From ablunden@mira.net Mon May 1 00:44:08 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 1 May 2017 17:44:08 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <44e15dd0-1aee-ef1e-4b03-e86a52603fcc@mira.net> David, in this paper https://www.academia.edu/30657582/ if you do a search for "chair" you will see an extended quote from a Hegelian called Heikki who is using production of chairs rather than tables as an example for concepts, after which you will see my critique (with which I am sure you will agree) and then if you flip to the mention of "chair" at the bottom of page 7 you see a surprising thing about the production of chairs which illustrates Mike's point about how pencils are carriers of historical practices. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 1/05/2017 4:58 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at > table" and meeting a the board room table etc., it not > that the table carries the idea of table but is the bearer > of practices, which have refined the size and shape of > tables for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for > cursive writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics > into clay. > > Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to > this idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a >> Festschrift for >> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >> >> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the >> interactions of >> which they >> were previously a part and which they mediate in the >> present (e.g., the >> structure of >> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms >> of writing). They >> are material >> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This >> principle applies >> with equal >> force whether one is considering language/speech or the >> more usually noted >> forms >> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute >> material culture. >> What >> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a >> table. is the >> relative prominence >> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart >> from its material >> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand >> movements, or as >> writing, >> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an >> order imposed by >> thinking >> human beings." >> >> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown >> out of journals by >> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and >> a table is the >> relative salience of the ideal and the material. >> Sure--words are full of >> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >> >> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, >> because a word >> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a >> word. In a >> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change >> one, and you >> change the other. But with a table, what you start with >> is the idea of the >> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a >> table. You could >> change the material to anything and you'd still have a >> table. >> >> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does >> ignore the delightful >> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out >> of the quote is >> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact >> Mike is saying >> just the opposite. >> >> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure >> of a pencil >> carries within it the history of certain forms of >> writing. Does he mean >> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's >> been used? Or is he >> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, >> rubber and their >> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing >> and erasing? >> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like >> words--the idea has to >> come first.) >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> > > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon May 1 06:14:26 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Mon, 1 May 2017 13:14:26 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1341829781.1954092.1493644466663@mail.yahoo.com> Ontogeny- up to an age a childcannot retain the image of a thing she has seen.Phylogeny- up to the emergence ofthe?human-thinking-man- no architect was there to boast of having the patternof a house which was going to be built on later time. The beavers , birds ,ants , etc. were in fact doing according to the in-built plans rather thanidealizing it first. ?Therefore , when we say ??everytable embodies an order (read history again) imposed by thinking human beings? ,we are bound to ?and it?s a very weighty burden on our shoulders?primarily thinkof what was that which took us to this point of time or to this boundary of development. ?Once one good colleague with respectto Engels? saying said it was long time ago to conclude that nowadays it?s ?thought?which reigns ignoring the facts that :1. This current brilliant ?thought?owes its very existence to the long history of ?ideal-less? creatures living in?un-self-hood? or anonymity which ruled over the fate of disastrous man surroundedby all sorts of ir-realities , fancies , phantoms , mirages , whims, witchcraftand Talisman .2. Even nowadays you still ignorethe fact that you yourselves put finger upon something that is indispensable tothe emergence or creation of signs , that is , the material stuff on which signmust necessarily be inscribed or laid down. The point you add with sufficient negligence, of course , is that you say : ?See ! this trivial mean base stuff you call materialbecomes into ashes in one blink of the eye ; it is consumed and finished up tothe tiniest particle because it just has ?use value? ; But see this one ,heavenly stuff , God?s light on earth , Socrates? spell of mouth , the essenceof eternity so on so forth . ?Tautology : matter is notconsumed/finished up. The form changes. With ?ideal?, you made people repeatthemselves because you know and deny. Materials and ideals are two distinctessences . The latter are essentially reflections and on a final countsecondary. They are mutually affected dialectically but they are not interchangeable orreplaceable. The material ground does not exhaust and is firm on its very legs. But the swinging sustained ideal not knowing about where it has lost his identification card locates in a queue so that its turn for identity is reached (somewhere to sit on). Between the neuronalprocesses and some material ground for the ideal to stick to , to lie in , tolay on , to get calm and located , lies a vast expanse of not perfectly known entity on large part of which the poor ideal should flutter aimlessly. ?Ilyenko inspired by Marx (Talers)does stress that all values exist ?but for the thinking human being and in sofar as the whole universe is humanized by such being. ?In economic sense to which semiologistsand modernists stick to push to their aims , as you know, just in capitalist formationthere?s talk of commodity and exchange value . In barter and subsistence economyno such formulation has been worked out. ?But words were in use in otherformations. Then , if , as one scholar remarked , involving in word/statements/discourses/utterancesactivities analogically and properly equalized involving in goal-oriented jointMATERIAL processes , of necessity it came out that pre-capitalist formations were toppledbecause of the revolutions carried out by the victorious masses who had beenexploited by the semiologic impositions. ?If you argue that in , say , feudalformation words were not a means of exploitation as we have in capitalism ,then I have to counter-argue that words genetically and developmentally in alleras had been one value but analytically divisible into two moments ontologicaland epistemological .BestHaydi ???? From: David Kellogg To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:14:53 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of which they were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the structure of a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They are material in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies with equal force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted forms of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. What differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the relative prominence of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as writing, or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by thinking human beings." This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying just the opposite. (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to come first.) David Kellogg Macquarie University From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon May 1 13:16:08 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Mon, 1 May 2017 20:16:08 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> Andy,What I think has been omitted from your discussion is 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires objectification and deobjectification of objects in practical processes. As you well know , Marx never reduces 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in agreement with Marx concerning the problem. Their objection is over the issue of thinking that the ideal should be inside the mind. What is outside the mind is material . He , as you know , gives many examples : A church is an ideal , A diplomat is an ideal as talers are , etc. and they are outside the mind. Respectively , the worship of God has been idealized in a church , the diplomat gets out of his ordinary posture becomes a representative for the State , talers in the pocket are nothing more than ordinary metals but replacing precious golds in turn representing the labour spent on their extraction in mines. The above-mentioned items are ideal NOW; Hammers WERE ideals THEN at the start of the practical process. Now they are 'materials' reified and metamorphosed , that is through the furnace of practical activity one essence has been tempered and converted into another essence for which marxists including Ilyenko have different definitions. BestHaydi? From: Andy Blunden To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table" and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay. Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > which they > were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > structure of > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They > are material > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > with equal > force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted > forms > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. > What > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as > writing, > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he > making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their > relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon May 1 13:16:08 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Mon, 1 May 2017 20:16:08 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> Andy,What I think has been omitted from your discussion is 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires objectification and deobjectification of objects in practical processes. As you well know , Marx never reduces 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in agreement with Marx concerning the problem. Their objection is over the issue of thinking that the ideal should be inside the mind. What is outside the mind is material . He , as you know , gives many examples : A church is an ideal , A diplomat is an ideal as talers are , etc. and they are outside the mind. Respectively , the worship of God has been idealized in a church , the diplomat gets out of his ordinary posture becomes a representative for the State , talers in the pocket are nothing more than ordinary metals but replacing precious golds in turn representing the labour spent on their extraction in mines. The above-mentioned items are ideal NOW; Hammers WERE ideals THEN at the start of the practical process. Now they are 'materials' reified and metamorphosed , that is through the furnace of practical activity one essence has been tempered and converted into another essence for which marxists including Ilyenko have different definitions. BestHaydi? From: Andy Blunden To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table" and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay. Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > which they > were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > structure of > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They > are material > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > with equal > force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted > forms > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. > What > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as > writing, > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he > making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their > relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon May 1 14:53:29 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 07:53:29 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <44e15dd0-1aee-ef1e-4b03-e86a52603fcc@mira.net> References: <44e15dd0-1aee-ef1e-4b03-e86a52603fcc@mira.net> Message-ID: A magnificent paper, Andy--I particularly like the distinction between project and practice. We tend to think of (pedagogical) practices as repetitive, self-reinforcing, and reactionary; this is a distinction that makes a difference. Koreans aren't really into chairs. We know about them, of course; just as we know about office cubicles, neckties, and French wines. But chairs are really for work; when you get home, you sit on the floor. If guests come, they sit on the sofa. And if they are really good friends, they sit in a row on the floor with their backs against the sofa, and you sit opposite them covering the TV set with your back, with a small floor-table (i.e. a table that is about ankle high) bearing cut persimmons with toothpicks in them between you, looking deep into their eyes. I don't think any of this is encoded in the structure of chairs, sofas, or TV sets. It's part of the way in which they have all been ripped from one cultural history and imposed on a very different one. I think you have to say the same thing about the stuff of words as well. As Vygotsky pointed out, every lexicogrammar is a rich emulsion, with islands of foreign wordings. On the one hand, the original significations of the words are often accessible to us through etymological analysis, so long as the language is familiar to us (e.g. so long as an English child knows enough French to know that a "clairvoyant" was originally someone who sees clearly). On the other, these original meanings are often a distraction from the sense that the words now have today (e.g. the English child must know that a "clairvoyant" sees darkly and mistily, as if through a veil of black gauze). Word stuff in English tends to go "DA-da" if it hangs around along enough. So for example, the name "An-DRE" becomes "AN-drew" within a few centuries of the Norman Conquest, and the diminutive "Andy", which is child-like in its refusal to end in a consonant sound like a proper man's name (compare: "Andrew") or to end in a vowel sound like a proper woman's name ("Andrea") is in some ways an exaggeration of its Englishness. This process of Anglicization makes it very hard to recover the original sounding. And of course meaning and sounding is solidary, in words if not in tables and chairs. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, May 1, 2017 at 5:44 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, in this paper https://www.academia.edu/30657582/ > > if you do a search for "chair" you will see an extended quote from a > Hegelian called Heikki who is using production of chairs rather than tables > as an example for concepts, after which you will see my critique (with > which I am sure you will agree) and then if you flip to the mention of > "chair" at the bottom of page 7 you see a surprising thing about the > production of chairs which illustrates Mike's point about how pencils are > carriers of historical practices. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 1/05/2017 4:58 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table" and meeting >> a the board room table etc., it not that the table carries the idea of >> table but is the bearer of practices, which have refined the size and shape >> of tables for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive >> writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay. >> >> Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this idea ... >> everywhere. It smells of Marxism. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for >>> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >>> >>> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of >>> which they >>> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the >>> structure of >>> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They >>> are material >>> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies >>> with equal >>> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually >>> noted >>> forms >>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. >>> What >>> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >>> relative prominence >>> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its >>> material >>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or >>> as >>> writing, >>> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed >>> by >>> thinking >>> human beings." >>> >>> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals >>> by >>> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the >>> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of >>> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >>> >>> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >>> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >>> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >>> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of >>> the >>> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >>> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >>> >>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the >>> delightful >>> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is >>> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying >>> just the opposite. >>> >>> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >>> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean >>> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he >>> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their >>> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? >>> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to >>> come first.) >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon May 1 18:07:48 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 11:07:48 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <7ac21ea1-b2ff-1bd2-c0d3-b6be4ebef0d5@mira.net> So "material" and "ideal" are not opposites. Hammers still have ideal properties as well as material properties. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/05/2017 6:16 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > Andy, > What I think has been omitted from your discussion is > 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires > objectification and deobjectification of objects in > practical processes. As you well know , Marx never reduces > 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in agreement with > Marx concerning the problem. Their objection is over the > issue of thinking that the ideal should be inside the > mind. What is outside the mind is material . He , as you > know , gives many examples : A church is an ideal , A > diplomat is an ideal as talers are , etc. and they are > outside the mind. Respectively , the worship of God has > been idealized in a church , the diplomat gets out of his > ordinary posture becomes a representative for the State , > talers in the pocket are nothing more than ordinary metals > but replacing precious golds in turn representing the > labour spent on their extraction in mines. The > above-mentioned items are ideal NOW; Hammers WERE ideals > THEN at the start of the practical process. Now they are > 'materials' reified and metamorphosed , that is through > the furnace of practical activity one essence has been > tempered and converted into another essence for which > marxists including Ilyenko have different definitions. > Best > Haydi > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > *Sent:* Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04 > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > > And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table" > and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the > table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of > practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables > for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive > writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay. > > Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this > idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a > Festschrift for > > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > > > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the > interactions of > > which they > > were previously a part and which they mediate in the > present (e.g., the > > structure of > > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms > of writing). They > > are material > > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This > principle applies > > with equal > > force whether one is considering language/speech or the > more usually noted > > forms > > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute > material culture. > > What > > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a > table. is the > > relative prominence > > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists > apart from its material > > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or > hand movements, or as > > writing, > > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies > an order imposed by > > thinking > > human beings." > > > > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown > out of journals by > > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word > and a table is the > > relative salience of the ideal and the material. > Sure--words are full of > > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > > > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, > because a word > > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a > word. In a > > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change > one, and you > > change the other. But with a table, what you start with > is the idea of the > > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a > table. You could > > change the material to anything and you'd still have a > table. > > > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does > ignore the delightful > > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out > of the quote is > > just that words are really just like tools. When in fact > Mike is saying > > just the opposite. > > > > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the > structure of a pencil > > carries within it the history of certain forms of > writing. Does he mean > > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's > been used? Or is he > > making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, > rubber and their > > relationship to a certain point in the history of > writing and erasing? > > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like > words--the idea has to > > come first.) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon May 1 18:18:31 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 11:18:31 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <44e15dd0-1aee-ef1e-4b03-e86a52603fcc@mira.net> Message-ID: I will have to slip in a line about the cultural as well as historical variation in the concept of "chair", David. Thank you for that. :) And yes, everything that is discussed in the paper about "useful objects", i.e., artefacts, applies exactly to words (which as Mike pointed out are artefacts). The great thing about making the point in connection with plain ordinary useful objects like spoons, chairs and tables is that it is all quite transparent and no special knowledge or facility in linguistics is required to follow the idea - anyone can grasp the point viscerally. I hope that I have given Heikki sufficient credit for this move while blasting him for his interpretation of the Philosophy of Right. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/05/2017 7:53 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > A magnificent paper, Andy--I particularly like the > distinction between project and practice. We tend to think > of (pedagogical) practices as repetitive, > self-reinforcing, and reactionary; this is a distinction > that makes a difference. > > Koreans aren't really into chairs. We know about them, of > course; just as we know about office cubicles, neckties, > and French wines. But chairs are really for work; when > you get home, you sit on the floor. If guests come, they > sit on the sofa. And if they are really good friends, > they sit in a row on the floor with their backs against > the sofa, and you sit opposite them covering the TV set > with your back, with a small floor-table (i.e. a table > that is about ankle high) bearing cut persimmons with > toothpicks in them between you, looking deep into their > eyes. I don't think any of this is encoded in the > structure of chairs, sofas, or TV sets. It's part of the > way in which they have all been ripped from one cultural > history and imposed on a very different one. I think you > have to say the same thing about the stuff of words as well. > > As Vygotsky pointed out, every lexicogrammar is a rich > emulsion, with islands of foreign wordings. On the one > hand, the original significations of the words are often > accessible to us through etymological analysis, so long as > the language is familiar to us (e.g. so long as an English > child knows enough French to know that a "clairvoyant" was > originally someone who sees clearly). On the other, these > original meanings are often a distraction from the sense > that the words now have today (e.g. the English child must > know that a "clairvoyant" sees darkly and mistily, as if > through a veil of black gauze). > > Word stuff in English tends to go "DA-da" if it hangs > around along enough. So for example, the name "An-DRE" > becomes "AN-drew" within a few centuries of the Norman > Conquest, and the diminutive "Andy", which is child-like > in its refusal to end in a consonant sound like a proper > man's name (compare: "Andrew") or to end in a vowel sound > like a proper woman's name ("Andrea") is in some ways an > exaggeration of its Englishness. This process of > Anglicization makes it very hard to recover the original > sounding. And of course meaning and sounding is > solidary, in words if not in tables and chairs. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Mon, May 1, 2017 at 5:44 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > David, in this paper > https://www.academia.edu/30657582/ > > > if you do a search for "chair" you will see an > extended quote from a Hegelian called Heikki who is > using production of chairs rather than tables as an > example for concepts, after which you will see my > critique (with which I am sure you will agree) and > then if you flip to the mention of "chair" at the > bottom of page 7 you see a surprising thing about the > production of chairs which illustrates Mike's point > about how pencils are carriers of historical practices. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 1/05/2017 4:58 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > And tables carry with them the practice of eating > "at table" and meeting a the board room table > etc., it not that the table carries the idea of > table but is the bearer of practices, which have > refined the size and shape of tables for eating, > talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive > writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics > into clay. > > Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of > resistance to this idea ... everywhere. It smells > of Marxism. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike > wrote in a Festschrift for > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded > form the interactions of > which they > were previously a part and which they mediate > in the present (e.g., the > structure of > a pencil carries within it the history of > certain forms of writing). They > are material > in that they are embodied in material > artifacts. This principle applies > with equal > force whether one is considering > language/speech or the more usually noted > forms > of artifacts such as tables and knives which > constitute material culture. > What > differentiates a word, such as ?language? > from, say, a table. is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal aspects. No word > exists apart from its material > instantiation (as a configuration of sound > waves, or hand movements, or as > writing, > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table > embodies an order imposed by > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets > me thrown out of journals by > the ear. Mike says that the difference between > a word and a table is the > relative salience of the ideal and the > material. Sure--words are full of > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. > Why? Well, because a word > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) > just isn't a word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with material > sounding: change one, and you > change the other. But with a table, what you > start with is the idea of the > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've > got a table. You could > change the material to anything and you'd > still have a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But > he does ignore the delightful > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he > gets out of the quote is > just that words are really just like tools. > When in fact Mike is saying > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that > the structure of a pencil > carries within it the history of certain forms > of writing. Does he mean > that the length of the pencil reflects how > often it's been used? Or is he > making a more archaeological point about > graphite, wood, rubber and their > relationship to a certain point in the history > of writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more like tables than > like words--the idea has to > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon May 1 23:41:43 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 06:41:43 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <7ac21ea1-b2ff-1bd2-c0d3-b6be4ebef0d5@mira.net> References: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> <7ac21ea1-b2ff-1bd2-c0d3-b6be4ebef0d5@mira.net> Message-ID: <1496852677.282350.1493707303232@mail.yahoo.com> For the first part of your remark Ilyenko gives a definition which you are quite familiar with : "Ideal is nothing more than the reflection of the material onto mind" ; then they are distinct but very closely related. The relativity is not a matter of gradience ? From: Andy Blunden To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Sent: Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 5:37:55 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words So "material" and "ideal" are not opposites. Hammers still have ideal properties as well as material properties. Andy Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/05/2017 6:16 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: Andy, What I think has been omitted from your discussion is 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires objectification and deobjectification of objects in practical processes. As you well know , Marx never reduces 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in agreement with Marx concerning the problem. Their objection is over the issue of thinking that the ideal should be inside the mind. What is outside the mind is material . He , as you know , gives many examples : A church is an ideal , A diplomat is an ideal as talers are , etc. and they are outside the mind. Respectively , the worship of God has been idealized in a church , the diplomat gets out of his ordinary posture becomes a representative for the State , talers in the pocket are nothing more than ordinary metals but replacing precious golds in turn representing the labour spent on their extraction in mines. The above-mentioned items are ideal NOW; Hammers WERE ideals THEN at the start of the practical process. Now they are 'materials' reified and metamorphosed , that is through the furnace of practical activity one essence has been tempered and converted into another essence for which marxists including Ilyenko have different definitions. Best Haydi? From: Andy Blunden To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table" and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay. Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > which they > were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > structure of > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They > are material > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > with equal > force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted > forms > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. > What > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as > writing, > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he > making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their > relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue May 2 01:29:16 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 08:29:16 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <7ac21ea1-b2ff-1bd2-c0d3-b6be4ebef0d5@mira.net> References: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> <7ac21ea1-b2ff-1bd2-c0d3-b6be4ebef0d5@mira.net> Message-ID: <1247679395.405586.1493713756700@mail.yahoo.com> For the first part of your remark Ilyenko gives a definition which you are quite familiar with "ideal is nothing more than the reflection of the material onto mind". Then they are distinct but very closely related . The relativity , I think , is not a matter of gradience or salience as David quoted from Mike. To put water into steam you need 'heat'. The heat we need to put ideal into material and inversely material into ideal is the very process of goal-oriented joint practical material activity. For the second part of your remark , I think you've forgotten Ilyenko (otherwise you knew well) saying "The REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal". Then,how can it possess the properties of the ideal? Does water have retained the properties of oxygen or hydrogen .That was why I said hammers are 'material' NOW. Hammers are now ready for use . As to the history Mike mentions , yes , it's the very history of idealization of a need which , in the process of material practical activity , turns into an object as product retaining no trace of its once ideality. Ilyenko himself says that the very knowledge/cognition of a phenomenon is to be able to unmediationally trace the genesis and emergence of that phenomenon. But that's for the theoretician not for the worker or whoever who has to use the hammer not as the embodiment of interactions , practices , experiences or what you correctly rejected as the carrier of ideas.? BestHaydi From: Andy Blunden To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Sent: Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 5:37:55 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words So "material" and "ideal" are not opposites. Hammers still have ideal properties as well as material properties. Andy Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/05/2017 6:16 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: Andy, What I think has been omitted from your discussion is 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires objectification and deobjectification of objects in practical processes. As you well know , Marx never reduces 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in agreement with Marx concerning the problem. Their objection is over the issue of thinking that the ideal should be inside the mind. What is outside the mind is material . He , as you know , gives many examples : A church is an ideal , A diplomat is an ideal as talers are , etc. and they are outside the mind. Respectively , the worship of God has been idealized in a church , the diplomat gets out of his ordinary posture becomes a representative for the State , talers in the pocket are nothing more than ordinary metals but replacing precious golds in turn representing the labour spent on their extraction in mines. The above-mentioned items are ideal NOW; Hammers WERE ideals THEN at the start of the practical process. Now they are 'materials' reified and metamorphosed , that is through the furnace of practical activity one essence has been tempered and converted into another essence for which marxists including Ilyenko have different definitions. Best Haydi? From: Andy Blunden To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table" and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay. Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > which they > were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > structure of > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They > are material > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > with equal > force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted > forms > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. > What > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as > writing, > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he > making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their > relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue May 2 02:02:45 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 19:02:45 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <1247679395.405586.1493713756700@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> <7ac21ea1-b2ff-1bd2-c0d3-b6be4ebef0d5@mira.net> <1247679395.405586.1493713756700@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <0d1105dc-d99d-7e46-02bf-8dec91f690fe@mira.net> Haydi, where did you get this quote: "The REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal"? I couldn't find it in "The Concept of the Ideal" https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm I'd like to see it in context. