Re: xmca discussions

nate (schmolze who-is-at students.wisc.edu)
Sat, 7 Aug 1999 19:26:51 -0500

----- Original Message -----
From: Paul Dillon <dillonph who-is-at northcoast.com>
To: <xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Saturday, August 07, 1999 5:31 PM
Subject: Re: xmca discussions

Paul and others,

A few thoughts. While I agree that Vygotsky and Luria, I'll let Engestron
speak for himself, were definately no relativists, that aspect of their
work has been problemitized for its insensitivity to diversity. Cole
(1998) as well as the CHAT website
http://www.helsinki.fi/~jengestr/activity/6a.htm point toward the CHAT
approach (the third generation) becoming more sensitive to cultural
diversity. Willem L. Wardekker
http://www.geocities.com/~nschmolze/wardekker.html also has an interesting
article titled *Critical and Vygotskian theories of education: a
comparison* in which he argues,

"Third, plurality may be seen in Vygotskian theory not only as a
characteristic of society, but also as a characteristic of human
personality. This is not valued only in a negative way, as in Critical
Pedagogy, because the human subject is not understood as just the
inevitable product of social factors. It is not the social structures
themselves that are internalized, but the meaning the individual learns to
give to these structures in its interaction with others and in relation to
what it has learned before"

My understanding of the role of Activity Theory as a general theretical
framework with its focus on the division of labor is researcher/s take a
perspective (more than one is suggested by Engestron in *Perspectives on
Activity Theory* 1999) of subject/s in the activity. This can be an
individual, dyad, groups, nations etc all depending on the particular
activity. Within such a framework feminism, anthropology, the poor, the
disenfranchised - you name it - are all valued and important perspectives
in which to theorize. In relating this to the current discussion all have
a role to play in such theorizing. As an activity setting or a discussion
such as the current one this diversity is not seen as problematic as in som
e Critical approaches. The blind men and the elephant come to mind for me.

In constrast to realitivism, I think many (myself at least) point towards
the shortcomings of "modernist" universals. From the little reading I have
done, Daly might be sympathetic to your cause, she herself is very critical
of realitivist, "post-modern" approaches to the study of gender at least.
Your reference to partials is correct I think, which is why fostering a
diversity of approaches or meaning making is such an important excersize.
A "tool and result" rather than a "tool for result" in which we take
synthesis as a given or a by product, rather than the object of the
discussion. This discussion probally has a variety of synthesis, but what
it didn't have was the "one synthesis".

If there was research such as a study of the Daly case certain perspectives
would need to be selected. This would of course affect the outcome of the
research. This of course does not mean all the other perspectives have no
validity, only that realitivism can only go so far and we have to make
choices. As the subject I could chose Daly, the Judge, students, men,
women, the Administration, or a combination, probally not more that two
though. Whatever choice I made there would be certain consequences for the
results of the study, a partial truth.

Nate

> I also think xmca is a good place to fully examine the concrete
historical
> role of the ultra-relativist epistemology succinctly stated by Kathie
as:
> "each of us creates, negotiates, expresses a unique reality" and how it
> conditions post-modern and feminist discourse. To my understanding, this
> individual relativism is absolutely opposed to the fundamental principles
of
> cultural historical activity theory as found in Vygotsky, Luria,
Engstrom,
> and others. This relativism contains a partial truth but is incorrect
> precisely because it is no more than partial, as incorrect as simply
saying
> that there are no individuals and that we all simply inherit identities
and
> enact roles determined by History, identities and roles that are beyond
our
> power to influence or modify, let alone create. At the present
historical
> juncture, when we are inundated by difference and bereft of any "common
> grounds", I don't see how such an epistemology provides any basis for
> developing a shared ground for dialogue that might further our
understanding
> of the relations between culture, activity, and history.
>
> Paul H. Dillon
>
>
>
>
>
>