??
Consciousness explains everything and therefor does not need explanation?
mike
On 1/26/06, Phil Chappell <philchappell@mac.com> wrote:
>
> And the Dalai Lama (Tibet) wrote:
>
> Everything is subject to change, and to causes and conditions. So
> there is no place given to a divine creator, nor to beings who are
> self-created; rather everything arises as a consequence of causes and
> conditions. So mind, or consciousness, too comes into being as a
> result of previous instants... the ultimate creative principle is
> consciousness...
>
>
>
> On 25/01/2006, at 10:40 PM, bb wrote:
>
> > About this doctrine thing, here's a counterpoint:
> >
> > "The ever present , unspoken assumption of [The Tibetan Book of the
> > Dead] is
> > the antinominal character of all metaphysical assertions, and also
> > the idea
> > of the qualitative differences of the various levels of
> > consciousness and of
> > the metaphysical realities conditioned by them. The background of
> > this
> > unusual book is not the European 'either-or' but a magnificently
> > affirmative
> > 'both-and'. "
> >
> > C.G. Jung
> >
> > On Tuesday 24 January 2006 11:06 pm, Mike Cole wrote:
> >> And then there is ancient wisdom, manifest in Catholic doctrine as
> >> well
> >> as good developmental science that the end is in the beginning.
> >> (or is that bad developmental science?) (or incorrect doctrine?).
> >>
> >> Working too hard on lectures on tangentially related topics to get
> >> back to
> >> the tertiary artifact discussion, bb et al, the mind is weak but
> >> the flesh
> >> is weaker.
> >> mike
> >>
> >> On 1/24/06, Ed Wall <ewall@umich.edu> wrote:
> >>> Interestingly enough (at least, I think so -
> >>> smile) while reading this email as regards
> >>> prolepsis and the nicely sketched example, I was
> >>> reading Gadamer reading Hegel and came across the
> >>> following:
> >>>
> >>> "Now it is clear, and Hegel makes use of the fact
> >>> in his commentary, that it lies in the nature of
> >>> any beginning to be dialectical. Nothing can be
> >>> presupposed in it and it clearly reveals itself
> >>> as primary and immediate. But it is still a
> >>> beginning only if it begins a development, which
> >>> is to say that it is "mediated" by the
> >>> latter....All becoming is a becoming of something
> >>> which exists as a result of having become. That
> >>> is an ancient truth, one already formulated by
> >>> Plato in the Philebus ..."
> >>>
> >>> Also, of course, there is Heidegger's
> >>>
> >>> "By this understanding, the possibilities of its
> >>> Being are disclosed and regulated. Its own past -
> >>> and this always means the past of its
> >>> 'generation' - is not something that *follows
> >>> along after Dasien*, but something which already
> >>> goes ahead of it."
> >>>
> >>> Ed Wall
> >>>
> >>>> Mike wrote:
> >>>> "So maybe the whole Wartofsky set of distinctions are
> >>>> irrelevant. Or
> >>>> need
> >>>
> >>> to
> >>>
> >>>> be bracket/specified more?"
> >>>>
> >>>> I prefer the latter, at least. Re-reading what
> >>>> Wartofsky wrote (Thanks Phil), I see the
> >>>> descriptions of primary through tertiary
> >>>> artifacts occurring in a manner which is not
> >>>> located in a particular situation, but
> >>>> generalized, and so I have the same reservation
> >>>> about use of these categories as I do tool and
> >>>> sign. That is to say, in instantiation,
> >>>> something could be a tool in one circumstance
> >>>> and a sign in another. For example, in forensic
> >>>> analysis, a knife that was once a tool, an
> >>>> instrument of someone's death, is matched in its
> >>>> shape and length to the wound, to become a sign
> >>>> in constructing the narrative of how the crime
> >>>> was committed. Similarly, if analyzed with
> >>>> Wartofsky's categories, the primary artifact has
> >>>> become a secondary one.
> >>>>
> >>>> Recasting the definitions of primary -> tertiary
> >>>> in functional terms has some advantage in
> >>>> specifying further how these categories can
> >>>> themselves function in theoretical analysis:
> >>>>
> >>>> Primary artifacts function directly in the
> >>>> production of the means of existence and in the
> >>>> reproduction of the species.
> >>>>
> >>>> Secondary artifacts function in the preservation
> >>>> and transmission of the acquired skills or modes
> >>>> of action or praxis by which this production is
> >>>> carried out.
> >>>>
> >>>> Secondary artifacts function in preserving and
> >>>> transmitting skills, and in the production and
> >>>> use of 'primary' artifacts (e.g. tools, modes of
> >>>> social organization, bodily skills and technical
> >>>> skills in the use of tools).
> >>>>
> >>>> Recasting this way facilitates a functional view
> >>>> of artifacts, aligning better Wartofsky's
> >>>> categories with analysis by Halliday, Lemke,
> >>>> Wells, and others, examining how language
> >>>> functions in activity. Then, it is easier to
> >>>> see, how, in instantiation, artifacts can be
> >>>> multi-functional.
> >>>>
> >>>> The first example is drawn from Gordon's
> >>>> "Dialogic Inquiry", (p 200) in which he shows
> >>>> how the third move in triadic dialogue, the E in
> >>>> IRE, is multifunctional: (1) in the teacher
> >>>> checking the students knowledge and (2) in
> >>>> extending the student's answer.
