether you call that usage
> metaphor or call movie "scripts" a metaphor for learned behaviour.
>
> Andy
> At 07:51 PM 10/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> >Andy,
> >
> > still awake and just want to make two quick comments, hopefully
> > tomorrow I will address your points with some care. I now type faster
> > than I compose which seems to be ok.
> >
> > 1. I just used Levi-Strauss' book title as an aside, an indication
> > that "table manners" are clearly a part of culture. I don't think that
> > his model of culture can account for what goes on in everyday
> > practice, Bourdieu soundly demonstrated the shortcomings of L-S's
> > struturalist theory of culture in "Outline of a Theory of
> > Practice". Nevertheless I don't nor do I think you should dismiss him so
> > lightly since his knowledge of cultural systems throughout the world
> > surpasses that of ANYONE working past or present in the CHAT
> > tradition. Now if knowledge of world cultures isn't important for a a
> > given theory of culture then isn't that theory somewhat idealist? But
> > with the commodification and consequent hyper-specialization in all
> > academic fields, especially anthropology, his level of scholarship is no
> > longer encountererd. I have no problem admitting that I learned a great
> > deal from studying L-S just as I learned a lot from studying Boas,
> > Kroeber, Leslie White, and
> > other anthropologists who are the folks who developed the very notion of
> > "culture", After all, just as psyche is the subject matter of
> > psychologiy, "culture" is that of social and "cultural" anthropology.
> >
> > 2. I don't agree about "script" being a metaphor. I don't think mike
> > intended it to be a metaphor anymore than he intended "schemas" (a
> > hallowed word harking back to Kant's productive imagination, and upon
> > which Hegel devoted many pages in the Lesser Logic) to be a metaphor.
> >
> > You qualify and qualify in response to my obseervations but I really am
> > beginning to feel like I'm watching you draw more and more epicycles
> > being around the supposed planetary orbits of a geocentric model of the
> > solar system.
> >
> > Now that's a metaphor!!
> >
> > Paul
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Andy Blunden wrote:
> > OK, firstly, the structuralist Claude Levi Strauss is not the source of
> my
> >concept of culture. CHAT is. In fact CLS's definition of "culture" is
> >precisely what I am asking people to let go of.
> >
> >Secondly, the notion of "script" as a "psychological tool" is a metaphor,
> >comparing it to the piece of paper that contains a list of stage
> directions
> >written by a playwright for actors to read and memorise so as to later
> act
> >out. Obviously, that bundle of paper with ink on it is an artefact. What
> >then is our internal form of it, the modifications f the actor's nervous
> >system such that even though he is not thinking about it this morning,
> when
> >he goes on to the stage this evening and is cued by another actor's
> lines,
> >he instantly responds as required by the playwright's script. Well, my
> >claim is that this internal organisation is also an artefact, though an
> >artefact of a special kind, a *psychological* tool. The artefact remains
> an
> >artefact through all its various transformations.
> >
> >Thirdly, "being an artefact" entails individual, universal and particular
> >moments. That's my whole point. A script written in the author's
> >idiosyncratic shorthand, after the author dies, cannot really be called a
> >script because no-one can read it. Likewise, in Pol POt's Camb9odia where
> >the theatre was eliminated along with actors, a piece of paper with ink
> on
> >it could not be a script. But it is the fact that in a given society
> which
> >includes drama in its social practices, and people who know how to read
> and
> >write scripts, and has "drama" as a social activity in which stage
> >directions written on paper are understood as "scripts" and people
> actually
> >recognise scripts when they see one, then we do have a script. The script
> >is not a script until people either actually use it, or at least the
> >conditions for them to use it are present or are remembered from the
> past,
> >etc., AND, people understand or interpret it as a set of stage directions
> >which must be followed, and not for example as a "review" or
> >"improvisation" and so on. A script is activated in performance by
> >individual actors.
> >
> >So, fourthly, although I have insisted that the artefact is a material
> >thing (in the broadest imaginable definition of "material thing"), it is
> >not just any material thing, but only one which is used in activity,
> >consciously - i.e. it turns out to be a social relation. It's
> >"artefactness" is also in its use in activity, sine qua non.
> >
> >All that is about "script" in the common dramatic usage. I think the same
> >applies to "script" in the sense that Mike uses it. The fact that there
> is
> >possibly nowhere written down a set of stage directions which can be
> >studied and deliberately memorised is challenging, but secondary. That's
> >the idea of metaphor, - it simplifies a complex problem.
> >
> >Andy
> >At 05:50 PM 10/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> > >Andy,
> > >
> > > Just one quick point.
