----- Original Message -----
From: Paul Dillon <dillonph who-is-at northcoast.com>
To: <xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Monday, November 01, 1999 12:53 AM
Subject: Re: interfunctionally integrated versus replaced
> Nate,
>
> The issue I raised concerning "biogical science" and "lived organic
> experience" doesn't seem to figure in what you write, at least as far as
I
> can tell, but I think your position is untenable because you don't
specify
> which one you mean or clearly state that you conflate them. The position
> you take when writing, "I would be more comfortable with saying there
is a
> dialectic involved and that it is virtually impossible for us as a
species
> to have access to the biological" can be read two ways.
>
> Are you saying that that we cannot have access to our organic existence?
If
> so then we cannot have access to our inorganic existence. This is a very
> idealist position. Of course there are many arguments against idealism
> (e.g, If we don't have access then how do we get a world in the first
> place?) and I'm not sure you even mean this.
I am saying we cannot access an "organic existence" that would bypass the
cultural-historical. Not unlike Hegel when he wrote there is no reality
that by passes mediation by tools. I would argue the world in the 1st
place is one of mediation.
>
> But if you mean "biological science" when you write "biological" it also
> seems to reduce itself to absurdity because biological science is a human
> artefact so we necessarily have access to it.
We have access to the biological through the mediation of our
cultural-historical theories of biological science. We don't have a direct
link with the "biological" that would bypass cultural-historical mediation
though.
>
> To me the important question is whether biological science can have
> objective knowledge of organic existence which is its field of inquiry.
I
> side with those who say yes. I also think that the cultural-historical
> sciences can have objective knowledge of their fields of inquiry. But
> this doesn't mean at all that the objective knowledge of one is reducible
to
> that of the other, or vice versa. Whether the objective knowledge of
> biological science can link up with the objective knowledge of the
> cultural-historical sciences is another question. How and when these
> syntheses occur seems to be a very complex issue involving globally
extended
> activity systems. But it seems that such linkages when they do occur
lead
> to great advances in the total human knowledge as well as reformulations
of
> the "sciences" that preceded them in terms of the new synthesis.
I guess I don't see them as two fields of inquiry. CHAT is not
psychological, sociological, or biological but rather those are certain
avenues for CHAT explanation. I think those like Ethel Tobach with an
emphasis on levels has pointed toward the genetic-biological being
explained from a CHAT perspective.
I am less inclined to entertain notions of an "objective truth". For me,
it seems that truth is always intertwined with the cultural-historical. An
assertion that there is an "objective truth" within a particular ideology
has been very much the goal of cognitive science. With concepts, we are
told we must seperate the concept "in itself" from the concept "for
itself". It is assumed that the logic, essence, or typicality of the
concept can be seperated from its use in activity.
My understanding of Vygotsky and Elkonin, in particular, is explaining what
the bourgeois viewed as eternal or biological in a cultural-historical
manner. Vygotsky accepted Piaget and other theories at the time as having
a "truth" but sought to explain them cultural-historically. A
developmental stage progression that was interelated with the activities we
set up for our younger members because of the division of labor. Yes,
Vygotsky took things from biology and other diciplines but rarely as is, as
when he explains what he does and does not mean by internal.
I guess for me, I cannot envision "lived organic experience" that would not
be situated in the cultural-historical. Earlier you mentioned, "As I read
Lakoff he is discussing the experiential body, the body that feels
exhilaration when racing down a ski slope and is overwhelmed with disgust
and loathing when confronted with situations that offend the sensibilities,
to mention some extremes. To deal with the latter it would assume a level
of disgust that would somehow transend the cultural-historical. A
biological disgust that can be severed from the cultural-historical. It is
this severing I have a problem with, our biological processes, needs etc.
are transformed into a cultural-historical system.
Nate
> Paul H. Dillon
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: nate <schmolze who-is-at students.wisc.edu>
> To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Sunday, October 31, 1999 9:06 PM
> Subject: Re: interfunctionally integrated versus replaced
>
>
> >Phil,
> >
> >I think both to a degree. First, when I say cultural-historical I see
it
> >more as the "system" I am part of and the biological is part of that
> >system. In development when Vygotsky talked about "revolution" it was
not
> >so much the new was an unfolding but "internal" and in relation to the
> >system. In this sense, the biological is always there but changes
because
> >of its relationship within the system. He described this in several
areas;
> >language, play, and instruction. In all three the biological is
> >qualitatively different not because of an unfolding perse, but because
of
> >its relationship to the system.
> >
> >I also think what we call "natural" or "biological" seems to be very
> >cultural-historical. This is real strong for me in "developmental"
> >literature especially the unfolding kind. Jerome Bruner talks about
this
> >as the "dialectics of culture" with early cognitive science and the war
on
> >poverty. He entertains the notion that maybe science leads culture and
> >decides against this approach. I would never go so far as to say "a
result
> >of", I don't tend to see relationships in that way. I would be more
> >comfortable with saying there is a dialectic involved and that it is
> >virtually impossible for us as a species to have access to the
biological.
> >
> >Biology is a very loaded and dangerous term for me. In many ways, like
> >development, it naturalizes a particular order of things, if its
cultural
> >or structural, that leaves a lot of questions unasked. Even something
> >like Vygotsky's scientific concepts can be found in our genes, I am
being
> >somewhat sarcastic, but not totally.
> >
> >Nate
> >
> >
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: Phil Graham <pw.graham who-is-at student.qut.edu.au>
> >To: <xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu>
> >Sent: Sunday, October 31, 1999 5:54 PM
> >Subject: Re: interfunctionally integrated versus replaced
> >
> >
> >> Nate,
> >>
> >> just to clarify:
> >> At 17:25 29-10-00 -0600, Nate wrote:
> >> > I don't think it excludes the biological, "I" just don't believe it
> >exists
> >> >for us as a species outside of the cultural-historical.
> >>
> >> Are you saying that the biological is part of, or a result of,
> >> cultural-historical?
> >>
> >> Phil
> >>
> >> Phil Graham
> >> p.graham who-is-at qut.edu.au
> >> http://www.geocities.com/SunsetStrip/Palms/8314/index.html
> >>
> >
>