15 june 2000
from peter jones
dear judy
an attempt at a quick response to your point as follows:
' The question seems to be over what legitimately constitutes the materiality
of meaning -- If materiality is understood through objects like trees and
rocks, we can "go outside" as Peter said and feel what is _objectively what_
to us as members of a culture. But when objects become social institutions
and semiotic artifacts, it does seem to problematize objectivity
differently. Our social practices serve the interests of some much more than
others -- so perspective matters. From the very inadequate bit I know of
Marx, he argues for class as an objective category for the analysis of the
social. But from a post modern perspective, class alone is an inadequate
measure of the differences that make a difference. So the question is also
about the legitimacy of the post-modern ? Different cultural narratives ???'
yes i agree my examples were a bit basic (basic level!) to say the least. the
idea was that in all this talk about objectivity and so on we mustn't lose
sight of the fact that even the most abstruse scientific and philosophical
abstractions are the products and servants of, and mediate, the real activities
of real living beings. so my general attack was directed towards philosophies
which deny - in principle - and i stress 'in principle' the possibility of ever
disentangling in our perceptions and concepts what belongs to us (to our
bodies, to our modes of action, or to our social institutions even) and what to
the nature of the object we perceive, act on, transform and attempt to
understand. but you are absolutely right to say that there is a big difference
between tree hugging and getting to the bottom of what makes institutions tick
(never mind how to criticize them and their effects both theoretically and
practically). i'm afraid that marx would not have had much time for the post
modernists (indeed he settled accounts to his satisfaction with the 19th
century equivalents) as you rightly imply. class, for example bourgeois and
proletarian, indeed, is considered as an objective category in the sense that
the existence of these classes in modern capitalist society is a fact (sorry,
nate!) about how social production takes place, whether people like it, know
it, or not. i guess that, for marx, without an understanding of that fact (not
just in general but concretely in terms of a detailed analysis of the system
and how it works) any conception of political or social institutions, of what
they are for and how they work will remain hopelessly abstract, inadequate (and
therefore ideological, in so far as it will fail to penetrate to the essential
socio-economic contradictions out of which such institutions arise). but this
does not mean that one can go directly from the concept of class to a concrete
analysis of institutions; if you can't do without the concept, that doesn't
mean it's the only one you need. to understand New Labour in Britain, for
example, you can't do without the concept of class (since the political, in
marxian terms, is ultiimately - essentially - an expression of the economic,
and therefore class interests) but you also need a concrete analysis of the
complex forms of mediation between the economic and the political, including
the social consciousness of people etc. (this is hardly a good answer to your
question, i realise). but from what standpoint, ultimately, are we evaluating
and analysing these institutions? isn't it again, in a word or three, from the
standpoint of practice? from the standpoint of (trying to understand) what
people are doing, and what they need to do - in practice - to rid themselves
of exploitation and oppression and the instutions (and ideologies) of such? so
that if some institution (eg the present Labour government in Britain) claims
that market economic relations and social justice are compatible, the response
i think is not just to say - 'well that is your perspective but i have a
different one, and since no perspectives (or cultural narratives) are objective
then mine is equally valid' (as the postmodernist might say!). for me the
response to our Labour government representative is: 'you confuse what is a
fact about social existence today with things as they seem (or you would like
them to appear) from the standpoint of your own narrow interests, interests
which are based precisly on the practices of economic exploitation and the
consequent system of social relations from which you benefit, and indeed from
which you draw your whole raison d'etre. an all sided (objective) analysis will
show, however, that capitalist production (and hence capitalist social
relations) constantly and inevitably produces social inequalities, injustices
and antagonisms of all kinds, by the very nature of the system (and despite
people's intentions). but of course in traditional marxian terms this
'objective' analysis also corresponds to the standpoint of the practice (on a
world scale) of those social forces which are constantly striving to resist
this exploitation and in so doing to create the potential for a social
existence which is not based on exploitation (ie classes).so i'm suggesting
that this standpoint of practice does not negate the position on objectivity of
knowledge. i don't know whether you find this convincing or appealing though?
best wishes to all
P
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu writes:
>Peter, I have not yet read all of your last post; the bit I skimmed
>prompted the below. I apologize for whatever crucial bits of your argument I
>don't address.
>
>The question seems to be over what legitimately constitutes the materiality
>of meaning -- If materiality is understood through objects like trees and
>rocks, we can "go outside" as Peter said and feel what is _objectively what_
>to us as members of a culture. But when objects become social institutions
>and semiotic artifacts, it does seem to problematize objectivity
>differently. Our social practices serve the interests of some much more than
>others -- so perspective matters. From the very inadequate bit I know of
>Marx, he argues for class as an objective category for the analysis of the
>social. But from a post modern perspective, class alone is an inadequate
>measure of the differences that make a difference. So the question is also
>about the legitimacy of the post-modern ? Different cultural narratives ???
>
>Judy
>
>
>
>
>Peter wrote:
>>maybe there is only one tree and
>>i'm seeing double, or maybe there are two trees, or maybe there aren't any
>>trees and i'm hallucinating. the question is: is it in principle ever possible
>>to distinguish between these three options? can we never, in principle, say
>>that such and such is the case, whatever the state of my body? does the
>>existence of trees, or their precise quantity, merge inextricably and
>>indissolubly with the state of my body such that we can never separate out
>>these different 'contributions' to my experience? i suggest that we can do
>this
>>in principle, and do it in fact, in practice, every single second of our lives
>>and that if it were not possible then all human (and indeed sentient) life
>>would cease to exist! for the tree problem - i go outside and have a feel, or
>>ask somebody else what they see. if my relations with the world remain purely
>>contemplative i can never solve the 'factorization' problem. but human
>
>
>Judith Diamondstone (732) 932-7496 Ext. 352
>Graduate School of Education
>Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
>10 Seminary Place
>New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1183
>
>
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