Re: Gegenstand X objekt

From: Bruce Robinson (bruce.rob@BTINTERNET.COM)
Date: Sun Jun 15 2003 - 11:13:12 PDT


Here are the two definitions taken from a German philosophical dictionary.
Not sure if the translation quite does them justice...

GEGENSTAND
That which is, not insofar as it is in general but insofar as it 'stands
opposite / faces' [entgegensteht], namely a conceiving [vorstellendes] Ego
(subject, consciousness). For Kant, a G only exists insofar as it is in
consciousness and is constructed by consciousness as a unity. The
understanding... in the application of its categories ties together the
multiplicity of sensuous perceptions [sinnliche Anschauungen] to give an
object of knowledge [Erkenntnis-Gegenstand]. While even here the
constitution of a G is a synthetic artifice (?) of subjectivity, in German
idealism the G becomes increasingly a product of the consciousness, of the
mind, not just in its form but also in its content...

OBJEKT
generally the object [Gegenstand!]. In mediaeval philosophy the (only)
perceived object [Gegenstand] in contrast to that which is, standing in
itself, to the subject. Only after Descartes does object [Objekt] take the
meaning of something that is true in itself because it can be perceived
objectively in a justifiable and generally valid way by every (human)
subject

Hope this is useful - I suppose it does make the distinction between G as
something that is a product of consciousness and O as something that has a
more general form of objectivity.

Bruce R

----- Original Message -----
From: "Kevin Rocap" <krocap@csulb.edu>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Sunday, June 15, 2003 7:40 PM
Subject: Re: Gegenstand X objekt

> Dear Ricardo et al,
>
> I don't want to speak out of turn not being a German speaker. However, a
> virtue of our recent XMCA course was that we came across some of the
> diverse uses of these German terms. So, if I may, let me share my
> nascent understanding and see if it is "on track" and helps at all.
> And, of course, I'll be interested in the perspectives of German fluent
> folks among us as well.
>
> First, I think it is important to remember what may seem obvious to
> some, namely, that the meanings of words themselves change over time and
> even within different situated contexts within a given language/culture
> community. So likely the term "Objekt" has gone through its own
> cultural-historical transformations over time and has multiple
> negotiated connotations in different sociocultural contexts, e.g, in
> philosophy versus in "scientific" disciplines, etc. But it seems to me,
> for our purposes, we are trying to get at a shared and useful
> understanding of the distinction that is being represented by the
> counter-point of "Objekt" and "Gegenstand" in this passage (and so, to
> some degree, whether or not we can perfectly tap into the appropriate
> translation of these terms, we can still try to capture that
> distinction, no?).
>
> So here is one take on it.
>
> In the XMCA course, it seems that one of the key shifts we discussed was
> that Marx's writing created a stronger ground of the dialectic in "human
> sensuous activity" or "praxis". This is significant, if I can be a bit
> crude in my analysis, in that prior to that the appropriate object of
> study of philosophy was the Ideal or ideas, while "science" focused on
> non-human, material objects (and I believe this latter may be more akin
> to the notion of "Objekt", but I'm happy to stand corrected). And the
> dialectic, such as Feuerbach's dialectic, attempted to reconcile these,
> but without significantly bringing in the role of "human sensuous
> activity". We engaged in some dialogue around "unit of analysis" which,
> as you can see, shifts from ideas on the one hand and non-human material
> objects on the other to the interactions of these in human sensuous
> activity or "praxis". And so the new "unit of analysis" or dare I say
> the "new object" (and perhaps this gets at "Gegenstand") is the
> dialectic as a process and outcome of "human sensuous activity" or
> "praxis". But a meaning of "Gegenstand" that sees it as tied to "human
> sensuous activity" or "praxis" seems to capture some part of the
> "embeddness-in-activity" notion, no? And when you think about it a
> material object (or "Objekt") only really becomes a "tool" if you posit
> "human sensuous activity", no? But then, of course, we have Vygotsky's
> contributions on the role of social relationships, language and inner
> speech, which gives a primacy to words and, particularly word meanings
> (in addition to, but to some degree as opposed to other material
> "objects"), as units of analysis and the focus of dialectical inquiry,
> no? But to wed Vygotsky's focus on the significant role of meaning with
> my crude interpretation of Marx's contribution above may further refine
> the notion of "Gegenstand" - perhaps "Gegenstand" refers more to what
> both the processes and outcomes of "human sensuous activity" *mean* to
> participants and observers, while other mediating artifacts and tools
> within the process and outcomes play a secondary role? Hmm. What do
> others think?
>
> Perhaps I'll let someone else try to take it from there; or to point out
> to me the error of my ways; or offer instructive additions/modifications.
>
> In Peace,
> K.
>
>
>



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