1. On individual activity.
Olav wrote on November 3, "I liked most of the discussion about individual
activity. If I understood Yrj=F6 right the message was that the individual=
can
not be understood without understanding the activity systems the individual
engages in; In other words, that the individual is made possible as
something emerging from the societal. This also makes sense in a history of
ideas perspective. It was not before civilization had made the individual
possible that thinkers as Rousseau started to complain about society
corrupting the individual."
I really like the point that activity and its aspects should be considered
in some "ecological" context in order to not to lose meaningfulness of the
generalization produced in the analysis. Taking about activity system is
probably a way of involving such a context.
2. On discrepancy.
Olav also wrote, "I think that it makes sense to understand every thing
people does as parts of activity systems. And obviously it is very effective
in solving the problems of primary health care in Finland, or in explaining
why the 'Postal Buddy' was a failure. However, the effectiveness of
'activity-systems-analysis' is strongly depending on manifest discrepancies.
This makes me wonder if there are things that can not be seen from the point
of view of activity theory, but that are crucially important for
understanding and supporting the development of working life and design of
new technology."
Olav raises an interesting issue that I always wanted to ask both Yrjo and
Ritva Engrstoms and Susan Leigh Star (Susan, are you on the net? -- she
used to be a xlchc-er). Unlike Olav, I don't think that Yrjo and Ritva
argue that a discrepancy in the visions of the object of the activity by
different participants (e.g., patent and doctor) of the activity system
(e.g., health care system) leads or indicates a serious problem in this
system. One type of the discrepancy could be in somatic representation of
illness by the doctor and holistic (i.e., well-being) representation by the
patient. Yrjo and Ritva wrote, "[I]nstead of fantasies of merger [of
doctor's and patient's models of representation of the activity object --
EM], the key question of expansive object construction in medical work is
rather how to enable the doctor and the patient to engage in working out
shared models or representations of the object -- i.e., of the patients'
health problem in is context. In other words, instead of trying to
eliminate the difference between the doctor and the patient, we might try
and create tools with which they can take advantage of their differences"
(Engestrom, Y. & Engestrom, R. (1990). Constructing the object in the work
activity of primary care physicians. In Y. Engestrom's volume, Learning,
working, and imagining. Helsinki, Finland: Orienta-Konsultit Oy, p. 128).
Star and Griesemer (1989; Institutional ecology, 'translations,' and
coherence: Amateurs and professionals in Berkeley's museum of vertebrate
zoology, 1907-1939. Social Studies of Science, 19, 387-420) introduced the
term "boundary objects" that seems to fit Engstroms' idea of
"co-engagement." Boundary objects have common borders and different
contents. The notion emphasizes that the very same material or symbolic
object can have different functions and means for different participants.
For example, rare animals of California were mainly objects of hunting,
profit for trappers who provided expositions for the museum, and objects for
the study of ecological evolution for biologists who were involved in
developing the museum. Different contents of boundary objects establish
complex and dynamic relationships between different communities involved in
"shared" practices.
I'd like to ask them (i.e., Yrjo and Ritva Engrstoms, Susan Leigh Star and
James Griesemer) if the notion of "boundary objects" is something that can
be useful for deciding when a discrepancy among participants' models of
representations of the activity goal can lead to system inefficiency and
collapse or when a discrepancy is a healthy source of a diversity of views
that moves the activity system ahead.
Eugene Matusov
UC Santa Cruz
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Eugene Matusov
Psychology Department
University of California at Santa Cruz
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
EMATUSOV who-is-at cats.ucsc.edu