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/05/2017 6:29 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > For the first part of your remark Ilyenko gives a > definition which you are quite familiar with "ideal is > nothing more than the reflection of the material onto > mind". Then they are distinct but very closely related . > The relativity , I think , is not a matter of gradience or > salience as David quoted from Mike. To put water into > steam you need 'heat'. The heat we need to put ideal into > material and inversely material into ideal is the very > process of goal-oriented joint practical material activity. > > For the second part of your remark , I think you've > forgotten Ilyenko (otherwise you knew well) saying "The > REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal". Then,how can it possess > the properties of the ideal? Does water have retained the > properties of oxygen or hydrogen .That was why I said > hammers are 'material' NOW. Hammers are now ready for use > . As to the history Mike mentions , yes , it's the very > history of idealization of a need which , in the process > of material practical activity , turns into an object as > product retaining no trace of its once ideality. Ilyenko > himself says that the very knowledge/cognition of a > phenomenon is to be able to unmediationally trace the > genesis and emergence of that phenomenon. But that's for > the theoretician not for the worker or whoever who has to > use the hammer not as the embodiment of interactions , > practices , experiences or what you correctly rejected as > the carrier of ideas. > Best > Haydi > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; > "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > *Sent:* Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 5:37:55 > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > > So "material" and "ideal" are not opposites. Hammers still > have ideal properties as well as material properties. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 2/05/2017 6:16 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: >> Andy, >> What I think has been omitted from your discussion is >> 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires >> objectification and deobjectification of objects in >> practical processes. As you well know , Marx never >> reduces 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in >> agreement with Marx concerning the problem. Their >> objection is over the issue of thinking that the ideal >> should be inside the mind. What is outside the mind is >> material . He , as you know , gives many examples : A >> church is an ideal , A diplomat is an ideal as talers are >> , etc. and they are outside the mind. Respectively , the >> worship of God has been idealized in a church , the >> diplomat gets out of his ordinary posture becomes a >> representative for the State , talers in the pocket are >> nothing more than ordinary metals but replacing precious >> golds in turn representing the labour spent on their >> extraction in mines. The above-mentioned items are ideal >> NOW; Hammers WERE ideals THEN at the start of the >> practical process. Now they are 'materials' reified and >> metamorphosed , that is through the furnace of practical >> activity one essence has been tempered and converted into >> another essence for which marxists including Ilyenko have >> different definitions. >> Best >> Haydi >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *From:* Andy Blunden >> >> *To:* xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> *Sent:* Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04 >> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words >> >> And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table" >> and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the >> table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of >> practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables >> for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive >> writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay. >> >> Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this >> idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> >> On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in >> a Festschrift for >> > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >> > >> > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the >> interactions of >> > which they >> > were previously a part and which they mediate in the >> present (e.g., the >> > structure of >> > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms >> of writing). They >> > are material >> > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This >> principle applies >> > with equal >> > force whether one is considering language/speech or the >> more usually noted >> > forms >> > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute >> material culture. >> > What >> > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a >> table. is the >> > relative prominence >> > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists >> apart from its material >> > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or >> hand movements, or as >> > writing, >> > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies >> an order imposed by >> > thinking >> > human beings." >> > >> > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown >> out of journals by >> > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word >> and a table is the >> > relative salience of the ideal and the material. >> Sure--words are full of >> > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >> > >> > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, >> because a word >> > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't >> a word. In a >> > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: >> change one, and you >> > change the other. But with a table, what you start with >> is the idea of the >> > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a >> table. You could >> > change the material to anything and you'd still have a >> table. >> > >> > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does >> ignore the delightful >> > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out >> of the quote is >> > just that words are really just like tools. When in >> fact Mike is saying >> > just the opposite. >> > >> > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the >> structure of a pencil >> > carries within it the history of certain forms of >> writing. Does he mean >> > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's >> been used? Or is he >> > making a more archaeological point about graphite, >> wood, rubber and their >> > relationship to a certain point in the history of >> writing and erasing? >> > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like >> words--the idea has to >> > come first.) >> > >> > David Kellogg >> > Macquarie University >> > >> > >> >> >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue May 2 08:03:03 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 08:03:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <0d1105dc-d99d-7e46-02bf-8dec91f690fe@mira.net> References: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> <7ac21ea1-b2ff-1bd2-c0d3-b6be4ebef0d5@mira.net> <1247679395.405586.1493713756700@mail.yahoo.com> <0d1105dc-d99d-7e46-02bf-8dec91f690fe@mira.net> Message-ID: <59089fc0.c121620a.7eb47.45cd@mx.google.com> Haydi, Thanks for focusing our attention upon the relativITY (quality of the relative) exploring ideal and material emerging within goal-oriented joint practical activity. I want to abstract and focus on the term (goal) Does goal imply (intentionalITY ? having the quality of the intentional)? This then returns us to Wolff-Michael and Alfredo who suggest differing qualities of relationalITY (qualities of the relational). The suggestion is not to begin with he or she being intentional, but rather to begin with the relation/place from which he and she ARE TAKEN TO BE ? This may be crytic and may misrepresent this alternative lense of discernment? If so I will continue to listen Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: May 2, 2017 2:03 AM To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ?; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words Haydi, where did you get this quote: "The REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal"? I couldn't find it in "The Concept of the Ideal" https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm I'd like to see it in context. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 2/05/2017 6:29 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: > For the first part of your remark Ilyenko gives a > definition which you are quite familiar with "ideal is > nothing more than the reflection of the material onto > mind". Then they are distinct but very closely related . > The relativity , I think , is not a matter of gradience or > salience as David quoted from Mike. To put water into > steam you need 'heat'. The heat we need to put ideal into > material and inversely material into ideal is the very > process of goal-oriented joint practical material activity. > > For the second part of your remark , I think you've > forgotten Ilyenko (otherwise you knew well) saying "The > REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal". Then,how can it possess > the properties of the ideal? Does water have retained the > properties of oxygen or hydrogen .That was why I said > hammers are 'material' NOW. Hammers are now ready for use > . As to the history Mike mentions , yes , it's the very > history of idealization of a need which , in the process > of material practical activity , turns into an object as > product retaining no trace of its once ideality. Ilyenko > himself says that the very knowledge/cognition of a > phenomenon is to be able to unmediationally trace the > genesis and emergence of that phenomenon. But that's for > the theoretician not for the worker or whoever who has to > use the hammer not as the embodiment of interactions , > practices , experiences or what you correctly rejected as > the carrier of ideas. > Best > Haydi > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; > "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > *Sent:* Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 5:37:55 > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > > So "material" and "ideal" are not opposites. Hammers still > have ideal properties as well as material properties. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 2/05/2017 6:16 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei? ? wrote: >> Andy, >> What I think has been omitted from your discussion is >> 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires >> objectification and deobjectification of objects in >> practical processes. As you well know , Marx never >> reduces 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in >> agreement with Marx concerning the problem. Their >> objection is over the issue of thinking that the ideal >> should be inside the mind. What is outside the mind is >> material . He , as you know , gives many examples : A >> church is an ideal , A diplomat is an ideal as talers are >> , etc. and they are outside the mind. Respectively , the >> worship of God has been idealized in a church , the >> diplomat gets out of his ordinary posture becomes a >> representative for the State , talers in the pocket are >> nothing more than ordinary metals but replacing precious >> golds in turn representing the labour spent on their >> extraction in mines. The above-mentioned items are ideal >> NOW; Hammers WERE ideals THEN at the start of the >> practical process. Now they are 'materials' reified and >> metamorphosed , that is through the furnace of practical >> activity one essence has been tempered and converted into >> another essence for which marxists including Ilyenko have >> different definitions. >> Best >> Haydi >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *From:* Andy Blunden >> >> *To:* xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> *Sent:* Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04 >> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words >> >> And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table" >> and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the >> table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of >> practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables >> for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive >> writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay. >> >> Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this >> idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> >> On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in >> a Festschrift for >> > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >> > >> > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the >> interactions of >> > which they >> > were previously a part and which they mediate in the >> present (e.g., the >> > structure of >> > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms >> of writing). They >> > are material >> > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This >> principle applies >> > with equal >> > force whether one is considering language/speech or the >> more usually noted >> > forms >> > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute >> material culture. >> > What >> > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a >> table. is the >> > relative prominence >> > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists >> apart from its material >> > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or >> hand movements, or as >> > writing, >> > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies >> an order imposed by >> > thinking >> > human beings." >> > >> > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown >> out of journals by >> > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word >> and a table is the >> > relative salience of the ideal and the material. >> Sure--words are full of >> > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >> > >> > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, >> because a word >> > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't >> a word. In a >> > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: >> change one, and you >> > change the other. But with a table, what you start with >> is the idea of the >> > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a >> table. You could >> > change the material to anything and you'd still have a >> table. >> > >> > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does >> ignore the delightful >> > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out >> of the quote is >> > just that words are really just like tools. When in >> fact Mike is saying >> > just the opposite. >> > >> > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the >> structure of a pencil >> > carries within it the history of certain forms of >> writing. Does he mean >> > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's >> been used? Or is he >> > making a more archaeological point about graphite, >> wood, rubber and their >> > relationship to a certain point in the history of >> writing and erasing? >> > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like >> words--the idea has to >> > come first.) >> > >> > David Kellogg >> > Macquarie University >> > >> > >> >> >> > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue May 2 11:32:01 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 18:32:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> References: , <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1493749921352.35535@iped.uio.no> Hi all, I've been able to follow the prior discussions only partially, as I was traveling last week, but I still wanted to jump into this one, as I always found the topic to be one tricky when familiarising one self with CHAT, turning the later a bit into a mysterious thing. It's always been troubling to me (and it seems David K. was reacting to this too) reading assertions concerning artefacts as 'carrying history/practice', and I always felt that I was missing the point or some step in the reasoning. Frankly, starting to read CHAT literature is not easy, and some times one wonders why these complications. For it takes a lot of work to trace back to Hegel and then to Marx to be able to see what authors such as Leontiev, for example, is saying when he writes that activity is 'crystallised' in the product. It is only then that one begins to see why this or that apparently 'weird' way of wordings things. The text you shared, Andy, really helps in tracing these to Hegel notion of the concept and the idea. I more than once think of "The gods must be crazy" movie (which I would not be surprised if it had been brought to bear at xmca before). (see the Coke scene): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17HGR7FBwu0 An artifact, a glass Coca-Cola bottle, is thrown out of an airplane and found by Bushmen in the Kalahari Desert, who have no idea about glass bottles or Coca-Cola. The bottle then becomes an object of cult that leads to all sorts of conflicts, eventually leading to an expedition to take the bottle out of the village. Surely most of you know the plot, and the allegory goes beyond the issue raised here. The scene may do as an example: the needs that the artifact meets are different in the kalahari tribe simply because in enters a different history of development. The bottle "embodies" nothing other than itself; the view that the bottle "encodes" something suggests that its use has to do with what theoreticians do (as Haydi points out), but actual use has more to do with what workers do (which is not less 'ideal'). Rather, all there is to the coke bottle in each context is its being a moment in some project. I think that for the non-initiated and the initiated CHAT readers, finding and using expressions about transitions from ideal to material, and from material to ideal, can be confusing, as things can get mixed up very easily. Probably this may have to do as well with the way the works have been translated. It takes very knowledgeable scholars to disentangle all this, in which case CHAT becomes a bit of a mystery thing, quite inaccessible to many (like myself)... Where I find the good in the promise to overcome a very problematic and highly ingrained idea: that outcomes of human activity are like the external stamp of ideas that first are in the internal conscious mind. To do so, however, CHAT uses words in a different sense: the words 'external' and 'internal' are not like in classical thinking. Even the word consciousness changes... There is lots of languaging issues that can get you stray unless you care a lot... To me, it is helpful to recur to other authors, such as G. Bateson, who are consistent with CHATs non dualist premises, but also develop a vocabulary less entangled into a long philosophical tradition. To me, the distinction Bateson makes between logical types, and specially that between Pleroma and Creatura (he uses Jung's terms, pleroma referring to the realm of physical forces; Creatura referring to the realm of organic (living) relations). The distinction here is not between the material and the idea, but between the inorganic and the organic (and then, between the organic and the uniquely human). I think that these get mixed up very easily in studies taking a CHAT approach these days. I agree with Y. Engestr?m, who saw a relation between Bateson's categories and the levels that Leontiev was working on (operations, goals). In fact, following Engels, Leontiev starts with this distinction between the way non-living things *respond* and the way living things *respond*. But of course, the living organism is not immaterial. It is made up of the same stuff as things are. And the same laws that apply to bodies apply to it. I think that articulating that juncture between what is of the realm of 'bodies,' and what is of the realm of conscious mind, and how the two are enmeshed with each other, is crucial for addressing the key Marxist insight with which Andy closes his article: ?Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation? (Marx, 1859). Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ?Haydi Zulfei? ?? Sent: 01 May 2017 22:16 To: ablunden@mira.net; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words Andy,What I think has been omitted from your discussion is 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires objectification and deobjectification of objects in practical processes. As you well know , Marx never reduces 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in agreement with Marx concerning the problem. Their objection is over the issue of thinking that the ideal should be inside the mind. What is outside the mind is material . He , as you know , gives many examples : A church is an ideal , A diplomat is an ideal as talers are , etc. and they are outside the mind. Respectively , the worship of God has been idealized in a church , the diplomat gets out of his ordinary posture becomes a representative for the State , talers in the pocket are nothing more than ordinary metals but replacing precious golds in turn representing the labour spent on their extraction in mines. The above-mentioned items are ideal NOW; Hammers WERE ideals THEN at the start of the practical process. Now they are 'materials' reified and metamorphosed , that is through the furnace of practical activity one essence has been tempered and converted into another essence for which marxists including Ilyenko have different definitions. BestHaydi From: Andy Blunden To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table" and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay. Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > which they > were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > structure of > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They > are material > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > with equal > force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted > forms > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. > What > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as > writing, > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he > making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their > relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue May 2 12:12:49 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 19:12:49 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <59089fc0.c121620a.7eb47.45cd@mx.google.com> References: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> <7ac21ea1-b2ff-1bd2-c0d3-b6be4ebef0d5@mira.net> <1247679395.405586.1493713756700@mail.yahoo.com> <0d1105dc-d99d-7e46-02bf-8dec91f690fe@mira.net> <59089fc0.c121620a.7eb47.45cd@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1766435675.1522954.1493752369532@mail.yahoo.com> Larry,I wonder If I understand you well.We are all revolving around thepivot of quality. No one of us said : 4 to 2 is as 8 to 4 to implicateincremental quantity. With the 'quality of theintentional' I could not find the other leg of the dichotomy : the quantity ofthe intentional. I have to take it as being conscioustowards what you're going to do , what need in the hierarchy of needs has takenyou to this point of taking over the responsibility and in what 'personalsense' have you risked being accountable to social commitments. Goal , as it is the actual practicalmoment of realizing activities (maybe not fully known or altogether unknown tothe doer or performer) should necessarily be known to the actor. I fancy myselfbelonging to a group who scandalize 'The practical essence of Man'! To live isto act! People here suggested that theyunderstand better if examples are given.?Yes :I hadyour relation of 'carry across...'as one relation two moments.Michael and Alfredo's construal of'field of speech' in place of a third as mediation.the primordial relation of?(general mediation,tool,activity,sign,stimulus means,general artifacts,etc.)Julian's relation of consideringsign/word within the wider context of ideological tenets as related to thewider sphere of economic activities (use and exchange value)Wolf-Michael?s relation ofconcretizing materializing word?s use and exchange value as completely andconfidently reframed into Marx?s framework of analyzing ?Capital? in detailedexplication.Roy Harriss and Herbert Clark?srelation of co-ordination and integration the former dealing with the strongversion of fixed-language code as being defective and inefficient in comparisonto a live talk and novel speech fusing linguistic and non-linguistic factors withinan spontaneously-created context of activity-based communication. The latterleaning towards a weaker version of non-compatibility of language-s with acommunication proper. I talked about my option and I?mready to be led to the right track. ?And I think I began with bothgoal-oriented persons and where such persons should take over their responsibilityand to what cause they should devote their sleves.This is what is in my capacity! Andy, I had a review overall. Word by wordproverbial cognate was impossible to find. I might have been mistaken inputting it in quoted form . As to its commensurability to the soul of whatIlyenko taught us , though you're a giant here yourselves , yet I wrote to two well-known Ilyenkovians. I?ll contact youfor this. Thanks! Very best wishesHaydi From: "lpscholar2@gmail.com" To: Andy Blunden ; ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Sent: Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 19:33:32 Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words #yiv4726786542 #yiv4726786542 -- _filtered #yiv4726786542 {panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;} _filtered #yiv4726786542 {font-family:Calibri;panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}#yiv4726786542 #yiv4726786542 p.yiv4726786542MsoNormal, #yiv4726786542 li.yiv4726786542MsoNormal, #yiv4726786542 div.yiv4726786542MsoNormal {margin:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt;font-size:11.0pt;}#yiv4726786542 a:link, #yiv4726786542 span.yiv4726786542MsoHyperlink {color:blue;text-decoration:underline;}#yiv4726786542 a:visited, #yiv4726786542 span.yiv4726786542MsoHyperlinkFollowed {color:#954F72;text-decoration:underline;}#yiv4726786542 .yiv4726786542MsoChpDefault {} _filtered #yiv4726786542 {margin:72.0pt 72.0pt 72.0pt 72.0pt;}#yiv4726786542 div.yiv4726786542WordSection1 {}#yiv4726786542 Haydi,Thanks for focusing our attention upon the relativITY (quality of the relative) exploring ideal and material emerging within goal-oriented joint practical activity.I want to abstract and focus on the term (goal)Does goal imply (intentionalITY ? having the quality of the intentional)? ?This then returns us to Wolff-Michael and Alfredo who suggest differing qualities of relationalITY (qualities of the relational).The suggestion is not to begin with he or she being intentional, but rather to begin with the relation/place from which he and she ARE TAKEN TO BE ? ?This may be crytic and may misrepresent this alternative lense of discernment?If so I will continue to listen ?Sent from my Windows 10 phone ?From: Andy Blunden Sent: May 2, 2017 2:03 AM To: ?Haydi Zulfei ?; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words ?Haydi, where did you get this quote: "The REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal"? ?I couldn't find it in "The Concept of the Ideal" https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm ?I'd like to see it in context. ?Andy ?------------------------------------------------------------Andy Blundenhttp://home.mira.net/~andyhttp://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making ?On 2/05/2017 6:29 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei ? wrote:> For the first part of your remark Ilyenko gives a > definition which you are quite familiar with "ideal is > nothing more than the reflection of the material onto > mind". Then they are distinct but very closely related . > The relativity , I think , is not a matter of gradience or > salience as David quoted from Mike. To put water into > steam you need 'heat'. The heat we need to put ideal into > material and inversely material into ideal is the very > process of goal-oriented joint practical material activity.> ?> For the second part of your remark , I think you've > forgotten Ilyenko (otherwise you knew well) saying "The > REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal". Then,how can it possess > the properties of the ideal? Does water have retained the > properties of oxygen or hydrogen .That was why I said > hammers are 'material' NOW. Hammers are now ready for use > . As to the history Mike mentions , yes , it's the very > history of idealization of a need which , in the process > of material practical activity , turns into an object as > product retaining no trace of its once ideality. Ilyenko > himself says that the very knowledge/cognition of a > phenomenon is to be able to unmediationally trace the > genesis and emergence of that phenomenon. But that's for > the theoretician not for the worker or whoever who has to > use the hammer not as the embodiment of interactions , > practices , experiences or what you correctly rejected as > the carrier of ideas.> Best> Haydi> ?> ?> ------------------------------------------------------------> *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* ?Haydi Zulfei ? ; > "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > *Sent:* Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 5:37:55> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words> ?> So "material" and "ideal" are not opposites. Hammers still > have ideal properties as well as material properties.> Andy> ------------------------------------------------------------> Andy Blunden> http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > ?> On 2/05/2017 6:16 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei ? wrote:>> Andy,>> What I think has been omitted from your discussion is >> 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires >> objectification and deobjectification of objects in >> practical processes. As you well know , Marx never >> reduces 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in >> agreement with Marx concerning the problem. Their >> objection is over the issue of thinking that the ideal >> should be inside the mind. What is outside the mind is >> material . He , as you know , gives many examples : A >> church is an ideal , A diplomat is an ideal as talers are >> , etc. and they are outside the mind. Respectively , the >> worship of God has been idealized in a church , the >> diplomat gets out of his ordinary posture becomes a >> representative for the State , talers in the pocket are >> nothing more than ordinary metals but replacing precious >> golds in turn representing the labour spent on their >> extraction in mines. The above-mentioned items are ideal >> NOW; Hammers WERE ideals THEN at the start of the >> practical process. Now they are 'materials' reified and >> metamorphosed , that is through the furnace of practical >> activity one essence has been tempered and converted into >> another essence for which marxists including Ilyenko have >> different definitions.>> Best>> Haydi>> ?>> ?>> ------------------------------------------------------------>> *From:* Andy Blunden >> >> *To:* xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> *Sent:* Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words>> ?>> And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table">> and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the>> table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of>> practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables>> for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive>> writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay.>> ?>> Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this>> idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism.>> ?>> Andy>> ?>> ------------------------------------------------------------>> Andy Blunden>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> ?>> ?>> On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote:>> > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in >> a Festschrift for>> > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts:>> >>> > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the >> interactions of>> > which they>> > were previously a part and which they mediate in the >> present (e.g., the>> > structure of>> > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms >> of writing). They>> > are material>> > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This >> principle applies>> > with equal>> > force whether one is considering language/speech or the >> more usually noted>> > forms>> > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute >> material culture.>> > What>> > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a >> table. is the>> > relative prominence>> > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists >> apart from its material>> > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or >> hand movements, or as>> > writing,>> > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies >> an order imposed by>> > thinking>> > human beings.">> >>> > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown >> out of journals by>> > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word >> and a table is the>> > relative salience of the ideal and the material. >> Sure--words are full of>> > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right?>> >>> > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, >> because a word>> > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't >> a word. In a>> > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: >> change one, and you>> > change the other. But with a table, what you start with >> is the idea of the>> > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a >> table. You could>> > change the material to anything and you'd still have a >> table.>> >>> > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does >> ignore the delightful>> > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out >> of the quote is>> > just that words are really just like tools. When in >> fact Mike is saying>> > just the opposite.>> >>> > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the >> structure of a pencil>> > carries within it the history of certain forms of >> writing. Does he mean>> > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's >> been used? Or is he>> > making a more archaeological point about graphite, >> wood, rubber and their>> > relationship to a certain point in the history of >> writing and erasing?>> > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like >> words--the idea has to>> > come first.)>> >>> > David Kellogg>> > Macquarie University>> >>> >>> ?>> ?>> ?> ?> ?> ? ? ? From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue May 2 14:06:20 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 21:06:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on that distinction between words and tables? And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different from tables; and then how nails are different from words? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of which they were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the structure of a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They are material in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies with equal force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted forms of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. What differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the relative prominence of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as writing, or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by thinking human beings." This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying just the opposite. (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to come first.) David Kellogg Macquarie University From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue May 2 15:19:36 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 08:19:36 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: One of the things I do regularly, is look at sound waves. That is, I look at a representation, on a graph, of minute changes in air pressure, as they affect a diaphragm in a microphone. The diaphragm then converts these changes in air pressure to electric signals, and these signals are really what I'm looking at on the graph. It's a little like watching waves on the sea strike a bulkhead or a breakwater: you have the sense of something quite natural colliding with something artificial and breaking up, but leaving a mark you can use to reconstruct it. When you look at the mark, you do not see vowels and consonants. In fact, you don't even see the spaces between words. They are literally not there: there is usually no break in the sound wave, any more than there is a sudden parting of the waves when you are watching the waves on the sea come in. I have gotten to the point where I can recognize certain patterns as linguistic patterns, but they are not the sort of thing that you would recognize (they aren't, for example, high sounds for "ee" and low sounds for "oooh" or anything like that (it's a quartet rather than a single flute--there are four "formants" of sound energy to keep track of, and there's quite a bit of counterpoint). The first thing you tend to notice is whether a whole utterance goes UP (like a yes/no question) or DOWN (like a statement or a wh-question). But it's really like watching waves until your feet get wet, and then you realize that you are also looking at tides. This is the stuff of words. I suppose you could argue that this is really very far from the real action; that the real action some current of meaning somewhere in people's minds. That's where the vowels and consonants arise, and where you get spaces between words and so on. I am sure that somewhere there is a linguist looking at brain signals in the cerebral cortex with much the same emotion I have looking at sound waves and much the same conviction that I have, that she or he is actually witnessing a current of meaning streaming through time. But to me this is a little like trying to say that the internet exists somewhere without actual computers. As far as I can see, if my sea of sound waves dried up, language would simply cease to exist. Of course, we can have sound waves without language, just as we can have computers without the internet. But as far as I can tell, we cannot have language without sound waves (or hand waves, if you are talking sign languages), just as we cannot have the internet without computers. Now think of a table. That's it. You did it. You now have everything you need to park your coffee cup and lay out your book. If there isn't anything with four legs and a flat surface around, you can just turn the wastebasket upside down, use the windowsill, and when guests arrive you take the door off the hinges and put it on the wastebasket and the windowsill or you just go outside and use a stump or a rock or a log. I think you can see that the material of which the table is made is quite accidental. If one material ceases to exist, you just get another one, and if you live in a culture where a few feet of elevation above floor level is less important (like Korea, or any other place where you don't wear your shoes indoors) you just do without a table. Your life is a little different, but not as different as life without word stuff. D.H. Lawrence, in "Why the Novel Matters"), goes through this long and (to me and to women) quite coy and annoying meditation on why we imagine that "man alive" lives in the head and not some other body part. He goes on and on about how his hand, and his fingers holding his pen are just as much a part of "the whole man" as the head. And then, forgetting for just a moment that he is really talking about some other appendage that he feels very attached to, he muses a moment about whether his fingernails are really part of "the whole man" and decides that they are somewhere in between, because he cuts them off. He doesn't really need to get that far--if you have to choose between losing a finger and losing a hand, you choose the former and not the latter, and the same thing is true if you have to choose between losing a hand and losing your head. It's tempting to see in this crude, coarse, unmanly (and unwomanly) essay something like Bateson's ruminations on the blind man and the stick. But I see them as being exactly the opposite. If you see the essence of humanity as out there, amongst your fellow humans, in their livings and lives and voices, then it makes perfect sense to see the absence of tables as accidental and irrelevant, an absence of fingernails and not the absence of a finger, a hand, or a head. But the absence of word stuff is an absence indeed; the loss of word stuff is the loss of human wholeness, if that is what Lawrence really meant by "man alive". David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on that > distinction between words and tables? > > And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different from > tables; and then how nails are different from words? