Genevieve,
On a closing note you asked, "Is this our choice: science or empathy?" and
I asked myself, "our choice for what?" If I'm looking to understand how
someone feels empathy is the appropriate way to proceed. If i'm trying to
construct a conceptual model of the effect of certain institutions on how
individuals create their narratives I'd prefer to use scientific methods
that bracket those feelings. Is there any way at all to construct a
scientific model on the basis of empathetic observations? Are emotions you
can't empathize with, e.g., uncontrollable rage, beyond the scope of
conceptual models for that reason?
You mention verstehen in another post. Isn't there something more than
what is implied in the Weberian notion of verstehen in Diane's and your use
the term empathy? Verstehen does not necessarily require the understanding
of the emotional state a person experiences in a given situation. It
requires understanding a person's behavior in terms of motives; the emotions
might or might not have anything to do with the motives. Is it empathy that
allows me to understand the driver's motives when the car in front of me
swerves or simply my ability to take the drivers place as a rationally
acting individual (that is acting with respect to a motive that explains my
behavior). When I see a ball roll on to the other side of the street I
understand that the driver: swerved to miss a possible child running after
it. I don't need to know whether the driver was angry, worried,
indifferent or anything else to understand the motive for swerving. Even If
I saw a driver puposely run over the child I still wouldn't need to
empathize to attempt to understand the psychological motives that led to
such asocial behavior. In introducing verstehen, Weber attempted to
incorporate subjective motive into explanation in the social sciences, not
to overthrow the possibility of a rationally grounded social science, and as
he explained it, verstehen does not require empathy.
Science builds scientific concepts and is based on repeatable procedures,
its findings can be verified by anyone who can repeat the procedures. If
nobody can repeat the procedures the observations are unverifiable in
principle. If the same observations aren't produced after following the
same procedures, the value of any conclusions (truth claims) based on the
observations is brought into question. Ethnomethodology is a science of
verstehen and specifies procedures that can be repeated. Can you specify
procedures
for empathetic observation that anyone might be able to follow if they have
the prerequisite knowledge and appropriate equipment? (Stockholm awaits)
If not, how do you evaluate the different findings about the same phenomena
that were based on "empathetic observation". Everybody's right? What if
someone claims, a crying child isn't really suffering, she's just being a
brat. What do we do? just agree with those opinions that fit the way we see
it, and deny the others that don't see it that way? On what basis??
In this sense I totally empathize with Stanton's question: "what do you want
me to do? add a few statements here and there or totally rework what I've
done." And I find Eva's answer, "that's up to you", totally unscientific.
To me the position expressed in Diane's abandonment of objectivity ,
science, and rigour, " because the social world is messy, squishy, confused,
chaotic, undisciplined, ideological, painful, wet, angry, hurtful, and zay,
silly, crazy, goofy, loving, sweet, kind " is not valid because (1) the mere
fact of stating this proves that these are accessible as empirical aspects
of social worlds (empirical means "relying on experience" after all) and (2)
there is no evidence to show that these aspects are not also possible
subjects of scientific concepts which, as Ilyenkov explains, move from the
abstract (by which he means precisely those angry, crazy, goofy, etc.
phenomena of experience whose concept is not understood) to the conrete
universals whose dialectical movement accounts for their forms of
appearance. Although there are no straight lines in nature, the
presumption of the same allowed humans to develop scientific concepts of the
laws of motion which everything in nature follows in one way or another.
Although you can't see the earth turn, the scientific concept that it does
turn allows us to account for the appearance of the seasons, the tides, and
the position of the little sparkling lights in the sky.
I don't know of anything in the tradition of cultural-historical activity
theory that supports the irrationalism that Diane defends. Of course that
doesn't imply that such an approach has no merit: but it would seem that
it's value is in the realm of poetry or literature, not the disciplines of
psychology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, archaeology, etc. But even
though art and literature distill and express and thereby show deep
understanding (verstehen) of human, social, personal experience that doesn't
imply that scientific concepts cannot also be developed for the same
phenomena as she seems to claim.
The truth of the moon that the scientist give us is not the truth of the
moon of the poet gives us but neither invalidates the other. My
understanding of scientific truths concerning the moon (e.g., that a full
moon on the winter solstice, such as the one on Dec. 22, 1999, occurs in
conjunction with a lunar perigee and will therefor appear about 14% larger
than it does at apogee, ie summer solstice) does not prevent me from
appreciating the poem that captures in verse the personally lived experience
of that bright, bright moon as in:
The moon in the water
Turned a somersault
And floated away.
What makes some humans think we are so special and unique as to be beyond
the scope of determination; what could be so special about humans that our
behavior, including our emotions, is not be capable of being comprehended
in scientific concepts?
Paul H. Dillon
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