I assume that 'ends' here is used like goal or object-orientation in AT, to
refer to the happening that the process should result in, rather than in
the more mentalistic sense of the _intentions_ of the actors. The first
kind of end (result) can be seen, or visualized-imagined; the second
(purpose) is more speculative. Chimps ought to be able to integrate
result-ends, and my guess is they can even do some rudimentary semiotic
anticipation (whether visually or kinesthetically, etc.) that amounts to an
imagined-result. I am not really sure that purpose-ends are anything more
than part of our own culture's folk-theory of minds; certainly language
bound, probably phylogenetically (not to say, culturally-historically)
unprecedented. But I assume Tomasello means result-ends for the chimps.
So for me the issue regarding emulation is this: is it learning a
result-end unconnected to the total action sequence, but only learnable
provided the sequence actually completes? if so, then why is it
disconnected from the rest of the sequence in which it was learned?
differential salience, perhaps? and are we to take this kind of learning as
half-empty (failure to learn the whole sequence) or half-full (ability to
abstract a salient event from an apriori unsegmented process/sequence)?
As to imitation, if it means learning action sequences which are not
integrated into a whole activity by exhibiting their result-object, then
this would seem to be a highly decontextualizing form of learning, and
rather unnatural for people (not to mention chimps). It would seem to be
just the kind of learning that schools often impose and students usually
fail at. One with a sort of authoritarian "Do as I say even it doesn't make
sense" style. This might fit a Chomskyan model of language acquisition, but
it certainly doesn't fit a contextual-functional one. It would seem to me
that imitative learning in this sense is a highly specialized and learned
way to learn, and not a part of the intrinsic human endowment.
Of course we then need to reinterpret just what kinds of mimetic activity
are pretty species universal for humans, and one way to do that would be to
consider that mimicry can function for humans (and for chimps?) as play,
and so as having a salient, motivating result-object which is NOT the same
for the child as for the person being mimicked. The operations and actions
so practiced then enter the behavioral repertory and the real issue is how
they get re-attached to other activities where they forward other
result-objects. That then becomes the key to basic learning of activities,
and it would seem to depend precisely on the ability to disconnect and
re-connect end-results and actions-leading-to. It allows perfectly for
creativity and innovation on both sides (old ends, new means; old means,
new uses). And chimps' emulation behavior would seem to be just the
expectable precursor of this.
One view. JAY.
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JAY L. LEMKE
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
JLLBC who-is-at CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
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