Re: [xmca] The social origins of pointing??

From: Mike Cole <lchcmike who-is-at gmail.com>
Date: Sun Nov 04 2007 - 13:19:53 PST

I can point like this, Martin. I will write Mike and ask if I can distribute
the pdf file. Butterworth's earlier work is also very
relevant. Tomasello et al. A new look at infant pointing, 2007, vol 78, pp.
705-722.
mike
I will send anyone who asks me outside of xmca for a copy a pdf, figuring
that would be fair use.

On Nov 4, 2007 12:35 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:

> Mike,
>
> What ages is Tomasello talking about? Can you point us to his text(s)?
>
> Martin
>
>
> On 11/4/07 1:47 PM, "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Dear XMCA-ites
> >
> > A few weeks ago in our seminar on mediational theories of mind, we
> > read recent work by Tomasello and colleagues on the ontogeny of pointing
> as
> > communicative gesture. Tomasello
> >
> > does not cite the work of Vygotsky on this topic because in his opinion,
> > Vygotsky's oft-cited views about the social origins of pointing have
> been
> > definitively proven erroneous.
> >
> > Given how often the example of the social origins of pointing are
> > repeated in chat-inspired writings, it seems worthwhile in light of
> current
> > research to question his views and to ask what difference it would make
> to
> > our ways of theorizing if we were to incorporate current work such
> >
> > as that of Tomasello and others.
> >
> > What follows is a brief descriptions of the issues. If people are
> > interested, we could go into this more deeply. If not, not.
> >
> >
> >
> > 1. (From out Group's discussion). For Vygotsky, pointing as a
> communication
> > gesture arises out of a failed grasping motion. An adult, seeing an
> infant
> > unsuccessfully grasp for an object, interprets the grasping as pointing
> at
> > the object and treats it as a communicative act. The movement "becomes a
> > gesture for others" (56, Vygotsky /Mind in /Society), and the adult
> gives
> > the movement meaning. Through this interaction, the original
> unsuccessful
> > grasping-motion is transformed into pointing, which becomes more refined
> and
> > simplified over time. Vygotsky interpreted the pointing gesture as an
> > example of internalization and transformation of the intermental to the
> > intramental.
> >
> >
> >
> > 2. (From Cole and Cole, The development of Chidlren (2001), p. 295)
> >
> > Between 9 months and a year, babies acquire *secondary
> > intersubjectivity,*the ability to share mental states with another
> > person and to understand
> > what they are intending to do (Chapter 5, p. 197). The close link
> between
> > secondary intersubjectivity and communication is evident in the form of
> > behavior called *social referencing,* the process through which babies
> check
> > their caregiver's reactions to an uncertain event or an unfamiliar
> person as
> > a guide to their own behavior. Secondary intersubjectivity is a crucial
> > precursor to language acquisition because babies and their caregivers
> are
> > sharing knowledge about the objects and events that are the focus of
> their
> > joint attention.
> >
> > Secondary intersubjectivity is also apparent when babies begin to point
> at
> > objects (Butterworth, 2003). Pointing is clearly a communicative act
> > intended to create a joint focus of attention, but it is a primitive
> one.
> > When 12-month-olds see a remote-controlled car roll past them, first
> they
> > point at it and then they look to see how their caregivers react to it
> > (social referencing). At 18 months of age, the function of pointing
> becomes
> > communicative in a more complex way. Now children are more likely first
> to
> > look at their caregivers to see if they are looking at the car and then
> to
> > point to it. If babies this age are alone in the room when the electric
> car
> > appears, they do not point until the caretaker walks back into the room,
> > clearly demonstrating that their pointing has a purpose and is meant to
> > communicate to another person (Butterworth, 2003).
> >
> >
> >
> > 3. (From Class discussion)
> >
> >
> >
> > Tomasello, on the other hand, argues that pointing arises as a
> > pre-linguistic communicative gesture. Instead of viewing pointing as
> > something that acquires a communicative meaning through interaction,
> > Tomasello argues that pointing has a communicative meaning from its
> initial
> > formation because the infant has acquired the social-cognitive skills to
> > share experiences with others, view others as mental agents,
> > and form goals with others. Pointing initiates joint attention of the
> infant
> > and another towards an object because of a shared communicative
> > intentionality. The infant points because he wishes to inform, request
> > information from, or share an emotional expression with an adult about
> an
> > object. For Tomasello, pointing is more than just a request for an
> > object, as Vygotsky seemed to imply.
> >
> > Not only does pointing serve various communicative functions, but
> Tomasello
> > also argues that human pointing forms the basic foundation for language.
> > Both pointing and language both require the same social-cognitive skills
> of
> > requiring infants to see others as "intentional agents with whom one can
> > share experience" (Tomasello et al. "A New Look at Infant Pointing,"
> 718).
> > Pointing serves the same purpose as an utterance: it introduces a topic
> (old
> > or new) for communication.
> >
> >
> >
> > 4 (Some questions).
> >
> > What is significant about the following?
> >
> > a)Tomasello does not cite the work of Butterfield and Butterfield's
> account
> > does not appear to lean heavily on the idea of secondary
> intersubjectivity.
> >
> > b). There is still an obviously important role for the adult
> in
> > ontogeny of pointing in Tomasello, but it attributes communicative
> intent to
> > the child from the onset. So clearly the role of the social other is
> > different.
> >
> >
> >
> > Overall, however, it seems wise to me that people seeking to illustrate
> > Vygotsky's ideas about the social origins of higher psychological
> functions
> > not use the example of pointing unless or until they
> >
> > can take account of the research briefly noted above.
> >
> >
> >
> > mike
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
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Received on Sun Nov 4 13:23 PST 2007

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