Andy,
The focus of the discussion was - at least up to now - on the practice of
war. I think that rational analysis has a lot to say on this subject and
said so. You're raising a different, though no less important issue, the
wider economic and political questions involved in the decision to go to
war. Simple good-old repression, gunboat diplomacy and what have you are
practices of war; ask any Vietnamese vetran (as well as a good many American
and Russian vetrans for that matter), most Iraqi citizens, and... (I don't
think its necessary to list others, there are plenty). War is as Clauswitz
wrote is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our
will." I can't think of a better definition than that for repression! War
can be undeclared, it can involve ngo's, and can even be declared against an
unarmed population.
The fact that war is repression is like the fact that it is violent, not
really very useful for serious analysis. Machiavelli, V. Clauswitz, Marx
and Engels, as well as other more recent writers like Hobsbawm, Stadt and
Schelling have raised important and relevant questions about war; its
relation to economics and civil society, its role in cultural-historical
development, and so on. Considering the threat of war to human survival and
the natural difficulties of regarding it rationally, it is a major
challenge, if not the major challenge to cultural-historical analysis.
Highest regards,
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 11:01 AM
Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> Sorry Victor. I think that was one of those reflex messages when I should
> hesitate before pressing "Send."
> I guess part of my reaction was because of radio talk here to the effect
> that "war is like this," i.e., it's justifiable. But of course what may be
> at a pinch justifiable in overcoming an opposing army can in no sense at
> all be justified when occupying a country and suppressing the resistance
of
> its populace. The war was justified before the event because although they
> were going to kill civilians with their "precision bombing" it was all
> worth it to get rid of the Saddam Hussein regime. I guess a lot of
> Americans and even some Iraqis were willing to go along with that
> utilitarian argument. This is what they get. And it isn't war, because
> there's no-one to declare war against. This is just simple, good old
> fashioned repression.
> Andy
> At 10:41 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> >Andy,
> >Since when is war a matter of official prononciamentos? The US fought a
10
> >year undeclared war in Vietnam (one important reason why I don't live
there)
> >killed some 2 million Vietnamese and about 58,000 Americans, effectively
> >destroyed the physical and economic infrastructure of Vietnam and lost
the
> >war against international Communism to boot. The WAR in Iraq promises us
> >another replay of Vietnam. It will probably go on interminably for years,
> >kill lots of Americans and many many more Iraqis, destroy whatever
remnants
> >of economic and civil organization are left in Iraq, and the US will end
up
> >losing the war for Liberal Democracy to boot. Is it relevant? I say it's
> >relevant as h--l!
> >Highest regards,
> >Victor
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:36 AM
> >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> >
> >
> > > But excuse me, the war was over months ago.
> > > What is going on now is the imposition of democracy in Iraq by the
> > > occupying power.
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > At 07:34 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > >Peter and David,
> > > >1. I sense here a certain degree of imbalance, easy judgements too
> >quickly
> > > >arrived at, and a measure of distance from the conditions experienced
by
> > > >soldiers and police officers, and civilians in war-time conditions.
The
> > > >Milgram experiments, Zimbardo's experiments at Stanford, and other
like
> > > >exercises for evoking interpersonal cruelty and terror have only the
> >barest
> > > >relevance to the practice of cruelty and of terror in war-time. The
> > > >discovery that humans are capable of collective violence, even
extreme
> > > >collective violence, is of little interest when applied to the study
and
> > > >evaluation of war and military policy. WE ALREADY KNOW THAT! Regard
the
> > > >elementary concept of war as presented by that most excellent
objective
> > > >idealist, v. Clauswitz:
> > > > "War ... is an
act of
> > > >violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."
> > > >This concept is elementary, and universal; it does not refer to
Americans
> >at
> > > >war, Iraquis at war, Muslim Jihadists at war, etc. etc. but to all
> > > >practicioners of war and to all practice of war. Thus, in the context
of
> >war
> > > >we can reasonably discuss the effectiveness of this or that policy of
> > > >violence, i.e. whether it is likely "to compel our opponent to
fulfill
> >our
> > > >will," not the practice of violence itself. Critical evaluation of
the
> > > >practice at war is most useful when addressed to the military
mission.
