Michael,
An argument for historical materialism? It's certainly not an argument
*against* historical materialism, but V's argument seems to be that HM was
fine in an analysis of society, but an analysis of mind needs something
else. Equally specific, but different. DM would be too general - and this is
where he's critizing others for just imposing the 'laws' of DM onto mental
phenomena.
Martin
On 12/18/06 7:58 PM, "Michael Glassman" <MGlassman@ehe.ohio-state.edu>
wrote:
> Martin,
>
> I don't know, maybe we are reading it the same way, but the way I'm reading
> this it seems like what Vygotsky is saying is that you can't apply dialectics
> as a separate entity to psychology - that it doesn't really exist outside of
> the natural continuum. The attempt to find a dialectics of psychology by
> looking at psychological phenomena and then applying a dialectical overview
> provides a false understanding. This might just be my bias, but it sounds to
> me like Vygotsky is really buying in to Engel's naturalism - the idea that you
> explore nature and that dialectical categories will emerge from that
> exploration, not the other way around. Perhaps he is saying the same thing
> about Marx, that this is what he did in Das Kapital - he wasn't trying to
> develop a Marxist sociology, he was examining categories of class, basis,
> values, and dialectics were emerging out of it. From my interpretation
> Vygotsky was being something of a romantic - I would bet my house that this
> wasn't how Engels came up with the Dialectics of Nature at all (possibly it
> was true for Marx). But anyway this reads to me like an argument for
> historical materialism - and then let dialectics emerge from the study. It
> sort of relates back to Sylvia Scribner's ideas on Vygotsky's different types
> of history. Look at individual development from a historical materialism
> viewpoint and dialectics will emerge, just like they did for Engels
> (supposedly) in studying phylogenetic history, and just like they did for Marx
> in studying social history.
>
> It reminds me of conversations I have had with some people who would say,
> "Well where does Vygotsky actually talk about dialectical development?" Well,
> from this passage, it seems to me he's thinking if he told you, then he's not
> really discovering the dialectics of psychology.
>
> Michael
>
> ________________________________
>
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin Packer
> Sent: Mon 12/18/2006 6:15 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] LSV and materialisms
>
>
>
> Mike, Joao,
>
> There are two or three places in the Crisis where V refers to dialectical
> materialism and historical materialism. The most interesting in my view is
> this passage (which I'm clumsily copying):
>
> " Engels¹ formula < not to foist the dialectical principles on nature, but
> to find them in it < is changed into its opposite here. The principles of
> dialectics are
> introduced into psychology from outside. The way of Marxists should be
> different. The direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism
> to the
> problems of natural science and in particular to the group of biological
> sciences or psychology is impossible, just as it is impossible to apply it
> directly
> to history and sociology. In Russia it is thought that the problem of
> ³psychology and Marxism² can be reduced to creating a psychology which is
> up to Marxism, but in reality it is far more complex. Like history,
> sociology is
> in need of the intermediate special theory of historical materialism which
> explains the concrete meaning, for the given group of phenomena, of the
> abstract laws of dialectical materialism. In exactly the same way we are in
> need of an as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological
> materialism
> and psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the
> concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
> the
> given field of phenomena.
> Dialectics covers nature, thinking, history < it is the most general,
> maximally
> universal science. The theory of the psychological materialism or dialectics
> of
> psychology is what I call general psychology.
> In order to create such intermediate theories < methodologies, general
> sciences < we must reveal the essence of the given area of phenomena, the
> laws of their change, their qualitative and quantitative characteristics,
> their
> causality, we must create categories and concepts appropriate to it, in
> short,
> we must create our own Das Kapital. It suffices to imagine Marx operating
> with the general principles and categories of dialectics, like
> quantity-quality,
> the triad, the universal connection, the knot [of contradictions], leap etc.
> <
> without the abstract and historical categories of value, class, commodity,
> capital, interest, production forces, basis, superstructure etc. < to see
> the
> whole monstrous absurdity of the assumption that it is possible to create
> any
> Marxist science while by-passing by Das Kapital. Psychology is in need of
> its
> own Das Kapital < its own concepts of class, basis, value etc. < in which it
> might express, describe and study its object." (pp. 329-330, roughly, in the
> Essential Vygotsky version)
>
> My gloss of this is that the only appropriate way to apply Marxism to
> psychology was, for V, to create what he called a "general psychology² (p.
