Hi Mike,
I mean the text from the volume 6 of Russian collected works of LSV
"Utchenie ob emotziakh" or "Spinoza" as it was titled by LSV himself.
As for Spinoza's choice it is the following:
he doesn't understands thinking as an ability of some imaginary thinking
substance to interact magically with the other equally imaginary
abstractly extensive substance as Descartes did. He found both Cartesian
substances as equally false.
So his own choice is an understanding of thinking as an attributive
inseparable from Substance=Nature=God ability of Nature to relate to
itself and to reflect in this self directed bodily relation the quality of
itself.
The most primitive level of self reflection of Nature is a mechanical
interaction, the next goes chemism, and finally Nature ascends to the
level of organic systems, the level of life. Exactly here we can find
basically new quality of this interaction – it ceases to be symmetrical
as in case of mechanical and chemical interaction, but gives birth to
poles of subject from active side of interaction and object, predmet from
the other, passive side of interaction.
So if we basing on Spinoza’s ideas want to comprehend the nature of
thinking we have to investigate the real way of interaction of real (not
only imaginary as in case of Descartes) bodily parts of the Universe.
This approach gives us a revolutionary new comprehension of thinking as an
ability of thinking body doesn’t act according to his own construction
or program but according to the form of its object.
All this is much better formulated in the first two chapters of
Il’enkov’s “Dialectical logic”. The only one thing I’ve added to
it is an understanding that the first and the most abstract definition of
Spinoza’s thinking, realizing by one-way, not reflecsive movement is
equal to definition of life and covers all unicellular and plant
organisms. In this case I follow Nikolai Bernstein with his revolutionary
new activity paradigm (alternative to Descartes as well as Ivan Pavlov
with their reflex arc). Bernstein (who evidently was a Spinozist) argues
that in case of predmet oriented movement when a subject has to move
according the real shapes of its objects in the real world the sign
relations (the relations based on ability of subject to ascribe to its
objects arbitrary signs) is basically irrelevant. The sign is something
arbitrary, conventional while an alive subject has to act in real, not
conventional situation. It’s interesting to mention one Vygotsky’s
observation connected with this problem. WE mean the refusal of little
children to play in renaming things when they were invited by an adult to
rename say “knife” into “chair”.
The child’s refusal was rationally motivated – if we consider a
“knife” as a “chair” we will have to sit on it, but it is stupid.
Vygotsky comments it as an indication of insufficient development of a
child who doesn’t still realize the arbitrary nature of words (signs).
We comprehend this peculiarity of childish behavior as an indication of
their basic understanding the nature of concepts as a way of acting with
the object of an understanding, according to its nature, its shape.
Starting from this basic intuitive understanding of concepts nature a
child will one day easily realize the nature of arbitrariness of signs,
while starting from the false idea of ability to ascribe arbitrary labels
or signs or Namengebungkraft we will never come to understanding of the
very possibility of predmet thinking, the very possibility to act
according to the universal shapes of the world.
Absolute fruitfulness of attempts to form thinking in deaf and blind
children based on idea of arbitrariness of words-signs, and really great
results of Alexander Mescheriakov who practically formed the human
thinking in deaf and blind children in Zagorsk by teaching them to act
with spoon, to put on cloths etc., etc. gave us the real prove of
objective (predmetnij) not semiotic nature of human psyche and
consciousness.
Sasha
> Sasha--
>
> I am trying to understand this discussion.
> What is the title, in Russian, of the Vygotsky work you refer to as
> "emotions teaching"?
>
> What is the choice following Spinoza that you recommend?
> mike
>
> On 11/29/06, Alexander Surmava <monada@netvox.ru> wrote:
>>
>> Hi, Andy
>>
>>
>>
>> I'm afraid but I think that just in this issue we have better to base
>> our
>> analysis on Marx and Il'enkov themselves than on Lektorsky. If you are
>> retelling him correctly he doesn't gives us an insight into the problem
>> of
>> Subject and Object (Predmet) relation but simply shares the old mistake
>> with
>> A.N.Leont'ev.
>>
>> If subject is "some self-conscious system of activity" it means that
>> both
>> animals and plants can't be estimated as subjects, surely, if we don't
>> ascribe them some form of self-consciousness :-). So it means that all
>> living creatures (except the self-conscious humans) are mere objects
>> (here
>> it doesn't mean "predmet" but something passive). This is nothing but
>> ancient Cartesian formula.