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words > > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > which they > were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > structure of > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They > are material > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > with equal > force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted > forms > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. > What > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as > writing, > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he > making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their > relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue May 2 16:04:04 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 16:04:04 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <1766435675.1522954.1493752369532@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> <7ac21ea1-b2ff-1bd2-c0d3-b6be4ebef0d5@mira.net> <1247679395.405586.1493713756700@mail.yahoo.com> <0d1105dc-d99d-7e46-02bf-8dec91f690fe@mira.net> <59089fc0.c121620a.7eb47.45cd@mx.google.com> <1766435675.1522954.1493752369532@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <5909107e.8136630a.7f343.278b@mx.google.com> Haydi, I am approaching this topic as exploratory in the spirit of the ?array? of options you have outlined in your summary. My focusing and questioning the term (intentional) questions this terms centrality by pivoting to explore the phrase (is TAKEN to be) - intentional which signals a shift in accent. More focused on what is occurring relationally (relationality being the quality OF this taking to be relation) implying that what is posited as occurring intentionally through his agency or her agency may alternatively be considered as occurring within a mutual single relation focusing upon being TAKEN as intentional. (back and forth moving across ? This shifts the focus to the way that our movements are (taken) and suggests the relational aspect as more central than the intentional aspect. In what (personal sense) am I drawn to this alternative. I suppose it speaks to where I locate (what matters?) I have mentioned the Japanese motion of ?ma? (interval) and I was surprised that Wolff-Michael had explored this Japanese sense ability. If we imagine A/B as two ?sides? that become ?joined? then A and B are prioritized. The alternative may be to consider A/B within a SINGLE relation that embodies movement occurring through this gap or interval. I hear Wolff-Michael engaging with this theme. I emphasize this is exploratory and radically ?open? to revision. How I move within my personal relations I imagine hanging in the balance. More a focused sense of disposition than intentional positionality. I am hesitant in my answer, but move through and within this spirit of inquiry. My take on this matter. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? Sent: May 2, 2017 12:21 PM To: lpscholar2@gmail.com; Andy Blunden; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words Larry, I wonder If I understand you well. We are all revolving around the pivot of quality. No one of us said : 4 to 2 is as 8 to 4 to implicate incremental quantity. With the 'quality of the intentional' I could not find the other leg of the dichotomy : the quantity of the intentional. I have to take it as being conscious towards what you're going to do , what need in the hierarchy of needs has taken you to this point of taking over the responsibility and in what 'personal sense' have you risked being accountable to social commitments. Goal , as it is the actual practical moment of realizing activities (maybe not fully known or altogether unknown to the doer or performer) should necessarily be known to the actor. I fancy myself belonging to a group who scandalize 'The practical essence of Man'! To live is to act! People here suggested that they understand better if examples are given. ? Yes :I had your relation of 'carry across...' as one relation two moments. Michael and Alfredo's construal of 'field of speech' in place of a third as mediation. the primordial relation of? (general mediation,tool,activity,sign,stimulus means,general artifacts,etc.) Julian's relation of considering sign/word within the wider context of ideological tenets as related to the wider sphere of economic activities (use and exchange value) Wolf-Michael?s relation of concretizing materializing word?s use and exchange value as completely and confidently reframed into Marx?s framework of analyzing ?Capital? in detailed explication. Roy Harriss and Herbert Clark?s relation of co-ordination and integration the former dealing with the strong version of fixed-language code as being defective and inefficient in comparison to a live talk and novel speech fusing linguistic and non-linguistic factors within an spontaneously-created context of activity-based communication. The latter leaning towards a weaker version of non-compatibility of language-s with a communication proper. I talked about my option and I?m ready to be led to the right track. And I think I began with both goal-oriented persons and where such persons should take over their responsibility and to what cause they should devote their sleves. This is what is in my capacity! Andy, I had a review overall. Word by word proverbial cognate was impossible to find. I might have been mistaken in putting it in quoted form . As to its commensurability to the soul of what Ilyenko taught us , though you're a giant here yourselves , yet I wrote to two well-known Ilyenkovians. I?ll contact you for this. Thanks! Very best wishes Haydi From: "lpscholar2@gmail.com" To: Andy Blunden ; ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Sent: Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 19:33:32 Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words Haydi, Thanks for focusing our attention upon the relativITY (quality of the relative) exploring ideal and material emerging within goal-oriented joint practical activity. I want to abstract and focus on the term (goal) Does goal imply (intentionalITY ? having the quality of the intentional)? ? This then returns us to Wolff-Michael and Alfredo who suggest differing qualities of relationalITY (qualities of the relational). The suggestion is not to begin with he or she being intentional, but rather to begin with the relation/place from which he and she ARE TAKEN TO BE ? ? This may be crytic and may misrepresent this alternative lense of discernment? If so I will continue to listen ? Sent from my Windows 10 phone ? From: Andy Blunden Sent: May 2, 2017 2:03 AM To: ?Haydi Zulfei ?; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words ? Haydi, where did you get this quote: "The REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal"? ? I couldn't find it in "The Concept of the Ideal" https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm ? I'd like to see it in context. ? Andy ? ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making ? On 2/05/2017 6:29 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei ? wrote: > For the first part of your remark Ilyenko gives a > definition which you are quite familiar with "ideal is > nothing more than the reflection of the material onto > mind". Then they are distinct but very closely related . > The relativity , I think , is not a matter of gradience or > salience as David quoted from Mike. To put water into > steam you need 'heat'. The heat we need to put ideal into > material and inversely material into ideal is the very > process of goal-oriented joint practical material activity. > ? > For the second part of your remark , I think you've > forgotten Ilyenko (otherwise you knew well) saying "The > REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal". Then,how can it possess > the properties of the ideal? Does water have retained the > properties of oxygen or hydrogen .That was why I said > hammers are 'material' NOW. Hammers are now ready for use > . As to the history Mike mentions , yes , it's the very > history of idealization of a need which , in the process > of material practical activity , turns into an object as > product retaining no trace of its once ideality. Ilyenko > himself says that the very knowledge/cognition of a > phenomenon is to be able to unmediationally trace the > genesis and emergence of that phenomenon. But that's for > the theoretician not for the worker or whoever who has to > use the hammer not as the embodiment of interactions , > practices , experiences or what you correctly rejected as > the carrier of ideas. > Best > Haydi > ? > ? > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* ?Haydi Zulfei ? ; > "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > *Sent:* Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 5:37:55 > *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > ? > So "material" and "ideal" are not opposites. Hammers still > have ideal properties as well as material properties. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > ? > On 2/05/2017 6:16 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei ? wrote: >> Andy, >> What I think has been omitted from your discussion is >> 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires >> objectification and deobjectification of objects in >> practical processes. As you well know , Marx never >> reduces 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in >> agreement with Marx concerning the problem. Their >> objection is over the issue of thinking that the ideal >> should be inside the mind. What is outside the mind is >> material . He , as you know , gives many examples : A >> church is an ideal , A diplomat is an ideal as talers are >> , etc. and they are outside the mind. Respectively , the >> worship of God has been idealized in a church , the >> diplomat gets out of his ordinary posture becomes a >> representative for the State , talers in the pocket are >> nothing more than ordinary metals but replacing precious >> golds in turn representing the labour spent on their >> extraction in mines. The above-mentioned items are ideal >> NOW; Hammers WERE ideals THEN at the start of the >> practical process. Now they are 'materials' reified and >> metamorphosed , that is through the furnace of practical >> activity one essence has been tempered and converted into >> another essence for which marxists including Ilyenko have >> different definitions. >> Best >> Haydi >> ? >> ? >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *From:* Andy Blunden >> >> *To:* xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> *Sent:* Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04 >> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words >> ? >> And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table" >> and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the >> table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of >> practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables >> for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive >> writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay. >> ? >> Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this >> idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism. >> ? >> Andy >> ? >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> ? >> ? >> On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in >> a Festschrift for >> > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >> > >> > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the >> interactions of >> > which they >> > were previously a part and which they mediate in the >> present (e.g., the >> > structure of >> > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms >> of writing). They >> > are material >> > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This >> principle applies >> > with equal >> > force whether one is considering language/speech or the >> more usually noted >> > forms >> > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute >> material culture. >> > What >> > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a >> table. is the >> > relative prominence >> > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists >> apart from its material >> > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or >> hand movements, or as >> > writing, >> > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies >> an order imposed by >> > thinking >> > human beings." >> > >> > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown >> out of journals by >> > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word >> and a table is the >> > relative salience of the ideal and the material. >> Sure--words are full of >> > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >> > >> > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, >> because a word >> > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't >> a word. In a >> > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: >> change one, and you >> > change the other. But with a table, what you start with >> is the idea of the >> > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a >> table. You could >> > change the material to anything and you'd still have a >> table. >> > >> > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does >> ignore the delightful >> > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out >> of the quote is >> > just that words are really just like tools. When in >> fact Mike is saying >> > just the opposite. >> > >> > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the >> structure of a pencil >> > carries within it the history of certain forms of >> writing. Does he mean >> > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's >> been used? Or is he >> > making a more archaeological point about graphite, >> wood, rubber and their >> > relationship to a certain point in the history of >> writing and erasing? >> > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like >> words--the idea has to >> > come first.) >> > >> > David Kellogg >> > Macquarie University >> > >> > >> ? >> ? >> ? > ? > ? > ? ? ? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 3E505D724E2044858A31176D3C1F6C87.png Type: image/png Size: 161 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170502/08f51bdb/attachment.png From ablunden@mira.net Tue May 2 18:55:05 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 11:55:05 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is to see how much alike are tables and words. But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed under the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way around. Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to understand how tables are signs and word are material objects. Andy (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard in reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave and coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that pressure signal.) ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on that distinction between words and tables? > > And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different from tables; and then how nails are different from words? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words > > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > which they > were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > structure of > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They > are material > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > with equal > force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted > forms > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. > What > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as > writing, > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he > making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their > relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Wed May 3 02:58:03 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 09:58:03 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <1060770238.2303008.1493805483221@mail.yahoo.com> Up to this point of time , an old antique memory remembered unprecedented insistence on words being 'material' and within our present discussion we have the authority who is dear and respectable to all of us documenting the materiality of word through its laying on or fusion into many types of solid hard mass referred to succinctly by David from the soft stuff of the ear up to the walls of Palmira , our Passargad , the Taj Mahal (Roy Harris) and all the monumental inscriptions through the great globe , yet we see here crystal clear that "... The point is to understand how tables are signs and words are material objects." After all dementia (mine) works its way! I think I as a dwarf of the giants can find many many tables which are signs now before I write a will to my heirs to be on the alert for the time when such conversions appear. Right at the white house , all castles , all museums , all monuments , all historical places , maybe all large libraries , etc. there are tables which have been being kept or are now being kept neat and safe and healthy and partially on display for the public to visit and refresh their soul watching these memorable precious invaluable ideal/signs. But with the words so far considered 'material' even recently in its mere concrete form I'm in swerving state. Can I give examples of its being 'material'? or material object? Or can I risk and find my way of announcing in its entirety and totality it's one 'ideal'. [[?Marxist psychology? ... [is] the only genuine psychology as a science. A psychology other than this cannot exist. And the other way around: everything that was and is genuinely scientifc belongs to Marxist psychology. This concept is broader than the concept of [scientifc] school or even current. It coincides with the concept scientific per se, no matter where and by whom it may have been developed. (Vygotsky, Crisis) ?Vygotsky set a great example of how to master the historical method; he showed us how to apply Marx and Lenin?s methodology to concrete studies in one of the most formidable fields of knowledge [psychology]? (cited in Levitin, 1982, p. 173). He also describes Vygotsky as the ?leading Marxist theoretician among us? (Luria, 1979, Chapter 3). He says that My entire generation was infused with the energy of revolutionary change? the liberating energy people feel when they are part of a society that is able to make tremendous progress in a very short time. ? The limits of our restricted, private world were broken down by the Revolution, and new vistas opened before us. We were swept up in a great historical movement. Our private interests were consumed by the wider social goals of a new, collective society. This atmosphere immediately following the Revolution provided the energy for many ambitious ventures. An entire society was liberated to turn its creative powers to constructing a new kind of life for everyone. (Ibid., Chapter 1) Marxist philosophy, one of the world?s more complex systems of thought, was assimilated slowly by Soviet scholars, myself included. Properly speaking, I never really mastered Marxism to the degree I would have liked. I still consider this to have been a major shortcoming in my education. (Ibid., Chapter 2)]] I think Luria died in 1977? Ilyenko in 1979? Did they get into 'unconvinced' marxist scholars? Davydov said he was a convinced marxist. The Piaterka? worked as convinced marxists. Felix Mikhailov , etc.etc. Alfredo back many posts exclaimed : Wow! for the coming out of a book (containing the above quotes as a small part) in relation to to what extent Vygotsky was a true Marxist. The introduction says all contributors to the volume belong to a STRONG take on the approach to Vygotsky as a convinced marxist.? In relation to the quote from Marx , did he really believed philosophers should have given language an independent existence as they had previously given thought an independent existence? And this is used as evidence for the priority and precedence of word? What happened to the dialectics? Antique? Could we make a concession as to turn once again Hegel to his right place and reproach ourselves for accusing him as to have laid things upside down? live under protection of HIS SPIRIT ABSOLUTE? Teacher : the hands of the clock is ideal.Student : But Sir! Wouldn't you think the whole clock is ideal? The fluttering aimless ideal this time erred , sat on just two sharp harming material stuff! The student is now confused! Highest regards to all! Haydi? From: Andy Blunden To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Wednesday, 3 May 2017, 6:27:17 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is to see how much alike are tables and words. But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed under the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way around. Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to understand how tables are signs and word are material objects. Andy (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard in reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave and coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that pressure signal.) ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on that distinction between words and tables? > > And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different from tables; and then how nails are different from words? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l]? The Stuff of Words > > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > which they > were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > structure of > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They > are material > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > with equal > force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted > forms > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. > What > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as > writing, > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he > making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their > relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Wed May 3 02:58:03 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 09:58:03 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <1060770238.2303008.1493805483221@mail.yahoo.com> Up to this point of time , an old antique memory remembered unprecedented insistence on words being 'material' and within our present discussion we have the authority who is dear and respectable to all of us documenting the materiality of word through its laying on or fusion into many types of solid hard mass referred to succinctly by David from the soft stuff of the ear up to the walls of Palmira , our Passargad , the Taj Mahal (Roy Harris) and all the monumental inscriptions through the great globe , yet we see here crystal clear that "... The point is to understand how tables are signs and words are material objects." After all dementia (mine) works its way! I think I as a dwarf of the giants can find many many tables which are signs now before I write a will to my heirs to be on the alert for the time when such conversions appear. Right at the white house , all castles , all museums , all monuments , all historical places , maybe all large libraries , etc. there are tables which have been being kept or are now being kept neat and safe and healthy and partially on display for the public to visit and refresh their soul watching these memorable precious invaluable ideal/signs. But with the words so far considered 'material' even recently in its mere concrete form I'm in swerving state. Can I give examples of its being 'material'? or material object? Or can I risk and find my way of announcing in its entirety and totality it's one 'ideal'. [[?Marxist psychology? ... [is] the only genuine psychology as a science. A psychology other than this cannot exist. And the other way around: everything that was and is genuinely scientifc belongs to Marxist psychology. This concept is broader than the concept of [scientifc] school or even current. It coincides with the concept scientific per se, no matter where and by whom it may have been developed. (Vygotsky, Crisis) ?Vygotsky set a great example of how to master the historical method; he showed us how to apply Marx and Lenin?s methodology to concrete studies in one of the most formidable fields of knowledge [psychology]? (cited in Levitin, 1982, p. 173). He also describes Vygotsky as the ?leading Marxist theoretician among us? (Luria, 1979, Chapter 3). He says that My entire generation was infused with the energy of revolutionary change? the liberating energy people feel when they are part of a society that is able to make tremendous progress in a very short time. ? The limits of our restricted, private world were broken down by the Revolution, and new vistas opened before us. We were swept up in a great historical movement. Our private interests were consumed by the wider social goals of a new, collective society. This atmosphere immediately following the Revolution provided the energy for many ambitious ventures. An entire society was liberated to turn its creative powers to constructing a new kind of life for everyone. (Ibid., Chapter 1) Marxist philosophy, one of the world?s more complex systems of thought, was assimilated slowly by Soviet scholars, myself included. Properly speaking, I never really mastered Marxism to the degree I would have liked. I still consider this to have been a major shortcoming in my education. (Ibid., Chapter 2)]] I think Luria died in 1977? Ilyenko in 1979? Did they get into 'unconvinced' marxist scholars? Davydov said he was a convinced marxist. The Piaterka? worked as convinced marxists. Felix Mikhailov , etc.etc. Alfredo back many posts exclaimed : Wow! for the coming out of a book (containing the above quotes as a small part) in relation to to what extent Vygotsky was a true Marxist. The introduction says all contributors to the volume belong to a STRONG take on the approach to Vygotsky as a convinced marxist.? In relation to the quote from Marx , did he really believed philosophers should have given language an independent existence as they had previously given thought an independent existence? And this is used as evidence for the priority and precedence of word? What happened to the dialectics? Antique? Could we make a concession as to turn once again Hegel to his right place and reproach ourselves for accusing him as to have laid things upside down? live under protection of HIS SPIRIT ABSOLUTE? Teacher : the hands of the clock is ideal.Student : But Sir! Wouldn't you think the whole clock is ideal? The fluttering aimless ideal this time erred , sat on just two sharp harming material stuff! The student is now confused! Highest regards to all! Haydi? From: Andy Blunden To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Wednesday, 3 May 2017, 6:27:17 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is to see how much alike are tables and words. But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed under the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way around. Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to understand how tables are signs and word are material objects. Andy (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard in reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave and coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that pressure signal.) ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on that distinction between words and tables? > > And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different from tables; and then how nails are different from words? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l]? The Stuff of Words > > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > which they > were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > structure of > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They > are material > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > with equal > force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted > forms > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. > What > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as > writing, > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he > making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their > relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > From rakahu@utu.fi Wed May 3 05:21:28 2017 From: rakahu@utu.fi (Rauno Huttunen) Date: Wed, 03 May 2017 12:21:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] BOOK: The 'Activity Approach' in Late Soviet Philosophy Message-ID: Hello, Have heard on this book: The 'Activity Approach' in Late Soviet Philosophy, Edited by Andrey Maidansky, Belgorod National Research University and Vesa Oittinen, University of Helsinki http://www.brill.com/products/book/practical-essence-man#TOC_1 Rauno Huttunen From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Wed May 3 08:52:19 2017 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (=?UTF-8?Q?=E2=80=AAHaydi_Zulfei=E2=80=AC_=E2=80=AA?=) Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 15:52:19 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <5909107e.8136630a.7f343.278b@mx.google.com> References: <1130094917.2433565.1493669768928@mail.yahoo.com> <7ac21ea1-b2ff-1bd2-c0d3-b6be4ebef0d5@mira.net> <1247679395.405586.1493713756700@mail.yahoo.com> <0d1105dc-d99d-7e46-02bf-8dec91f690fe@mira.net> <59089fc0.c121620a.7eb47.45cd@mx.google.com> <1766435675.1522954.1493752369532@mail.yahoo.com> <5909107e.8136630a.7f343.278b@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <219646934.2893442.1493826739843@mail.yahoo.com> Larry,Respectfully!This is my last message as I?m preparing for a travel. With you as everI can find the gap and the moving back and forth ??Thenon-intentional ?maybe?? maybe in the sense of metamorphosis of ?qualities which might widen or tighten the gapthrough which you might be able to pass ?if salvation is your lot.?This moving backand forth for some chance to pause for the second thoughts to crystalize toavoid dogmas and orthodoxies is human beneficial??This does notrule out scientific endeavoring ?and regarding the philosophy of science ??Relativity andrelationality of phenomena towards one another manifests itself as a trait ofour humanness ?all the more so that the human being itself came out of the veryrelated phenomena ??Morality reignswhen human beings turn to this spell of existence ? ?Concluding ? ?This shifts thefocus to the way that our movements are (taken--not intended to) and suggests the relationalaspect as more central than the intentional aspect.??As far as thepersonal sense is concerned , it?s preferable if one locates him or herself ina space of positioning of what matters ?then dispositioning oneself of egoistic stances...intentionality ?If one is blindto the joining of the two sides which maneuver in their segregation to drawyour attention to their selves , the modest descent savior disguised in JustOne Single Relation might be lost sight of ?everything spoilt ??Better we BE inthe BEING of ?other?? where man is defined as the ensemble of social RELATIONS ?so hard to be digested ? because death of one to him/herself is considered tobe the end?of all! ?With ideal andmaterial in their philosophical terms this Single relation and this moving backand forth reigns ?as two moments and this ?two? is RELATIONAL as they act asMOMENTS within the inseparable MOLAR?THE SOCIATED WHOLES. Highest regards Haydi ? From: "lpscholar2@gmail.com" To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ? ; Andy Blunden ; "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Sent: Wednesday, 3 May 2017, 3:34:34 Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words Haydi,I am approaching this topic as exploratory in the spirit of the ?array? of options ?you have outlined in your summary.My focusing and questioning? ?the term (intentional) questions this terms centrality by pivoting to explore the phrase (is TAKEN to be) - intentional which signals a shift in accent. More focused on what is occurring relationally (relationality being the quality OF this taking to be relation) implying that what is posited as occurring intentionally through his agency or? her agency ?may alternatively be considered as occurring within a mutual single relation focusing upon? being TAKEN as intentional. (back and forth moving across ?This shifts the focus to the way that our movements are (taken) and suggests the relational aspect as more central than the intentional aspect. ?In what (personal sense) am I drawn to this alternative. I suppose it speaks to where I locate (what matters?) I have mentioned the Japanese motion of ?ma? (interval) and I was surprised that Wolff-Michael had explored this Japanese sense ability. If we imagine A/B as two ?sides? that become ?joined? then A and B are prioritized. The alternative may be to consider A/B within a SINGLE relation that embodies movement occurring through this gap or interval. I hear Wolff-Michael engaging with this theme. ?I emphasize this is exploratory and radically ?open? to revision. ?How I move within my personal relations I imagine hanging in the balance. More a focused sense ?of disposition than intentional positionality. ?I am hesitant in my answer, but move through and ?within this? spirit of inquiry. My take on this matter. ? ? ? ?Sent from my Windows 10 phone ?From: ?Haydi Zulfei ? Sent: May 2, 2017 12:21 PM To: lpscholar2@gmail.com; Andy Blunden; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words ? ?Larry,I wonder If I understand you well.We are all revolving around the pivot of quality. No one of us said : 4 to 2 is as 8 to 4 to implicate incremental quantity. With the 'quality of the intentional' I could not find the other leg of the dichotomy : the quantity of the intentional. I have to take it as being conscious towards what you're going to do , what need in the hierarchy of needs has taken you to this point of taking over the responsibility and in what 'personal sense' have you risked being accountable to social commitments. Goal , as it is the actual practical moment of realizing activities (maybe not fully known or altogether unknown to the doer or performer) should necessarily be known to the actor. I fancy myself belonging to a group who scandalize 'The practical essence of Man'! To live is to act! People here suggested that they understand better if examples are given.?Yes :I hadyour relation of 'carry across...' as one relation two moments.Michael and Alfredo's construal of 'field of speech' in place of a third as mediation.the primordial relation of? (general mediation,tool,activity,sign,stimulus means,general artifacts,etc.)Julian's relation of considering sign/word within the wider context of ideological tenets as related to the wider sphere of economic activities (use and exchange value)Wolf-Michael?s relation of concretizing materializing word?s use and exchange value as completely and confidently reframed into Marx?s framework of analyzing ?Capital? in detailed explication.Roy Harriss and Herbert Clark?s relation of co-ordination and integration the former dealing with the strong version of fixed-language code as being defective and inefficient in comparison to a live talk and novel speech fusing linguistic and non-linguistic factors within an spontaneously-created context of activity-based communication. The latter leaning towards a weaker version of non-compatibility of language-s with a communication proper. I talked about my option and I?m ready to be led to the right track. ?And I think I began with both goal-oriented persons and where such persons should take over their responsibility and to what cause they should devote their sleves.This is what is in my capacity! Andy, I had a review overall. Word by word proverbial cognate was impossible to find. I might have been mistaken in putting it in quoted form . As to its commensurability to the soul of what Ilyenko taught us , though you're a giant here yourselves , yet I wrote to two well-known Ilyenkovians. I?ll contact you for this. Thanks! Very best wishesHaydi ?From: "lpscholar2@gmail.com" To: Andy Blunden ; ?Haydi Zulfei ? ; "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Sent: Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 19:33:32 Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words ?Haydi,Thanks for focusing our attention upon the relativITY (quality of the relative) exploring ideal and material emerging within goal-oriented joint practical activity.I want to abstract and focus on the term (goal)Does goal imply (intentionalITY ? having the quality of the intentional)??This then returns us to Wolff-Michael and Alfredo who suggest differing qualities of relationalITY (qualities of the relational).The suggestion is not to begin with he or she being intentional, but rather to begin with the relation/place from which he and she ARE TAKEN TO BE ??This may be crytic and may misrepresent this alternative lense of discernment?If so I will continue to listen?Sent from my Windows 10 phone?From: Andy Blunden Sent: May 2, 2017 2:03 AM To: ?Haydi Zulfei ?; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words?Haydi, where did you get this quote: "The REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal"??I couldn't find it in "The Concept of the Ideal" https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm?I'd like to see it in context.?Andy?