> > >
> > > Your rejection of table manners as an artefact flatly contradicts
> > > mike's inclusion of "scripts" as type-2 artefacts. So your rejection
> of
> > > their status as artefacts clearly illustrates my contention concerning
> > > the flattening, eliminating what doesn't fit into the model. The
> second
> > > volume of Claude Levi-Strauss' Mythologiques bears the title "The
> Origin
> > > of Table Manners". Clearly table manners are part of "culture" but how
> > > could that be possible given your definition of culture as the sum of
> the
> > > artefacts. Does "culture" include something else that you've not
> mentioned?
> > >
> > > I plan to address some of your other points later but one more tiny
> > > point: yes, I do think I got the material basis of thought notion from
> > > something you wrote. I'll look for it. I didn't mean to imply that you
> > > reduce thought to the bio-electrical patterns in the brain, all to the
> > > contrary. I'll clarify shortly and search for the passage that led me
> to
> > > make the statement.
> > >
> > > Paul
> > >Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > Paul, you are right that it is the idea of subject which is central to
> my
> > >paper, not the concept of "culture" and in fact the idea of "subject"
> can
> > >be explained without resolving the different usages of the word
> "culture."
> > >But it helps.
> > >
> > >Just some random dots points:
> > >
> > >* I flatten the idea of artefacts in just the same way that the
> > >philosophical concept of "matter" flattens the diversity of forms of
> > >movement found outside of consciousness. Grasping the category in its
> > >distinctness from other categories is helpful in understanding the
> > complexity.
> > >
> > >* You mention "thought relies on a physical basis of electrical
> impulses
> > >and is therefore material" - I really don't know where this comes from.
> > >Please, please I hope not from me. To say that "thought (i.e. ideas in
> the
> > >head) is material" is a bundle of confusion.
> > >
> > >* You say "lumping a shovel, table manners, and a surfboard, into a
> > >nominalistic category ..." but "table manners" is only an artefact if
> you
> > >mean a book of table manners, or the chairs, table, cutlery etc., which
> > >afford table manners, but the activity in which people act according to
> > >manners, i.e., "ways" is not an artefact. And I do insist that a
> surfboard
> > >(which is a commodity earning the maker a profit and a means of
> production
> > >for professional surfers) is as much an artefact as a hammer. I do
> > >criticise the Russians for at times fixating on the "means of
> production"
> > >as the privileged culture (i.e. mass of artefacts) whereas I hold that
> > >*all* artefacts have comparable impact on psychology - land, buildings,
> > >words, songs, paintings, road-signs, computers, - the lot.
> > >
> > >* You say: 'The word "culture" explains absolutely nothing and is
> > >impossible to link to any "particular". Contrast it to the concept of
> the
> > >commodity, something that exists concretely'. Sure a word explains
> nothing,
> > >but you need words with clear meanings to explain anything. The OED has
> 17
> > >meanings of the word "culture". You can't do science without a
> consensus on
> > >what you are talking about. It turns out of course that we can't make
> sense
> > >of the definition I am proposing without an agreement on the role of
> > >products of human labour in the processes of human activity and
> > >consciousness. It *turns out* to be a very concrete concept. I am
> asking us
> > >to start with an abstract definition so that we can move towards such
> > >concreteness. Secondly, what concrete properties do "commodities" have?
> I
> > >thought the whole point was that they have no such concrete properties,
> > >what looked like a mass of things turns out to be a social relation.
> > >
> > >"the existence of the things qua commodities, and the value-relation
> > >between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have
> > >absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the
> > >material relations arising therefrom."
> > >http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#204
> > >
> > >that's enough for now,
> > >Andy
> > >
> > >At 09:46 AM 10/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> > > >mike,
> > > >
> > > > abstract and vague are totally different, furthermore, "abstract
> "has
> > > > difrferent meanings depending of your philosophical orientation. but
> > > > vague is just vague, not specific, artefacts but no surfboards,
> backhoes,
> > > > or academic hierarches.
> > > >
> > > > when you get back from your upclose demandful concommitants, could
> you
> > > > be more specific about your reference to "falling into ungrounded
> tangled
> > > > attempts to understand each other?" probably i'm just obtuse but, to
> > > > bastardize Robinson Jeffers, be it more or less dense, its the same
> > > > vagueness that blinds us all
> > > >
> > > > paul
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >Mike Cole wrote:
> > > > Could we substitute "Absractness" for "vagueness" and then seek
> various
> > > > ways
> > > >to rise to useful concrete instantiations to avoid falling into
> ungrounded
> > > >tangled attempts to understand each other.
> > > >
> > > >Social/cultural. Another long issues. But I think the example of the
> > mother
> > > >saying "she is never going to be a rugby" player when a baby is born,
> and
> > > >the way the proleptic transformatiosn of material and social are made
> > > >available for inspection there is one tiny
> > > >toe hold on understanding the social-ity/cultural relationship.
