An interesting illustration of this comes in moral/character education.
One big criticism of Lawrence Kohlberg (who more or less founded the idea
of moral reasoning) was that people could be deemed highly moral based on
their articulation of moral ideas in response to Kohlberg's scenarios, yet
behave badly; or a person could be less articulate (and deemed of lesser
moral development) yet behave admirably. Most politicians I know of fit
the first profile well, including some current office-holders. Peter
> Peter et al interested in externalization/internalization.
> I have the D&A article which you referred to, Peter, and I will get it
> pdf'ed next week and posted for discussion.
> Turns out I wrote a little intro and noted, in part,
> "Davydov consistently rejects the notion that to be able to talk about a
> concept of to fulfill it under a restricted set of circumstances is
> to indicate that it has been thoroughly internalized; rather, the
> individual must demonstrate an ability to carry out the requisite
> in a variet of appropriate circumstances.
> An especially interesting point .. is the evidence that certain
> (gestures for example) may inherently be particularly bound to certain
> stimulus configurations, thus reducing the generalizability of the
> cognitive operations....."
> The gestures Davydov is talking about are quite different than the ones
> in the Amelia, GP example. Plenty of interesting food for thought.
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