------------------------------------------------------------Andy Blundenhttp://home.mira.net/~andyhttp://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making ?On 2/05/2017 6:29 PM, ?Haydi Zulfei ? wrote:> For the first part of your remark Ilyenko gives a > definition which you are quite familiar with "ideal is > nothing more than the reflection of the material onto > mind". Then they are distinct but very closely related . > The relativity , I think , is not a matter of gradience or > salience as David quoted from Mike. To put water into > steam you need 'heat'. The heat we need to put ideal into > material and inversely material into ideal is the very > process of goal-oriented joint practical material activity.> ?> For the second part of your remark , I think you've > forgotten Ilyenko (otherwise you knew well) saying "The > REIFIED ideal is no longer ideal". Then,how can it possess > the properties of the ideal? Does water have retained the > properties of oxygen or hydrogen .That was why I said > hammers are 'material' NOW. Hammers are now ready for use > . As to the history Mike mentions , yes , it's the very > history of idealization of a need which , in the process > of material practical activity , turns into an object as > product retaining no trace of its once ideality. Ilyenko > himself says that the very knowledge/cognition of a > phenomenon is to be able to unmediationally trace the > genesis and emergence of that phenomenon. But that's for > the theoretician not for the worker or whoever who has to > use the hammer not as the embodiment of interactions , > practices , experiences or what you correctly rejected as > the carrier of ideas.> Best> Haydi> ?> ?> ------------------------------------------------------------> *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* ?Haydi Zulfei ? ; > "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > *Sent:* Tuesday, 2 May 2017, 5:37:55> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words> ?> So "material" and "ideal" are not opposites. Hammers still > have ideal properties as well as material properties.> Andy> ------------------------------------------------------------> Andy Blunden> http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > ?> On 2/05/2017 6:16 AM, ?Haydi Zulfei ? wrote:>> Andy,>> What I think has been omitted from your discussion is >> 'metamorphasis' or 'reification' of ideals which requires >> objectification and deobjectification of objects in >> practical processes. As you well know , Marx never >> reduces 'material' to 'ideal' . Ilyenko is quite in >> agreement with Marx concerning the problem. Their >> objection is over the issue of thinking that the ideal >> should be inside the mind. What is outside the mind is >> material . He , as you know , gives many examples : A >> church is an ideal , A diplomat is an ideal as talers are >> , etc. and they are outside the mind. Respectively , the >> worship of God has been idealized in a church , the >> diplomat gets out of his ordinary posture becomes a >> representative for the State , talers in the pocket are >> nothing more than ordinary metals but replacing precious >> golds in turn representing the labour spent on their >> extraction in mines. The above-mentioned items are ideal >> NOW; Hammers WERE ideals THEN at the start of the >> practical process. Now they are 'materials' reified and >> metamorphosed , that is through the furnace of practical >> activity one essence has been tempered and converted into >> another essence for which marxists including Ilyenko have >> different definitions.>> Best>> Haydi>> ?>> ?>> ------------------------------------------------------------>> *From:* Andy Blunden >> >> *To:* xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> *Sent:* Monday, 1 May 2017, 11:30:04>> *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words>> ?>> And tables carry with them the practice of eating "at table">> and meeting a the board room table etc., it not that the>> table carries the idea of table but is the bearer of>> practices, which have refined the size and shape of tables>> for eating, talking, etc. LIkewise pencils are for cursive>> writing on paper. not scratching hieroglyphics into clay.>> ?>> Great quote from Mike! There is a LOT of resistance to this>> idea ... everywhere. It smells of Marxism.>> ?>> Andy>> ?>> ------------------------------------------------------------>> Andy Blunden>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> ?>> ?>> On 1/05/2017 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote:>> > Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in >> a Festschrift for>> > George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts:>> >>> > "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the >> interactions of>> > which they>> > were previously a part and which they mediate in the >> present (e.g., the>> > structure of>> > a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms >> of writing). They>> > are material>> > in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This >> principle applies>> > with equal>> > force whether one is considering language/speech or the >> more usually noted>> > forms>> > of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute >> material culture.>> > What>> > differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a >> table. is the>> > relative prominence>> > of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists >> apart from its material>> > instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or >> hand movements, or as>> > writing,>> > or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies >> an order imposed by>> > thinking>> > human beings.">> >>> > This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown >> out of journals by>> > the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word >> and a table is the>> > relative salience of the ideal and the material. >> Sure--words are full of>> > the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right?>> >>> > Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, >> because a word>> > without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't >> a word. In a>> > word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: >> change one, and you>> > change the other. But with a table, what you start with >> is the idea of the>> > table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a >> table. You could>> > change the material to anything and you'd still have a >> table.>> >>> > Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does >> ignore the delightful>> > perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out >> of the quote is>> > just that words are really just like tools. When in >> fact Mike is saying>> > just the opposite.>> >>> > (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the >> structure of a pencil>> > carries within it the history of certain forms of >> writing. Does he mean>> > that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's >> been used? Or is he>> > making a more archaeological point about graphite, >> wood, rubber and their>> > relationship to a certain point in the history of >> writing and erasing?>> > Actually, pencils are more like tables than like >> words--the idea has to>> > come first.)>> >>> > David Kellogg>> > Macquarie University>> >>> >>> ?>> ?>> ?> ?> ?> ??? ? ? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 3E505D724E2044858A31176D3C1F6C87.png Type: image/png Size: 161 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170503/70c382cb/attachment.png From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed May 3 09:00:45 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 09:00:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: BOOK: The 'Activity Approach' in Late Soviet Philosophy In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Looks like a very interesting book, Rauno, thanks for alerting us. Any chance, i wonder, if the authors would like to see it reviewed in MCA? mike On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 5:21 AM, Rauno Huttunen wrote: > Hello, > > Have heard on this book: > > The 'Activity Approach' in Late Soviet Philosophy, Edited by Andrey > Maidansky, Belgorod National Research University and Vesa Oittinen, > University of Helsinki > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/practical-essence-man#TOC_1 > > Rauno Huttunen > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed May 3 15:18:55 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 08:18:55 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the conditions under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we need this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if sloppy formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating activity which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on other mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh and the exploited muscles are one and the same. Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by the ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a wide range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, just as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the stabilization of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a two way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic perception and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the brain imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this view if not from language and from other people? David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is to > see how much alike are tables and words. > > But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was > fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed under > the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in > different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as philosophers > have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make > language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the > times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way around. > > Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to understand > how tables are signs and word are material objects. > > Andy > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear > project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard in > reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave and > coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that > pressure signal.) > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on that >> distinction between words and tables? >> >> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different >> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of David Kellogg >> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >> >> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for >> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >> >> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of >> which they >> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the >> structure of >> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They >> are material >> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies >> with equal >> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted >> forms >> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. >> What >> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >> relative prominence >> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its >> material >> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as >> writing, >> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by >> thinking >> human beings." >> >> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by >> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the >> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of >> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >> >> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the >> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >> >> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful >> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is >> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying >> just the opposite. >> >> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean >> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he >> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their >> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? >> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to >> come first.) >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu May 4 07:40:51 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 07:40:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <590b3d8f.cf31630a.957ed.a770@mx.google.com> David, If I follow you are these examples of livability (qualia of living) differing from life. In other word ? living OF life. Now your examples of the brain (getting these examples) through words and other people. Livability being this quality of words and other people within which you, I, we, (are taken). Livability as becoming (process) through reciprocity OF the quality of taking/beong taken within a SINGLE potential reciprocity. Question: If we abstract livability from life (as a reflective process) what are the qualities of life remaining with livability put aside ( through thought). David, am trying to grasp (prehensile) the relation of taking and being taken within reciprocal livability that adds this something to life. (words, social relations, perceptions, varifocality, under the theme living) Taking and being taken expressing reciprocity and exploring intentionality? Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: David Kellogg Sent: May 3, 2017 3:21 PM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the conditions under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we need this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if sloppy formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating activity which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on other mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh and the exploited muscles are one and the same. Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by the ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a wide range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, just as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the stabilization of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a two way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic perception and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the brain imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this view if not from language and from other people? David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is to > see how much alike are tables and words. > > But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was > fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed under > the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in > different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as philosophers > have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make > language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the > times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way around. > > Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to understand > how tables are signs and word are material objects. > > Andy > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear > project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard in > reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave and > coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that > pressure signal.) > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on that >> distinction between words and tables? >> >> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different >> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of David Kellogg >> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >> >> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for >> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >> >> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of >> which they >> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the >> structure of >> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They >> are material >> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies >> with equal >> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted >> forms >> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. >> What >> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >> relative prominence >> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its >> material >> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as >> writing, >> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by >> thinking >> human beings." >> >> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by >> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the >> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of >> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >> >> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the >> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >> >> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful >> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is >> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying >> just the opposite. >> >> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean >> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he >> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their >> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? >> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to >> come first.) >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu May 4 15:37:15 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:37:15 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <590b3d8f.cf31630a.957ed.a770@mx.google.com> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <590b3d8f.cf31630a.957ed.a770@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry: I'm afraid I don't know what "these examples" refers to. You mean sloppy formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", etc.? I certainly didn't mean that these were qualia of living at all. I think they are misuses of concepts. I was saying that they are empty metaphors which muddle up the important distinction between signs and tools (because "culture" refers to signs, and "capital" is about tools; "symbols" is semiotic and "violence" is the work of weapons, etc.). I am afraid that "use value/exchange value" applied to words is probably similar: commodities are not like words; when we "exchange" words, we hang onto all of their value. I also don't know what "livability" means, or what you mean by "qualia of living" or how these might differ from life itself. I can't find a finite verb in the two sentences that follow ("Livabiliy being..." and "Livability as becoming....") and also in your final question "Taking and being taken expressing...?"), so I can't interpret them. I don't know what it would mean to abstract livability from life. Do you mean killing people? I do know something about "taking and being taken". When people use language like "construct and is constructed by" or "mutually defining", etc. they are indeed being dialectical. The problem is that they are portraying a relationship as symmetrical when it very rarely is. So for example, if I assume that what you mean by "abstracting livability from life" is in fact murdering people, there isn't any way I can construe this as a symmetrical relationship. Hamlet kills Claudius three times (one with the sword, again with its poison, and again with the chalice). But Claudius does not kill Hamlet; Laertes does. All Claudius does is to exchange signs with Laertes. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 12:40 AM, Lplarry wrote: > David, > If I follow you are these examples of livability (qualia of living) > differing from life. > In other word ? living OF life. > Now your examples of the brain (getting these examples) through words and > other people. > > Livability being this quality of words and other people within which you, > I, we, (are taken). > Livability as becoming (process) through reciprocity OF the quality of > taking/beong taken within a SINGLE potential reciprocity. > Question: If we abstract livability from life (as a reflective process) > what are the qualities of life remaining with livability put aside ( > through thought). > > David, am trying to grasp (prehensile) the relation of taking and being > taken within reciprocal livability that adds this something to life. > (words, social relations, perceptions, varifocality, under the theme living) > > Taking and being taken expressing reciprocity and exploring intentionality? > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: David Kellogg > Sent: May 3, 2017 3:21 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > > Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the conditions > under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to > subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we need > this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if sloppy > formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating activity > which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on other > mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed > philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? > > I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too > interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently > interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it > is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as > Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow > generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh and > the exploited muscles are one and the same. > > Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by the > ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for > studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a wide > range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, just > as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" > meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates > wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a > context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. > > So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the stabilization > of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a two > way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The > reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and > compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of > chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic perception > and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the brain > imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this > view if not from language and from other people? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is to > > see how much alike are tables and words. > > > > But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was > > fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed under > > the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a > > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in > > different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > > Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as philosophers > > have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make > > language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the > > times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way > around. > > > > Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to understand > > how tables are signs and word are material objects. > > > > Andy > > > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear > > project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard > in > > reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave > and > > coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that > > pressure signal.) > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > >> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on > that > >> distinction between words and tables? > >> > >> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different > >> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? > >> > >> Alfredo > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> on behalf of David Kellogg > >> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words > >> > >> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > >> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > >> > >> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > >> which they > >> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > >> structure of > >> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). > They > >> are material > >> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > >> with equal > >> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually > noted > >> forms > >> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material > culture. > >> What > >> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > >> relative prominence > >> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its > >> material > >> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or > as > >> writing, > >> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed > by > >> thinking > >> human beings." > >> > >> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals > by > >> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > >> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > >> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > >> > >> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > >> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > >> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > >> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of > the > >> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > >> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > >> > >> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the > delightful > >> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > >> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > >> just the opposite. > >> > >> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > >> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > >> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is > he > >> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and > their > >> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > >> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > >> come first.) > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> > >> > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu May 4 17:03:37 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 18:03:37 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value' In-Reply-To: References: <58f4dfe0.5a45620a.c2a11.c004@mx.google.com> <58fe679e.e0096b0a.a0a68.9cf7@mx.google.com> <58ff9619.8427630a.82c24.69ee@mx.google.com> <69279808-ff88-e2a5-354a-5b699e069edb@mira.net> Message-ID: Would it help our understand of "wording" any to know that David is a painter (and quite a good one!)? Someone else has put this much more elegantly than this, but we might ask, (in parallel fashion to word and wording): Is the meaning in the paint or in the painting? -greg On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 8:23 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Sometimes the answer to a question depends on the answer to a question. > Like: > > A: Can I have a beer? > B: Are you eighteen? > > So if you tell me that "life" and "living" are two different words, then I > will tell you that they are not ineffable: you can say for example that a > "life" is an instance of "living", or perhaps that "living" is an instance > of "life", and the explanation isn't circular. But if you tell me that > "life" and "living" are just two different wordings of the same meaning, > then I will say that word meaning is ineffable, in the sense that the only > way to define it is in terms of itself. > > All word meanings are ineffable in this rather general sense. In order to > explain them, we need other words and other word meanings. Teachers run > into this problem all the time when they try to teach words with > flashcards: If I am teaching the word "kick" and I have a flashcard with a > foot kicking a ball, the child really doesn't know if I am teaching the > meaning "foot", or "ball" or "football" or whatever. The only way to > disambiguate the picture is with words, and that's true of any word meaning > you care to think of. Wittgenstein has a somewhat more elaborate version of > this argument, but I prefer to stick to situations I myself have > experienced (meaning situations that, as Vandy says, I myself have > transformed into a system of word meanings). > > We have a system of wordings that tends to privilege entities over > processes. Halliday says that dynamism and synopticity are complementary: > there isn't any sense in which "living" is somehow closer to reality than > "life", and so there also isn't any sense in which one is closer to > idealization than the other. Nevertheless, as Virginia Woolf knew, "Life > stand still here" is a much harder trick to pull off, and it takes kids > many more years to master it. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 12:05 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Since you answer my question with a question, I take it that the answer > is > > "yes." > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 26/04/2017 11:56 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > >> Andy-- > >> > >> Are "life" and "living" two different words, or are they two different > >> wordings of the same word? > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 11:42 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: > >> > >> David, after reading this fascinating 2-page narrative > >> about Ricoeur and the structuralists out of the blue > >> we get the conclusion: "And the power is not in the > >> word, but in the wording." Have I missed something? Is > >> "wording" ineffable? > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> Andy Blunden > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > >> >> decision-making> > >> > >> On 26/04/2017 7:13 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >> I remember Paul Ricoeur. He taught at a seminary > >> at the University of > >> Chicago when I was an undergraduate. I was a > >> member of the campus Spartacus > >> Youth Club, and it was the only place that would > >> allow us a public space > >> for meetings. I tried to sell him a copy of "Young > >> Spartacus" once: I can't > >> remember if he bought it or not. But I remember > >> him as a French gentleman, > >> personally quite conservative, but not at all put > >> off by the presence of > >> a screaming red nineteen year old who for > >> inexplicable reasons had > >> a Parisian accent and spoke the argot of the > >> Versailles banlieue. Maybe he > >> bought our French paper, Le Bolchevik. > >> > >> I have been reading a symposium "On Narrative" > >> that was going on at UC when > >> I was organizing against Milton Friedman's Nobel > >> Prize (he was also a > >> professor there at the time--he won the prize the > >> same year that Saul > >> Bellow, another UC professor, did). Ricoeur, > >> Derrida, and Hayden White all > >> took part. > >> > >> It was the heyday of structuralism, and Ricoeur's > >> contribution is > >> interesting because it's quite ANTI-structuralist: > >> he points out that the > >> effect of structuralism on narrative studies has > >> been to de-historicize, > >> de-memorize, dehumanize; to convert stories into > >> exchange values rather > >> than use values. So the elements that Propp > >> discovers in Ludmilla and > >> Ruslan (and the Firebird and its variants) can > >> come in any order. In > >> contrast, even the simplest act of repetition is > >> historicized, humanized, > >> and memorable. A use value and not an exchange value. > >> > >> Derrida ignores everybody else and embarks on his > >> usual verbal > >> pyrotechnics, but Hayden White develops Ricoeur's > >> idea in a way I think I > >> actually used in my "Thinking of Feeling" paper: > >> human memory goes through > >> stages: medieval annals, Renaissance chronicles, > >> and the nineteenth century > >> narrative, each of which adds something > >> distinctive and makes the > >> meta-narrative that they form together into > >> something non-reversible and > >> developmental. But now I see that the reviewers > >> made me remove all that (it > >> is just as well: sociogenesis is one story and > >> ontogenesis quite another). > >> > >> Ruqaiya Hasan used to say that there is a certain > >> unity imposed on > >> experience by language, from "the living of life" > >> to the child's first real > >> morpho-phoneme. If you take the phrase "the living > >> of life" just as an > >> example, you can see some of what Ricoeur is > >> trying to get at. On the face > >> of it, the phrase is redundant: the word "life" > >> seems to contain absolutely > >> nothing that isn't already there in "living". Yet > >> "of life" must mean > >> something, otherwise it would not enable us to add > >> the specifier "the" to > >> "living". > >> > >> I think Ricoeur would say that "life" is a kind of > >> de-historicized, > >> de-memorized, de-humanized "living", one that is > >> turned from process into > >> entity, and made synoptical, like the various > >> retellings in different > >> orders of the four Gospels. Yes, it's a powerful > >> way of speaking, but it is > >> powerful the way that sculpture is rather than the > >> way that painting is. > >> And the power is not in the word, but in the wording. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 4:31 AM, > >> >> > wrote: > >> > >> Mike, > >> There is a particular example that occurred > >> here when Wolff-Michael > >> referenced Ricouer?s 3 volume project > >> exploring metaphor and narrativity > >> and their common unifying theme existing > >> within human temporality > >> (finitude). > >> Is there an expectation for ?us? to go back > >> and reference Ricouer?s > >> exploration of this relation in depth? Through > >> reading and re-reading these > >> works of scholarship. > >> I myself turned to the preface of Ricouer?s 3 > >> volume exploration of this > >> particular relation, metaphor/narrativity:: > >> Temporality. > >> > >> Without human temporality, narrativity and > >> metaphor would not exist. > >> > >> On this listserve there was a glance or nod in > >> Ricouer?s direction and > >> then???. > >> > >> This month we are recycling themes which > >> already exist in the archive, but > >> is this recycling just repetition,, or > >> renovation, or innovation?. > >> > >> Peg?s metaphor of leaving loose threads for > >> others to return to expresses > >> a temporal sense ability at odds with high > >> impact journals. > >> > >> > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > >> > >> From: mike cole > >> Sent: April 25, 2017 11:02 AM > >> To: Larry Purss > >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting > >> 'use-value' & 'value' > >> > >> Right Larry. A lot of high impact journals > >> (not all) are deeply > >> a-historical. > >> > >> When my wife and I were writing a textbook, we > >> had, with each addition, > >> to cut out older refs. To be allow to refer to > >> Gesell, Rousseau in a > >> serious manner was a constant battle. > >> > >> But what the heck. In a lot of classes that > >> use the textbook, students are > >> not required to remember or re-cover material > >> from the mid-term on the > >> final exam. In a course on development in a > >> field that makes a big deal of > >> sequence and growth over time. Live for the > >> moment, no need to know the > >> history of behavior in order to understand it. > >> > >> Yes, mediation has not gone away, despite its > >> claimed ailments and devious > >> traps. :-) > >> > >> mike > >> > >> On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 2:00 PM, > >> >> > wrote: > >> So... If more than 10 years old makes thinking > >> and thought anethema WHAT > >> does that say about the scope of thinking of > >> high impact journals? > >> > >> When returning to wording, statement, and > >> utterance I hope we also turn > >> back to ?mediation?. > >> I have this definition of mediation to > >> consider: (carrying across -within > >> back/forth) BOTH (giving/receiving) within a > >> singular relation > >> This is felt differently than mediation: > >> (carrying over to the other side) > >> which may imply bridges required for joining > >> or linking two pre-existing > >> sides (first one and then the other). > >> > >> > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > >> > >> From: mike cole > >> Sent: April 23, 2017 9:54 AM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' > >> & 'value' > >> > >> Hi David et al -- > >> > >> Found my copy of Cole and Scribner! To my > >> relief, it appears that somewhere > >> along the way there was a misattribution of > >> that quote you posted that > >> Hasan criticized and that I wanted to disavow > >> (but there it was in black > >> and white!). > >> > >> So, apropos, we have a problem of context > >> here. If you look at p. 25 of > >> Scribner and Cole, you will find that the > >> quotation was in a paper by Cole > >> and Gay (1972) (A paper on culture and memory > >> in the American > >> Anthropologist I had did not recall the date > >> of. If you go just one > >> sentence above the quotation you find the > >> following: > >> > >> *For instance, one anthropologist commented, > >> upon hearing about the results > >> of our first research in this area (Gay and > >> Cole 1967): The reasoning and > >> thinking processes of different people in > >> different cultures don't differ . > >> . . just their values, beliefs, and ways of > >> classifying differ [personal > >> correspondence ].