Interesting that you should mention Skinner, Mike. The old guy was already
on my mind yesterday because of his strict adherence to a psychology where
the fututure has no place, scientifically speaking, other than as this
mysterious resource that keeps providing us with a continuation of the now.
I looked up my old files of quotes (from when I wrote a paper on his
lifetime of verbal discipline, and collected the stuff with a terrified
fascination). The following snippets are from his autobiographies (when he
was talking to plain folks, so to speak). His Subject may not be passive --
as it exhibits a lot of operant behavior (learned as having produced
certain effects in the past) -- but it (he) also does not have a shred of
agency in the sense of free will. The last snippet of the three is
interesting: it is Skinner's translation into behavioristic language of
some theses of the presbyterian theologist Jonathan Edwards, with which he
found himself in agreement in sense if not in terminology.
****************************************************************************=
***
"I am sometimes asked, "Do you think of yourself as you think of
the organisms you study?" The answer is yes. So far as I know, my behavior
at any given moment has been nothing more than the product of my genetic
endowment, my personal history, and the current setting. That does not mean
that I can explain everything I do or have done."
Skinner, Burrhus Frederic. 1983. *A Matter of Consequences.* New York:
Alfred A. Knopf. p. 400
**************
"I could not put the concept of operant behavior in its proper
historical setting, because I did not know enough about the long struggle
to define a unit of behavior. Except for structuralism, in which a unit was
defined in terms of organization, some sort of appeal had usually been made
to the consequences of behavior. "Intention" and "purpose" alluded to
consequences, and "persistence until a goal was reached" did so more
explicitly. The maze began to serve a theoretical function (for Tolman, in
particular) because the behavior was physically oriented toward a goal. But
when it was implied or asserted that "behavior occurred because of its
consequences," the reference was to the consequences which were to follow.
An operant, defined as behavior that has a specific effect upon the
environment, might seem to suggest the same thing, but the experimental
contingencies made it clear that the strength of behavior was due to past
consequences. The strength of behavior was determined by what had already
happened rather than by what was going to happen in the future."
Skinner, Burrhus Frederic. 1979. *The Shaping of a Behaviorist*. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 202-203
**************
"[Jonathan Edwards] reconciled predestination with man's moral
responsibility (BFS: he formulated 'responsibility' within a determined
system of behavior).
He said that consciousness was a delusion implanted in man to give him a
sense of responsibility
(BFS: awareness is of social origin possibly designed for the good of others=
)
=2E . . Freedom consists not in making a choice but in pursuing an inclinati=
on
(BFS: operant strength is to be studied not in comparing the strengths of
alternative responses but in measuring the probability of a single response)
=2E . . The acts of the human will are caused otherwise than by mere power o=
f
willing
(BFS: the relevant variables are external; an inner will as a causal force
is a fiction).
[It is)] plausible that men, who cannot be converted except by God's will,
should attempt to force that will.
(BFS: though not free to act, men nevertheless behave as if they were)."
(Skinner, 1983, pp. 402-403)
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***
Now, isn't the paradox with proleptic behavior (and I'm talking about what
dwells in the humblest ZoPed rather than any longterm career planning) --
that by acting in the present as if a particular kind of future were
certain, or, indeed, _already present_ is how this future is brought about
(children learn to read or are acquired by learning disabilities, for
example)...
=2E.. so that there is a difference that makes a difference between "behavin=
g
as if free to act" and "behaving as if determined by my past and my
environment"?
In analogy, when building culture on the verge of an abyss it doesn't seem
very fruitful to stare down with vertigious fascination. Better bring in
all our engineering, mountaineering and levitation skills, right? The abyss
must be known but knowing must not be indulging.
So I'll resist the temptation of going back to bed in the winter darkness,
and make myself some morning coffee instead.
Eva