Re: [xmca] LSV and materialisms

From: Martin Packer (packer@duq.edu)
Date: Mon Dec 18 2006 - 18:27:21 PST


Sasha,

I know that Marx never used the phrase HM, and it was Engels who 'extracted
the rational kernel' from Hegel to invent it and DM, yes. I know that Lenin
elaborated DM, and that Stalin adopted it as "the world outlook of the
Marxist-Leninist party." Nothing to do with Marx? Hmm. The "real" Marx?
Double hmmm.

Martin

On 12/18/06 8:54 PM, "Alexander Surmava" <monada@netvox.ru> wrote:

> Hi Martin,
>
>
>
> You surely know, that the very distinction between so called "dialectical
> materialism" and "historical materialism" is entirely false Soviet
> misinterpretation which has nothing to do with real Marx.
>
> Actually in Marxist theoretic culture both notions are identical. The
> distinction between them as the distinction between two different
> disciplines lies in completely positivist approach. So you are quite right
> stating that Vygotsky evidently “saw neither as the appropriate basis for
> his Marxist psychology!”
>
> As for Vygotsky he was absolutely exact refuting completely attempts to
> build new materialistic psychology by simple merging of positivist empirical
> psychology with "dialectical materialism" or "historical materialism" and
> insisting on the necessity of elaborating of "psychological Das Kapital". So
> all his as well as Leont'ev's investigations we can consider as more or less
> good attempts to find approaches to this task.
>
> Only the works of Il'enkov came closely to play a role of first chapters of
> such "psychological Das Kapital". I mean Il'enkov's analysis of
> psychophysical problem and the great Il'enkov-Spinoza's idea of "thinking
> body" can be considered as such first chapters.
>
>
>
> Sasha
>
>
>
> P.S. I don’t forget about my promise to comment LSV’s “mirror metaphor”. It
> is ready in Russian and now it’s only waiting for free time in my timetable
> to translate them into English for XMCA.
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Martin Packer
> Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2006 2:15 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] LSV and materialisms
>
>
>
> Mike, Joao,
>
>
>
> There are two or three places in the Crisis where V refers to dialectical
>
> materialism and historical materialism. The most interesting in my view is
>
> this passage (which I'm clumsily copying):
>
>
>
> " Engels¹ formula ‹ not to foist the dialectical principles on nature, but
>
> to find them in it ‹ is changed into its opposite here. The principles of
>
> dialectics are
>
> introduced into psychology from outside. The way of Marxists should be
>
> different. The direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism
>
> to the
>
> problems of natural science and in particular to the group of biological
>
> sciences or psychology is impossible, just as it is impossible to apply it
>
> directly
>
> to history and sociology. In Russia it is thought that the problem of
>
> ³psychology and Marxism² can be reduced to creating a psychology which is
>
> up to Marxism, but in reality it is far more complex. Like history,
>
> sociology is
>
> in need of the intermediate special theory of historical materialism which
>
> explains the concrete meaning, for the given group of phenomena, of the
>
> abstract laws of dialectical materialism. In exactly the same way we are in
>
> need of an as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological
>
> materialism
>
> and psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the
>
> concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
>
> the
>
> given field of phenomena.
>
> Dialectics covers nature, thinking, history ‹ it is the most general,
>
> maximally
>
> universal science. The theory of the psychological materialism or dialectics
>
> of
>
> psychology is what I call general psychology.
>
> In order to create such intermediate theories ‹ methodologies, general
>
> sciences ‹ we must reveal the essence of the given area of phenomena, the
>
> laws of their change, their qualitative and quantitative characteristics,
>
> their
>
> causality, we must create categories and concepts appropriate to it, in
>
> short,
>
> we must create our own Das Kapital. It suffices to imagine Marx operating
>
> with the general principles and categories of dialectics, like
>
> quantity-quality,
>
> the triad, the universal connection, the knot [of contradictions], leap etc.
>
> ‹
>
> without the abstract and historical categories of value, class, commodity,
>
> capital, interest, production forces, basis, superstructure etc. ‹ to see
>
> the
>
> whole monstrous absurdity of the assumption that it is possible to create
>
> any
>
> Marxist science while by-passing by Das Kapital. Psychology is in need of
>
> its
>
> own Das Kapital ‹ its own concepts of class, basis, value etc. ‹ in which it
>
> might express, describe and study its object." (pp. 329-330, roughly, in the
>
> Essential Vygotsky version)
>
>
>
> My gloss of this is that the only appropriate way to apply Marxism to
>
> psychology was, for V, to create what he called a "general psychology² (p.
>
> 329). What this required was neither the direct application of dialectical
>
> materialism (too abstract) nor the application of historical materialism
>
> (too specific). Historical materialism was appropriate for sociology, but