> > > >Evaluation of the mission can and should be done at all levels: be it
the
> > > >decision to invade Iraq, the decision to to so without full UN
> > > >participation, the decision to renovate the Al Ghraib prison, the
> >decision
> > > >to arrest and detain far more suspects of guerilla activity - now all
> > > >extra-military collect violence is indiscriminately called terror,
how
> > > >silly! - than can be secured and investigated with due speed and
> > > >effectiveness, and so on and on
> > > >
> > > >2. So, how can we relate to the conditions at the Al Ghraib prison
> >within
> > > >the context of the war in Iraq? We can, of course, criticize the
mission
> >as
> > > >a whole; the invasion into Iraq by a coalition of one, possibly two,
> > > >powerful states, with much to gain and little to lose in a war in
Iraq
> > > >augmented by a collection of their client states. While there is a
good
> > > >deal to be said about the explicit and hidden objectives of the
mission
> >in
> > > >Iraq, it is not the focus of current discussion. Evaluation of the
> > > >treatment of a rebellious civilian population, prisoners of war and
> > > >prisoners in general is the issue here. I'll make this short: the
> > > >under-supervised exercise of "softening techniques" by personell with
> >only a
> > > >smattering acquaintance with the psychology and psychobiology of
> >coercion,
> > > >with even less knowledge of the historical, cultural and social
contexts
> >of
> > > >their prisoners, and, worst of all (remember this is a discussion of
> > > >war-time practice), total ignorance of useful military practice has
> >produced
> > > >conditions that expose the coalition armies to the most difficult
kind of
> > > >oppositional modes; that of angry contempt. Demonization of the
enemy,
> > > >indisciplined expression of violence unrelated to the mission at
hand,
> >and
> > > >the emergence of what I called in an earlier message the formation of
> >unit
> > > >practices irrelevant to the unit's mission are all sure signs of
emergent
> > > >irrelevance of practice for the effective realization of military
> > > >objectives and the general collapse of morale.
> > > >
> > > >3. A military unit whose members fail to recognize that their
opponents
> >are
> > > >as human as they are has already gone a long way in becoming a
military
> > > >liability and is in severe danger of permanent, irrevocable and final
> > > >closure. Demonization is, in a military context, simply the
replacement
> >of
> > > >that most basic principle of the art of war; "know thine opponent at
> >least
> > > >as well as you know thyself," with a comforting but false image of
the
> > > >opponent as subhuman, unworthy, and contemptible. . When
administration
> > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi dissidents,
and
> > > >liken Iraqis to vermin they encourage the very uprising they
ostensibly
> >hope
> > > >to repress. Relevant too is the example from the Rwandan genocide.
The
> > > >reference by Hutu extremists to Tutsi's as "cockroaches" may have
given
> >the
> > > >Hutu the confidence to murder some 800,000 unarmed Tutsi's, but it
> >resulted
> > > >in a bloody civil war in which the armed Tutsi "cockroaches" managed
to
> > > >expell a respectable portion of the Hutu into permanent exile in
refugee
> > > >camps outside Rwanda.
> > > >
> > > >4. Extreme violence can be effective policy in the practice of war,
but
> >it
> > > >alone never guarantees the political aims of war. Of the most often
> >cited
> > > >examples of the cruelest of conquest states; Gengis Khan, the Romans
and,
> >of
> > > >course, the Axis powers, only the Romans managed to stabilize
somewhat
> >their
> > > >victories, and this they did mainly by conscientious incorporation of
> > > >conquered states into the very fabric of their empire. Certainly,
the
> > > >indisciplined practice of violence irrelevant to military goals is as
> > > >ineffective as are policies of extreme violence and even
> >counter-productive
> > > >to the aim of forcing the opponent's compliance. Indisciplined
violence
> >on
> > > >the part of a military organization signals its opponents that there
is
> > > >really no basis for reasonable relations (these can exist in war as
in
> >any
> > > >other circumstance) and that even compliance is not a real option.
In
> >the
> > > >absence of any possibility to communicate with the enemy, the only
> > > >possibility is war ā outrance (war to the bitter end), something that
no
> > > >reasonable policy of war can accept.
> > > >
> > > >5. As written above we've already discussed the problems of the
> >emergence
> > > >of internal practices irrelevant to the unit's mission. In those
> > > >presentations we also indicated that the authoritarian military
hierarchy
> > > >has evolved from the integral difficulties of critical
self-evaluation
> >for
> > > >the isolated military unit under pressure. We agree entirely with
> >Stephen
> > > >Reicher and Alex Haslam that the existance of responsible and
intelligent
> > > >military leadership is integral to an effective military
organization.
> >It
> > > >is, again, Clauswitz who raises some pretty pointed questions
concerning
> >the
> > > >nature and conditions of leadership in democratic, mass society.
