language as a cognitive parser

Dale Cyphert (dxc20 who-is-at psu.edu)
Wed, 01 May 1996 08:59:27 -0400

Gordon Wells described some aspects of language that seem to point to an
inherent, inescapable inability of language to communicate the complexities
and ambiguities of human existence. This seems to be in direct contradition
with the Western/Aristotelian/Cartesian/logocentric assumption that
knowledge doesn't "count" unless it can be articulated and the tools of
language are the best defense against the evils of "uncertainty."

I have been approaching this paradox from a rhetorical perspective, arguing
that looking ONLY at explicit, articulated discourse (and cognition) misses
most of the point. So far, my best "proof" is Godel's Theorem, but I haven't
come across any research that tackles this head-on, from a
cognitive/psycholinguistic angle. Is anyone out there an expert in this
area? I'd sure like some pointers to the "right" literature.
Dale Cyphert
dxc20 who-is-at psuvm.psu.edu
Department of Speech Communication, Penn State University