RE: [xmca] Subject: Verb, Object

From: Peg Griffin <Peg.Griffin who-is-at worldnet.att.net>
Date: Sun Dec 30 2007 - 09:31:55 PST

Yes, Andy and Mike, Leontiev it is. Sorry about the keypress misses.

I think Leontiev's use of the two terms (to describe a child's changes) are
curiously reminiscent of your description of Hegel's immanent critique. In
both cases the subject begins with a motive/object that may be wholehearted
but is oddly not a true/real/lived experience.

You write that Hegel "'enters into' them [various forms of consciousness],
adopts and follows their logic and asks questions of a way of thinking from
its own standpoint. That is, he follows the path of its own critique, until
the 'ideology' itself leads to an impasse. Subsequently, sometimes after an
interval, sometimes directly arising from the self-scepticism, a new way of
thinking arises, which is able to cope with or avoid the contradictions into
which the previous one fell..."

Here's a Leontiev scenario for his terms: A child has homework he doesn't
want to do; he knows he should but... The motives of a parent and other
grownups are "merely understood" by the child. So, a parent brings in a
"really effective" motive for the child: go out to play only when/if the
homework pages are finished. It works; the child sits down and does homework
each day. Finally comes the day the child does a page of homework BUT gets
frustrated and tosses the page out. That goes against the previously "really
effective" motive since it delays the child's going out to play. Leontiev
sees, in the contradiction, that the child apparently has grown (or glommed
onto) another one -- maybe the one that had previously been "merely
understood" but held by the parent/teacher/community.

Do you see the similarity? The father is pressing child change; the
immanent critic is pressing analytic change. Quite in opposition to the
plumber and Hitler youth case, no?
PG

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Saturday, December 29, 2007 6:26 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Subject: Verb, Object

As I have no knowledge of a writer called Leonie, Peg, I'll go with Mike's
suggestion, though "really effective" and "merely understood"
motives? is quite understandable based on the meaning of the words rather
than the source.

Basically, I don't know, but to grasp in the dark, the consequences of an
individual's action are of course always over the horizon Just on
Hegel-stuff for a second, Hegel (1) sees "spirit" i.e., the real
effectiveness of action, as "acting behind the backs of individuals", but
(2) he says a person is responsible only for what they intended, not
unforeseen consequences. So (1) is consistent with structuralism, but with
the added spice that history is infinitely rich and unpredictable, which is
not what "structures" are really. But (2) implies that this "laws of
history" angle is not relevant to the individual's psychology.

But there is another distinction in there as well, between the individual
and the collective subject. For example, a member of the Hitler Youth
League may think they are standing up for Germany and being a good citizen;
but their consciousness is a mile away from the leaders' who know exactly
what they are doing. This is not the same distinction as between intentions
and ultimate consequences. I think a person's intentions have to be taken
as part of the whole movement's intentions, not their partial and maybe
naive individual take.

So in my example of the plumber, one has to look at the whole system of
relations which underpins the "tradesperson" mentality. Of course, this not
equal to the consciousness of the individual anymore than an individual oak
tree is identical with the genotypical model.

Does that make any sense??