> >National
> > > >leadership and it's subsidiary military specialists are subject to
> >political
> > > >pressures of both special interests and of public opinion that is
neither
> > > >subject to the discipline of rational practice of war nor even
familiar
> >with
> > > >war-time conditions. Think of the tremendous appeal of expressions
such
> >as
> > > >"The Axis of Evil," "the Yellow Horde," and "Police Pigs" to a
frightened
> > > >and impressionable population that votes, often without a clear idea
of
> >what
> > > >they're voting for. How easy it is to mobilize public support for
> >extreme
> > > >politics by contrived lies such as MacNamara's Tonkin Bay incident,
the
> >WMD
> > > >foolishness, and the suggestion that making "the n word + piles" of
naked
> > > >Iraqi prisoners is high military policy of the coalition forces in
Iraq.
> >The
> > > >emergence of national states, mass democracy, and the possibilities
for
> > > >concentrating tremendous resources for the prosecution of war and
> >oppression
> > > >has made the last century the bloodiest in human history, and it
appears
> > > >that we haven't really even begun to address the problem in this
century
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > >From: "Peter Smagorinsky" <smago@coe.uga.edu>
> > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > >Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 9:22 PM
> > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > Oz is an HBO program set in a prison with lots of hard core
criminals
> >and
> > > > > hard core guards.
> > > > > At 01:02 PM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > >Peter,
> > > > > >
> > > > > >What Oz is?
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Re the torture imagery in American life, the few times I saw NYPD
> >blue,
> > > > > >it seemed to me that it was in the verge of legitimizing the use
of
> > > > > >torture as a way to collect criminal info. Of course, in a
"softened"
> > > > > >way, but the underlying message was quite violent and, of
course,the
> > > > > >naive viewer couldnīt help but identifying with the good cops. As
> >9/11
> > > > > >directed viewers to see with New eyes American movies, the Iraq
> >Torture
> > > > > >case should do the same thing. There is plenty of cases where
> >physical
> > > > > >abuse is done by the "good" guys, but always in a threshold that
an
> > > > > >average viewer can tolerate (and enjoy...)
> > > > > >
> > > > > >David
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Quoting Peter Smagorinsky <smago@coe.uga.edu>:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > 3ce7295.jpg
> > > > > > > At 10:52 AM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Why everyone's not a torturer
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >By Stephen Reicher and Alex Haslam
> > > > > > > >Psychologists
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Guards and prisoners, taking part in The Experiment for the
BBC
> >in
> > > > > > > 2002
> > > > > > > >So groups of people in positions of unaccountable power
naturally
> > > > > > > >resort to violence, do they? Not according to research
conducted
> >in
> > > > > > > a
> > > > > > > >BBC experiment.
> > > > > > > >The photographs from Abu Ghraib prison showing Americans
abusing
> > > > > > > Iraqi
> > > > > > > >prisoners make us recoil and lead us to distance ourselves
from
> > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > >horror and brutality. Surely those who commit such acts are
not
> > > > > > > like
> > > > > > > >us? Surely the perpetrators must be twisted or disturbed in
some
> > > > > > > way?
> > > > > > > >They must be monsters. We ourselves would never condone or
> > > > > > > contribute
> > > > > > > >to such events.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Sadly, 50 years of social psychological research indicates
that
> > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > >comforting thoughts are deluded. A series of major studies
have
> > > > > > > shown
> > > > > > > >that even well-adjusted people, when divided into groups and
> >placed
> > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > >competition against each other, can become abusive and
violent.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > OTHER RESEARCH
> > > > > > > >Stanley Milgram at Yale instructed experimenters to give
electric
> > > > > > > >shocks to another
> > > > > > > >They did so, despite person's cries of pain
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >In depth: After Saddam
> > > > > > > >Most notoriously, the 1971 Stanford prison experiment,
conducted
> > > > > > > by
> > > > > > > >Philip Zimbardo and colleagues, seemingly showed that young
> > > > > > > students
> > > > > > > >who were assigned to the role of guard quickly became
> >sadistically
> > > > > > > >abusive to the students assigned to the role of prisoners.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Combined with lessons from history, the disturbing
implication of
> > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > >research is that evil is not the preserve of a small minority
of
> > > > > > > >exceptional individuals. We all have the capacity to behave
in
> > > > > > > evil
> > > > > > > >ways. This idea was famously developed by Hannah Arendt whose
> > > > > > > >observations of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, led her
to
> > > > > > > remark
> > > > > > > >that what was most frightening was just how mild and ordinary
he
> > > > > > > >looked. His evil was disarmingly banal.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >The latest pictures show detainees being threatened with dogs
(AP
> > > > > > > >Photo/Courtesy of The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > >In order to explain events in Iraq, one might go further and
> > > > > > > conclude
> > > > > > > >that the torturers were victims of circumstances, that they
lost
> > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > >moral compass in the group and did things they would normally
> > > > > > > abhor.