* > >> > >> > >> We were *contesting *this statement which was > >> the anthropological consensus > >> at the time. For those interested in our own > >> views at the time, > >> > >> it is best to consult Chapter 8 of that book > >> by Cole and Scribner on > >> *Culture > >> and Thought. *(Its all antiquarian stuff > >> anyway. Its now 50 years since the > >> first publication of that line of work! > >> References more than 10 years old > >> are anethema to HIGH IMPACT journals! :-) > >> and :-( > >> > >> > >> mike > >> > >> > >> Which takes the discussion back to the > >> discussion of wording, stating, and > >> uttering. > >> > >> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 1:39 PM, Wolff-Michael > >> Roth < > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > >> > wrote: > >> > >> Julian, > >> I suggest reading Rossi-Landi, and Italian > >> Marxist scholar, where I have > >> taken this: > >> > >> Like other products of labor, signs, > >> words, expressions, > >> and messages have use value in > >> communication and are subject to exchange, > >> distribution, and consumption; the markets > >> within which these > >> products circulate as commodities are > >> linguistic communities (Rossi- > >> Landi 1983). > >> > >> An appreciation of his contributions by > >> Cianca Bianchi states: "Through > >> > >> his > >> > >> "homological schema", > >> material and linguistic production are > >> conceived to be the result of a > >> single process > >> that is particular to human beings and > >> that can best be understood in > >> > >> terms > >> > >> of work > >> and trade. " > >> > >> Cheers, > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------ > >> ------------------------------ > >> -------------------- > >> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > >> Applied Cognitive Science > >> MacLaurin Building A567 > >> University of Victoria > >> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > >> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > >> com/catalogs/bookseries/new- > >> com/catalogs/bookseries/new- > >> > > >> directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > >> mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > >> > >> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 12:09 PM, Julian > >> Williams < > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> As you were - so we are entirely in > >> disagreement, then. > >> > >> For me the E-V and U-V of a dialogic > >> exchange has nothing essentially > >> > >> to > >> > >> do with the sensual and super sensual > >> moments of the 'word' as per > >> Vygotsky. And I don't see at all how > >> these really confer 'value' in any > >> Marxist sense of the term on > >> speech/utterance (etc etc). > >> > >> I am guessing that we are back with > >> analogy of 'commodity' and 'word' > >> > >> in > >> > >> dialogue, rather than a holistic > >> understanding of discourse in the > >> totality of social-economic relations, > >> and so we have made no progress > >> here. > >> > >> We can take this up another time perhaps. > >> > >> Julian > >> > >> > >> > >> On 22/04/2017 19:47, > >> "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> on behalf of > >> Wolff-Michael Roth" > >> >> > >> on behalf of > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> Julian, > >> E-V and U-V, but not of the kind > >> that you are talking about, the > >> > >> abstract > >> > >> . > >> . . You can look at it like LSV, > >> who emphasizes that the word has a > >> sensible (material) part and a > >> supersensual (ideal) part, not in the > >> abstract, but concretely realized > >> in every exchange. Michael > >> > >> ------------------------------ > >> ----------------------------- > >> > >> --------------- > >> > >> ------ > >> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne > >> Professor > >> Applied Cognitive Science > >> MacLaurin Building A567 > >> University of Victoria > >> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > >> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> New book: *The Mathematics of > >> Mathematics > >> >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new- > >> >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new-> > >> > >> directions-in-mat > >> > >> hematics-and-science-education > >> /the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > >> > >> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 11:38 AM, > >> Julian Williams < > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> M. > >> > >> Um, hang on a minute - I agree > >> with everything you said here (I > >> think..). > >> > >> So I suppose this means you > >> agree(d) with me; een though I > >> thought I > >> > >> was > >> > >> challenging your view. I > >> thought you were trying to > >> find E-V and U-V > >> > >> in > >> > >> the dialogue-in-itself, where > >> I think it's value has to be > >> > >> understood > >> > >> by > >> > >> the way it is mediated through > >> the wider field of > >> discourse/practice > >> (i.e. > >> In its meaning/sense in terms > >> of the real exchanges taking > >> place in > >> practice). > >> > >> So the point is that one can > >> only understand the exchanges > >> taking > >> > >> place > >> > >> within the wider context- the > >> worker exchanges 10 hours of > >> labour > >> > >> for > >> > >> the > >> commodities required to keep > >> themselves alive for a day ? > >> but this > >> > >> has > >> > >> to > >> be understood within the > >> system that allows the > >> capitalist to > >> > >> exploit > >> > >> those 10 hours for a profit, > >> and pay wages that do not > >> allow the > >> > >> worker > >> > >> to > >> purchase the goods they this > >> produce (or their > >> equivalent)?. There > >> > >> are > >> > >> obvious analogies in discourse > >> too. > >> > >> Julian > >> > >> Ps I see I have raised > >> 'mediation' now - oops. > >> > >> > >> > >> On 22/04/2017 19:15, > >> "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> on behalf of > >> Wolff-Michael Roth" > >> >> > >> on behalf of > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> Julian, > >> My sense is that you are > >> referring to macro-issues, > >> you need to > >> > >> stand > >> > >> back, > >> abstract, and look from > >> the outside at a system, > >> let it unfold in > >> > >> front of > >> > >> your eyes. > >> > >> I am concerned with the > >> actual constitution of > >> society in > >> > >> individual > >> > >> exchanges, actual > >> relations between two or > >> more people, the > >> > >> "ensemble" > >> > >> of > >> > >> which constitutes society > >> (Marx, Vygotsky, > >> Leont'ev). I am thus > >> > >> concerned > >> > >> with actual exchange > >> relations, the kind Marx > >> refers to in the > >> > >> first > >> > >> 100 > >> > >> pages of das Kapital, > >> where he has the tailor > >> exchange a coat with > >> > >> the > >> > >> weaver receiving two yards > >> of cloth . . . The tailor > >> exchanges > >> > >> his/her > >> > >> cloth with others, like > >> the farmer, for 40 bushels > >> of grain . . . > >> > >> In > >> > >> my > >> > >> work, I am following them > >> around, concerned not with > >> "meaning" or > >> > >> "ideal" > >> > >> in the abstract but as > >> realized in every THIS > >> occasion of a social > >> relation. > >> > >> My sense is that the > >> differences you point out > >> (attempt to) lie > >> there---perhaps. > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> ------------------------------ > >> ----------------------------- > >> > >> --------------- > >> > >> ------ > >> Wolff-Michael Roth, > >> Lansdowne Professor > >> Applied Cognitive Science > >> MacLaurin Building A567 > >> University of Victoria > >> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > >> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > >> > >> >> > >> faculty/mroth/> > >> > >> New book: *The Mathematics > >> of Mathematics > >> >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new- > >> >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new-> > >> > >> directions-in-mat > >> > >> hematics-and-science-education > >> /the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > >> > >> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at > >> 10:24 AM, Julian Williams < > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk > >> manchester.ac.uk > >> >> > >> wrote: > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> Going back many, many > >> posts now: almost 24 > >> hours worth, I think. > >> > >> When I wrote this: > >> > >> 'Thus, I suggest, the > >> 'exchange/use value' of an > >> > >> utterance/dialogic > >> > >> exchange maybe ought > >> to be examined in the > >> ideological context of > >> > >> its > >> > >> relationship with the > >> 'whole' of social > >> re/production where class > >> > >> power > >> > >> becomes visible. I > >> don't know how to do > >> this, but the argument is > >> > >> there > >> > >> in > >> Bourdieu: the power > >> relations between > >> people are part of the > >> capital-mediated > >> structure of relations > >> in a field (including the > >> > >> field > >> > >> of > >> opinion/discourse), > >> and this explains the > >> forms of discourse that > >> express > >> these power > >> relationships and help > >> to hold powerful > >> positions in > >> > >> place > >> > >> in > >> the field. In this > >> view it is not > >> possible to identify the > >> > >> 'value' > >> > >> of an > >> > >> utterance or a sign > >> outside of this wider > >> analysis? and an > >> > >> analysis > >> > >> of > >> > >> the > >> particular > >> discursive/cultural > >> field within its wider > >> sociality.' > >> > >> The sort of thing I > >> had in mind was this > >> > >> 'word/utterance/statement' > >> > >> of > >> > >> yours (I care not at > >> the moment which of > >> these is chosen - in > >> > >> this > >> > >> context > >> I am not clear it > >> matters, though I > >> recognise that every > >> work was > >> > >> once > >> > >> an > >> utterance and a speech > >> act? and that parsing > >> into words is a > >> > >> relatively > >> > >> recent cultural artifice): > >> > >> '?. My personal > >> inclination would be > >> to take Ric?ur as more > >> authoritative > >> on the subject than > >> any or most of us' > >> (see below) > >> > >> I think the 'value' > >> (i.e. exchange value) > >> of this statement of > >> > >> yours > >> > >> in > >> > >> my > >> frame has to be > >> understood in the > >> context of its > >> function/workthe > >> academic field (or > >> this section of it), > >> how power is exerted here > >> through > >> reference to > >> 'authorities' like > >> Ricoeur (NB not just > >> 'authors' > >> > >> like > >> > >> the > >> > >> rest of us? ), whether > >> this is really useful > >> in helping the > >> > >> community to > >> > >> progress its > >> understanding of the > >> issue for practical > >> purposes > >> > >> (e.g. > >> > >> How > >> > >> many of the readers of > >> this post have > >> seriously read Ricoeur > >> > >> enough > >> > >> to > >> > >> get > >> the point?). > >> > >> How our community of > >> discourse comes to be > >> structured so that > >> > >> power > >> > >> 'works' like this - > >> that is a wider issue > >> - and here it does get > >> > >> hard > >> > >> for > >> us academics to see > >> ourselves as we > >> perhaps could or should be > >> > >> seen. > >> > >> Michael: I hope you > >> don't take this cheeky > >> affront too > >> > >> personally: > >> > >> I > >> > >> could > >> do the same to most of > >> the posts that one > >> reads on xmca, and > >> > >> probably > >> > >> my > >> own- I don't mean to > >> suggest that they have > >> no use-value, and > >> > >> certainly > >> > >> not that the > >> collective dialogue > >> has no use value. Yet > >> still? we > >> > >> should > >> > >> recognise that there > >> is a power game in > >> this field of > >> > >> discourse/opinion, > >> > >> if we are to > >> understand one another > >> well. It may even be > >> argued > >> > >> (with > >> > >> some > >> merit?) that a quote > >> appealing to Marx - or > >> even Ricoeur - has > >> > >> some > >> > >> use > >> > >> as > >> well as exchange value > >> (or lets say merit) in > >> linking ideas to a > >> > >> body of > >> > >> previous revolutionary > >> work. > >> > >> Hugs! > >> > >> Julian > >> > >> > >> > >> On 21/04/2017 16:53, > >> "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> >> .ucsd.edu> > >> on behalf > >> > >> of > >> > >> Wolff-Michael Roth" > >> >> >> .ucsd.edu> > >> on behalf > >> > >> of > >> > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > >> >> > >> wrote: > >> > >> Ric?ur (1985), in > >> *Time and > >> Narrative 2*, uses > >> the following > >> > >> distinction > >> > >> for the purposes > >> of theorizing the > >> difference between > >> narrated > >> > >> time > >> > >> and > >> > >> time of narration. > >> Accordingly, > >> "narrative posses" > >> "the > >> > >> remarkable > >> > >> property" "of > >> being split into > >> utterance > >> [*?nociation*] and > >> > >> statement [ > >> > >> *?nonc?*]." > >> To introduce this > >> distinction, it > >> suffices to recall > >> that the > >> configurating > >> act presiding > >> over emplotment is > >> a judicative act, > >> involving a "grasping > >> > >> together." > >> > >> More > >> > >> precisely, this > >> act belongs to the > >> family of reflective > >> > >> judgments.1 > >> > >> We > >> > >> have > >> been > >> led to say > >> therefore that to > >> narrate a story is > >> already to > >> > >> "reflect > >> > >> upon" > >> > >> the event > >> narrated. For this > >> reason, narrative > >> "grasping > >> together" carries > >> > >> with > >> > >> it > >> > >> the capacity > >> for distancing > >> itself from its > >> own production and > >> in this way > >> > >> dividing > >> > >> itself in two. (p. 61) > >> > >> My personal > >> inclination would > >> be to take Ric?ur > >> as more > >> > >> authoritative > >> > >> on > >> > >> the subject than > >> any or most of us. > >> > >> Michael > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------ > >> ----------------------------- > >> > >> --------------- > >> > >> ------ > >> Wolff-Michael > >> Roth, Lansdowne > >> Professor > >> Applied Cognitive > >> Science > >> MacLaurin Building > >> A567 > >> University of Victoria > >> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > >> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > >> > >> >> > >> faculty/mroth/ > >> > >> New book: *The > >> Mathematics of > >> Mathematics > >> >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new- > >> >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new-> > >> > >> directions-in-mat > >> > >> hematics-and-science-education > >> /the-mathematics-of- > >> > >> mathematics/>* > >> > >> On Thu, Apr 20, > >> 2017 at 10:38 PM, > >> David Kellogg > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> wrote: > >> > >> I think that > >> "statement" is > >> too tight, and > >> "utterance" is too > >> > >> loose. > >> > >> A > >> > >> statement is > >> an > >> indicative-declarative > >> wording of > >> some kind: > >> > >> we > >> > >> don't > >> > >> usually refer > >> to commands > >> (imperatives), > >> questions > >> (indicative-interrogatives), > >> or > >> exclamations > >> as "statements" > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu May 4 18:10:46 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 11:10:46 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value' In-Reply-To: References: <58f4dfe0.5a45620a.c2a11.c004@mx.google.com> <58fe679e.e0096b0a.a0a68.9cf7@mx.google.com> <58ff9619.8427630a.82c24.69ee@mx.google.com> <69279808-ff88-e2a5-354a-5b699e069edb@mira.net> Message-ID: It depends on the painting, doesn't it? At any rate, whether you consider a painter good or not certainly does. People can look at this discussion article on the LCHC website and decide for themselves, not only about my own powers as a painter but also about the powers of painters next to whom my powers are pretty puny (Caravaggio, Caravaggio, and Caravaggio). http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/The_Real_Ideal.pdf If you compare "The Dead Seal and the Shelving Sea" (p. 3) with "Farmers Work Hard" (p. 10) you will see exactly what Greg means. "The Dead Seal" is more about paint then about a dead seal (I painted it during the day, and made it a night scene because of the way the kind of paint I had). "Farmers Work Hard" is really all about the people in the painting: my best friend, his mother and father, and his little daughter, and the onion harvest (I painted it over many months, and when I needed one paint instead of another I went out and got it). Jakobson argues that only the poetic function of language is really concerned with word stuff (so for example when you rhyme "onion" with "bunion" you are more interested in the word stuff then the actual meaning, else you would have used "callous"). But Jakobson had a very generous view of what that meant (so for example he would probably say that if I translate Homer as "we lay down next to the shelving sea and slept" I am using word stuff to convey the hiss and crackle and not just the sight of the waves, but that the way in which the sight is conveyed is also done through the stuff of the word, because "wavy" would have been more transparent to the object of the waviness of the waves). I think one key difference between tools and signs is that with tools the whole point is to try to remove the person from the scene (as Marx says, to allow objects to act on each other, and as Hegel said, reason is only as powerful as it is cunning). But texts do not communicate anything by themselves: people communicate with texts. So to remove the person from the context of situation is to remove the meaning of the sign as well. That's why I think "Farmers Work Hard" is a better painting than "The Dead Seal" (even though it is an earlier one), and also why it's okay to paint a painting about paint if you are painting a dead seal, but not if you are painting Emmett Till in his coffin. http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2017/03/29/the_problem_with_the_whitney_biennial_s_emmett_till_painting_isn_t_that.html I remember when I was art school we had a nude model--she was a poor girl from the countryside, only doing it for the money and very self-conscious, and one day she had her period but she couldn't afford to take the day off, so she staunched herself with rags, and stood there naked with tears running down her cheeks and blood running down her thigh while the professor exhorted us to paint her like a side of beef, or some other clever thing that he had learned from Cezanne. As Vygotsky says (and Chekhov too, at the end of the Cherry Orchard): you have forgotten, there's a person in there! David Kellogg Macquarie University On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 10:03 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Would it help our understand of "wording" any to know that David is a > painter (and quite a good one!)? > > Someone else has put this much more elegantly than this, but we might ask, > (in parallel fashion to word and wording): Is the meaning in the paint or > in the painting? > > -greg > > > > On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 8:23 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Sometimes the answer to a question depends on the answer to a question. > > Like: > > > > A: Can I have a beer? > > B: Are you eighteen? > > > > So if you tell me that "life" and "living" are two different words, then > I > > will tell you that they are not ineffable: you can say for example that a > > "life" is an instance of "living", or perhaps that "living" is an > instance > > of "life", and the explanation isn't circular. But if you tell me that > > "life" and "living" are just two different wordings of the same meaning, > > then I will say that word meaning is ineffable, in the sense that the > only > > way to define it is in terms of itself. > > > > All word meanings are ineffable in this rather general sense. In order to > > explain them, we need other words and other word meanings. Teachers run > > into this problem all the time when they try to teach words with > > flashcards: If I am teaching the word "kick" and I have a flashcard with > a > > foot kicking a ball, the child really doesn't know if I am teaching the > > meaning "foot", or "ball" or "football" or whatever. The only way to > > disambiguate the picture is with words, and that's true of any word > meaning > > you care to think of. Wittgenstein has a somewhat more elaborate version > of > > this argument, but I prefer to stick to situations I myself have > > experienced (meaning situations that, as Vandy says, I myself have > > transformed into a system of word meanings). > > > > We have a system of wordings that tends to privilege entities over > > processes. Halliday says that dynamism and synopticity are complementary: > > there isn't any sense in which "living" is somehow closer to reality than > > "life", and so there also isn't any sense in which one is closer to > > idealization than the other. Nevertheless, as Virginia Woolf knew, "Life > > stand still here" is a much harder trick to pull off, and it takes kids > > many more years to master it. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 12:05 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > > Since you answer my question with a question, I take it that the answer > > is > > > "yes." > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 26/04/2017 11:56 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > >> Andy-- > > >> > > >> Are "life" and "living" two different words, or are they two different > > >> wordings of the same word? > > >> > > >> David Kellogg > > >> Macquarie University > > >> > > >> On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 11:42 AM, Andy Blunden > >> > wrote: > > >> > > >> David, after reading this fascinating 2-page narrative > > >> about Ricoeur and the structuralists out of the blue > > >> we get the conclusion: "And the power is not in the > > >> word, but in the wording." Have I missed something? Is > > >> "wording" ineffable? > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> Andy Blunden > > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > >> > >> decision-making> > > >> > > >> On 26/04/2017 7:13 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > >> > > >> I remember Paul Ricoeur. He taught at a seminary > > >> at the University of > > >> Chicago when I was an undergraduate. I was a > > >> member of the campus Spartacus > > >> Youth Club, and it was the only place that would > > >> allow us a public space > > >> for meetings. I tried to sell him a copy of "Young > > >> Spartacus" once: I can't > > >> remember if he bought it or not. But I remember > > >> him as a French gentleman, > > >> personally quite conservative, but not at all put > > >> off by the presence of > > >> a screaming red nineteen year old who for > > >> inexplicable reasons had > > >> a Parisian accent and spoke the argot of the > > >> Versailles banlieue. Maybe he > > >> bought our French paper, Le Bolchevik. > > >> > > >> I have been reading a symposium "On Narrative" > > >> that was going on at UC when > > >> I was organizing against Milton Friedman's Nobel > > >> Prize (he was also a > > >> professor there at the time--he won the prize the > > >> same year that Saul > > >> Bellow, another UC professor, did). Ricoeur, > > >> Derrida, and Hayden White all > > >> took part. > > >> > > >> It was the heyday of structuralism, and Ricoeur's > > >> contribution is > > >> interesting because it's quite ANTI-structuralist: > > >> he points out that the > > >> effect of structuralism on narrative studies has > > >> been to de-historicize, > > >> de-memorize, dehumanize; to convert stories into > > >> exchange values rather > > >> than use values. So the elements that Propp > > >> discovers in Ludmilla and > > >> Ruslan (and the Firebird and its variants) can > > >> come in any order. In > > >> contrast, even the simplest act of repetition is > > >> historicized, humanized, > > >> and memorable. A use value and not an exchange value. > > >> > > >> Derrida ignores everybody else and embarks on his > > >> usual verbal > > >> pyrotechnics, but Hayden White develops Ricoeur's > > >> idea in a way I think I > > >> actually used in my "Thinking of Feeling" paper: > > >> human memory goes through > > >> stages: medieval annals, Renaissance chronicles, > > >> and the nineteenth century > > >> narrative, each of which adds something > > >> distinctive and makes the > > >> meta-narrative that they form together into > > >> something non-reversible and > > >> developmental. But now I see that the reviewers > > >> made me remove all that (it > > >> is just as well: sociogenesis is one story and > > >> ontogenesis quite another). > > >> > > >> Ruqaiya Hasan used to say that there is a certain > > >> unity imposed on > > >> experience by language, from "the living of life" > > >> to the child's first real > > >> morpho-phoneme. If you take the phrase "the living > > >> of life" just as an > > >> example, you can see some of what Ricoeur is > > >> trying to get at. On the face > > >> of it, the phrase is redundant: the word "life" > > >> seems to contain absolutely > > >> nothing that isn't already there in "living". Yet > > >> "of life" must mean > > >> something, otherwise it would not enable us to add > > >> the specifier "the" to > > >> "living". > > >> > > >> I think Ricoeur would say that "life" is a kind of > > >> de-historicized, > > >> de-memorized, de-humanized "living", one that is > > >> turned from process into > > >> entity, and made synoptical, like the various > > >> retellings in different > > >> orders of the four Gospels. Yes, it's a powerful > > >> way of speaking, but it is > > >> powerful the way that sculpture is rather than the > > >> way that painting is. > > >> And the power is not in the word, but in the wording. > > >> > > >> David Kellogg > > >> Macquarie University > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 4:31 AM, > > >> > >> > wrote: > > >> > > >> Mike, > > >> There is a particular example that occurred > > >> here when Wolff-Michael > > >> referenced Ricouer?s 3 volume project > > >> exploring metaphor and narrativity > > >> and their common unifying theme existing > > >> within human temporality > > >> (finitude). > > >> Is there an expectation for ?us? to go back > > >> and reference Ricouer?s > > >> exploration of this relation in depth? Through > > >> reading and re-reading these > > >> works of scholarship. > > >> I myself turned to the preface of Ricouer?s 3 > > >> volume exploration of this > > >> particular relation, metaphor/narrativity:: > > >> Temporality. > > >> > > >> Without human temporality, narrativity and > > >> metaphor would not exist. > > >> > > >> On this listserve there was a glance or nod in > > >> Ricouer?s direction and > > >> then???. > > >> > > >> This month we are recycling themes which > > >> already exist in the archive, but > > >> is this recycling just repetition,, or > > >> renovation, or innovation?. > > >> > > >> Peg?s metaphor of leaving loose threads for > > >> others to return to expresses > > >> a temporal sense ability at odds with high > > >> impact journals. > > >> > > >> > > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > >> > > >> From: mike cole > > >> Sent: April 25, 2017 11:02 AM > > >> To: Larry Purss > > >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting > > >> 'use-value' & 'value' > > >> > > >> Right Larry. A lot of high impact journals > > >> (not all) are deeply > > >> a-historical. > > >> > > >> When my wife and I were writing a textbook, we > > >> had, with each addition, > > >> to cut out older refs. To be allow to refer to > > >> Gesell, Rousseau in a > > >> serious manner was a constant battle. > > >> > > >> But what the heck. In a lot of classes that > > >> use the textbook, students are > > >> not required to remember or re-cover material > > >> from the mid-term on the > > >> final exam. In a course on development in a > > >> field that makes a big deal of > > >> sequence and growth over time. Live for the > > >> moment, no need to know the > > >> history of behavior in order to understand it. > > >> > > >> Yes, mediation has not gone away, despite its > > >> claimed ailments and devious > > >> traps. :-) > > >> > > >> mike > > >> > > >> On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 2:00 PM, > > >> > >> > wrote: > > >> So... If more than 10 years old makes thinking > > >> and thought anethema WHAT > > >> does that say about the scope of thinking of > > >> high impact journals? > > >> > > >> When returning to wording, statement, and > > >> utterance I hope we also turn > > >> back to ?mediation?. > > >> I have this definition of mediation to > > >> consider: (carrying across -within > > >> back/forth) BOTH (giving/receiving) within a > > >> singular relation > > >> This is felt differently than mediation: > > >> (carrying over to the other side) > > >> which may imply bridges required for joining > > >> or linking two pre-existing > > >> sides (first one and then the other). > > >> > > >> > > >> Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > >> > > >> From: mike cole > > >> Sent: April 23, 2017 9:54 AM > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' > > >> & 'value' > > >> > > >> Hi David et al -- > > >> > > >> Found my copy of Cole and Scribner! To my > > >> relief, it appears that somewhere > > >> along the way there was a misattribution of > > >> that quote you posted that > > >> Hasan criticized and that I wanted to disavow > > >> (but there it was in black > > >> and white!). > > >> > > >> So, apropos, we have a problem of context > > >> here. If you look at p. 25 of > > >> Scribner and Cole, you will find that the > > >> quotation was in a paper by Cole > > >> and Gay (1972) (A paper on culture and memory > > >> in the American > > >> Anthropologist I had did not recall the date > > >> of. If you go just one > > >> sentence above the quotation you find the > > >> following: > > >> > > >> *For instance, one anthropologist commented, > > >> upon hearing about the results > > >> of our first research in this area (Gay and > > >> Cole 1967): The reasoning and > > >> thinking processes of different people in > > >> different cultures don't differ . > > >> . . just their values, beliefs, and ways of > > >> classifying differ [personal > > >> correspondence ].* > > >> > > >> > > >> We were *contesting *this statement which was > > >> the anthropological consensus > > >> at the time. For those interested in our own > > >> views at the time, > > >> > > >> it is best to consult Chapter 8 of that book > > >> by Cole and Scribner on > > >> *Culture > > >> and Thought. *(Its all antiquarian stuff > > >> anyway. Its now 50 years since the > > >> first publication of that line of work! > > >> References more than 10 years old > > >> are anethema to HIGH IMPACT journals! :-) > > >> and :-( > > >> > > >> > > >> mike > > >> > > >> > > >> Which takes the discussion back to the > > >> discussion of wording, stating, and > > >> uttering. > > >> > > >> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 1:39 PM, Wolff-Michael > > >> Roth < > > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > >> Julian, > > >> I suggest reading Rossi-Landi, and Italian > > >> Marxist scholar, where I have > > >> taken this: > > >> > > >> Like other products of labor, signs, > > >> words, expressions, > > >> and messages have use value in > > >> communication and are subject to exchange, > > >> distribution, and consumption; the markets > > >> within which these > > >> products circulate as commodities are > > >> linguistic communities (Rossi- > > >> Landi 1983). > > >> > > >> An appreciation of his contributions by > > >> Cianca Bianchi states: "Through > > >> > > >> his > > >> > > >> "homological schema", > > >> material and linguistic production are > > >> conceived to be the result of a > > >> single process > > >> that is particular to human beings and > > >> that can best be understood in > > >> > > >> terms > > >> > > >> of work > > >> and trade. " > > >> > > >> Cheers, > > >> > > >> Michael > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> ------------------------------ > > >> ------------------------------ > > >> -------------------- > > >> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > > >> Applied Cognitive Science > > >> MacLaurin Building A567 > > >> University of Victoria > > >> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > >> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > >> > > >> > >> > > > >> > > >> New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > > >> > com/catalogs/bookseries/new- > > >> > com/catalogs/bookseries/new- > > >> > > > >> directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the- > > >> mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > >> > > >> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 12:09 PM, Julian > > >> Williams < > > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk > > >> > > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> Michael > > >> > > >> As you were - so we are entirely in > > >> disagreement, then. > > >> > > >> For me the E-V and U-V of a dialogic > > >> exchange has nothing essentially > > >> > > >> to > > >> > > >> do with the sensual and super sensual > > >> moments of the 'word' as per > > >> Vygotsky. And I don't see at all how > > >> these really confer 'value' in any > > >> Marxist sense of the term on > > >> speech/utterance (etc etc). > > >> > > >> I am guessing that we are back with > > >> analogy of 'commodity' and 'word' > > >> > > >> in > > >> > > >> dialogue, rather than a holistic > > >> understanding of discourse in the > > >> totality of social-economic relations, > > >> and so we have made no progress > > >> here. > > >> > > >> We can take this up another time perhaps. > > >> > > >> Julian > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On 22/04/2017 19:47, > > >> "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> > > >> on behalf of > > >> Wolff-Michael Roth" > > >> > >> > > >> on behalf of > > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > >> > > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> Julian, > > >> E-V and U-V, but not of the kind > > >> that you are talking about, the > > >> > > >> abstract > > >> > > >> . > > >> . . You can look at it like LSV, > > >> who emphasizes that the word has a > > >> sensible (material) part and a > > >> supersensual (ideal) part, not in the > > >> abstract, but concretely realized > > >> in every exchange. Michael > > >> > > >> ------------------------------ > > >> ----------------------------- > > >> > > >> --------------- > > >> > > >> ------ > > >> Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne > > >> Professor > > >> Applied Cognitive Science > > >> MacLaurin Building A567 > > >> University of Victoria > > >> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > >> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > >> > > >> > >> > > > >> > > >> New book: *The Mathematics of > > >> Mathematics > > >> > >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new- > > >> > >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new-> > > >> > > >> directions-in-mat > > >> > > >> hematics-and-science-education > > >> /the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > >> > > >> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 11:38 AM, > > >> Julian Williams < > > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk > > >> > > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> M. > > >> > > >> Um, hang on a minute - I agree > > >> with everything you said here (I > > >> think..). > > >> > > >> So I suppose this means you > > >> agree(d) with me; een though I > > >> thought I > > >> > > >> was > > >> > > >> challenging your view. I > > >> thought you were trying to > > >> find E-V and U-V > > >> > > >> in > > >> > > >> the dialogue-in-itself, where > > >> I think it's value has to be > > >> > > >> understood > > >> > > >> by > > >> > > >> the way it is mediated through > > >> the wider field of > > >> discourse/practice > > >> (i.e. > > >> In its meaning/sense in terms > > >> of the real exchanges taking > > >> place in > > >> practice). > > >> > > >> So the point is that one can > > >> only understand the exchanges > > >> taking > > >> > > >> place > > >> > > >> within the wider context- the > > >> worker exchanges 10 hours of > > >> labour > > >> > > >> for > > >> > > >> the > > >> commodities required to keep > > >> themselves alive for a day ? > > >> but this > > >> > > >> has > > >> > > >> to > > >> be understood within the > > >> system that allows the > > >> capitalist to > > >> > > >> exploit > > >> > > >> those 10 hours for a profit, > > >> and pay wages that do not > > >> allow the > > >> > > >> worker > > >> > > >> to > > >> purchase the goods they this > > >> produce (or their > > >> equivalent)?. There > > >> > > >> are > > >> > > >> obvious analogies in discourse > > >> too. > > >> > > >> Julian > > >> > > >> Ps I see I have raised > > >> 'mediation' now - oops. > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On 22/04/2017 19:15, > > >> "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> > > >> on behalf of > > >> Wolff-Michael Roth" > > >> > >> > > >> on behalf of > > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > >> > > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> Julian, > > >> My sense is that you are > > >> referring to macro-issues, > > >> you need to > > >> > > >> stand > > >> > > >> back, > > >> abstract, and look from > > >> the outside at a system, > > >> let it unfold in > > >> > > >> front of > > >> > > >> your eyes. > > >> > > >> I am concerned with the > > >> actual constitution of > > >> society in > > >> > > >> individual > > >> > > >> exchanges, actual > > >> relations between two or > > >> more people, the > > >> > > >> "ensemble" > > >> > > >> of > > >> > > >> which constitutes society > > >> (Marx, Vygotsky, > > >> Leont'ev). I am thus > > >> > > >> concerned > > >> > > >> with actual exchange > > >> relations, the kind Marx > > >> refers to in the > > >> > > >> first > > >> > > >> 100 > > >> > > >> pages of das Kapital, > > >> where he has the tailor > > >> exchange a coat with > > >> > > >> the > > >> > > >> weaver receiving two yards > > >> of cloth . . . The tailor > > >> exchanges > > >> > > >> his/her > > >> > > >> cloth with others, like > > >> the farmer, for 40 bushels > > >> of grain . . . > > >> > > >> In > > >> > > >> my > > >> > > >> work, I am following them > > >> around, concerned not with > > >> "meaning" or > > >> > > >> "ideal" > > >> > > >> in the abstract but as > > >> realized in every THIS > > >> occasion of a social > > >> relation. > > >> > > >> My sense is that the > > >> differences you point out > > >> (attempt to) lie > > >> there---perhaps. > > >> > > >> Michael > > >> > > >> ------------------------------ > > >> ----------------------------- > > >> > > >> --------------- > > >> > > >> ------ > > >> Wolff-Michael Roth, > > >> Lansdowne Professor > > >> Applied Cognitive Science > > >> MacLaurin Building A567 > > >> University of Victoria > > >> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > >> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > >> > > >> > >> > > >> faculty/mroth/> > > >> > > >> New