> > > >
> > > >Upclose demandful life requires that I put this aside but the issues
> are
> > > >important and a lot is left out here. Maybe a community discussion
> via
> > > >skype?
> > > >
> > > >ALSO, NOTE, more matrials following from the LCHC-Helsinki DWR group
> > > >discussion is now online at xmca.
> > > >
> > > >mike
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >On Jan 10, 2008 7:46 AM, Paul Dillon
> > > >wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Andy,
> > > > >
> > > > > OK. I think I do understand the central aim of your paper and my
> > > > > comments on Peter Sawchuk's forwarded message (which I followed up
> > with a
> > > > > review of various of the articles he has made available online)
> were
> > > meant
> > > > > to validate that contribution. But it seems to me that the strong
> > points
> > > > > have more to do with the problem of "the subject" than with
> > > clarifying the
> > > > > notion of "culture". I don't really think the notion of "culture"
> > is even
> > > > > important to that purpose. But this does not mean that the
> dimension of
> > > > > ideality isnj't important, clearly it is.
> > > > >
> > > > > And that's why the "flattening" of artefacts is troubling and
> there is
> > > > > really more than a "hint" of flattening in your proposal. I didn't
> > > find any
> > > > > acknowledgement that what Wartkofsky calls type-2 artefacts
> > (scripts and
> > > > > schemas in mike's expansion), or type-3 artefacts (say a jungle
> jim,
> > > ferris
> > > > > wheel, roller coaster,, chess set, or inflatable playmate) are
> > > > > distinguished from type-1 artefacts (say, a shovel, an irrigation
> > > canal, a
> > > > > Lincoln 200 amp. arc welder, a locomotive, a big 8 wheeler, etc).
> > You say
> > > > > you've never felt the need to use such distinctions but that
> doesn't do
> > > > away
> > > > > with the fact that these distinctions are central to the CHAT
> model of
> > > > > culture as presented in mike's Cultural Psychology. This isn't an
> > > > > endorsement of Wartkofky's categories on my part but a recognition
> that
> > > > some
> > > > > distinctions need to be made, simply saying that because that
> thought
> > > > relies
> > > > > on a physical basis of electrical impulses and is therefor
> material
> > just
> > > > > ignores the fact that lumping a
> > > > > shovel, table manners, and a surfboard, into a nominalistic
> category
> > > > > don't help us understand anything at all about "artefacts" in
> general
> > > or in
> > > > > these particular instances.
> > > > >
> > > > > Furthermore your statement "the only way you are going to get
> through
> > > > > the
> > > > > vagueness of concept of culture and cultural difference is to have
> an
> > > > > absolutely clear meaning for the word "culture" really surprised
> me,
> > > > > especially because later in the message you make a strong point
> > about the
> > > > > difference between "what people do and what they say". I really
> don't
> > > > > agree that one can clarify a concept by "defining" the meaning of
> a
> > > word .
> > > > > This seems to be the very opposite of how one goes about
> > progressing from
> > > > > "notions" to "concepts". and, as far as I understand, is contrary
> > to the
> > > > > dialectical interpretation of the universal-particular-individual
> > > relations
> > > > > , the interpretation at the heart of your article. Ilyenjov (DAC,
> Ch1,
> > > > > p.36 of MIA markup) indicates that "what one usually calls
> > concepts; man,
> > > > > house, animal, etc." are anything but concepts precisely because
> > they are
> > > > > based on definitions. The word "culture" explains absolutely
> > nothing and
> > > > > is impossible to link to any "particular". Contrast it to the
> > concept of
> > > > > the commodity, something that exists concretely yet the properties
> of
> > > which
> > > > > allowed Marx to derive
> > > > > all of the other categories of the capitalist economic system or
> > mode of
> > > > > production.
> > > > >
> > > > > Finally, my comments of "BongoBongo" and "BingoBango" were not
> really
> > > > > about cultural differences but about mike's use of Geertz's
> > > interpretative
> > > > > anthropology to ensure coherence in the CHAT culture model.
> Perhaps
> > more
> > > > > illustrative would have been the international culture of
> > endless-summer
> > > > > surfers. Something Californians,Peruvians, and Australians all
> know
> > first
> > > > > hand, no? Difficult to call it a "sub-culture" since it transcends
> all
> > > > > "cultural" boundaries. Seems amenable to a Geertzian approach (for
> > > example
> > > > > Tom Wolfe's "The Pump House Gang") but also illustrates, upon
> further
> > > > > examination of its genesis and structure, the limitations of the
> > > > > interpretative approach for explaining the real coherence of that
> > > > phenomena.
