Husserl - on Solaris and otherwise

Piotr Szybek (Piotr.Szybek who-is-at pedagog.lu.se)
Mon, 24 Jun 1996 14:34:04 +0100

On Sun, 23 Jun 1996 16:31:35 -0700 (PDT)
Mike Cole wrote wrote (Subject: Why Husserl only?)
> Eva-- Your response to Piotr reinforced a response that I had in reading
> his note, but was unsure of.
>
> Piotr wrote:
> >Now watch what happened! There is another thing that has emerged:
> > " the one performing the act of 'seeing' ".
> >This is, then, an_internal relation_ between
> > *the act of 'seeing',
> > *the object that is constituted by this act, and
> > *the one performing the act of 'seeing'.
> >The three constitute one another, mutually.
>
> >(The mutual
> >constitution of the subject, object and act of experiencing is describe=
d
> >(A) in Husserls _Ideen...., Erstes Buch,_ and
> >(B) in Eva Ekeblad's thesis "Children*learning*numbers")
> -----
> And, I thought, in the work of Russian CHAT theorists, summarized
> for example, in Lektorsky's "Subject, Object, Cognition" in
> Engestrom's work, and elsewhere.

1. A snapshot: Yrj=F6 Engestr=F6m is working in another
Nordic state, more or less as if he was working in Texas and I in
Illinois. In a way there are tighter cultural bonds between Finland
and Sweden than between each of the the two countries and the US. Yet
I have to subscribe to a California-based list in order to learn that
he has written the book which Eva mentioned (By the way, thank you
Eva! And: I promise I wont call you names - you are not a Husserlian. You =
are Eva).
Now, for the real tidbit: The book is not owned by the library in
this house, which is a library serving the department of education and two=

psychological departments. There is one copy of it in Lund, (Lund is the b=
iggest
university in Scandinavia). CHAT/ /AT seems to be made an un-theory in thi=
s
town.

2. Why "only Husserl"? Well, it is partly answered by the
above-mentioned situational description. But it is not only Husserl,
and the question should maybe be put "why he in first place, and not rathe=
r, say,
Gadamer". It may be because I have been educated to proceed from axiomatiz=
ed
principles and to let a scrupulous description take precedent over an intu=
itive sketch,
no matter how captivating. I do read and try to appropriate Gadamer and
Ricoeur and (not least!) L=E9vinas, but I recognize them all as
phenomenologists starting from a common "axiomatic system".

3. Why phenomenology at all? This is because its "axiomatic system"
is a manifestation of a horizon in which things are seen "as"
something which I want them to be seen "as". E.g. the equality of
status of mood and cognition as aspects (modalities) of the act of
experiencing.

4. Now, I do not subscribe to the list in order to teach
phenomenology to you. On the contrary, I want to learn CHAT/ /AT and
other such things from you.
This I do in the way I was reared to do: by asking questions, no
matter how stupid. That's what I am a PhD student for, you know: to
ask dumb questions.

> Some time ago, Bud Mehan here at UCSD wrote about the affinities
> between the work of Husserl, Shutz and other sociological
> phenomenologists.

Mike: is it feasible to forward a copy of this letter to me?

>This seems important to me. What are the
> implications of coming to this perspective from different
> intellectual/national traditions?
> Another question: What is the affect of the object of analysis
> and relation of theory to practice of using one or another
> tradition of ideas?
> mike
A dumb question I would try on you would be if it isn't possible to
see it like this: The object of analysis is primarily deliminated
(situated? maybe a better word) not by the "theoretical approach" but
by the "practical conatus". I presented a paper in march at the 24th
congress of NAER (NFPF) in Norway where I argued something like this.
One could see it with Bakhtin's terms: the "Zadannost' " (task-aspect)
of a thing is primary to its "Dannost' " (being a given) (Die Aufgegebenh=
eit
hat Vorrang vor der Gegebenheit).
E.g. The discussion currently between Matusow, Lemke, Smagorinsky et
al. Why do they discuss racism (and even want to spend time to have an
electroseminar on it)? Is it because racism is an apprpriate "object
of analysis" to make their theories work? It does not look this way. It i=
s rather because
it is "their headache", as it were.

In Bulgakov's novel "Master and Margarita" Pilate asks a detainee:
"Why do you talk of truth, you hobo? What do you know of it? Well -
what is truth?" and gets the answer "The truth is that you right now
have a headache".

Truth is then, that somebody's (an-other human's - or maybe not only
human's?) pain is there, for me. The clincher would be that _somebody's_ h=
eadache
becomes _my_ headache, and not as a given, to be analyzed, but as a
task, to be remedied. This is the "practical conatus", something which mak=
es
people run, because they cannot stand other people suffering.
This "practical conatus", I would say, determines how an ontological game=

(a "practice" - like science, in this case) is going to be played.

Again, I could say that this has to do with Husserl, but better you
tell me how it has to do with your ideas.

Piotr Szybek
University of Lund
Department of Education
PO Box 199, S-221 00 Lund, SWEDEN
tel +46462224732, fax +46462224538
E-mail piotr.szybek who-is-at pedagog.lu.se