meanings and distributed cognition

cfran who-is-at micron.net
Mon, 2 Sep 96 18:23 MDT

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I recently reread Salomon's - No Distribution Without Individual Cognition
(in Distributed Cognition edited by Salomon, 1993 Cambridge U. Press) and am
puzzled over his reference to Searle's distinction between syntactic and
semantic representation. Are individuals the only "entities" that can
understand...or take/make meaning? If not, how can a system understand or
make meaning?

It never occured to me to doubt the essential me-ness in what I take to be
meaning. Is this, in fact, the whole issue of situated and distributed
cognition.. that is.. the idea that what I take to be my understanding or
meaningfulness of a thing or idea or person is, in actuality, a social event
- a situated and distributed event?

***********************************
Chris Francovich
Alternative Educational Services
Boise, Idaho
email: cfran who-is-at micron.net
http://netnow.micron.net/~cfran
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