> > > > >
> > > > > For me these issues are far from being resolved. but I think the
> > starting
> > > > > point turns of how one views the subject; the recognition that
> even the
> > > > > limit-case, the individual is not self-identical but incorporates
> the
> > > same
> > > > > contradictions and multiplicities present in the collectivies of
> > various
> > > > > kinds.
> > > > >
> > > > > Paul
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > > > Briefly Paul, yes I think there is a hint of "flattening" in what
> I
> > have
> > > > > proposed. I said at the outset that the paper only aims to clarify
> > > > > fundamentals of CHAT. It is not reductionist. I am not denying the
> > > > > validity of Wartofsky's categorisations, I have just never found
> the
> > > > > occasion to use them. I think the only way you are going to get
> through
> > > > > the
> > > > > vagueness of concept of culture and cultural difference is to have
> an
> > > > > absolutely clear meaning for the word "culture". That in no way
> > reduces,
> > > > > bypasses or overlooks the infinite complexity of questions
> cultural
> > > > > difference, which involves far more than a mass of artefacts.
> > > > >
> > > > > You say that you 'share Mike's concern about the utility of that
> > > > > "cultural/social" distinction.' I find that an unhelpful term and
> I
> > don't
> > > > > know where it comes from. Are you saying that it is not helpful to
> > > > > distinguish between the material things (artefacts of various
> sorts),
> > > > > which
> > > > > are used to implement some social practice or institution and the
> > actual
> > > > > actions and operations that constitute that social practice or
> > > > > institution?
> > > > > That the difference between what people do and what they say,,
> between
> > > > > what
> > > > > happened in history and what was written about it, between the
> academic
> > > > > activity that goes on in a university and the books and buildings
> that
> > > > > make
> > > > > up a university? That the common difference indicated here -
> between
> > > > > things
> > > > > and the activities in which things are "activated" - is not
> useful?
> > > > >
> > > > > Andy
> > > > > At 01:52 AM 10/01/2008 -0800, you wrote:
> > > > > >I haven't participated much in this discussion although I have
> read
> > > every
> > > > > >post. In a way that has been part of the problem since I've
> > followed out
> > > > > >the threads and references. I often begin responses to threads
> that I
> > > > > >don't finish in one sitting and save in the drafts folder. So it
> seems
> > > > > >coincidental (synchronistic?) that I was preparing an post
> entitled
> > > > > >"artefact" that got stored in the drafts folder just about the
> > same time
> > > > > >Andy must have been preparing his "artefacts" post. Now it seems
> > > relevant
> > > > > >to at least share and expand.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > This was stored 4 or 5 days ago:
> > > > > > Mike's "ugh", in a message responding to my post questioning the
> word
> > > > > > "culture" , impelled me to read the chapter of Cullt Psych that
> he
> > > > > > attached I read Cult Psych 5 or 6 years ago but really had
> > > forgotten the
> > > > > > specifics of the model of culture presented in the book, the key
> > > > > > elements of which I understand to be : the ideal/material
> duality
> > > > > > implicit in all artefacts; Wartofsky's 3 types of artefacts,;
> the
> > > > > > notions of schema and script, in which (at least) type-2
> > artefacts are
> > > > > > linked contextually to activity/practice; where context also has
> > has a
> > > > > > dual existence as "that which surrounds" and "that which weaves
> > > > > > together." The term culture reconnected to its etymological
> origins
> > > > > > in cultivating, a garden being an appropriate metaphor for the
> domain
> > > > > > of artifact mediated activity or practice whose manifestation in
> > > > > > "cultures", coherent and consistent groups of
> activities/practices,
> > > in w
> > > > > .
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Although I can see some of the relations between Hegel and CHAT
> that
> > > > > > Andy proposes; e.g., the relationship of meaning to scripts or
> > schemas
> > > > > > (CHAT) and that between the universal and the particular
> (Hegel),
> > > > > > And that's as far as I got before storing it the drafts folder.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Moving on: if Andy is using mike's model of "culture" I don't
> believe
> > > > > > he adequately deals with the differences implicit Wartofsky's
> > > > > > artefact-type differentiation. In fact, it seems as though all
> the
> > > > > > artefacts in Andy's presentation are Type-1, which on another
> > plane is
> > > > > > analogous the analytic philosophers' mania to reduce all logic
> to
> > > > > > first-order propositional logic, a comparison Andy might well be
> > > able to
> > > > > > relate to (beneath Godel's beaming grin). The idea that
> artefacts can
>
> === message truncated ===
>
>
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Received on Sat Jan 12 09:39 PST 2008