Re: Gegenstand X objekt

From: Ricardo Japiassu (rjapias@uol.com.br)
Date: Sun Jun 15 2003 - 14:19:03 PDT


Yes. Sure. Tks.

Ricardo Japiassu
Universidade do Estado da Bahia em Teixeira de Freitas - Uneb X
Rua SS, s/n - Jd. Caraípe
Tx. de Freitas - Bahia
45 995 000 BRASIL
http://www.ricardojapiassu.pro.br
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bruce Robinson" <bruce.rob@BTINTERNET.COM>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Sunday, June 15, 2003 3:13 PM
Subject: Re: Gegenstand X objekt

>
> Here are the two definitions taken from a German philosophical dictionary.
> Not sure if the translation quite does them justice...
>
> GEGENSTAND
> That which is, not insofar as it is in general but insofar as it 'stands
> opposite / faces' [entgegensteht], namely a conceiving [vorstellendes] Ego
> (subject, consciousness). For Kant, a G only exists insofar as it is in
> consciousness and is constructed by consciousness as a unity. The
> understanding... in the application of its categories ties together the
> multiplicity of sensuous perceptions [sinnliche Anschauungen] to give an
> object of knowledge [Erkenntnis-Gegenstand]. While even here the
> constitution of a G is a synthetic artifice (?) of subjectivity, in German
> idealism the G becomes increasingly a product of the consciousness, of the
> mind, not just in its form but also in its content...
>
> OBJEKT
> generally the object [Gegenstand!]. In mediaeval philosophy the (only)
> perceived object [Gegenstand] in contrast to that which is, standing in
> itself, to the subject. Only after Descartes does object [Objekt] take the
> meaning of something that is true in itself because it can be perceived
> objectively in a justifiable and generally valid way by every (human)
> subject
>
> Hope this is useful - I suppose it does make the distinction between G as
> something that is a product of consciousness and O as something that has a
> more general form of objectivity.
>
> Bruce R
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Kevin Rocap" <krocap@csulb.edu>
> To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Sent: Sunday, June 15, 2003 7:40 PM
> Subject: Re: Gegenstand X objekt
>
>
> > Dear Ricardo et al,
> >
> > I don't want to speak out of turn not being a German speaker. However, a
> > virtue of our recent XMCA course was that we came across some of the
> > diverse uses of these German terms. So, if I may, let me share my
> > nascent understanding and see if it is "on track" and helps at all.
> > And, of course, I'll be interested in the perspectives of German fluent
> > folks among us as well.
> >
> > First, I think it is important to remember what may seem obvious to
> > some, namely, that the meanings of words themselves change over time and
> > even within different situated contexts within a given language/culture
> > community. So likely the term "Objekt" has gone through its own
> > cultural-historical transformations over time and has multiple
> > negotiated connotations in different sociocultural contexts, e.g, in
> > philosophy versus in "scientific" disciplines, etc. But it seems to me,
> > for our purposes, we are trying to get at a shared and useful
> > understanding of the distinction that is being represented by the
> > counter-point of "Objekt" and "Gegenstand" in this passage (and so, to
> > some degree, whether or not we can perfectly tap into the appropriate
> > translation of these terms, we can still try to capture that
> > distinction, no?).
> >
> > So here is one take on it.
> >
> > In the XMCA course, it seems that one of the key shifts we discussed was
> > that Marx's writing created a stronger ground of the dialectic in "human
> > sensuous activity" or "praxis". This is significant, if I can be a bit
> > crude in my analysis, in that prior to that the appropriate object of
> > study of philosophy was the Ideal or ideas, while "science" focused on
> > non-human, material objects (and I believe this latter may be more akin
> > to the notion of "Objekt", but I'm happy to stand corrected). And the
> > dialectic, such as Feuerbach's dialectic, attempted to reconcile these,
> > but without significantly bringing in the role of "human sensuous
> > activity". We engaged in some dialogue around "unit of analysis" which,
> > as you can see, shifts from ideas on the one hand and non-human material
> > objects on the other to the interactions of these in human sensuous
> > activity or "praxis". And so the new "unit of analysis" or dare I say
> > the "new object" (and perhaps this gets at "Gegenstand") is the
> > dialectic as a process and outcome of "human sensuous activity" or
> > "praxis". But a meaning of "Gegenstand" that sees it as tied to "human
> > sensuous activity" or "praxis" seems to capture some part of the
> > "embeddness-in-activity" notion, no? And when you think about it a
> > material object (or "Objekt") only really becomes a "tool" if you posit
> > "human sensuous activity", no? But then, of course, we have Vygotsky's
> > contributions on the role of social relationships, language and inner
> > speech, which gives a primacy to words and, particularly word meanings
> > (in addition to, but to some degree as opposed to other material
> > "objects"), as units of analysis and the focus of dialectical inquiry,
> > no? But to wed Vygotsky's focus on the significant role of meaning with
> > my crude interpretation of Marx's contribution above may further refine
> > the notion of "Gegenstand" - perhaps "Gegenstand" refers more to what
> > both the processes and outcomes of "human sensuous activity" *mean* to
> > participants and observers, while other mediating artifacts and tools
> > within the process and outcomes play a secondary role? Hmm. What do
> > others think?
> >
> > Perhaps I'll let someone else try to take it from there; or to point out
> > to me the error of my ways; or offer instructive
additions/modifications.
> >
> > In Peace,
> > K.
> >
> >
> >
>



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