> 329). What this required was neither the direct application of dialectical
> materialism (too abstract) nor the application of historical materialism
> (too specific). Historical materialism was appropriate for sociology, but
> psychology needed a new "theory of biological materialism and psychological
> materialism" that would be an "intermediate science which explains the
> concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
> the given field of phenomena² (p. 330). This intermediate science would be
> ³a critique of psychology² (p. 331); this ³theory of the psychological
> materialism or dialectics of psychology is what I call general psychology²
> (330). It would not take from Marx, but learn from Marx. To do this ³we must
> create our own Das Kapital² (p. 330).
>
> Evidently V was aware of the distinction between dialectical materialism and
> historical materialism. Equally evidently he saw neither as the appropriare
> basis for his marxist psychology! We need a "psychological materialism"!
>
> Hope this helps. back to the grading!
>
> Martin
>
>
>
>
> On 12/18/06 2:16 PM, "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> David Answered the Question as follows.
>>
>> V. refers favourably to historical materialism in his "The Socialist
>> Alternation of Man" (in *The Vygotsky Reader*) but otherwise, to my
>> knowledge, does not have much to say about the diamat/histmat distinction.
>> Not really his style.
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>
> Engels¹ formula < not to foist the dialectical principles on nature, but to
> find
> them in it < is changed into its opposite here. The principles of dialectics
> are
> introduced into psychology from outside. The way of Marxists should be
> different. The direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism
> to the
> problems of natural science and in particular to the group of biological
> sciences or psychology is impossible, just as it is impossible to apply it
> directly
> to history and sociology. In Russia it is thought that the problem of
> ³psychology and Marxism² can be reduced to creating a psychology which is
> up to Marxism, but in reality it is far more complex. Like history,
> sociology is
> in need of the intermediate special theory of historical materialism which
> explains the concrete meaning, for the given group of phenomena, of the
> abstract laws of dialectical materialism. In exactly the same way we are in
> need of an as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological
> materialism
> and psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the
> concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
> the
> given field of phenomena.
> Dialectics covers nature, thinking, history < it is the most general,
> maximally
> universal science. The theory of the psychological materialism or dialectics
> of
> psychology is what I call general psychology.
> In order to create such intermediate theories < methodologies, general
> sciences < we must reveal the essence of the given area of phenomena, the
> laws of their change, their qualitative and quantitative characteristics,
> their
> causality, we must create categories and concepts appropriate to it, in
> short,
> we must create our own Das Kapital. It suffices to imagine Marx operating
> with the general principles and categories of dialectics, like
> quantity-quality,
> the triad, the universal connection, the knot [of contradictions], leap etc.
> <
> without the abstract and historical categories of value, class, commodity,
> capital, interest, production forces, basis, superstructure etc. < to see
> the
> whole monstrous absurdity of the assumption that it is possible to create
> any
> Marxist science while by-passing by Das Kapital. Psychology is in need of
> its
> own Das Kapital < its own concepts of class, basis, value etc. < in which it
> might express, describe and study its object.
>
>
> ³The only rightful application of Marxism to psychology would be
> to create a general psychology² (p. 329e), but what this required was
> neither the direct application of dialectical materialism (too abstract) nor
> the application of historical materialism (too specific). Historical
> materialism was appropriate for sociology, but psychology is ³in need of an
> as yet undeveloped but inevitable theory of biological materialism and
> psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains the
> concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to
> the given field of phenomena² (p. 330e). This intermediate science would be
> ³a critique of psychology² (p. 331e); this ³theory of the psychological
> materialism or dialectics of psychology is what I call general psychology²
> (330e). It would not take from Marx, but learn from Marx. To do this ³we
> must create our own Das Kapital² (p. 330e). ³I do not want to learn what
> constitutes the mind for free, by picking out a couple of citations, I want
> to learn from Marx¹s whole method how to build a science, how to approach
> the investigation of the mind² (p. 331e).
>
>
>
>
>
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