RE: [xmca] Peirce as Hegel, but "in costume"

From: Tony Whitson <twhitson who-is-at UDel.Edu>
Date: Sat Nov 03 2007 - 18:55:05 PDT


Pretty much everything you say here seems right to me. Just a few
quibbles: Peirce saw himself first and foremost as a logician, but he
wouldn't differentiate that from being a philosopher.

I don't know how much Dewey may have respected Russell, but I think
Russell had minimal respect (at best) for both Dewey and James. There
might be some of this in Tom Burke's book which is the best I know on
Dewey's Logic vs. Russell. I'm pretty sure CSP would have regarded Russell
as limited to a rather uninteresting corner of the full domain of
what CSP viewed as "logic."

On Sat, 3 Nov 2007, Michael Glassman wrote:

> I think it's important to understand who Peirce was at this time. I believe that Peirce considered himself to be primarily a logician - not a philosopher really. He looked to follow through on determining a logical structure to the universe (not analytical in the logical positivist sense - but logical in the relational sense). As such I assume he would have considered I think Hegel as the most important philosopher because up to that point (and I may be wrong on this, somebody stronger in that period of philosophy might be able to correct me on this) he made logic at least a central piece of his philosophical mission. Bertrand Russell had not emerged yet at this point. So of course he would see Hegel as the most important of philosophers, and I'm sure he felt he could never exist without Hegel. That said, I think he saw Hegel as dangerous for the very same reasons - he used logic but he was not really a logician, and his logic is infused with idealism. I think if Hegel did not develop a logic then Peirce probably wouldn't have cared about him that much. But to a logician who wanted to keep idealism out of the equation he was anethema (do we only hate those we are closest to, feel the most threat from?).
> So to follow through, when individuals started using the type of logic that Peirce was developing (and at this point I don't think you can say the development of this thought was from a single person - but it is possible to say neither 'Dewey nor Russell could have existed without Peirce, just like Peirce could not have existed without Hegel. But I also think you can say that Dewey and Russell "hated" each other in the sense that I am using hate here. They really respected each other, just as Peirce obviously respected Hegel, but both felt the other was taking critical ideas in the wrong direction.
> Michael
> ________________________________
> From: on behalf of Tony Whitson
> Sent: Sat 11/3/2007 8:12 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Peirce as Hegel, but "in costume"
> Interesting quotes. I was particularly intrigued by the phrase "that
> Nantucket of thought." I think it's most likely a reference to "One of
> Robert Lowell's most famous early poems, "The Quaker Graveyard in
> Nantucket," with rich allusions to whaling and death at sea ..." See
> In at least some of these quotes posted by Andy and me, Peirce is
> crediting Hegel as superior to all the other modern philosophers, while
> critiquing his failure to follow through on his more promising insights,
> and faulting Hegel's followers for not having critiqued and advanced upon
> those insights as would have served Hegel better.
> That's not an attitude that I'd characterize as one of "hating" Hegel.
> Since we have the same language in front of us, what difference there is
> here must be over usage of "hating," rather than over CSP's esteem for
> Hegel.
> As for the evolution of CSP's thought over his career, both Parmentier and
> Bergman are writing about changes in the course of that evolution; but I
> don't see support in those texts for either Yrjo's or Michael's
> characterizations of how Peirce's thinking changed (which I also don't
> see as mutually equivalent, either -- so I don't see Michael's
> interpretation, if valid, as necessarily supporting Yrjo's in any case).
> The identification of Peirce and James on "Pragmatism" is also curious,
> since Peirce famously renamed his own philosophy as "pragmaticism"
> specifically to deny its identification with James' "pragmatism," which
> had become what people thought of by the word first coined by Peirce.
> Peirce added that the new word "pragmaticism" was so ugly that it stood in
> less danger of being kidnapped.
> On Sun, 4 Nov 2007, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> In the light of day, I accept that it was far too bland to claim Peirce
>> "hated" Hegel. Clearly his view was more nuanced.