book: *The Mathematics > > >> of Mathematics > > >> > >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new- > > >> > >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new-> > > >> > > >> directions-in-mat > > >> > > >> hematics-and-science-education > > >> /the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>* > > >> > > >> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at > > >> 10:24 AM, Julian Williams < > > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk > > >> > manchester.ac.uk > > >> >> > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> Michael > > >> > > >> Going back many, many > > >> posts now: almost 24 > > >> hours worth, I think. > > >> > > >> When I wrote this: > > >> > > >> 'Thus, I suggest, the > > >> 'exchange/use value' of an > > >> > > >> utterance/dialogic > > >> > > >> exchange maybe ought > > >> to be examined in the > > >> ideological context of > > >> > > >> its > > >> > > >> relationship with the > > >> 'whole' of social > > >> re/production where class > > >> > > >> power > > >> > > >> becomes visible. I > > >> don't know how to do > > >> this, but the argument is > > >> > > >> there > > >> > > >> in > > >> Bourdieu: the power > > >> relations between > > >> people are part of the > > >> capital-mediated > > >> structure of relations > > >> in a field (including the > > >> > > >> field > > >> > > >> of > > >> opinion/discourse), > > >> and this explains the > > >> forms of discourse that > > >> express > > >> these power > > >> relationships and help > > >> to hold powerful > > >> positions in > > >> > > >> place > > >> > > >> in > > >> the field. In this > > >> view it is not > > >> possible to identify the > > >> > > >> 'value' > > >> > > >> of an > > >> > > >> utterance or a sign > > >> outside of this wider > > >> analysis? and an > > >> > > >> analysis > > >> > > >> of > > >> > > >> the > > >> particular > > >> discursive/cultural > > >> field within its wider > > >> sociality.' > > >> > > >> The sort of thing I > > >> had in mind was this > > >> > > >> 'word/utterance/statement' > > >> > > >> of > > >> > > >> yours (I care not at > > >> the moment which of > > >> these is chosen - in > > >> > > >> this > > >> > > >> context > > >> I am not clear it > > >> matters, though I > > >> recognise that every > > >> work was > > >> > > >> once > > >> > > >> an > > >> utterance and a speech > > >> act? and that parsing > > >> into words is a > > >> > > >> relatively > > >> > > >> recent cultural artifice): > > >> > > >> '?. My personal > > >> inclination would be > > >> to take Ric?ur as more > > >> authoritative > > >> on the subject than > > >> any or most of us' > > >> (see below) > > >> > > >> I think the 'value' > > >> (i.e. exchange value) > > >> of this statement of > > >> > > >> yours > > >> > > >> in > > >> > > >> my > > >> frame has to be > > >> understood in the > > >> context of its > > >> function/workthe > > >> academic field (or > > >> this section of it), > > >> how power is exerted here > > >> through > > >> reference to > > >> 'authorities' like > > >> Ricoeur (NB not just > > >> 'authors' > > >> > > >> like > > >> > > >> the > > >> > > >> rest of us? ), whether > > >> this is really useful > > >> in helping the > > >> > > >> community to > > >> > > >> progress its > > >> understanding of the > > >> issue for practical > > >> purposes > > >> > > >> (e.g. > > >> > > >> How > > >> > > >> many of the readers of > > >> this post have > > >> seriously read Ricoeur > > >> > > >> enough > > >> > > >> to > > >> > > >> get > > >> the point?). > > >> > > >> How our community of > > >> discourse comes to be > > >> structured so that > > >> > > >> power > > >> > > >> 'works' like this - > > >> that is a wider issue > > >> - and here it does get > > >> > > >> hard > > >> > > >> for > > >> us academics to see > > >> ourselves as we > > >> perhaps could or should be > > >> > > >> seen. > > >> > > >> Michael: I hope you > > >> don't take this cheeky > > >> affront too > > >> > > >> personally: > > >> > > >> I > > >> > > >> could > > >> do the same to most of > > >> the posts that one > > >> reads on xmca, and > > >> > > >> probably > > >> > > >> my > > >> own- I don't mean to > > >> suggest that they have > > >> no use-value, and > > >> > > >> certainly > > >> > > >> not that the > > >> collective dialogue > > >> has no use value. Yet > > >> still? we > > >> > > >> should > > >> > > >> recognise that there > > >> is a power game in > > >> this field of > > >> > > >> discourse/opinion, > > >> > > >> if we are to > > >> understand one another > > >> well. It may even be > > >> argued > > >> > > >> (with > > >> > > >> some > > >> merit?) that a quote > > >> appealing to Marx - or > > >> even Ricoeur - has > > >> > > >> some > > >> > > >> use > > >> > > >> as > > >> well as exchange value > > >> (or lets say merit) in > > >> linking ideas to a > > >> > > >> body of > > >> > > >> previous revolutionary > > >> work. > > >> > > >> Hugs! > > >> > > >> Julian > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On 21/04/2017 16:53, > > >> "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> > >> .ucsd.edu> > > >> on behalf > > >> > > >> of > > >> > > >> Wolff-Michael Roth" > > >> > >> > >> .ucsd.edu> > > >> on behalf > > >> > > >> of > > >> > > >> wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com > > >> gmail.com > > >> > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> Ric?ur (1985), in > > >> *Time and > > >> Narrative 2*, uses > > >> the following > > >> > > >> distinction > > >> > > >> for the purposes > > >> of theorizing the > > >> difference between > > >> narrated > > >> > > >> time > > >> > > >> and > > >> > > >> time of narration. > > >> Accordingly, > > >> "narrative posses" > > >> "the > > >> > > >> remarkable > > >> > > >> property" "of > > >> being split into > > >> utterance > > >> [*?nociation*] and > > >> > > >> statement [ > > >> > > >> *?nonc?*]." > > >> To introduce this > > >> distinction, it > > >> suffices to recall > > >> that the > > >> configurating > > >> act presiding > > >> over emplotment is > > >> a judicative act, > > >> involving a "grasping > > >> > > >> together." > > >> > > >> More > > >> > > >> precisely, this > > >> act belongs to the > > >> family of reflective > > >> > > >> judgments.1 > > >> > > >> We > > >> > > >> have > > >> been > > >> led to say > > >> therefore that to > > >> narrate a story is > > >> already to > > >> > > >> "reflect > > >> > > >> upon" > > >> > > >> the event > > >> narrated. For this > > >> reason, narrative > > >> "grasping > > >> together" carries > > >> > > >> with > > >> > > >> it > > >> > > >> the capacity > > >> for distancing > > >> itself from its > > >> own production and > > >> in this way > > >> > > >> dividing > > >> > > >> itself in two. (p. 61) > > >> > > >> My personal > > >> inclination would > > >> be to take Ric?ur > > >> as more > > >> > > >> authoritative > > >> > > >> on > > >> > > >> the subject than > > >> any or most of us. > > >> > > >> Michael > > >> > > >> > > >> ------------------------------ > > >> ----------------------------- > > >> > > >> --------------- > > >> > > >> ------ > > >> Wolff-Michael > > >> Roth, Lansdowne > > >> Professor > > >> Applied Cognitive > > >> Science > > >> MacLaurin Building > > >> A567 > > >> University of Victoria > > >> Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > > >> http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > >> > > >> > >> > > >> faculty/mroth/ > > >> > > >> New book: *The > > >> Mathematics of > > >> Mathematics > > >> < > https://www.sensepublishers.c > > >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new- > > >> < > https://www.sensepublishers.c > > >> om/catalogs/bookseries/new-> > > >> > > >> directions-in-mat > > >> > > >> hematics-and-science-education > > >> /the-mathematics-of- > > >> > > >> mathematics/>* > > >> > > >> On Thu, Apr 20, > > >> 2017 at 10:38 PM, > > >> David Kellogg > > >> > > >> > >> > > > >> > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> I think that > > >> "statement" is > > >> too tight, and > > >> "utterance" is too > > >> > > >> loose. > > >> > > >> A > > >> > > >> statement is > > >> an > > >> indicative-declarative > > >> wording of > > >> some kind: > > >> > > >> we > > >> > > >> don't > > >> > > >> usually refer > > >> to commands > > >> (imperatives), > > >> questions > > >> > (indicative-interrogatives), > > >> or > > >> exclamations > > >> as "statements" > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri May 5 08:09:51 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 09:09:51 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: David (and others), In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), your last post included this: "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense "realise" them as matter." I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends on what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of existence that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res extensa? noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you have described it? This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. Worlds apart. And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean approach to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may give a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. 102 of the attached Logic as Semiotic). Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and is the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found in other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential and thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the end of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus ineffable)). But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the iconic and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is pointing). Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's at Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any takers, the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit but slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of Sociolinguistics Life"). Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed out, might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - words are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, "bottle" is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer to a co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse markers at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), since discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is the rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development of the symbolic function. So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is not ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given our current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that if it becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too far. I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization of "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the idea that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk about "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that floats around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of the material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction that anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of this is to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the concept seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding the concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n historical) relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts are thus little historical text-lets. Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further now. Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a young scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike the rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the other for me). Very best, greg On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the conditions > under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to > subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we need > this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if sloppy > formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating activity > which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on other > mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed > philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? > > I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too > interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently > interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it > is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as > Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow > generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh and > the exploited muscles are one and the same. > > Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by the > ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for > studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a wide > range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, just > as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" > meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates > wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a > context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. > > So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the stabilization > of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a two > way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The > reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and > compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of > chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic perception > and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the brain > imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this > view if not from language and from other people? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is to > > see how much alike are tables and words. > > > > But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was > > fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed under > > the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a > > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in > > different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > > Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as philosophers > > have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make > > language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the > > times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way > around. > > > > Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to understand > > how tables are signs and word are material objects. > > > > Andy > > > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear > > project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard > in > > reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave > and > > coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that > > pressure signal.) > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > >> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on > that > >> distinction between words and tables? > >> > >> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different > >> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? > >> > >> Alfredo > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> on behalf of David Kellogg > >> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words > >> > >> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > >> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > >> > >> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > >> which they > >> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > >> structure of > >> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). > They > >> are material > >> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > >> with equal > >> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually > noted > >> forms > >> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material > culture. > >> What > >> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > >> relative prominence > >> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its > >> material > >> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or > as > >> writing, > >> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed > by > >> thinking > >> human beings." > >> > >> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals > by > >> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > >> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > >> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > >> > >> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > >> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > >> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > >> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of > the > >> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > >> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > >> > >> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the > delightful > >> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > >> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > >> just the opposite. > >> > >> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > >> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > >> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is > he > >> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and > their > >> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > >> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > >> come first.) > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Saussure-Course-excerpts.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 988598 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170505/f8d7ec04/attachment-0002.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Peirce, CS--Logic as semiotic.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 904203 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170505/f8d7ec04/attachment-0003.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri May 5 08:57:09 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:57:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <590ca0f2.0304620a.dd718.663e@mx.google.com> Greg, R: the stuff of Words. I read your contribution as so very ?pertinent? to our developing exploration of the stuff of word. [pertain to: is to be germane, relevant, appropriate, applicable, apposite, apropos RELATED TO OR BEARING upon *a* particular matter. An adjective DIRECTED toward or bearing upon the subject matter IN hand]. Relevant: indicating *a* traceable, significant TRANS/action. This seems to imply the recognition of *vari/focality*. This play upon the suff of words was generated through a google search of the word [pertinent] Greg, I now have your post in my hand and will highlight where I notice in particular where your focus is bearing upon what matters. ? A way of understanding the concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than simply as an ideal thing. ? THIS is precisely what is needed. ? The concept is *the holding* of *a* relational, historical, relation ACROSS TIME. The theme of relational/ity & historical/ity. ? Making a contribution to the conceptualization of ?concept? by EXTENSION contributes to social scienceS conceptualizing ?meaningfulness?. ? The Piercean/Vygotskian focality grounded within the ?indexical? [the ?word?/sign] that is both IN the world and OF the world ? We should read Silverstein?s article ?Indexical Order and the Dialectics of Sociolinguistic life? Greg can this article be posted on line? ? Locating/focusing a ground OF the symbolic function IN the more primitive [rudimentary] indexical function. ? With only the symbolic focus we arrive at Derrida?s exploring the end of the road in Saussurean focality [the meaning of meaning IS empty] ? What occurs when we re/focus upon [bear upon] indexical/ity as ground. Greg, I have found your post very pertinent Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Greg Thompson Sent: May 5, 2017 8:13 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words David (and others), In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), your last post included this: "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense "realise" them as matter." I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends on what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of existence that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res extensa? noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you have described it? This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. Worlds apart. And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean approach to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may give a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. 102 of the attached Logic as Semiotic). Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and is the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found in other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential and thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the end of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus ineffable)). But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the iconic and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is pointing). Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's at Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any takers, the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit but slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of Sociolinguistics Life"). Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed out, might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - words are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, "bottle" is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer to a co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse markers at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), since discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is the rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development of the symbolic function. So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is not ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given our current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that if it becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too far. I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization of "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the idea that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk about "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that floats around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of the material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction that anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of this is to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the concept seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding the concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n historical) relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts are thus little historical text-lets. Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further now. Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a young scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike the rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the other for me). Very best, greg On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the conditions > under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to > subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we need > this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if sloppy > formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating activity > which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on other > mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed > philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? > > I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too > interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently > interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it > is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as > Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow > generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh and > the exploited muscles are one and the same. > > Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by the > ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for > studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a wide > range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, just > as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" > meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates > wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a > context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. > > So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the stabilization > of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a two > way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The > reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and > compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of > chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic perception > and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the brain > imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this > view if not from language and from other people? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is to > > see how much alike are tables and words. > > > > But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was > > fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed under > > the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a > > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in > > different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > > Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as philosophers > > have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make > > language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the > > times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way > around. > > > > Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to understand > > how tables are signs and word are material objects. > > > > Andy > > > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear > > project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard > in > > reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave > and > > coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that > > pressure signal.) > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > >> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on > that > >> distinction between words and tables? > >> > >> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different > >> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? > >> > >> Alfredo > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> on behalf of David Kellogg > >> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words > >> > >> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for > >> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > >> > >> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > >> which they > >> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the > >> structure of > >> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). > They > >> are material > >> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies > >> with equal > >> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually > noted > >> forms > >> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material > culture. > >> What > >> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > >> relative prominence > >> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its > >> material > >> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or > as > >> writing, > >> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed > by > >> thinking > >> human beings." > >> > >> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals > by > >> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the > >> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of > >> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > >> > >> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > >> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > >> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > >> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of > the > >> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > >> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > >> > >> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the > delightful > >> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is > >> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying > >> just the opposite. > >> > >> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > >> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean > >> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is > he > >> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and > their > >> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > >> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to > >> come first.) > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri May 5 10:38:19 2017 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 10:38:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <6A7592A5-0F8E-46B9-81DF-4FB848BC83A1@gmail.com> I'm going to keep this one. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On May 2, 2017, at 3:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > One of the things I do regularly, is look at sound waves. That is, I look > at a representation, on a graph, of minute changes in air pressure, as they > affect a diaphragm in a microphone. The diaphragm then converts these > changes in air pressure to electric signals, and these signals are really > what I'm looking at on the graph. It's a little like watching waves on the > sea strike a bulkhead or a breakwater: you have the sense of something > quite natural colliding with something artificial and breaking up, but > leaving a mark you can use to reconstruct it. > > When you look at the mark, you do not see vowels and consonants. In fact, > you don't even see the spaces between words. They are literally not there: > there is usually no break in the sound wave, any more than there is a > sudden parting of the waves when you are watching the waves on the sea come > in. I have gotten to the point where I can recognize certain patterns as > linguistic patterns, but they are not the sort of thing that you would > recognize (they aren't, for example, high sounds for "ee" and low sounds > for "oooh" or anything like that (it's a quartet rather than a single > flute--there are four "formants" of sound energy to keep track of, and > there's quite a bit of counterpoint). The first thing you tend to notice is > whether a whole utterance goes UP (like a yes/no question) or DOWN (like a > statement or a wh-question). But it's really like watching waves until your > feet get wet, and then you realize that you are also looking at tides. > > This is the stuff of words. I suppose you could argue that this is > really very far from the real action; that the real action some current > of meaning somewhere in people's minds. That's where the vowels and > consonants arise, and where you get spaces between words and so on. I am > sure that somewhere there is a linguist looking at brain signals in the > cerebral cortex with much the same emotion I have looking at sound waves > and much the same conviction that I have, that she or he is actually > witnessing a current of meaning streaming through time. But to me this is a > little like trying to say that the internet exists somewhere without actual > computers. As far as I can see, if my sea of sound waves dried up, language > would simply cease to exist. Of course, we can have sound waves without > language, just as we can have computers without the internet. But as far as > I can tell, we cannot have language without sound waves (or hand waves, if > you are talking sign languages), just as we cannot have the internet > without computers. > > Now think of a table. That's it. You did it. You now have everything you > need to park your coffee cup and lay out your book. If there isn't anything > with four legs and a flat surface around, you can just turn the wastebasket > upside down, use the windowsill, and when guests arrive you take the door > off the hinges and put it on the wastebasket and the windowsill or you just > go outside and use a stump or a rock or a log. I think you can see that the > material of which the table is made is quite accidental. If one material > ceases to exist, you just get another one, and if you live in a culture > where a few feet of elevation above floor level is less important (like > Korea, or any other place where you don't wear your shoes indoors) you > just do without a table. Your life is a little different, but not as > different as life without word stuff. > > D.H. Lawrence, in "Why the Novel Matters"), goes through this long and (to > me and to women) quite coy and annoying meditation on why we imagine that > "man alive" lives in the head and not some other body part. He goes on and > on about how his hand, and his fingers holding his pen are just as much a > part of "the whole man" as the head. And then, forgetting for just a moment > that he is really talking about some other appendage that he feels very > attached to, he muses a moment about whether his fingernails are really > part of "the whole man" and decides that they are somewhere in between, > because he cuts them off. He doesn't really need to get that far--if you > have to choose between losing a finger and losing a hand, you choose the > former and not the latter, and the same thing is true if you have to choose > between losing a hand and losing your head. > > It's tempting to see in this crude, coarse, unmanly (and unwomanly) essay > something like Bateson's ruminations on the blind man and the stick. But I > see them as being exactly the opposite. If you see the essence of humanity > as out there, amongst your fellow humans, in their livings and lives and > voices, then it makes perfect sense to see the absence of tables as > accidental and irrelevant, an absence of fingernails and not the absence of > a finger, a hand, or a head. But the absence of word stuff is an absence > indeed; the loss of word stuff is the loss of human wholeness, if that is > what Lawrence really meant by "man alive". > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on that >> distinction between words and tables? >> >> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different from >> tables; and then how nails are different from words? >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of David Kellogg >> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >> >> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for >> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >> >> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of >> which they >> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the >> structure of >> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They >> are material >> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies >> with equal >> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted >> forms >> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. >> What >> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >> relative prominence >> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material >> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as >> writing, >> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by >> thinking >> human beings." >> >> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by >> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the >> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of >> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >> >> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the >> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >> >> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful >> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is >> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying >> just the opposite. >> >> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean >> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he >> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their >> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? >> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to >> come first.) >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri May 5 11:05:37 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 11:05:37 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <6A7592A5-0F8E-46B9-81DF-4FB848BC83A1@gmail.com> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <6A7592A5-0F8E-46B9-81DF-4FB848BC83A1@gmail.com> Message-ID: <590cbf0d.c196620a.15ad.992a@mx.google.com> Helena, I am keeping both this one and Alfredo?s one from this morning. I will keep them close ?to hand? Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Helena Worthen Sent: May 5, 2017 10:41 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words I'm going to keep this one. