Jay, you suggest that deliberate status abdication by dominant
males be conflated with [may be a "mirror-adoption" of]
"a feminine moral stance... distorted by the interests of patriarchy."
I don't quite understand though. If, on surveying the distribution
of privileges, you can see your own as part of the patriarchal order,
then how could letting go of privilege conferred by patriarchy
be an act distorted by the interests of patriarchy? It almost sounds
as though the decision by one who has more privilege than others to abdicate
some of it is suspect because it LOOKS LIKE femininity, like the sort
of thing that powerless people are conditioned to value. When the
valuation would be very different when done by someone more powerfully
positioned.
Jay also suggests that it tends towards the commodifying moral abstraction.
I appreciate the reminder that "principled" decisions can be
unethical _because_ decontextualized. But what about the meta-ethical
space that was previously proposed here, a sort of grey zone where
zoomed-out and zoomed-in views intersect and produce the material
for a nuanced response. Seems like status abdication might be one
option for a nuanced response.
This reminds me that, in Gilligan's work that I'm familiar with,
(early work; I haven't read anything lately) the caring ideal is
defended - it's the abdication of desire that
is problematized. If girls claim legitimacy for what they WANT,
(however the wanting has been shaped) will boys concede its
legitimacy and share some of their -- status? This has turned
into old ground somehow, but then what ground isn't old. (I'm
a bit weary of the girl-boy dichotomies; I prefer the more
textured discussions of our differences)
- Judy
Judy Diamondstone
Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey
Graduate School of Education
]10 Seminary Place
New Brunswick, NJ 08903