Re: prolepsis

Eugene Matusov (ematusov who-is-at cats.ucsc.edu)
Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:48:11 -0800

Hello everybody--

I think that Tim and Jay provide fresh turn in discussion on prolepsis by
shifting the focus from considering transmission of information from a
teacher to student (function I of communication, according to Lotman, 1988)
to development of new meanings (function II). It seems to me that the
notion of prolepsis is to individual-focused that reduces the communication
process to ping-pong exchange of what one partner thinks about his thinking
(and so on). The degree of uncertainty raises dramatically in focusing on
individual's turn or understanding.

I think in order to capture meaning emergence in communication, we should
construct a unit of analysis that is more than individual's understanding of
what is going on in joint activity. Jim Wertsch proposes a mediated action
for such unit of analysis. I am entertaining the notion of coordination of
participants' contribution. Whatever it is most useful it should transcend
an individual.

Jay raises legitimate questions that if the unit of analysis of
communication is not individual than it might become a somewhat privileges
(and potentially undemocratic) position. He asks,

>But it is still subject to the question of just in what sense the
>emerging frame is 'collective'. Can we be sure it is really the same
>frame for all participants at the 'end'? What sorts of residual
>differences may remain? How can we know this? What sort of definition
>of the frames is needed to answer such questions?

I think it should be not a privileged position but a position of an observer
who tries to describe a pattern of communication and not "the true picture
of what is going on." For example, if Vygotsky described that a middle
class European mother treats her baby "AS IF" the baby fully understands
her, it does not mean that the Vygotsky's description is "the true one" and
"out there." Definitely the mother would disagree with Vygotsky as a
participant of the communication having specific goals in mind and comfort
perceived. Moreover, Vygotsky's description can be a real danger for the
specific middle class communication if the mother starts believing Vygotsky
and becomes doubtful in her baby reciprocity and understanding. On the
other hand, Vygotsky's description "AS IF" is an observant model (i.e., a
"theory-in-use" using Argys and Schon's term) of his observation of the
communication. The mother's participant model (i.e., an "espoused theory")
is "BABY UNDERSTANDS AND GUIDES ME." It is impossible for the mother to
remain participant as she is and agree with Vygotsky's model "AS IF."

The mother is correct for the purpose of her own activity (i.e., of
communication with her baby, socializing the baby in middle-class
interactional style, having fun, and so on). Vygotsky is correct for the
purpose of his own activity (i.e., of observing the communication,
presenting his finding to the academic community, developing a
sociohistorical theory, and so on). What unites both Vygotsky and the
mother is that they produce models (i.e., semiotic mediations) of the same
phenomenal process of mother-child communication. However, this uniting
phenomenal process is a "boundary object" using the term of Lee Star --
there are common boundaries and different contents.

But still who is right: does the baby really understands her mother in the
communication? Whose model of communication is more correct? Again the
answer to this question depends on the context (and background activity) of
the question. If Vygotsky would invite the mother to watch a videotaped
observation of her communication with the baby, I guess he might convince
the mother that he is right and the model "AS IF" is the true model of the
communication. But if mother give her baby in Vygotsky's hands and let him
to play with the baby, I guess he would play with the baby in the
middle-class European way in accord with the mother's model "BABY
UNDERSTANDS AND GUIDES ME." In this case, the mother is correct and her
model is the true model of the communication.

We should probably accept that in some cases two dramatically different
models of the phenomenon are both right without a tempting attempt to build
a compromising third model. The circumstances for the two truths are
different: participation in activity vs. observation of the activity. Each
activity has its own reliability and verifiability power and criteria. It
seems that we can only jump from one to the other even when we are
participant observants. I know that this sounds a bit like the quantum
physics, like Heisenberg's uncertainty principle but so it be.

Finishing on a humorous note, I'd summarize in the following way: Jay asks
how an individual research can describe supra-individual (Mike's term)
phenomena -- I'd answer -- simply by jumping from one activity to another.

Eugene Matusov
UC Santa Cruz
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Eugene Matusov
UC Santa Cruz