>>but perhaps i don't understand what you mean (or maybe we
>>disagree?). habituation to an artifact, whether as an extension of
>>the body (Bateson's cane for example) or otherwise, mediates
>>consciousness whether it is at the level of operation in a smoothly
>>functioning process-ontology or migrates up to an action should a
>>challenge present itself.
>This is exactly where you are not taking into account Heidegger's
>analysis (Being and Time, pp. 76-83) of the sign, or Derrida's
>analysis of language. You are also not consistent with Buber's
>distinction between I-You and I-It, both of which involve language,
>but of different kind.
you've misread me. for clarification, the point above had to do with
my (possible mis-) interpretation of your earlier (to me unclear)
statement about mediation.
BREAK: Ana's note just came in. Michael -- as you feel so strongly
about what i (and possibly others) have not taken account of/been
consistent with, why don't we move at least one strand of the
conversation in the direction Ana suggests -- that you illustrate
some concrete examples using Buber in particular. what do you think?
>Back to the above point, the mediating relationship in the activity
>system, or for action, cannot be the same as that in the operation
>case, and this is exactly the point Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Buber
>and others seem to make in my view.
-- Steven L. Thorne Assistant Professor of Applied Linguistics Linguistics and Applied Language Studies and Communication Arts and Sciences Associate Director, Center for Language Acquisition Associate Director, Center for Advanced Language Proficiency Education and Research The Pennsylvania State University Interact > 814.863.7036 | email@example.com | http://language.la.psu.edu/~thorne/ | IM: avkrook
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