>> Some more of Peirce on Hegel:
>> -----------------------
>> The Hegelian system recognises every natural tendency of thought as logical,
>> although it be certain to be abolished by counter-tendencies. Hegel thinks
>> there is a regular system in the succession of these tendencies, in
>> consequence of which, after drifting one way and the other for a long time,
>> opinion will at last go right. And it is true that metaphysicians do get the
>> right ideas at last; Hegels system of Nature represents tolerably the science
>> of his day; and one may be sure that whatever scientific investigation shall
>> have put out of doubt will presently receive a priori demonstration on the
>> part of the metaphysicians. [from 'Fixation of Faith'CP 5.358-87]
>> -----------------------
>> Had Kant merely said, I shall adopt for the present the belief that the three
>> angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles because nobody but brother
>> Lambert and some Italian has ever called it in question, his attitude would
>> be well enough. But on the contrary, he and those who today represent his
>> school distinctly maintain the proposition is proved, and the Lambertists
>> refuted, by what comes merely to general disinclination to think with them.
>> As for Hegel, who led Germany for a generation, he recognises clearly what he
>> is about. He simply launches his boat into the current of thought and allows
>> himself to be carried wherever the current leads. He himself calls his method
>> dialectics, meaning that frank discussion of the difficulties to which any
>> opinion spontaneously gives rise will lead to modification after modification
>> until a tenable position is attained. This is a direct profession of faith in
>> the method of inclinations. [Note to 'Fixation of Faith', 1893]
>> -----------------------
>> Internal anancasm, or logical groping, which advances upon a predestined line
>> without being able to foresee whither it is to be carried nor to steer its
>> course, this is the rule of development of philosophy. Hegel first made the
>> world understand this; and he seems to make logic not merely the subjective
>> goal and monitor of thought, which was all it had been ambitioning before,
>> but to be the very mainspring of thinking, and not merely individual thinking
>> but of discussion, of the history of the development of thought, of all
>> history, of all development. This involves a positive, clearly demonstrable
>> error. Let the logic in question be of whatever kind it may, a logic of
>> necessary inference or a logic of probable inference (the theory might
>> perhaps be shaped to fit either), in any case it supposed that logic is
>> sufficient of itself to determine what conclusion follows from given
>> premises; for unless it will do so much, it will not suffice to explain why
>> an individual train of reasoning should take just the course it does take, to
>> say nothing of other kinds of development. It thus supposes that from given
>> premises, only one conclusion can logically be drawn, and that there is no
>> scope at all for free choice. That from given premises only one conclusion
>> can logically be drawn, is one of the false notions which have come from the
>> logicians' confining their attention to that Nantucket of thought, the logic
>> of non-relative terms. In the logic of relatives, it does not hold good.
>> [from CP 6.287-90, 1893]
>> Andy
>> At 05:25 PM 3/11/2007 -0400, you wrote:
>>> Tony,
>>> Are you saying that you are arguing that Peirce's thinking didn't go
>>> through an evolution and change as he became invested in Pragmatism, or
>>> are you simply arguing that Peirce didn't hate Hegel. As far as the first
>>> one goes we can have a discussion about that based on Bergman's article
>>> some time I suppose. If it is the latter, I have to tell you that I don't
>>> read the quotes you offered as being particularly sympathetic to Hegel.
>>> Of course he didn't think Hegel was a fool or a bad philosopher. But he
>>> makes the same points I have read elsewhere which is the critique of an
>>> idealist based movement, suggesting any movement towards an end point is
>>> idealist.
>>> The issue was Hegel's organicism, which I think you can really read Peirce
>>> as critiqueing in the quotes you offered. I believe there are letters
>>> between James and Dewey where James chastises Dewey for holding on to this
>>> organicism. I have read in more than one place that Peirce was
>>> complaining to James about Dewey. I think the quotes offered sort of
>>> suggest this was Peirce's view of Hegel.
>>> Michael
>>> ________________________________
>>> From: on behalf of Tony Whitson
>>> Sent: Sat 11/3/2007 10:23 AM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: [xmca] Peirce as Hegel, but "in costume"
>>> Thanks, Michael G., for calling attention to Bergman's article in
>>> Semiotica 144-1/4 (2003) 1-17.
>>> After reviewing both Bergman and Parmentier, I'm afraid I can't find the
>>> basis for either Engstrom's comments or your observations (Nov 1, below).
>>> but I see you didn't have Bergman's paper at hand then.
>>> I was surprised by the comment that Peirce & James "hated Hegel" (below).