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Vietnam blog: helenaworthen.wordpress.com On May 2, 2017, at 3:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > One of the things I do regularly, is look at sound waves. That is, I look > at a representation, on a graph, of minute changes in air pressure, as they > affect a diaphragm in a microphone. The diaphragm then converts these > changes in air pressure to electric signals, and these signals are really > what I'm looking at on the graph. It's a little like watching waves on the > sea strike a bulkhead or a breakwater: you have the sense of something > quite natural colliding with something artificial and breaking up, but > leaving a mark you can use to reconstruct it. > > When you look at the mark, you do not see vowels and consonants. In fact, > you don't even see the spaces between words. They are literally not there: > there is usually no break in the sound wave, any more than there is a > sudden parting of the waves when you are watching the waves on the sea come > in. I have gotten to the point where I can recognize certain patterns as > linguistic patterns, but they are not the sort of thing that you would > recognize (they aren't, for example, high sounds for "ee" and low sounds > for "oooh" or anything like that (it's a quartet rather than a single > flute--there are four "formants" of sound energy to keep track of, and > there's quite a bit of counterpoint). The first thing you tend to notice is > whether a whole utterance goes UP (like a yes/no question) or DOWN (like a > statement or a wh-question). But it's really like watching waves until your > feet get wet, and then you realize that you are also looking at tides. > > This is the stuff of words. I suppose you could argue that this is > really very far from the real action; that the real action some current > of meaning somewhere in people's minds. That's where the vowels and > consonants arise, and where you get spaces between words and so on. I am > sure that somewhere there is a linguist looking at brain signals in the > cerebral cortex with much the same emotion I have looking at sound waves > and much the same conviction that I have, that she or he is actually > witnessing a current of meaning streaming through time. But to me this is a > little like trying to say that the internet exists somewhere without actual > computers. As far as I can see, if my sea of sound waves dried up, language > would simply cease to exist. Of course, we can have sound waves without > language, just as we can have computers without the internet. But as far as > I can tell, we cannot have language without sound waves (or hand waves, if > you are talking sign languages), just as we cannot have the internet > without computers. > > Now think of a table. That's it. You did it. You now have everything you > need to park your coffee cup and lay out your book. If there isn't anything > with four legs and a flat surface around, you can just turn the wastebasket > upside down, use the windowsill, and when guests arrive you take the door > off the hinges and put it on the wastebasket and the windowsill or you just > go outside and use a stump or a rock or a log. I think you can see that the > material of which the table is made is quite accidental. If one material > ceases to exist, you just get another one, and if you live in a culture > where a few feet of elevation above floor level is less important (like > Korea, or any other place where you don't wear your shoes indoors) you > just do without a table. Your life is a little different, but not as > different as life without word stuff. > > D.H. Lawrence, in "Why the Novel Matters"), goes through this long and (to > me and to women) quite coy and annoying meditation on why we imagine that > "man alive" lives in the head and not some other body part. He goes on and > on about how his hand, and his fingers holding his pen are just as much a > part of "the whole man" as the head. And then, forgetting for just a moment > that he is really talking about some other appendage that he feels very > attached to, he muses a moment about whether his fingernails are really > part of "the whole man" and decides that they are somewhere in between, > because he cuts them off. He doesn't really need to get that far--if you > have to choose between losing a finger and losing a hand, you choose the > former and not the latter, and the same thing is true if you have to choose > between losing a hand and losing your head. > > It's tempting to see in this crude, coarse, unmanly (and unwomanly) essay > something like Bateson's ruminations on the blind man and the stick. But I > see them as being exactly the opposite. If you see the essence of humanity > as out there, amongst your fellow humans, in their livings and lives and > voices, then it makes perfect sense to see the absence of tables as > accidental and irrelevant, an absence of fingernails and not the absence of > a finger, a hand, or a head. But the absence of word stuff is an absence > indeed; the loss of word stuff is the loss of human wholeness, if that is > what Lawrence really meant by "man alive". > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > >> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on that >> distinction between words and tables? >> >> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different from >> tables; and then how nails are different from words? >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of David Kellogg >> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >> >> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift for >> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >> >> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of >> which they >> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., the >> structure of >> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). They >> are material >> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle applies >> with equal >> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted >> forms >> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material culture. >> What >> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >> relative prominence >> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its material >> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, or as >> writing, >> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by >> thinking >> human beings." >> >> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of journals by >> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is the >> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full of >> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >> >> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of the >> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >> >> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the delightful >> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote is >> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is saying >> just the opposite. >> >> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he mean >> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is he >> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and their >> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? >> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has to >> come first.) >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri May 5 15:01:42 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 6 May 2017 08:01:42 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Greg: (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems until the tide is well and truly over my head.) Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the way that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this organization is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, you will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you are religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if you are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature which has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the same thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans vs res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it (which in the end amount to the same thing). You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on their relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say that a Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues or hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz and blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to blackness. So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, Greg. In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there are tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in order to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot tell a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still have trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like K-pop to her. I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; I think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So for example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing sound stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff (sometimes lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes the abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the lips and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is itself not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph and think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound stuff, the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I think it requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each other in order and start to organize the world around them. (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of me, I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very different from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting is different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you are doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered two innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can feel unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. dk On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > David (and others), > > In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), your > last post included this: > "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning > and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > > I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. > > I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends on > what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of existence > that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of > trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). > Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you > have described it? > > This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the > diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of > sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is > self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. Worlds > apart. > > And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the > ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of > language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed > ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean approach > to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > > Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may give > a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. 102 > of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > > Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to > object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with > which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and is > the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found in > other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic > function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential and > thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the end > of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and > discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus > ineffable)). > > But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the iconic > and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen > contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that > holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the > bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of > representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., > where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, > there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to > which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is > pointing). > > Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman > Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can > indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the > more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. > > But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any takers, > the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter > "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit but > slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > Sociolinguistics Life"). > > Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in > ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par > excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed out, > might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general > structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - words > are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, "bottle" > is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse markers > at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), since > discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is the > rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development of > the symbolic function. > > So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is not > ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the > indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. > > This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps > speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful > heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given our > current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that if it > becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too far. > > I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to > make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization of > "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the idea > that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk about > "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that floats > around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction that > anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" > (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already > running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of this is > to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the concept > seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding the > concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than > simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n historical) > relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > are thus little historical text-lets. > > Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to > return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further now. > > Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these > conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > > I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a young > scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike the > rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > for me). > > Very best, > greg > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the > conditions > > under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to > > subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we > need > > this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if > sloppy > > formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > > value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating > activity > > which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on > other > > mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for > > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed > > philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? > > > > I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation > > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too > > interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently > > interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it > > is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as > > Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited > > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow > > generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh > and > > the exploited muscles are one and the same. > > > > Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by > the > > ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for > > studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a > wide > > range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by > > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, > just > > as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" > > meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense > > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates > > wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a > > context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. > > > > So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the > stabilization > > of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a > two > > way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The > > reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and > > compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of > > chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic > perception > > and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the > brain > > imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this > > view if not from language and from other people? > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is > to > > > see how much alike are tables and words. > > > > > > But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was > > > fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed > under > > > the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a > > > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in > > > different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > > > Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as > philosophers > > > have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make > > > language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the > > > times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way > > around. > > > > > > Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to > understand > > > how tables are signs and word are material objects. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear > > > project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard > > in > > > reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave > > and > > > coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that > > > pressure signal.) > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > > >> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on > > that > > >> distinction between words and tables? > > >> > > >> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different > > >> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? > > >> > > >> Alfredo > > >> ________________________________________ > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu edu> > > >> on behalf of David Kellogg > > >> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words > > >> > > >> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift > for > > >> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > >> > > >> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > > >> which they > > >> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., > the > > >> structure of > > >> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). > > They > > >> are material > > >> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle > applies > > >> with equal > > >> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually > > noted > > >> forms > > >> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material > > culture. > > >> What > > >> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > > >> relative prominence > > >> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its > > >> material > > >> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, > or > > as > > >> writing, > > >> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order > imposed > > by > > >> thinking > > >> human beings." > > >> > > >> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of > journals > > by > > >> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is > the > > >> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full > of > > >> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > >> > > >> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > > >> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > > >> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > > >> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of > > the > > >> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > > >> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > > >> > > >> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the > > delightful > > >> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote > is > > >> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is > saying > > >> just the opposite. > > >> > > >> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > > >> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he > mean > > >> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is > > he > > >> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and > > their > > >> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > > >> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has > to > > >> come first.) > > >> > > >> David Kellogg > > >> Macquarie University > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri May 5 20:37:19 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 20:37:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <590d450a.cf78630a.13514.0405@mx.google.com> David, Greg, In your reciprocal back and forth David offers an expansion of the number of categories of sign function beyond just three that are generated from three (ineffable) primitives. David offered examples such as symbol-indices (symbols that function as indexes) However Greg?s focus upon the indexical function of the sign as more rudimentary is not addressed. Greg?s question if the earliest wordings are indexical and symbolic wordings are derivative from the indexical? Michael Silverstein was offered as one version of this focus upon the indexical as more rudimentary. The Peircean/Vygotskian version as another model also focused upon the indexical function developing prior to the symbolic and arbitrary function developing as derivative. In Greg?s wording: The indexical function is the rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development of the symbolic function.. This Peircean/Vygotskian approach Has this inquiry on the sequencing of the indexical and symbolic functions been answered? It seems a particulary relevant relation to explore. The way we answer will have ramifications for the way we approach instructional matters Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: David Kellogg Sent: May 5, 2017 3:04 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words Greg: (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems until the tide is well and truly over my head.) Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the way that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this organization is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, you will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you are religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if you are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature which has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the same thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans vs res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it (which in the end amount to the same thing). You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on their relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say that a Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues or hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz and blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to blackness. So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, Greg. In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there are tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in order to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot tell a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still have trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like K-pop to her. I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; I think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So for example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing sound stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff (sometimes lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes the abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the lips and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is itself not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph and think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound stuff, the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I think it requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each other in order and start to organize the world around them. (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of me, I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very different from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting is different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you are doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered two innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can feel unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. dk On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > David (and others), > > In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), your > last post included this: > "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning > and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > > I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. > > I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends on > what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of existence > that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of > trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). > Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you > have described it? > > This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the > diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of > sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is > self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. Worlds > apart. > > And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the > ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of > language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed > ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean approach > to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > > Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may give > a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. 102 > of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > > Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to > object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with > which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and is > the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found in > other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic > function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential and > thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the end > of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and > discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus > ineffable)). > > But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the iconic > and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen > contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that > holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the > bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of > representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., > where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, > there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to > which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is > pointing). > > Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman > Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can > indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the > more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. > > But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any takers, > the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter > "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit but > slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > Sociolinguistics Life"). > > Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in > ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par > excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed out, > might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general > structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - words > are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, "bottle" > is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse markers > at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), since > discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is the > rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development of > the symbolic function. > > So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is not > ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the > indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. > > This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps > speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful > heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given our > current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that if it > becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too far. > > I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to > make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization of > "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the idea > that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk about > "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that floats > around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction that > anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" > (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already > running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of this is > to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the concept > seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding the > concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than > simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n historical) > relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > are thus little historical text-lets. > > Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to > return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further now. > > Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these > conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > > I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a young > scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike the > rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > for me). > > Very best, > greg > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the > conditions > > under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to > > subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we > need > > this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if > sloppy > > formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > > value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating > activity > > which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on > other > > mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for > > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed > > philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? > > > > I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation > > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too > > interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently > > interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it > > is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as > > Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited > > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow > > generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh > and > > the exploited muscles are one and the same. > > > > Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by > the > > ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for > > studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a > wide > > range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by > > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, > just > > as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" > > meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense > > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates > > wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a > > context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. > > > > So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the > stabilization > > of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a > two > > way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The > > reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and > > compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of > > chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic > perception > > and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the > brain > > imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this > > view if not from language and from other people? > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is > to > > > see how much alike are tables and words. > > > > > > But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was > > > fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed > under > > > the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a > > > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in > > > different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > > > Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as > philosophers > > > have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make > > > language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the > > > times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way > > around. > > > > > > Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to > understand > > > how tables are signs and word are material objects. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear > > > project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard > > in > > > reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave > > and > > > coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that > > > pressure signal.) > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > > >> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on > > that > > >> distinction between words and tables? > > >> > > >> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different > > >> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? > > >> > > >> Alfredo > > >> ________________________________________ > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu edu> > > >> on behalf of David Kellogg > > >> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words > > >> > > >> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift > for > > >> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > > >> > > >> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of > > >> which they > > >> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., > the > > >> structure of > > >> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). > > They > > >> are material > > >> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle > applies > > >> with equal > > >> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually > > noted > > >> forms > > >> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material > > culture. > > >> What > > >> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > > >> relative prominence > > >> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its > > >> material > > >> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, > or > > as > > >> writing, > > >> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order > imposed > > by > > >> thinking > > >> human beings." > > >> > > >> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of > journals > > by > > >> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is > the > > >> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full > of > > >> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > > >> > > >> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > > >> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > > >> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > > >> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of > > the > > >> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > > >> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > > >> > > >> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the > > delightful > > >> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote > is > > >> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is > saying > > >> just the opposite. > > >> > > >> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > > >> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he > mean > > >> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is > > he > > >> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and > > their > > >> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? > > >> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has > to > > >> come first.) > > >> > > >> David Kellogg > > >> Macquarie University > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun May 7 10:22:34 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 7 May 2017 11:22:34 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: David and Andy, I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and certainly you were part of that discussion. I would like to understand that better, also how it relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that might relate, which I hope so, since it would bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), Andy?s Academia articles on political representation and activity/social theory are probably relevant in some way, though Andy probably sees language as a figure against a larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns the figure/ground relationship around? Henry > On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Greg: > > (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems > until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > > Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always > present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the way > that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this organization > is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, you > will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by > nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). > Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you are > religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if you > are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature which > has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the same > thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans vs > res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it (which > in the end amount to the same thing). > > You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and > "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary > notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on their > relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say that a > Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues or > hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the > condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a > Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York > City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz and > blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to > blackness. > > So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, Greg. > In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there are > tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three > ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in order > to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are > symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend > on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic > gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot tell > a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still have > trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. > Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like > K-pop to her. > > I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; I > think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So for > example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing sound > stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff (sometimes > lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes the > abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also > look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the lips > and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather > something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is itself > not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human > organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph and > think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound stuff, > the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I think it > requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to > firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with > Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody > has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each > other in order and start to organize the world around them. > > (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of me, > I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not > absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting is > different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you are > doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered two > innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can feel > unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very > well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. > > dk > > > On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> David (and others), >> >> In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), your >> last post included this: >> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning >> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >> >> I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. >> >> I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends on >> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of existence >> that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of >> trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res extensa? >> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). >> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you >> have described it? >> >> This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the >> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of >> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is >> self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. Worlds >> apart. >> >> And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the >> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of >> language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed >> ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean approach >> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >> >> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may give >> a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. 