>>
>> Let's go ahead. You write: "subject arises out of some definite,
>> objective
>> system of activity when it becomes self-conscious". I will agree with
>> this
>> statement if you (or Lektorsky) will explain us what makes your
>> "definite,
>> objective system of activity" turn into self-conscious being? The
>> possibility of such a magical transmutation of something mechanical,
>> passive
>> ("objective") into self-conscious is looking like the popular among some
>> psychologists idea of emerging. According to this point of view we
>> explain
>> something if we say that it suddenly emerges, or in old Soviet
>> ideological
>> style if something appears as a result of transition of quantity into
>> quality. You probably know that Vygotsky scoffed at the very idea of
>> emergentism in his "Emotions teaching".
>>
>> The main (Cartesian) mistake of CHAT classics was in their theoretically
>> fruitful attempts to jump from mechanic S==>R level to the level of
>> consciousness leaving out three necessary stages. It is clear that such
>> transition is possible only in fair tales where the fairy godmother
>> gives
>> a
>> soul to the ugly nutcracker.
>>
>> In reality to pass from mechanical to the consciousness level we have to
>> ascend to the levels of chemism and organism and only here on the stage
>> of
>> organic life we will meet the real subject-object (predmetnoe) relation.
>> The
>> birth of subjectness takes place here on the level of abstract life. But
>> on
>> the first stage (including unicellulars and plants) we have only
>> subjectness, not subjectivness. We have no reasons to search here
>> self-consciousness because on this level we haven't even psyche.
>>
>> Only on the next level when a living subject starts to relate to itself
>> or
>> the predmet activity of living subject is realizing by means of self
>> directed, reflecsive activity we are coming to the level of psyche (zoo
>> psyche) or self-sensation (still now – not self-consciousness).
>>
>> Thus we can go to the next level – the level of consciousness and self
>> consciousness only standing on the level of zoo psyche.
>>
>> Only basing on such intermediate evolutionary levels separating the
>> mechanical (Cartesian) S==>R robot and still Cartesian bodiless soul
>> with
>> free will we can acquire the rational, not magical understanding of free
>> bodily human being. On the contrary, if we will insist on our Cartesian
>> attempts we will at best have a chance to repeat after LSV the
>> questionable
>> metaphor of triangle and sign mediation or after ANL the idea of
>> activity
>> mediating the relation of stimulus and reaction.
>>
>> We entirely agree with Vygotsky's declaration that "the problem of
>> freedom
>> is a central problem of psychology" (it was recently published in
>> Russian
>> among other materials for Vygotsky's archive). We insist that both
>> Vygotsky
>> and Leont'ev belonged to one and the same theoretic school (you know
>> some
>> of
>> our colleges are denying this fact) because both they were trying to
>> solve
>> the one and the same problem – the problem of freedom. How a human can
>> be
>> free from the mechanical S==>R causation of its body?
>>
>> So if we want not only repeat both true and erroneous words of Vygotsky
>> and
>> Leont'ev being said long ago, but to do our part for development of CHAT
>> we
>> have to go further than they in solving the same problem which was in
>> the
>> focus of their theoretic interest, the problem of freedom. And we can do
>> it
>> only abandoning the false Cartesian position identifying animals with
>> mechanical (exclusive of subjectness) S==>R causality, doesn't
>> understanding
>> them as a subjects, (not to say about subjectivness) but as a soulless
>> mechanical toys. We are stressing that transition from Cartesian tubes,
>> threads and valves to the modern conception of living body as a
>> biomechanical S==>R robot left us entirely inside Cartesian mechanism as
>> a
>> specific logic.
>>
>> I realize that all this is hardly acceptable for those investigators who
>> are
>> trying to develop the semiotic approach appreciating LSV's idea of sign
>> mediation as his central and the most fruitful idea. It can't be helped.
>>
>> We have to choose the way: are we going to share Vygotsky's way based on
>> ideas of sign mediation, or we are going to share Vygotsky's way based
>> on
>> ideas of Spinoza. Vygotsky had too little time to realize that two these
>> ways led him to the opposite sides, split the very logic of his
>> investigation. I am sure, and I share this position with Il'enkov who
>> fundamentally argued the absolute incompatibility, of semiotic and
>> activity
>> approaches, that the semiotic way leads us to the dead end, while
>> activity
>> approach gives us a chance to build a new dialectical psychology.
>>
>> And we have to realize finally that Vygotsky was not a God, so if we are
>> investigators, not believers we have to cease the protracted
>> interpretation
>> of his "sacred" texts and start, or better to say – continue after him
>> investigation of problems he formulated for himself and for all of us.
>>
>>
>>
>> Sasha
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> On
>> Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>> Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 12:22 AM
>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: RE: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD
>>
>>
>>
>> Big question Michael.
>>
>> See http://www.marxists.org/archive/lektorsky/subject-object/index.htm
>> for
>>
>> a book-length answer from Lektorsky.