> > > > > > > >Indeed, using Zimbardo's findings as evidence, this is
precisely
> > > > > > > what
> > > > > > > >some people do conclude. But this is bad psychology and it is
bad
> > > > > > > >ethics.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >It is bad psychology because it suggests we can explain human
> > > > > > > behaviour
> > > > > > > >without needing to scrutinize the wider culture in which it
is
> > > > > > > located.
> > > > > > > >It is bad ethics because it absolves everyone from any
> > > > > > > responsibility
> > > > > > > >for events - the perpetrators, ourselves as constituents of
the
> > > > > > > wider
> > > > > > > >society, and the leaders of that society.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >In the situation of Abu Ghraib, some reports have indicated
that
> > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > >guards were following orders from intelligence officers and
> > > > > > > >interrogators in order to soften up the prisoners for
> > > > > > > interrogation.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >If that is true, then clearly the culture in which these
soldiers
> > > > > > > were
> > > > > > > >immersed was one in which they were encouraged to see and
treat
> > > > > > > Iraqis
> > > > > > > >as subhuman. Other army units almost certainly had a very
> > > > > > > different
> > > > > > > >culture and this provides a second explanation of why some
people
> > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > >some units may have tortured, but others did not.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Grotesque fun
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Perhaps the best evidence that such factors were at play is
the
> > > > > > > fact
> > > > > > > >that the pictures were taken at all. Reminiscent of the
postcards
> > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > >lynch mobs circulated to advertise their activities, the
torture
> > > > > > > was
> > > > > > > >done proudly and with a grotesque sense of fun.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >'Those in the photos wanted others to know what they had
done'
> > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > >Those in the photos wanted others to know what they had done,
> > > > > > > >presumably believing that the audience would approve. This
sense
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > >approval is very important, since there is ample evidence
that
> > > > > > > people
> > > > > > > >are more likely to act on any inclinations to behave in
obnoxious
> > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > >when they sense - correctly or incorrectly - that they have
> > > > > > > broader
> > > > > > > >support.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >So where did the soldiers in Iraq get that sense from? This
takes
> >us
> > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > >a critical influence on group behaviour: leadership. In the
> > > > > > > studies,
> > > > > > > >leadership - the way in which experimenters either overtly or
> > > > > > > tacitly
> > > > > > > >endorsed particular forms of action - was crucial to the way
> > > > > > > >participants behaved.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Many guards in our experiment did not wish to act - or be
seen
> > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > >act - as bullies or oppressors
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Thus one reason why the guards in our own research for the
BBC
> >did
> > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > >behave as brutally as those in the Stanford study, was that
we
> >did
> > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > >instruct them to behave in this way.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Zimbardo, in contrast, told his participants: "You can create
in
> > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > >prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of fear to some
degree,
> >you
> > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > >create a notion of arbitrariness that their life is totally
> > > > > > > controlled
> > > > > > > >by us, by the system, you, me - and they'll have no
privacy....
> >In
> > > > > > > >general what all this leads to is a sense of powerlessness".
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Officers' messages
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >In light of this point it is interesting to ask what messages
> >were
> > > > > > > >being provided by fellow and, more critically, senior
officers in
> > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > >units where torture took place? Did those who didn't approve
fail
> > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > >speak out for fear of being seen as weak or disloyal? Did
senior
> > > > > > > >officers who knew what was going on turn a blind eye or else
> > > > > > > simply
> > > > > > > >file away reports of misbehaviour?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >All these things happened after the My Lai massacre, and in
many
> > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > >the responses to an atrocity tell us most about how it can
happen
> > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > >the first place. They tell us how murderers and torturers can
> >begin
> > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > >believe that they will not be held to account for what they
do,
> >or
> > > > > > > even
> > > > > > > >that their actions are something praiseworthy. The more they
> > > > > > > perceive
> > > > > > > >that torture has the thumbs up, the more they will give it a
> >thumbs
> > > > > > > up
> > > > > > > >themselves.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >So how do we prevent these kinds of episodes? One answer is
to
> > > > > > > ensure
> > > > > > > >that people are always made aware of their other moral
> >commitments
> > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > >their accountability to others. Whatever the pressures within
> > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > >military group, their ties to others must never be broken.
