Re: embodied mind paper (some responses)

From: Paul H. Dillon (illonph@pacbell.net)
Date: Wed Jun 07 2000 - 12:16:56 PDT


Hi Peter,

I've been postponing commenting on your post for the most undialectical of
reasons: waiting until the idea was complete. But now that you've commented
on Andy's and Nate's responses I want to to add some comments in the hopes
that we can take advantage of your paper(s) to explore the implications of
Ilyenkov's work.

1. As you point out in response to Nate, Ilyenkov's example of the
conscious relationship of the subject to the world surrounding him, is not
really directed to considerations of art per se, but seems more to be a
paraphrase of Marx's well known comparison of the activity of a spider
weaving its web to any human carpenter. The idea of the final product is a
precondition of the activity in the latter, not so in the former.

2. The fundamental issue of your critique of Lakoff, it seems to me,
concerns the origin of categories and their relationship to reality. Of the
many theories out there that deny "in principle the possibility of objective
knowledge of anything" CL is an important target. One cannot simply say,
as Elisa does, that Lakoff is trying to deal with semantic processes, not
scientific thinking. This would imply that everyday thinking and scientific
thinking don't deal with the same world. What possibly could be the
category system that underlies scientific thinking if it is not constructed
out of concrete everyday human practice? Starr, Bowker, and others have
tried to make the point that in fact there is no difference (independently
of the adoption of the embodied cognition pt of view). The difference
between everyday and formal scientific categorization is post facto.

3. Nate touches tangentially on a very important issue: the ideal, but I
think he misinterprets you when he states that concepts and the ideal are
"dictated, structured by the objective properties of the world". This
position is not what I read in your paper or in Ilyenkov. This is simply
the position of non-dialectical materialism (Machism) and is one of the
principal targets of Ilyenkov's critique. I found a quote I had written on
a piece of paper without putting down the reference: "Seeing knowledge and
information as dynamic systems of concrete human practice rather than static
structures that either reflect of consitute the image of the external world
is the heart of the dialectical approach." (I think this might be from one
of Bruce Robinson's papers). It would seem that Nate doesn't distinguish
this difference yet it is fundamental. You deal more directly with the
question of the ideal in "Symbols, Tools, and Ideality in Ilyenkov" but
perhaps we can try to bring the question of the ideal into this discussion.
As Bakhurst points out "Ilyenkov's conception of the objectivity of the
ideal is a crucial facet of his rejection of methodological solipsism, for
it is precisely the objective ideal that forms 'social consciousness,' that
'complex and historically shaped spehre of the material and spiritual
culture of humankind,' that each individuial must assimilate in order to
rise to conscious life (Ilyenkov 1960a: 40). Consequently, Ilyenkov holds
that without appeal to objectively existing ideal properties no acceptable
theory of thought will be possible." (Bakhurst 1991: 153).

I think the discussion of the "objectivity of the ideal" would go directly
to the question of the difference between notion and essence. The genetic
method is central in this inquiry. How are the "universal" and the
"essential" related in Ilyenkov?

BTW do you know where Ilyenkov's paper "The Concept of the Ideal" is
available? Bakhurst makes extensive use of this piece in his discussion.
It would be a great addition to Andy's Ilyenkov web page.

4. I agree with your appraisal of Andy's statement concerning the
separation of theoretical and practical labor in relation to this
discussion. For one thing, the separation of manual and mental labor is not
simply a product of "bourgeois" but of all class society.

5. This observation brings up a much more fundamental question, one that
arose during the discussion of Bruce Robinson's paper on dialectics and
modeling: in class society what is the historical subject whose practice
constitutes the objective basis (the truth) of the totality? The classic
example of this dialectic is Hegel's analysis of the Master/Slave
relationship (the objective basis of the master is the slave). Within the
marxist tradition (dialectical materialism or Materialism) this subject is
the working class. Is there any way to apply dialectical materialism
without including this aspect? Bruce appealed to Lukacs "concrete
totality" but the question is for whom this concrete totality is revealed,
for whom does this universal standpoint exist? Wouldn't this be the
"goddess eye" perpsective. Notably Engestrom's version of activity theory
imports the antagonism between "use value" and "exchange value" as the
fundamental contradiction within all activity systems in capitalist society
which seems more a "tip of the hat" than an actual grappling with the
problem. This is the question of the position of the analyst-- the
objective truth of dialectics is not the abstract objectivity of positivism,
empiricism, neo-positivism, etc.

Hmm. . .

I'll just post this now and see where it goes.

Paul H. Dillon

p.s. Diane, Marx's concept of Gattungwesen (pirated by Durkheim ) provides
the framework within which to investigate "soul" from the perspective of
Materialism. As to one's concern for "an individual soul", the following
paraphrase from Ilyenkov might be useful (assuming the question was asked
seriously): "The separate individual is only human in the exact and strict
sense of the word, insofar as she actualises--and just by her
individuality--some ensemble or other of historically developed faculties
(specifically human forms of life activity), of a culture formed before and
independently of her and mastered by her during upbringing (the forming of
the person). From that angle, the human personality can rightly be
considered as an individual embodiment of culture, ie, of the universal, in
humankind." (Ilyenkov 1979, PC modifications courtesy of Doxic Enterprises
Ltd.)

p.s.s. Another route to take on the question of soul is found in the works
of Aretha Franklin, James Brown, King Curtis, Percey Sledge, etc.



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