>>> I don't know about James, but I don't remember Peirce ever expressing such
>>> an attitude toward any philosopher worth reading at all.
>>> It's a bit late for Halloween (when kids and, increasingly, adults, dress
>>> up in costumes in the US), but I think these paragraphs better represent
>>> Peirce's view of Hegel:
>>> Peirce: CP 1.40-42 (40 and 41-2 are from separate unidentified fragments,
>>> c. 1892.)
>>> 40. The critical logicians have been much affiliated to the theological
>>> seminaries. About the thinking that goes on in laboratories they have
>>> known nothing. Now the seminarists and religionists generally have at all
>>> times and places set their faces against the idea of continuous growth.
>>> That disposition of intellect is the most catholic element of religion.
>>> Religious truth having been once defined is never to be altered in the
>>> most minute particular; and theology being held as queen of the sciences,
>>> the religionists have bitterly fought by fire and tortures all great
>>> advances in the true sciences; and if there be no true continuous growth
>>> in men's ideas where else in the world should it be looked for? Thence, we
>>> find this folk setting up hard lines of demarcation, or great gulfs,
>>> contrary to all observation, between good men and bad, between the wise
>>> and foolish, between the spirit and the flesh, between all the different
>>> kinds of objects, between one quantity and the next. So shut up are they
>>> in this conception of the world that when the seminarist Hegel discovered
>>> that the universe is everywhere permeated with continuous growth (for
>>> that, and nothing else, is the "Secret of Hegel") it was supposed to be an
>>> entirely new idea, a century and a half after the differential calculus
>>> had been in working order.
>>> 41. Hegel, while regarding scientific men with disdain, has for his chief
>>> topic the importance of continuity, which was the very idea the
>>> mathematicians and physicists had been chiefly engaged in following out
>>> for three centuries. This made Hegel's work less correct and excellent in
>>> itself than it might have been; and at the same time hid its true mode of
>>> affinity with the scientific thought into which the life of the race had
>>> been chiefly laid up. It was a misfortune for Hegelism, a misfortune for
>>> "philosophy," and a misfortune (in lesser degree) for science.
>>> 42. My philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume.
>>> On Thu, 1 Nov 2007, Michael Glassman wrote:
>>>> Andy,
>>>> I'm going to try and find the reference, but there is this great article
>>> that I think eloquently argues that Peirce made a turn from concentrating
>>> on language per se, where he was more interested in semiotics, to being
>>> more interested in relations. I can't remember if he said this is when
>>> Peirce started referring to semiosis. Once he started talking about
>>> relations the issue of mediation became far less important in his work -
>>> again not in terms of existing, but in terms of study.
>>>> So Engestrom is right, but depending on which Peirce you are reading at
>>> the moment. Of course Peirce is terribly opaque, and any discussion I
>>> have ever had about him eventually winds up going down the rabbit hole.
>>> But I think you can make the argument that as James and Peirce were
>>> becoming invested in the Peircian named Pragmatism his thinking did change
>>> - and actually become more challenging - if that was possible.
>>>> Michael
>>>> ________________________________
>>>> From: on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>> Sent: Thu 11/1/2007 6:30 PM
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>> Thank you Michael, and Eric and Mira and others too. My questions have
>>> all
>>>> been wonderfully answered (unless, Michael, you tell me that you are
>>> really
>>>> Mikhail Glashchmanovich writing under an assumed name, in which case
>>> I'll
>>>> have to go back to the drawing board).
>>>> Another question for you all. Recently I criticised Sasha because I
>>> thought
>>>> he had misunderstood Peirce. Reading Engstrom's book, I find what I take
>>> to
>>>> be the same misunderstanding.
>>>> He says: "For the sake of clarity, Peirce's excessive and often opaque
>>> work
>>>> is here discussed only through the concise but balanced interpretation
>>> of
>>>> Parmentier" - something we can all sympathise with I am sure, but then
>>> goes
>>>> on to claim "The mediating sign is here [with Peirce], in the context of
>>>> human action, treated as something purely mental and intentional. It
>>> thus
>>>> loses its potentially anti-Cartesian, cultural quality and reverts to
>>>> individualism and rationalism."
>>>> This was never my view of Peirce. Do you Americans have a view on this?
