Please keep these coming, ie your contributions to XMCA- they've been
helpful to me and will surely continue to be so. Also, had you heard about
this, The Michigan Humor Initiative?
http://www.lsa.umich.edu/psych/news/department/news/?id=132 It relates to
your work on cartoons. I think I might have sent a while back, but I forget.
Also, need to have a quick chat with you tomorrow about classes- will you be
From: Jay Lemke [mailto:email@example.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2005 11:56 PM
Cc: XMCA LISTGROUP
Subject: Re: signs/symbols etc
many interesting questions ... questions beget questions when we're really
first perhaps, the tool. We can think of a tool as having an iconic sign
function insofar as form follows function ... insofar as from looking at
some tools we can tell a bit about what they were used _on_ or with (e.g. a
screwdriver, a key, a plug-for-a-socket or vice versa, etc.) We can think of
it as having an indexical sign function insofar as its other material
affordances, what it can physically do not by virtue of shape or form alone,
but in other respects (say a brick as a weapon, or a screwdriver as a
lever), "points to" those uses or contexts or co-operands.
but indeed a tool can also be a symbol, as when the Euclidean compass (or
protractor for those old enough to remember constructive geometry in school)
is a symbol of the field of architecture (Egyptian) or of the society of
Free Masons (builders). In that case its relation to its "object", what it
points towards (or what an interpreting system construes it as pointing
towards) is based now NOT on its physical properties (form or causal
efficacy) but on some conventional generalization perhaps far abstracted
from its historical uses, with an intervening cultural value system that has
determined that some particular such connection is a salient one (architects
or builders could be represented symbolically by trowels, or blueprints, or
stone blocks, or archways).
But is it then still a tool? or just the image or idea of what was once a
More in the spirit of CHAT, I think, would be the notion that something
can be used as a tool and ALSO have a symbolic value (the Ideal aspect): an
heirloom samurai sword can still be used to cut someone's head off, and it
may retain its symbolic value in part because it is still kept sharp and
functional; or its shorter cousin might be the hara-kiri tool of choice, not
just because it's sharper than the ordinary kitchen knife, but because it is
more honorable and appropriate to cut out your guts with a family heirloom
that symbolically represents honor and the way of the samurai than to do the
same act with a kitchen knife. Tool function and symbolic meaning can
converge as well as diverge.
As to the sense/sentence/utterance meaning distinctions ... I think Peg is
right that one has some different dimensions here. My sense of how Peirce
deals with this is that word or sentence meaning is conventional symbolic
meaning, arbitrary and assigned by convention of the community ... but
utterance meaning, apart from issues of intentionality, is an interpreted
meaning, it has a longer chain of interpretants, that goes from the typical
sentence meaning to what that sentence is taken to mean by some interpreter,
in a context, with a history, etc.
I believe that for Vygotsky the great wonder was that a lot of individual
interpreters could all agree on some more abstract sentence meanings.
Bakhtin rather reversed this and wondered at how we take a sentence and make
it our own on some occasion, how we fill it with our unique accentuations.
"yeah, yeah" becomes "you've got to be kidding" or "not likely" or "tell me
something I don't know" when filled by not just tone of voice, but selective
use in a situation. LSV is looking at how the child gets into the shared
language system of the community. B. is looking at how we then take a shared
resource and use it to make meanings uniquely our own.
Halliday would say that a sentence in isolation, like a word, has a
"meaning potential", a specific range of things it DOES NOT mean, choices it
makes among all possible meanings that define an open range of what it
could, as opposed to could not, mean according to the conventions of the
community ... but an utterance in actual situated use has an "instantial
meaning" which is far more specific, more specific indeed than the language
system as such allows for, because it incorporate meaning-specifying
contextual information in addition to the linguistic information represented
by choices in the semantic system.
The child is learning to interpret instantial meanings from which to infer
ways of using (implicit) meaning potentials to create new instantial
meanings. The little grammarian is also a little poet. LSV talks a good deal
about the role of symbolic play in learning the culture ... does he deal
specifically with word-play? with what I would take to be the strongest
evidence of conscious use of language (or any signs) as tools, and not just
as a code-of-standard-meanings: inventive play with language. Lying is just
the tip of this iceberg, below it lie puns and jokes, and deep under the
water the marvelous poetry of everyday inventive language use. Kids,
famously, say the damndest things!
At 12:32 PM 1/9/2005, you wrote:
Jay-- This summary was helpful to me:
For Peirce, and usefully for many influenced by his semiotics, SIGN is
most general term, and SYMBOL is a special case (contrasted usually with
"index" and "icon") where the interpretation or construal of a relation
between the symbol (as form, i.e. signifier, aka representamen) and what
it's taken to be a symbol of or for is based on a culturally
and otherwise arbitrary relationship unrelated to any physical-causal
connection or to any formal similarity.
SIGNs are not just symbols, but all possible types of 3-way
in which something (1) interprets a relationship between (2) one item
(form, event, thing, whatever) and (3) another, which is not reducible
simple sum of pairwise relations.
So, would it be fair to say that Vygotsky really was talking about
sign mediation of at least the index and symbolic subvarieties? (I am
not so sure about icons because of his writing on "natural"
psychological processes where images are precursors of signs). Then
when he slips into using the term symbol as in "symbolic activity"
(see index of collected works) he is not making some new point we
should focus on?
And, what should WE really be talking about? From an earlier message,
Peg, in November,
wrote in response to a note from Peter:
The definitions you found for sign and symbol make me think of Grice's
discussion of natural and non-natural meaning. "These spots mean
is an example of natural; "Three rings of the bell means the trolley is
stop" is an example of non-natural.
Tools and symbols would both be non-natural. Signs would be natural.
For language, there is also a tripartite distinction among sentence
utterance meaning, and speaker meaning. Maybe that distinction would
in handy when thinking about symbols that re-present in/for a
socio-historical community of users.
So, Peg, if we talk about a word like "water" it can operate as a
sign in the sense of Jay's para 2, but also as both "a culturally
and otherwise arbitrary relationship unrelated to any physical-causal
connection or to any formal similarity" and "symbols that re-present
socio-historical community of users." It operates as a sign if I say
"The rain in southern
california is finally filling our reservoirs with water" but as a
symbol when I say " Water reminds us of the cycle of living matter, of
the fragility of life in southern california, and of life
But if this is a reasonable way to think two questions come to mind:
1. Are all tools only symbols and never signs?
2. The three kinds of meaning you mention do not map easily for me
onto the sense/
meaning distinction in vygotky, in particular "speaker meaning."
Wouldn't speaker meaning be sense?
As usual, confused in southern california.
University of Michigan
School of Education
610 East University
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
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