Martin (and Michael)
Things have been hectic lately and I will try to say more later and
to return to your 'mind' in the world, Martin (and some points raised
by Michael Glassman). Intriguingly, as I read along with Garfinkel -
smile - he seems to wonder about such things in a somewhat dismissive
way. In any case, I tend to agree, in some sense, with Michael below
about this. The problem is that, saying something like this obscures
as much as it illuminates and does little to speak to a rather large
contingent of people in areas outside philosophy that are doing
'phenomenology.' If that is what you mean by 'modern phenomenology,'
I would tend to disagree, Michael.
Ed
>Phenomenology always is first, second, and third person---JE est un
>autre, as the poet Rimbaud said, and this is the conclusion of
>modern phenomenology, at the heart of the Self is the Other. Michael
>
>
>On 23-Feb-07, at 8:51 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
>
>It's so quiet!
>
>Ed, can you say more about what you mean by a 3rd-person phenomenology?
>
>Martin
>
>
>On 2/18/07 10:02 PM, "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:
>
>>Martin
>>
>> I don't happen to think so (this is Anne Rawls' gloss). I do know
>>that, in this book and at the time it was written, Garfinkel was
>>trying to distance himself somewhat from pragmatism and
>>phenomenology. I think what Rawls (and Garfinkel) may be trying to
>>say here is that getting into such discussions is, from Garfinkel's
>>perspective, a mistake (which doesn't mean it is wrong) since for him
>>what is primary is, to quote you here, the "incorporation of natural
>>entities into social practices that enables them to present
>>themselves to us *as* objects of a particular kind." In any case, I
>>was wondering whether what ethnomethodologists are up to could be
>>considered contemporary empirical research in the sense Mike asked it.
>> Oh, my interest in enthomethodology is largely because it has,
>>more or less, the structure of a third person phenomenology (I'm sure
>>Garfinkel would object to such a characterization) and I've been
>>thinking for awhile about what a third person hermeneutic
>>phenomenology would look like (Ihde seems to address this somewhat).
>>
>>Ed
>>
>>>Ed,
>>>
>>>Are these two necessarily - direct relation between perceiver and object of
>>>perception; actor's location in social practices - in opposition? I am
>>>thinking of Bakhurst's articulation of 'radical realism' in his book
>>>'Consciousness and revolution in Soviet Philosophy.' In contrast to
>>>'conservative realism,' in which the mind is assumed to form 'reflections,'
>>>representations or images of the external world, in 'radical realism' mind
>>>is assumed to be *in* the world, knowing reality directly. But it is the
>>>incorporation of natural entities into social practices that enables them to
>>>present themselves to us *as* objects of a particular kind.
>>>
>>>Martin
>>>
>>>
>>>On 2/17/07 7:51 PM, "Ed Wall" <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Thus, treating the relationship between a perceiver
>>>> and an object of perception as a primary reality, as James did, is
>>>> from Garfinkel's perspective a mistake. The possibility of perceiving
>>>> objects as "objects of a sort" depends on the actor's location in a
>>>> social organization and their commitment to the situated expectations
>>>> belonging to that location.
>>>
>>>
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