>>>> Andy
>>>> At 02:44 PM 1/11/2007 -0400, you wrote:
>>>>> Mira,
>>>>> I know Dewey studied Hegel with George Morris, but James and Peirce
>>>>> hated Hegel - and criticized Dewey for holding on to him. I don't
>>> think
>>>>> it had much to do with Feuerbach's critique though. I think it was
>>> more
>>>>> a reaction against idealism, which Eric talks about. Pragmatic
>>>>> philosophy is not as abstract as other philosophical traditions, and it
>>>>> emerges out of a number of issues that would in many ways be alien to
>>>>> continental philosophy (for instance I would argue that the exploration
>>>>> of the frontier, the settling of the mid-western and western states,
>>> and
>>>>> the need for communal problem solving that accompanied it had an
>>>>> important impact (even though Pragmatism started in Boston, it really
>>>>> reached fruition in Chicago just as it was emerging as the type of
>>>>> metropolis that grows from a frontier town). I also think Lincoln had
>>> a
>>>>> tremendous influence on the development of at least instrumental
>>>>> Pragmatism. All this and more combined with the emergence of Darwin's
>>>>> ideas of adaptation probably had far more to do with the development of
>>>>> Pragmatic thought than continental philosophy in general. It was a
>>>>> different idea and by trying to bring the two together I'm not sure if
>>>>> we are trying to fit a square peg in to a round hole.
>>>>> Michael
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: []
>>>>> On Behalf Of Branimira Slavova
>>>>> Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2007 9:03 AM
>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>>> Hello,
>>>>> I was trying to understand the differences among these philosophies
>>> some
>>>>> time ago. So I'll pitch in my 2 cents. I was led to believe that the
>>>>> main difference between the American pragmatist philosophers and the
>>>>> Russians is based on their different stances on the Feuerbach's
>>> critique
>>>>> of Hegel. My sense was that the pragmatists had more of a reductionist
>>>>> view, while the Russians were anti-reductionist which allowed them to
>>>>> consider more sophisticated basic units of analysis. Is that a fair
>>>>> thing to say?
>>>>> m
>>>>> Dr Mira Slavova
>>>>> Research Fellow in Information Management
>>>>> AIM TECH
>>>>> Maurice Keyworth Building
>>>>> The University of Leeds
>>>>> Leeds LS2 9JT
>>>>> Tel: 0113 343 7818
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: on behalf of Michael Glassman
>>>>> Sent: Thu 11/1/2007 13:24
>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>>> Andy,
>>>>> I think the response is a kind of complicated and it relates back I
>>>>> think to an earlier comment you made about unity or whether you
>>> consider
>>>>> communication as products of labor. There was a difference between
>>>>> Peirce/James and Dewey/Mead when it comes to Pragmatism - which
>>> involves
>>>>> whether activity builds upon itself, making life better and adaptation
>>>>> easier, or whether all activity is situation specific and doesn't
>>> really
>>>>> have a larger social meaning beyond solving a problem. James (and I
>>>>> assume Peirce) believed that Dewey (and by extension Mead) saw social
>>>>> progress in activity because of a Hegelian deposit that remained in
>>>>> Dewey's thinking even after he left Johns Hopkins. It has been a
>>>>> continuous argument about whether Dewey has a Hegelian deposit for
>>> about
>>>>> a century now. But James was much more interested in the individual
>>>>> while Dewey/Mead because of their interest in progress were necessarily
>>>>> more socially or societally oriented - Is that what you mean by the
>>>>> difference between narrow and broad Pragmatism? Pepper separated them
>>>>> by calling one contextualism and one organicism (though the
>>>>> differentiation seem to be to be a short at Dewey).
>>>>> But the idea that there are materials that can somehow be thought of
>>>>> separate from practical activity and problem solving - now I think they
>>>>> all pretty much would have argued against that by the mid 1890s. The
>>>>> big issue I think is their thinking was a fear of dualism. Once you
>>>>> assume that there are materials that are separate from actions in any
>>>>> way, including any types of universals, then you are somehow separating
>>>>> the human condition from nature itself. What you run in to is control
>>>>> of these things, or attempts to control these things, outside of the
>>>>> problem based interaction/transaction itself. For instance if you
>>> posit
>>>>> that discourse is somehow a product, are you making the assumption or
>>>>> claim that you can somehow control discourse and they way it is
>>>>> manipulated outside of the process itself? I think this is the reason
>>>>> that, at least to my reading, even though Dewey believed there was
>>>>> mediation he questioned the worth of studying and understanding it,
>>>>> because that assumed that you could transfer this meaning to the next
>>>>> situation - because you can't separate language or anything else from
>>>>> the actual activity.