>>
>>
>>
>> Subject and object are always two distinct entities, but the subject
>> (some
>>
>> self-conscious system of activity) arises out of some definite,
>> objective
>>
>> system of activity when it becomes self-conscious, and the activity then
>>
>> constitutes (in AN Leontyev's words) the "intertraffic" between subject
>> and
>>
>> object. The activity of the subject then is to objectify itself in the
>>
>> object, giving its activities material forms deposited in the objective
>>
>> world around it, vested with meanings by which the subject
>>
>> "institutionalises" itself.
>>
>>
>>
>> So in the beginning there is no distinction, because the relevant system
>> of
>>
>> activity has not yet become self-conscious, and in the end there is no
>>
>> distinction because the subject has "naturalised" its activity and
>> become
>>
>> indistinguishable from the object. These are of course both tendencies,
>> and
>>
>> not absolute truths, and the whole life of a subject exists between
>> these
>>
>> two poles.
>>
>>
>>
>> Andy
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> At 02:03 PM 28/11/2006 -0500, you wrote:
>>
>> >Andy and Paul,
>>
>> >
>>
>> >What is the argument that a dialectical approach, even dialectical
>>
>> >materialism, dissolves the difference between subject and object? I
>> guess
>>
>> >we are all influenced by what we have been reading lately, but it seems
>>
>> >that it is difficult for a dialectic based perspective to escape the
>>
>> >idealism trap.
>>
>> >
>>
>> >Thanks,
>>
>> >
>>
>> >Michael
>>
>> >
>>
>> >-----Original Message-----
>>
>> >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> On
>>
>> >Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>
>> >Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 5:09 AM
>>
>> >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>
>> >Subject: Re: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD (was= Does
>> VygotskyAccept
>>
>> >the "Assistance Assumption"?)
>>
>> >
>>
>> >Paul, surely you overstate the matter.
>>
>> >
>>
>> >ZPD is, like all scientific concepts, a theory-laden object. To say
>> that
>> it
>>
>> >exists says that certain more or less well-defined procedures
>> understood
>>
>> >within the Vygotskyan theory, will produce this or that verifiable
>> result.
>>
>> >Otherwise what is the useof the concept and the theory of which it is a
>>
>> >part? While there are lots of concepts within the Vygotskyan theory
>> which
>>
>> >are new and unique, or have a Marxist genealogy, there are also plenty
>>
>> >which are shared with all pedagogical theories and common sense. In
>> fact,
>>
>> >all scientific theories must incorporate "common sense" concepts into
>> their
>>
>> >framework in order to be truly scientific. "Empiricism" denies that
>>
>> >scientific objects are "theory laden" and that there is anything
>>
>> >problematic in the idea of a purely factual test for the existence of
>> some
>>
>> >object. But to deny Empiricism is not to deny the validity and
>> necessity
>> of
>>
>> >empirical evidence.
>>
>> >
>>
>> >And surely it is wrong to say that in Marxism or Vygotsky "the subject
>>
>> >object distinction is dissolved". The absolute independence and
>>
>> >separateness of subject and object is certainly denied by Marx and
>>
>> >Vygotsky, but neither claim that "subject" and "object" are invalid
>>
>> >concepts, or concepts between which no distinction can be made. For
>>
>> >example, Marx does not claim that an object (e.g. ZPD) exists insofar
>> as
>> a
>>
>> >subject (Vygotskyan psychology) incorporates the concept in its
>> activity,
>>
>> >so that empirical refutation of the concept is ruled out in principle.
>> No
>>
>> >subject exists in absolute separateness from every other subject, all
>>
>> >subjects exist in a material and therefore infinitely interconnected,
>>
>> >world. So the identity of subject and object can only be relative, not
>>
>> >absolute.
>>
>> >
>>
>> >Andy
>>
>> >
>>
>> >At 12:26 AM 28/11/2006 -0800, you wrote:
>>
>> > > Isn´'t the idea of "empirical" evidence for the ZPD something of
>> an
>>
>> > > oxymoron in itself? Didn{t Vygotsky develop his thinking within the
>>
>> > > framework of dialetical materialism, something that many north
>> americans
>>
>> > > and others seem all too ready to forget? Isn't the concept of a ZPD
>> a
>>
>> > > dialectical model in itself, which is to say, a model in which the
>>
>> > > subject object distinction is dissolved, a dissolution which defies
>> the
>>
>> > > concept of empirical?
>>
>> > > Paul Dillon
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>> AIM
>>
>> >identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>
>> >
>>
>> >_______________________________________________
>>
>> >xmca mailing list
>>
>> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>
>> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>> >_______________________________________________
>>
>> >xmca mailing list
>>
>> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>> AIM
>>
>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>
>>
>>
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