Andy sent this to me by mistake and intended it for the list.
My own view is that the connection to Goffman is interesting and
highlights for me
the ambiguity in this discussion about the reference (s) of the term
socially situated, social situation, historicallyi situated, etc. When
Khan is driving with her mother to
a lawyer and the discourse sample is her report of what was said on
( in that "situation") she is also in a more extensive sense situated
in a family and
a community, in the US, in a historical moment of Southeast Asian diaspora, etc.
I get really confused about what sense of situated are invoked when
in the use of Bakhtin.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: andrew jocuns <email@example.com>
Date: Sun, 20 Feb 2005 07:01:18 -0500
Subject: Re: dialogical self
I hope you don't mind me jumping in here. The different I-positions
remind me a lot of what Goffman refers to as the different senses of "I"
that can emerge in interaction in his Footing paper. Goffman suggests
that different sense of "I" become embedded through different types
speech within a social situation.
Mike Cole wrote:
>Thank you for expanding our horizons by checking into the references
>in the B&R article, Ini. I am still somewhat unclear about the idea of
> "inclusive separation" which I encountered in the debate between
>Rogoff and Valsiner in Human Development a while
>back. This passage I found particularly helpful with its pointers
>toward next places to look:
>The I-positions are continuously created within the sociocultural
>constraints of the situation. The description of I-positions is in
>that case just a
>tool of the observer. The I-positions are not different parts that
>reorganize inside the head. And that just what they according to B&R –
>following Valsiner - are: "…. that some forms of negotiations with
>parts of the self are less demanding and lead us forward toward a more 'stable'
>development, although other forms of negotiations are more paralyzing, severe
>and show 'instability'." (p 238) So B&R might want to present a really
>dynamic conception of identity, but I think Valsiner's intrapsychological
>organization and reorganization still forms the background..
>Seems like we need to check on some key Valsiner texts. Not that Jaan
>also speaks of "personal culture" as that part of the cultural tool
>kit (is a tool kit also a process? hmmm)
>that has been internalized by the individual, or is known to the
>individual, etc. Part of the
>inclusive separation issue I believe.
>On Thu, 17 Feb 2005 17:13:19 +0100, I.Haket@ppsw.rug.nl
>>Your e-mails fed my thinking about the dialogical self en social
>>looked at the article again with your remarks in mind.
>>Let me first repeat that I think the position of B & R interesting
and a very good
>>alternative for Berry's approach. My problem was with the conceptual
>>framework. To say that identity is dynamic and socially situated is
not the same
>>as offering a theory that shows, how identity is dynamic and
>>Maybe I 'd better sketch the background of my question. I 'm working on a
>>dynamic conception of culture/cognition. At the moment I'm studying Rogoff's
>>theory. So identity is not really my subject, but it interest me nonetheless,
>>because I think we need a general framework for understanding development as
>>dynamic and socially situated.
>>Looking through the article again the thought crossed my mind, that maybe I
>>didn't aim my comment at the right authors. Who should provide the theoretical
>>framework? B&R cite Valsiner en Hermans. Valsiner interprets the relation
>>individual – world as inclusive separation. As I understand this, the term is
>>presented as an alternative to dualism, but is also meant to convey the
>>independent status of (in this case) I-positions inside the human head. After
>>reading the B & R article I read one of Hermans' articles. My impression was,
>>that I-positions in his theory are rather static. (Although he
claims them to be
>>dynamic?) Hermans conceives of self as a dynamic construction on the base of
>>I-positions like a father or a worker. When I 'm looking for social
>>want to understand, how I-positions are really dynamic. Let me explain this by
>>using as an analogy abstract cognitive skills. These used to be interpreted as
>>abstract competences in the head. I think abstractions as such are just in the
>>head of the researcher. In the same way I can conceive of I-positions as
>>dynamic. The I-positions are continuously created within the sociocultural
>>constraints of the situation. The description of I-positions is in
that case just a
>>tool of the observer. The I-positions are not different parts that
>>reorganize inside the head. And that just what they according to B&R –
>>following Valsiner - are: "…. that some forms of negotiations with
>>parts of the self are less demanding and lead us forward toward a
>>development, although other forms of negotiations are more paralyzing, severe
>>and show 'instability'." (p 238) So B&R might want to present a really
>>dynamic conception of identity, but I think Valsiner's intrapsychological
>>organization and reorganization still forms the background.
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