Total
> > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > >secret institutions, where people are isolated from contact
with
> > > > > > > all
> > > > > > > >others are breeding grounds for atrocity. Similarly, there
are
> > > > > > > great
> > > > > > > >dangers in contracting out security functions to private
> > > > > > > contractors
> > > > > > > >which lack fully developed structures of public
accountability.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Power vacuum
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Another answer is to look at the culture of our institutions
and
> > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > >role of leaders in framing that culture. Bad leadership can
> >permit
> > > > > > > >torture in two ways. Sometimes leaders can actively promote
> > > > > > > oppressive
> > > > > > > >values. This is akin to what happened in Zimbardo's study and
may
> > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > >the case in certain military intelligence units. But
sometimes
> > > > > > > leaders
> > > > > > > >can simply fail to promote anything and hence create a vacuum
of
> > > > > > > power.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >'Inmates' in The Experiment in their cells
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Is it in anyone to abuse a captive?
> > > > > > > >Our own findings indicated that where such a vacuum exists,
> >people
> > > > > > > are
> > > > > > > >more likely to accept any clear line of action which is
> >vigorously
> > > > > > > >proposed. Often, then, tyranny follows from powerlessness
rather
> > > > > > > than
> > > > > > > >power. In either case, the failure of leaders to champion
clear
> > > > > > > humane
> > > > > > > >and democratic values is part of the problem.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >But it is not enough to consider leadership in the military.
One
> > > > > > > must
> > > > > > > >look more widely at the messages and the values provided in
the
> > > > > > > >community at large. That means that we must address the
anti-Arab
> > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > >anti-Muslim sentiment in our society. A culture where we have
got
> > > > > > > used
> > > > > > > >to pictures of Iraqi prisoners semi-naked, chained and
humiliated
> > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > >create a climate in which torturers see themselves as heroes
> > > > > > > rather
> > > > > > > >than villains.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Again, for such a culture to thrive it is not necessary for
> >everyone
> > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > >embrace such sentiments, it is sufficient simply for those
who
> > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > >oppose them to feel muted and out-of-step with societal
norms.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Leaders' language
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >And we must also look at political leadership. When
> >administration
> > > > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi
> >dissidents,
> > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > >likens Iraqis to vermin. Note, for example, that just before
the
> > > > > > > >Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists started referring to
Tutsi's
> > > > > > > >as "cockroaches".
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >The US is trying to limit the damage after an abuse scandal
> > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > >Such use of language again creates a climate in which
> >perpetrators
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > >atrocity can maintain the illusion that they are nobly doing
what
> > > > > > > >others know must be done. The torturers in Iraq may or may
not
> > > > > > > have
> > > > > > > >been following direct orders from their leaders, but they
were
> > > > > > > almost
> > > > > > > >certainly allowed to feel that they were behaving as good
> > > > > > > followers.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >So if we want to understand why torture occurs, it is
important
> >to
> > > > > > > >consider the psychology of individuals, of groups, and of
> >society.
> > > > > > > >Groups do indeed affect the behaviour of individuals and can
lead
> > > > > > > them
> > > > > > > >to do things they never anticipated. But how any given group
> > > > > > > affects
> > > > > > > >our behaviour depends upon the norms and values of that
specific
> > > > > > > group.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Evil can become banal, but so can humanism. The choice is not
> >denied
> > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > >us by human nature but rests in our own hands. Hence, we need
a
> > > > > > > >psychological analysis that addresses the values and beliefs
that
> > > > > > > we,
> > > > > > > >our institutions, and our leaders promote. These create the
> > > > > > > conditions
> > > > > > > >in which would-be torturers feel either emboldened or unable
to
> > > > > > > act.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >We need an analysis that makes us accept rather than avoid
our
> > > > > > > >responsibilities. Above all, we need a psychology which does
not
> >
> > > > > > > >distance us from torture but which requires us to look
closely at
> > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > >ways in which we and those who lead us are implicated in a
> >society
> > > > > > > >which makes barbarity possible.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >Alex Haslam is a professor of psychology at University of
Exeter
> > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > >editor of the European Journal of Social Psychology. Stephen
> >Reicher
> > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > >a professor of psychology at University of St Andrews, past
> >editor
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > >the British Journal of Social Psychology and a fellow of the
> >Royal
> > > > > > > >Society of Edinburgh.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 12:05:48 PST