>>>>> I'm not sure I understand your point about one group of theorists in
>>>>> Russia and one group of theorists in the United States. What is true
>>> is
>>>>> that there were a number of forces in the United States that were
>>>>> pushing thinking about human condition towards more practical aspects
>>> of
>>>>> human problem solving.
>>>>> Michael
>>>>> _____
>>>>> From: on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>>> Sent: Thu 11/1/2007 8:49 AM
>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>>> Mmm, that's an answer, Micharl.
>>>>> Engstrom seems to be saying, amongst other things, that Mead was much
>>>>> better than his interpreters of the 1980s/90s. The question arose for
>>> me
>>>>> in
>>>>> connection with a paper I am writing about Axel Honneth, including his
>>>>> appropriation of Mead in the 90s. I had the same view, i.e., that what
>>>>> Mead
>>>>> said was OK, but Honneth just missed it, and transformed his theory
>>> into
>>>>> typical postmodern "intersubjectivity" (social rather than societal
>>> some
>>>>> would say). When I was challenged and asked to say why I thought
>>>>> Vygotsky
>>>>> and Leontiev should be used as a foundation in social psychology,
>>>>> instead
>>>>> of Mead, it was confusing to answer. I actually think that the main
>>>>> differences between Vygotsky/Leontyev/Luria and Mead/Peirce/Dewey is
>>>>> that
>>>>> the first group were Russians living in the USSR and the second lot
>>> were
>>>>> Americans living in the USA. - not so much in the actually theoretical
>>>>> differences between these early figures.
>>>>> One of the ideas I use in my paper is the contrast between pragmatism
>>> in
>>>>> the "narrow" sense an pragmatism in the "broad" sense. People said, you
>>>>> mean Mead was pragmatic in the narrow sense and Vygotsky in the broad.
>>>>> No!
>>>>> Mead is pragmatic in the broad sense, but the "spirit" of American
>>>>> pragmatism is narrow, and the ideas of great thinkers cannot survive
>>> the
>>>>> spirit of their times and the spirit of their people. (By narrow
>>>>> pragmatism
>>>>> I mean pragmatism that reduces everything to interactions between
>>>>> individuals deemed to be the bearers of needs, knowledge etc., and
>>>>> denies
>>>>> the real existence of universals. By pragmatism in the broad sense, I
>>>>> mean
>>>>> pragmatism which understands that interactions between individuals
>>>>> happen
>>>>> by means of universals, which are material artefacts, culture - public
>>>>> property, so to speak, and this material culture constitutes the
>>>>> objectivity of universals. The ordinary American pragmatist of the kind
>>>>> I
>>>>> think you are talking about Michael, if I'm not mistaken, doesn't
>>>>> believe
>>>>> in theories and ideas, it all comes down just to whether its useful or
>>>>> not.
>>>>> But Mead and Dewey and Perice were better than that.
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> (PS Engstrom answer my question about communicative and instrumental
>>>>> action
>>>>> a few paragraphs later. Sorry for the stupid question in that other
>>>>> thread
>>>>> I started, and apologies for forgetting to set "Send text only")
>>>>> At 08:02 AM 1/11/2007 -0400, you wrote:
>>>>>> It's difficult to describe, but even though the theorists don't get so
>>>>>> much play, much of the theory of Mead and the others is integrated in
>>>>> to
>>>>>> everyday activity in United States society (why the
>>>>>> disconnect? Hmmmm.) Every time somebody does Case Management they
>>> are
>>>>>> testing this theory. Many drug programs and housing programs are
>>>>> testing
>>>>>> this theory. Most street level social work is working within and
>>>>> testing
>>>>>> this theory. Many teachers, inside the classroom, are continuously
>>>>>> testing this theory (Standardized Curriculums can be seen as a frontal
>>>>>> political attack on these ideas). The results need to be empirical
>>> but
>>>>>> they are not positivist, and they are not generalizable - which in
>>>>> itself
>>>>>> is part of Pragmatic thought. It is not so much these ideas aren't
>>>>>> constantly used and tested, but perhaps more the way we view testing
>>>>> and
>>>>>> evidence.