>
> psychology needed a new "theory of biological materialism and psychological
>
> materialism" that would be an "intermediate science which explains the
>
> concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
>
> the given field of phenomena² (p. 330). This intermediate science would be
>
> ³a critique of psychology² (p. 331); this ³theory of the psychological
>
> materialism or dialectics of psychology is what I call general psychology²
>
> (330). It would not take from Marx, but learn from Marx. To do this ³we must
>
> create our own Das Kapital² (p. 330).
>
>
>
> Evidently V was aware of the distinction between dialectical materialism and
>
> historical materialism. Equally evidently he saw neither as the appropriare
>
> basis for his marxist psychology! We need a "psychological materialism"!
>
>
>
> Hope this helps. back to the grading!
>
>
>
> Martin
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 12/18/06 2:16 PM, "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>> David Answered the Question as follows.
>
>>
>
>> V. refers favourably to historical materialism in his "The Socialist
>
>> Alternation of Man" (in *The Vygotsky Reader*) but otherwise, to my
>
>> knowledge, does not have much to say about the diamat/histmat distinction.
>
>> Not really his style.
>
>> _______________________________________________
>
>> xmca mailing list
>
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
>
> Engels¹ formula ‹ not to foist the dialectical principles on nature, but to
>
> find
>
> them in it ‹ is changed into its opposite here. The principles of dialectics
>
> are
>
> introduced into psychology from outside. The way of Marxists should be
>
> different. The direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism
>
> to the
>
> problems of natural science and in particular to the group of biological
>
> sciences or psychology is impossible, just as it is impossible to apply it
>
> directly
>
> to history and sociology. In Russia it is thought that the problem of
>
> ³psychology and Marxism² can be reduced to creating a psychology which is
>
> up to Marxism, but in reality it is far more complex. Like history,
>
> sociology is
>
> in need of the intermediate special theory of historical materialism which
>
> explains the concrete meaning, for the given group of phenomena, of the
>
> abstract laws of dialectical materialism. In exactly the same way we are in
>
> need of an as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological
>
> materialism
>
> and psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the
>
> concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
>
> the
>
> given field of phenomena.
>
> Dialectics covers nature, thinking, history ‹ it is the most general,
>
> maximally
>
> universal science. The theory of the psychological materialism or dialectics
>
> of
>
> psychology is what I call general psychology.
>
> In order to create such intermediate theories ‹ methodologies, general
>
> sciences ‹ we must reveal the essence of the given area of phenomena, the
>
> laws of their change, their qualitative and quantitative characteristics,
>
> their
>
> causality, we must create categories and concepts appropriate to it, in
>
> short,
>
> we must create our own Das Kapital. It suffices to imagine Marx operating
>
> with the general principles and categories of dialectics, like
>
> quantity-quality,
>
> the triad, the universal connection, the knot [of contradictions], leap etc.
>
> ‹
>
> without the abstract and historical categories of value, class, commodity,
>
> capital, interest, production forces, basis, superstructure etc. ‹ to see
>
> the
>
> whole monstrous absurdity of the assumption that it is possible to create
>
> any
>
> Marxist science while by-passing by Das Kapital. Psychology is in need of
>
> its
>
> own Das Kapital ‹ its own concepts of class, basis, value etc. ‹ in which it
>
> might express, describe and study its object.
>
>
>
>
>
> ³The only rightful application of Marxism to psychology would be
>
> to create a general psychology² (p. 329e), but what this required was
>
> neither the direct application of dialectical materialism (too abstract) nor
>
> the application of historical materialism (too specific). Historical
>
> materialism was appropriate for sociology, but psychology is ³in need of an
>
> as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological materialism and
>
> psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the
>
> concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
>
> the given field of phenomena² (p. 330e). This intermediate science would be
>
> ³a critique of psychology² (p. 331e); this ³theory of the psychological
>
> materialism or dialectics of psychology is what I call general psychology²
>
> (330e). It would not take from Marx, but learn from Marx. To do this ³we
>
> must create our own Das Kapital² (p. 330e). ³I do not want to learn what
>
> constitutes the mind for free, by picking out a couple of citations, I want
>
> to learn from Marx¹s whole method how to build a science, how to approach
>
> the investigation of the mind² (p. 331e).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
>
> xmca mailing list
>
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca

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