On Thu, 21 Mar 1996 rhall who-is-at garnet.berkeley.edu wrote:
> So the conclusion (massively hedged) was that material designs, as
> constructed on paper, produced quite different affordances for knowing and
> doing mathematics among the people who made and used them. At the same
> time, forms of representation that were generally considered nonstandard or
> even in some cases childish in relation to algebra instruction, played a
> strong generative role. I've followed these ideas into thinking about
> represenation as an activity rather than an object, but that could be
> another longish set of threads.
>From quite a different starting point I've also come to emphasize knowing
and representing rather than knowledge and representations. I was influenced
in this by Marx Wartofsky's "Models, Representation and the Scientific
Understanding", Boston: Reidel (1979). Also by Halliday's work on the
shift from a dynamic to a synoptic mode of construing experience which
occurs in the development of scientific writing: "On the language of
physical science." In M. Ghadessy (Ed.) "Registers of Written English",
London: Pinter (1988).
Rogers, could you please post the Becker and Livingstone references.
Gordon Wells, gwells who-is-at oise.on.ca
OISE, Toronto.