Phenomenology always is first, second, and third person---JE est un
autre, as the poet Rimbaud said, and this is the conclusion of modern
phenomenology, at the heart of the Self is the Other. Michael
On 23-Feb-07, at 8:51 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
It's so quiet!
Ed, can you say more about what you mean by a 3rd-person phenomenology?
On 2/18/07 10:02 PM, "Ed Wall" <email@example.com> wrote:
> I don't happen to think so (this is Anne Rawls' gloss). I do know
> that, in this book and at the time it was written, Garfinkel was
> trying to distance himself somewhat from pragmatism and
> phenomenology. I think what Rawls (and Garfinkel) may be trying to
> say here is that getting into such discussions is, from Garfinkel's
> perspective, a mistake (which doesn't mean it is wrong) since for him
> what is primary is, to quote you here, the "incorporation of natural
> entities into social practices that enables them to present
> themselves to us *as* objects of a particular kind." In any case, I
> was wondering whether what ethnomethodologists are up to could be
> considered contemporary empirical research in the sense Mike asked it.
> Oh, my interest in enthomethodology is largely because it has,
> more or less, the structure of a third person phenomenology (I'm sure
> Garfinkel would object to such a characterization) and I've been
> thinking for awhile about what a third person hermeneutic
> phenomenology would look like (Ihde seems to address this somewhat).
>> Are these two necessarily - direct relation between perceiver and
>> object of
>> perception; actor's location in social practices - in opposition?
>> I am
>> thinking of Bakhurst's articulation of 'radical realism' in his book
>> 'Consciousness and revolution in Soviet Philosophy.' In contrast to
>> 'conservative realism,' in which the mind is assumed to form
>> representations or images of the external world, in 'radical
>> realism' mind
>> is assumed to be *in* the world, knowing reality directly. But it
>> is the
>> incorporation of natural entities into social practices that
>> enables them to
>> present themselves to us *as* objects of a particular kind.
>> On 2/17/07 7:51 PM, "Ed Wall" <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
>>> Thus, treating the relationship between a perceiver
>>> and an object of perception as a primary reality, as James did, is
>>> from Garfinkel's perspective a mistake. The possibility of
>>> objects as "objects of a sort" depends on the actor's location in a
>>> social organization and their commitment to the situated
>>> belonging to that location.
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