Re: embodied mind paper (some responses)

From: Judy Diamondstone (diamonju@rci.rutgers.edu)
Date: Wed Jun 07 2000 - 15:22:38 PDT


Peter, I've only read 1/2 of your paper, but I found that much very helpful
for clarifying as you said some of the issues in this debate. i wish i had
more time to do the paper justice, but i think my questions might be
relevant anyway. This is a VERY interesting discussion.

At this point, I'm wondering if, despite your main objection to CL, you have
nevertheless made something of a straw person of the perspective(s) in
(perceived?) conflict with your own. I don't think anyone would see the
subjects in Rips' study as representative of some notion (let alone
conceptual understanding) of learning. To my understanding of those you cite
as "other" to materialist views, they'd all agree that to learn presupposes
that the learner 'stop and think'; that the learner reject readily available
notions; that the learner engage with a real (concrete) world.

  I need to spend much more time with the argument to be helpful here, but
let me make one other point that I think we agree on. * Important:
"semantics" (meaning making) can NOT BE SPLIT OFF from cognition; that would
deny their dialectical 'fusion' (as Vygotsky showed/ argued so convincingly).

You disagree with me on the following points:

--There CAN be an objective world that nevertheless remains ultimately
knowable ONLY through meaning-making practices (i.e., we necessarily think
through 'basic level categories' to get at our dialectical truths).

--Semantics (meaning making) has its 'own' operations within the cognitive
processes prompted by engagement with the world, which to me suggests that
we need to understand meaning-making on its "own" terms -- we need to
understand the tools we use as much as the concrete world we are part of,
because that world is necessarily construed using our available tools.

-- in the concrete practice of making knowledge, the 'world' that humanity
interacts with includes human others; all persons are fallible knowers;
ethics are implicated in knowledge.

-- You use the phrase: "a consciousness verified by the practice of
contemporary society" Many on this list would object (as I think you know)
that current social practices cannot in themselves verify the soundness of
what an individual thinks. Can you clarify your thinking on this point?

Looking forward to hearing more,
Judy

Judith Diamondstone (732) 932-7496 Ext. 352
Graduate School of Education
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
10 Seminary Place
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1183



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