Andy

At 02:02 PM 29/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
>Leontiev, you mean, Peg. And in the book that David K was reading last time
>around.
>(My spelling is attributable to the use of the "whole word" method of
>reading instruction and perhaps
>to the fact that I am left handed. Glad it also pushes at the
>skill/knowledge issue as a bonus.
>
>I picked on the same phrase Peg did, but mostly the firs part where you ask
>the question of whether
>the object of activity can be defined in advance. This sparked two
different
>lines of thought. First,
>that Yrjo speaks of the object of activity always being over the horizon.
>Which is related to a line from
>Tennyson's Ulysees quoted by Dewey:
>
>Yet all experience is an arch wherethro'
>Gleams that untravell'd world, whose margin fades
>For ever and for ever when I move.I take this metaphor to include listening
>to what other's say and seeing where it leads,
>and to point to a process in time (a developmental process?) by which a
>merely understandable
>motive (having been imagined by others who describe it to you) and a
"really
>effective" motive,
>e.g., one that now guides your action and its (future) direction.
>
>It also fits with an understanding of the ideal and material aspects of
>objects being wildly interwoven.
>
>mike
>
>
>On Dec 29, 2007 8:05 AM, Peg Griffin <Peg.Griffin@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>
> > Interesting work, Andy, thanks for what you have done and pointing to
what
> > is yet to be done!
> > I am particularly moved to reply to a little point at the end with a
> > question. When discussing immanent critique, you write "But I think we
> > can't
> > define the "object" of activity in advance. To start with, we have to
take
> > it as a whole. We have to listen to what subjects say and accept to a
> > certain extent what they say the object is, and see where it leads."
> >
> > Here is my question: Do you see here any connection with Leonie's
> > distinction and relation between "really effective" and "merely
> > understood"
> > motives?
> >
> > PG
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On
> > Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > Sent: Friday, December 28, 2007 6:14 PM
> > To: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Subject: Verb, Object
> >
> > That remark is really to signal that I don't as yet have a worked-out
> > response to the issues David has been raising in relation to ANL's
concept
> > of "activity" only some criticisms of my own. But at the moment, I
believe
> > that "immanent critique" holds the key. Here is how I understand the
idea
> > of "immanent critique".
> >
> > "Immanent critique" was first developed by Hegel in his Phenomenology.
> >
> > See
> >
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm#m053
> > where Hegel explains it. The Phenomenology is the canonical example of
> > "immanent critique". Hegel does not back sit back and look at the
various
> > forms of consciousness which have succeeded one another in history, and
> > "criticise" tehm from his own superior point of view, but "enters into"
> > them, adopts and follows their logic and asks questions of a way of
> > thinking from its own standpoint. That is, he follows the path of its
own
> > critique, until the "ideology" itself leads to an impasse. Subsequently,
> > sometimes after an interval, sometimes directly arising from the
> > self-scepticism, a new way of thinking arises, which is able to cope
with
> > or avoid the contradictions into which the previous one fell. And so the
> > process goes on. Americans will recognise shades of Thomas Kuhn here,
and
> > we should all recognise Marx's obsession with political economy. (For
> > example, if you look at how capital worked up until 1883, i.e. before
> > Taylor's experiments in scientific management, you will see that Marx's
> > concept of value was just how capitalists worked. Taylor made a critique
> > of
> > this business of lengthening the working day and keeping wages down.
Marx
> > was following capital's own critique, but he died in 1883 and his
> > followers
> > didn't know what to do next)
> >
> > So "immanent critique" means critiquing an object by following its own
> > logic:
> >
> > "So my friend you say that ..., so doesn't that mean that ... and
> > didn't you say you were against that?"
> >
> > What does it mean to say that social psychology should adopt "immanent
> > critique" as an approach to defining the subject-object relation and its
> > concept of "activity"? Well, as I said, this is work in progress, OK?
But
> > we have to see a subject (its opinions, its strengths, its psychoses,
its
> > "standpoint", its identity, etc.) as one of many or several possible
> > subjects which are part and parcel of a certain way of life. The
activity
> > which a subject is involved in is defined *by the subject* (and to a
> > certain extent vice versa) and becomes something else as a result of the
> > working out of that system of activity (and the subject's own critique
of
> > it).
> >
> > So for example, the subject might say "I am a tradesperson. Everyone
will
> > always need a plumber. I don't have to beg for my money. These
> > paper-pushers could disappear tomorrow and we wouldn't miss them ...etc
> > etc" - the collected prejudices of a randomly chosen figure in our
> > society.
> > He is involved in the practice of a trade which guarantees her a
> > respectable living standard. The question is, how do contradictions
arise
> > in *that* way of thinking as the trade become more and more one of
> > plugging