>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>> From: on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>>>> Sent: Wed 10/31/2007 9:14 AM
>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>> Subject: RE: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>>>> Please understand Michael that my knowledge of Mead is very thin; I
>>>>> only
>>>>>> know what have read in terms of a couple of hundred pages of his
>>>>> writings,
>>>>>> a couple of biographical articles and of course I am familiar with the
>>>>>> Progressive Movement, Dewey, Peirce and everyone, of which he was a
>>>>> part.
>>>>>> But I get the impression that he worked out these ideas, as you say,
>>> in
>>>>>> dialogue especially with Dewey and in the midst of that milieu, but I
>>>>> don't
>>>>>> imagine that there was a lot of laboratory work involved, controlled
>>>>>> experiments and observation, and so on, by Mead, during his own
>>>>> lifetime.
>>>>>> The Vygotsky school on the other and incorporates today many decades
>>> of
>>>>>> empirical and practical experimental work and observation by scores of
>>>>>> psychologists. Yes? How many research groups or psychological
>>>>> practitioners
>>>>>> use Symbolic Interactionism specifically today, as their comprehensive
>>>>>> theoretical paradigm?
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>> At 08:58 AM 31/10/2007 -0400, you wrote:
>>>>>>> Andy,
>>>>>>> Mead's work was not just one man - he was surrounded by an entire
>>>>> group at
>>>>>>> the University of Chicago that had come together under the umbrella
>>>>> of
>>>>>>> this type of Pragmatic thought. John Dewey recruited him to the
>>>>>>> University of Chicago from the Univfersity of Michigan, and they were
>>>>> best
>>>>>>> friends - both intellectually and socially. There was also a large,
>>>>> more
>>>>>>> application oriented group centered around Jane Addams and Hull
>>>>> House, and
>>>>>>> the nascent labor movement. When Dewey went to Columbia, there was a
>>>>>>> great deal of cross-pollination between the group he started at
>>>>> Columbia
>>>>>>> and Mead who stayed at the University of Chicago and the remains of
>>>>> that
>>>>>>> group. Mead's ideas are not the ideas of one man but a brilliant
>>>>>>> philosophical movement that helped to create what we now call
>>>>> psychology,
>>>>>>> and sociology, and qualitative methodology, and even to a certain
>>>>> extent
>>>>>>> much of modern anthropology (Boas was also a marginal member of this
>>>>> whole
>>>>>>> group).
>>>>>>> I'm interested, why would you think the ideas are so much more
>>>>> speculative
>>>>>>> than say CHAT?
>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>>> From: on behalf of Andy Blunden
>>>>>>> Sent: Wed 10/31/2007 8:21 AM
>>>>>>> To:
>>>>>>> Subject: [xmca] George Herbert Mead. help please
>>>>>>> I'm currently reading a collection of George Herbert Mead, which
>>>>> confirms
>>>>>>> my view that his ideas on social psychology were very close to our
>>>>> own,
>>>>>>> though inevitably, as the work of just one man, relatively
>>>>> speculative.
>>>>>>> Can anyone recommend to me a critique of Mead by a CHAT person,
>>>>> perhaps a
>>>>>>> message in the XCMA archive or a paper available in HTML or PDF? I
>>>>> know
>>>>>>> that you guys cover him in your courses at UCSD.
>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>> Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380
>>>>> 9435,
>>>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>>>> mobile 0409 358 651
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>> Tony Whitson
>>> UD School of Education
>>> NEWARK DE 19716
>>> _______________________________
>>> "those who fail to reread
>>> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
>>> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>> Andy Blunden : tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, mobile
>> 0409 358 651
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
> Tony Whitson
> UD School of Education
> NEWARK DE 19716
> _______________________________
> "those who fail to reread
> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)

Tony Whitson
UD School of Education

"those who fail to reread
  are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
                   -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)

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Received on Sat Nov 3 19:06 PDT 2007

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