> >>>>
> >>>> The second example comes from Jeanne, my
> >>>> coauthor, expressing how she was reconfiguring
> >>>> her classroom during the summer of 2004, in
> >>>> anticipation of a new cohort of students. To
> >>>> locate this exchange theoretically, I'd like to
> >>>> quote Mike's description of prolepsis, which is
> >>>> essentially what Jeanne engages in when
> >>>> redesigning the classroom to the form I have
> >>>> posted on the web:
> >>>>
> >>>> "Only a culture-using human being can "reach
> >>>> into" the cultural past, project it into the
> >>>> future, and then "carry" that conceptual future
> >>>> "back" into the present to create the
> >>>> sociocultural environment of the newcomer."
> >>>> Cole, cultural psychology, p 186
> >>>>
> >>>> Our exchange follows:
> >>>>
> >>>> J:" I moved the circle table over mostly because
> >>>> I wanted to make a separate meeting area too. So
> >>>> there are two meeting areas now. There will be
> >>>> another easel, right by the black board. There's
> >>>> a yellow rug, and I've got two red rugs."
> >>>>
> >>>> B: "Why two meeting areas?"
> >>>>
> >>>> J: "Well, because I have the [collaborative
> >>>> model] now, this year. So I'm going to have two
> >>>> teachers in here. There will be two teachers, me
> >>>> and Gina. And, um, so I have a higher
> >>>> population of special ed. children, so this way
> >>>> I have more leverage. I can break kids up. Gina
> >>>> and I can say OK you take the same lesson,
> >>>> differentiate it, but we can actually do it at
> >>>> the same time. Two places to work. I can meet
> >>>> with reading groups over there….
> >>>>
> >>>> What's also going to happen is that this new
> >>>> meeting area is going to have more math stuff
> >>>> over here. So we'll do more math things because
> >>>> the screen is right there. So I can pull the
> >>>> screen down and most of the kids should be able
> >>>> to sit there or at a table. All the kids will
> >>>> be able to stay right there and see the screen.
> >>>> Maybe grab a clipboard and that's easy. And then
> >>>> the other one am going to keep more for
> >>>> literacy, read alouds, I put the big book
> >>>> holder, the chart thing, the schedule.
> >>>>
> >>>> Morning meeting will be in the same place. But
> >>>> I'll have more leverage. I finally have a place
> >>>> for that chart thing, right there next to you. I
> >>>> won't have to move it, I'll just have to move
> >>>> the children. The pocket chart. The big pocket
> >>>> chart, which also has poems on it. So when we
> >>>> are doing nursery rhyme study, I'll be able to
> >>>> have that in a much better place than it was
> >>>> last year. "
> >>>>
> >>>> Jeanne's use of future tense, in Halliday and
> >>>> Hasan's terms: cataphora, e.g. "will be", "going
> >>>> to happen", "going to have" indicates her
> >>>> projecting into the future, and her making both
> >>>> cataphoric and anaphoric reference "Morning
> >>>> meeting will be in the same place", with "same
> >>>> place" referencing back into "the same place as
> >>>> last year" and which I understood in context.
> >>>> The exophoric references Jeanne makes to the
> >>>> artifacts in her classroom, "right there", "over
> >>>> here", indicate how these artifacts contribute
> >>>> to the narrative in which Jeanne tells me of the
> >>>> processes of her planning.
> >>>>
> >>>> Whether this future world in which Jeanne
> >>>> anticipates what will be happening with her
> >>>> children qualifies as a tertiary artifact, I'm
> >>>> still not convinced. But if it does, it has the
> >>>> following implications. The tables, the screens,
> >>>> the yellow rug, the red rug, the easel, the
> >>>> circle table, are all secondary artifacts for
> >>>> the children, who are learning to read, write,
> >>>> do math, etc.. They function in the children's
> >>>> learning activities during the day, qualifying
> >>>> as secondary artifacts. But for Jeanne, the
> >>>> physical locations and orientations of these
> >>>> materials function in her planning for the
> >>>> entire school year, anticipating the diversity
> >>>> in children's learning, the role of other
> >>>> adults, the curriculum that the children are
> >>>> about to learn, supporting her imagining what
> >>>> will happen in her classroom.. The spatial
> >>>> location of these artifacts mediate Jeanne's
> >>>> thinking about what is to happen in the
> >>>> classroom. As in Mike's description of
> >>>> prolepsis, Jeanne has not yet met the childre!
> >>>> n, but is configuring her room in expectation
> >>>> of their future activity. In her planning, in
> >>>> this instantiation, the very same artifacts that
> >>>> function secondarily in the children's learning,
> >>>> function in a tertiary manner in Jeanne's
> >>>> planning.
> >>>>
> >>>> Does this make sense?
> >>>> bb
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> From: xmca-whoever@comcast.net (bb)
> >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>>> Subject: Gordon Wells on Halliday
> >>>> Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2006 21:59:12 +0000
> >>>> Content-Type: Multipart/mixed;
> >>>> boundary="NextPart_Webmail_9m3u9jl4l_11056_1138030309_1"
> >>>>
> >>>> From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] constraints, affordances and semiotic
> >>>> potentials
> >>>> Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2006 19:42:27 +0000
> >>>> Content-Type: Multipart/mixed;
> >>>> boundary="NextPart_Webmail_9m3u9jl4l_24929_1137880752_1"
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
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