You pose some good questions about the systematicity and dialecticity
of the concepts in Vygotsky's experiment with the blocks.
>> But the
>>definitions of LAG et al strike me as different from concepts like 'mass' or
>>'velocity.' Scientific concepts are defined in a network, no? Mass and
>>velocity are interrelated, along with space and gravity... But that's not
>>true of LAG and the others. One could remove one nonsense word and the
>>definitions of the others wouldn't need to change.
Probably the action underlying the concept is the action of choosing a
block labeled LAG, right? Then that action is part of a larger system of
actions -- a general method of choosing a block labeled by any of the
nonsense syllables. So "choosing a LAG" is in a network with
"choosing a CEV" and so on.
>>Nor does LAG strike me as a particularly dialectical concept. The concept of
>>'commodity,' for example, is once again part of a complex network, and it is
>>inherently dynamic. LAG doesn't seem anything like a process. Perhaps that's
>>one of the artificialities of this experiment, and Vygotsky is very clear
>>that these artificialities serve important analytical purposes.
Isn't the dialecticity of the concept observed in the process of its emergence?
I mean, in the unstable transitions back and forth from complexes to
pseudo concepts to the final, correct way of selecting a block labeled LAG?
Once the concept has emerged, it's just a skill -- we have a well-defined
algorithm for choosing a LAG, and the dialecticity is no longer "visible."
What do you think?
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