The character of team hunting among wild animals does seem to provide a
counterargument to Leont'ev's view that it is with the emergence of a
division of labour within collaborative tool-using activity that human
psychology acquires a qualitatively different character from the mental
functioning of animals. According to L's line of reasoning human
consciousness was produced when tool use and the division of labour in a
group of hominids allowed the actions of an individual to be oriented
towards a goal which was the total opposite of the desired object,
precisely because this desired object remained as the motive of the
activity of the collective. Leont'ev illustrates this with the way that
"the beater" in a hunting team performs an action with the goal of
frightening the herd of animals away from himself. This goal-oriented
action is paradoxical when viewed in isolation, as it achieves the mission
of propelling prospective food further out of reach for the acting
individual. However, in the context of a team hunting activity where other
members of the group are waiting in ambush, the action is an effective
component in the collective acquisition of the hungrily desired object.
I would very much appreciate some hints about how to update activity theory
in this respect.
Interesting also with those poor, inept, domesticated dogs. To me the
malfunctioning of their hunting-system points to the importance of
continuity in functional systems. It certainly isn't all in the genes, nor
in the environment of the supra-organismic system, but in a historical
continuity of the self-organizing system itself. I don't know how happy
people around here would be to call this "history", however -- is that
earmarked for humankind?
Eva