> > in integrated components, work that can be done by a kid, but work
control
> > requires the use of all sorts of computers, etc., etc., and altogether
all
> > the assumptions his or her way of life is predicated on change. ...
> >
> > I am only guessing with the above. But I think we can't define the
> > "object"
> > of activity in advance. To start with, we have to take it as a whole. We
> > have to listen to what subjects say and accept to a certain extent what
> > they say the object is, and see where it leads.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> >
> > At 10:09 AM 28/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
> > >I follow you right up to the last paragraph in this note, Andy, where
you
> > >write:
> > >
> > >I want to go back to Hegel methodologically and work on the claim that
an
> > >*immanent* critique of the categories of activity is the only viable
> > >approach. Otherwise, we are just pulling pre-determined categories out
of
> > >our own heads. The latter is the usual approach in my view.
> > >
> > >Probably this means that I need to go back and read your article more
> > >carefully.
> > >What is an *immanent" critique?
> > >
> > >mike
> > >
> > >On Dec 27, 2007 2:35 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Re Leontyev's concept of "activity'. I wanted to leave this to a
kind
> > of
> > > > "stage two" but since I want to use a category of activity too I
have
> > to
> > > > get to it.
> > > >
> > > > So far as I can see, for ANL, "activity" is paradigmatically but
not
> > > > exclusively the "external" activity, of an individual organism. So
it
> > is
> > > > the same category of "activity" as Fichte used in his critique of
> > Kant,
> > > > which Hegel picks up on. And for ANL it is "instrumental" to use
> > Mike's
> > > > word (instrumental allows the object to be another subject, treated
as
> > an
> > > > object though), or "purposive", though I think inclusive of
unintended
> > or
> > > > non-conscious components of the actions. So it must be very similar
to
> > the
> > > > category of "practice" insofar as theory and practice are
> > differentiated.
> > > >
> > > > The problem comes for me when you have to get "stuck into" this
> > category
> > > > and work out the appropriate way of elaborating the various *forms*
of
> > > > activity. With some good reason, ANL I think moves to a Marxist
> > paradigm
> > > > of
> > > > "mode of production", practice-as-labour, in order to mobilise a
> > series
> > of
> > > > categories through which activity can be grasped. This leads to the
> > > > problem
> > > > that David identified, namely, that the dichotomy between labour and
> > > > communication is a false one. In fact this dichotomy has caused
havoc
> > in
> > > > the whole stream of Cultural Psychology over the past 200 years,
from
> > > > Hegel
> > > > to Marx to CHAT to contemporary contintental philosophy. Hegel
dropped
> > the
> > > > paradigm of labour in favour of a paradigm of critique around 1805,
at
> > the
> > > > same time as he adopted a monological concept of Spirit. Marx
returned
> > to
> > > > a
> > > > paradigm of labour in 1844. Then in the anti-Marxist tide of the
> > post-WW2
> > > > period everyone from French philosophers to critical theorists
> > abandoned
> > > > labour for communication as the paradigm. Some also turn to
aesthetic
> > > > acitivity as the paradigm (subject-object, subject-other or
> > subject-self
> > > > are the three possible relations here).
> > > >
> > > > It seemed to me that the position of LSV which I so valued was that
> > LSV
> > > > held that it was the WHOLE of social practice (not just labour), and
> > the
> > > > WHOLE of culture (not just means of production) which were the
> > operative
> > > > concepts for psychology.
> > > >
> > > > The problem remains though, if we are not to simply adopt and take
> > over
> > > > the
> > > > orthodox marxist categories of the labour process as the basis for
> > > > psychology, and I think that is the case, and we are not to go with
> > > > Foucault, Derrida, Habermas etc., and ditch labour in favour of
> > > > communicative action (or aesthetic action in some cases), then how
do
> > we
> > > > begin to get a handle on activity which is appropriate for
psychology?
> > > >
> > > > I want to go back to Hegel methodologically and work on the claim
that
> > an
> > > > *immanent* critique of the categories of activity is the only viable
> > > > approach. Otherwise, we are just pulling pre-determined categories
out
> > of
> > > > our own heads. The latter is the usual approach in my view.
> > > >
> > > > Andy
> > > >
> > > > At 11:11 AM 27/12/2007 -0800, you wrote:
> > > > >Great help, David, thanks. And Andy and Paul.
> > > > >
> > > > >David- In Cultural Psychology I also level the charge of a focus
on
> > > > >instrumentality - object oriented-ness at Leontiev. But you can
find
> > > > places
> > > > >in his writing where the "object" is a
> > > > >person, a sujbect, and he talks about subject-subject relations.
> > Yrjo
> > > > has
> > > > >some such quote in Learning by Expanding.
> > > > >...
> > > >
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> > Andy Blunden :
> http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>tel (H) +61 3
> 9380 9435,
> > mobile 0409 358 651
> >
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  Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
mobile 0409 358 651

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Received on Sun Dec 30 09:33 PST 2007

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