FW: joe wants to know

Glick, Joseph (JGlick who-is-at gc.cuny.edu)
Tue, 15 Jun 1999 17:46:02 -0400

Thanks Bill:

Your response and Geoff Hayward's provided a powerful incentive to
straighten out why I could receive from and couldn't send to the list.
If you get this then I'm on.

To add a little more to the substance around the quote - Kant goes on
(in the introduction to Part 2 of the Critique of Pure Reason) to argue
that the close linkage is precisely the reason that we must separate the
two - analytically (p. 93 of the Kemp Smith translation)

"But that is no reason for confounding the contribution of either one
with that of the other, rather it is a strong reason for carefully
separating and distinguishing the one from the other."

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Bill Barowy [SMTP:wbarowy who-is-at mail.lesley.edu]
>Sent: Tuesday, June 15, 1999 5:21 AM
>To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu
>Subject: Re: joe wants to know
>
>It helps to have a little more substance around the Kant quote.
>
>" If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving
>representations
>in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibiiity,
>then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the
>spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding. Our
>nature is
>so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible;
>that
>is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The
>faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of
>sensible intuition is the understanding. To neither of these powers may
>a
>preference be given over the other. Without sensibility no object would
>be
>given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts
>without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It
>is,
>therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to
>add
>the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions
>intelligible,
>that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities
>cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing,
>the
>senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge
>arise."
>
>BB
>