102 >> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >> >> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to >> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with >> which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and is >> the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found in >> other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic >> function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential and >> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the end >> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and >> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus >> ineffable)). >> >> But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the iconic >> and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen >> contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that >> holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" >> in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the >> bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of >> representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., >> where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, >> there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to >> which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is >> pointing). >> >> Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman >> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the >> only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's at >> Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can >> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the >> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. >> >> But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any takers, >> the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter >> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit but >> slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of >> Sociolinguistics Life"). >> >> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in >> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par >> excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed out, >> might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general >> structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - words >> are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, "bottle" >> is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer to a >> co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse markers >> at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), since >> discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is the >> rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development of >> the symbolic function. >> >> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is not >> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the >> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. >> >> This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps >> speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful >> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given our >> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that if it >> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too far. >> >> I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to >> make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization of >> "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one >> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the idea >> that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk about >> "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that floats >> around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of the >> material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction that >> anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" >> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already >> running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of this is >> to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the concept >> seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding the >> concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than >> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n historical) >> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts >> are thus little historical text-lets. >> >> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to >> return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further now. >> >> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these >> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >> >> I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a young >> scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike the >> rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the other >> for me). >> >> Very best, >> greg >> >> >> >> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >>> Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the >> conditions >>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to >>> subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we >> need >>> this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if >> sloppy >>> formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange >>> value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating >> activity >>> which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on >> other >>> mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for >>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed >>> philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? >>> >>> I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation >>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too >>> interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently >>> interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it >>> is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as >>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited >>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow >>> generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh >> and >>> the exploited muscles are one and the same. >>> >>> Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by >> the >>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for >>> studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a >> wide >>> range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by >>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, >> just >>> as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" >>> meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense >>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates >>> wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a >>> context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. >>> >>> So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the >> stabilization >>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a >> two >>> way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The >>> reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and >>> compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of >>> chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic >> perception >>> and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the >> brain >>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this >>> view if not from language and from other people? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is >> to >>>> see how much alike are tables and words. >>>> >>>> But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was >>>> fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed >> under >>>> the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a >>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in >>>> different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >>>> Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as >> philosophers >>>> have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make >>>> language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the >>>> times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way >>> around. >>>> >>>> Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to >> understand >>>> how tables are signs and word are material objects. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear >>>> project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard >>> in >>>> reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave >>> and >>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that >>>> pressure signal.) >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>> >>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on >>> that >>>>> distinction between words and tables? >>>>> >>>>> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different >>>>> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > edu> >>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg >>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >>>>> >>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift >> for >>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >>>>> >>>>> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of >>>>> which they >>>>> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., >> the >>>>> structure of >>>>> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). >>> They >>>>> are material >>>>> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle >> applies >>>>> with equal >>>>> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually >>> noted >>>>> forms >>>>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material >>> culture. >>>>> What >>>>> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >>>>> relative prominence >>>>> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its >>>>> material >>>>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, >> or >>> as >>>>> writing, >>>>> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order >> imposed >>> by >>>>> thinking >>>>> human beings." >>>>> >>>>> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of >> journals >>> by >>>>> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is >> the >>>>> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full >> of >>>>> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >>>>> >>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >>>>> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >>>>> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >>>>> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of >>> the >>>>> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >>>>> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >>>>> >>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the >>> delightful >>>>> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote >> is >>>>> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is >> saying >>>>> just the opposite. >>>>> >>>>> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >>>>> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he >> mean >>>>> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is >>> he >>>>> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and >>> their >>>>> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? >>>>> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has >> to >>>>> come first.) >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> From ablunden@mira.net Sun May 7 17:32:38 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 10:32:38 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be utterly incapable of managing his own life as the foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce was a Logician who invented two different schools of philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular because it is a logical triad which Hegel never theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is acquired by human beings, which is an idea I appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics and his Pragmaticism. A total madman. A real Metaphysician, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > David and Andy, > I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and certainly you were part of that discussion. I would like to understand that better, also how it relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that might relate, which I hope so, since it would bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), Andy?s Academia articles on political representation and activity/social theory are probably relevant in some way, though Andy probably sees language as a figure against a larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns the figure/ground relationship around? > Henry > > >> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Greg: >> >> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems >> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) >> >> Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always >> present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the way >> that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this organization >> is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, you >> will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by >> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). >> Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you are >> religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if you >> are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature which >> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the same >> thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans vs >> res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it (which >> in the end amount to the same thing). >> >> You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and >> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary >> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on their >> relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say that a >> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues or >> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the >> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a >> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York >> City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz and >> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to >> blackness. >> >> So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, Greg. >> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there are >> tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three >> ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for >> example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in order >> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are >> symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend >> on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic >> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot tell >> a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still have >> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. >> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like >> K-pop to her. >> >> I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; I >> think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So for >> example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing sound >> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff (sometimes >> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes the >> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also >> look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the lips >> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather >> something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is itself >> not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human >> organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph and >> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound stuff, >> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't >> think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I think it >> requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to >> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with >> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody >> has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each >> other in order and start to organize the world around them. >> >> (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of me, >> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not >> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very different >> from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting is >> different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you are >> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but >> keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered two >> innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can feel >> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very >> well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. >> >> dk >> >> >> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> David (and others), >>> >>> In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), your >>> last post included this: >>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning >>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >>> >>> I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. >>> >>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends on >>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of existence >>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of >>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res extensa? >>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). >>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you >>> have described it? >>> >>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the >>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of >>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is >>> self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. Worlds >>> apart. >>> >>> And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the >>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of >>> language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed >>> ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean approach >>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >>> >>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may give >>> a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. 102 >>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >>> >>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to >>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with >>> which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and is >>> the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found in >>> other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic >>> function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential and >>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the end >>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and >>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus >>> ineffable)). >>> >>> But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the iconic >>> and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen >>> contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that >>> holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" >>> in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the >>> bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of >>> representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., >>> where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, >>> there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to >>> which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is >>> pointing). >>> >>> Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman >>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the >>> only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's at >>> Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can >>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the >>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. >>> >>> But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any takers, >>> the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter >>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit but >>> slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of >>> Sociolinguistics Life"). >>> >>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in >>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par >>> excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed out, >>> might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general >>> structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - words >>> are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, "bottle" >>> is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer to a >>> co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse markers >>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), since >>> discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is the >>> rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development of >>> the symbolic function. >>> >>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is not >>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the >>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. >>> >>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps >>> speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful >>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given our >>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that if it >>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too far. >>> >>> I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to >>> make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization of >>> "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one >>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the idea >>> that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk about >>> "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that floats >>> around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of the >>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction that >>> anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" >>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already >>> running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of this is >>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the concept >>> seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding the >>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than >>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n historical) >>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts >>> are thus little historical text-lets. >>> >>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to >>> return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further now. >>> >>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these >>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >>> >>> I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a young >>> scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike the >>> rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the other >>> for me). >>> >>> Very best, >>> greg >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the >>> conditions >>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to >>>> subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we >>> need >>>> this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if >>> sloppy >>>> formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange >>>> value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating >>> activity >>>> which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on >>> other >>>> mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for >>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed >>>> philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? >>>> >>>> I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation >>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too >>>> interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently >>>> interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it >>>> is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as >>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited >>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow >>>> generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh >>> and >>>> the exploited muscles are one and the same. >>>> >>>> Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by >>> the >>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for >>>> studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a >>> wide >>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by >>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, >>> just >>>> as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" >>>> meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense >>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates >>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a >>>> context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. >>>> >>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the >>> stabilization >>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a >>> two >>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The >>>> reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and >>>> compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of >>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic >>> perception >>>> and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the >>> brain >>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this >>>> view if not from language and from other people? >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is >>> to >>>>> see how much alike are tables and words. >>>>> >>>>> But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was >>>>> fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed >>> under >>>>> the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a >>>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in >>>>> different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >>>>> Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as >>> philosophers >>>>> have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make >>>>> language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the >>>>> times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way >>>> around. >>>>> Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to >>> understand >>>>> how tables are signs and word are material objects. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear >>>>> project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard >>>> in >>>>> reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave >>>> and >>>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that >>>>> pressure signal.) >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on >>>> that >>>>>> distinction between words and tables? >>>>>> >>>>>> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different >>>>>> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? >>>>>> >>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> edu> >>>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg >>>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >>>>>> >>>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift >>> for >>>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >>>>>> >>>>>> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of >>>>>> which they >>>>>> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., >>> the >>>>>> structure of >>>>>> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). >>>> They >>>>>> are material >>>>>> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle >>> applies >>>>>> with equal >>>>>> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually >>>> noted >>>>>> forms >>>>>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material >>>> culture. >>>>>> What >>>>>> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >>>>>> relative prominence >>>>>> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its >>>>>> material >>>>>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, >>> or >>>> as >>>>>> writing, >>>>>> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order >>> imposed >>>> by >>>>>> thinking >>>>>> human beings." >>>>>> >>>>>> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of >>> journals >>>> by >>>>>> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is >>> the >>>>>> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full >>> of >>>>>> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >>>>>> >>>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >>>>>> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >>>>>> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >>>>>> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of >>>> the >>>>>> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >>>>>> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >>>>>> >>>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the >>>> delightful >>>>>> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote >>> is >>>>>> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is >>> saying >>>>>> just the opposite. >>>>>> >>>>>> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >>>>>> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he >>> mean >>>>>> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is >>>> he >>>>>> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and >>>> their >>>>>> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? >>>>>> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has >>> to >>>>>> come first.) >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun May 7 17:45:42 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 10:45:42 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Ruqaiya Hasan used to say that the natural condition of language use is a context of situation. That is, a word like "he" or "the" or even "of" is more typical of language use than a word like "coke bottle", and the relationship of wording to meaning is really a natural relationship, utterly unlike the relationship of sounding to wording (which is conventional). You can see this in a lot of ways. One is simply frequency: in any English text of sufficient size, "the" will always be twice as frequent as the next most frequent words. In any list of the most frequent words in English, the top one hundred or so are so-called "functors", not words like "coke" or "bottle" or "gather". Another is, of course, ontogenesis: children start their journey into language by referring to the context of situation; it's hard to see how else they could possible do it. There is also a rather abstract, technical argument by Voloshinov that I sometimes like to think about; he is answering the question that N.Ya. Marr used to ask, whether a language that has only one word is still a language, and what the one word would be. Voloshinov concludes it would be a THEME (that is, it would be indicative, demonstrative, deictic--not signifying) and it would indeed be a language, because the essence of language is really "smysl" and not "znachenie" (it is ever-changing dynamic theme and not self-similar "meaning"). I like to think that in English it would go something like this: What? That! Where? There! When? Then! Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and the "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to answer: a? a! eh? eh! e? e... That's a language. In fact, I rather think it's the origin of all language; it's why Marr might just have been right to assume that there wasn't any one original language, but that there was, possibly, an original word, invented and reinvented hundreds of thousands of times in human history, and constantly being reinvented by newborn children before our very eyes. But as you can see, Ruqaiya was right. Its natural condition of use is a context of situation. The problem is that the natural condition of language study is NOT a context of situation. It's more like the office I'm sitting in, the library where I will spend most of today, or the laboratory where I try to get back to the firstness of word stuff. That's how we get theories like Saussure's: Saussure tries to cut off all language from "parole", that is, from context and use, and also from history, and the result is more or less what Greg said: a purely dualistic, entirely idealistic, and wholly language-internal theory. Saussure was a brilliant phonologist; his theory is able to explain pretty well why it is that any sound stuff can express any meaning stuff. But he hit on the only completely conventional part of the whole language system, and then he overgeneralized. There isn't anything conventional about the relationship of meaning to grammar: there are very good reasons, for example, why entities are typically nouns and processes are typically verbs. It's not because we have that much of a universal grammar. It's because we have that much of a universal context of situation. Does Peirce help much? Not if we take him at his word: I can't really understand how, for example, a mark of graphite on paper expresses the Euclid's idea of line or why an algebraic equation is an index and not a symbol. Yet there is an obvious difference between the way a child learns that everybody has two feet, the way that we see a footprint and think of the foot that made it, and the way that we encode a foot as a "foot". These are not completely separate kinds of meaning-making (the word "foot" is ALSO an index, because it "points" to the vocal tract that produced it or the pencil that wrote it, and it is ALSO an icon because it is made of the stuff of words. So in that sense it really is a way out of the decontextualized heads that Saussure tried to put us in. And a way back to the natural condition of language use, which is the context of situation. David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: For reasons I don't understand, I'm not getting any of Haydi's stuff. I see people referring to it, and I sometimes see it at the end of their posts, but it's never in my inbox. I miss you, Haydi! dk On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > David and Andy, > I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, secondness and thirdness on the > chat before, and certainly you were part of that discussion. I would like > to understand that better, also how it relates to the three categories of > signs (iconic, indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your ?Thinking > of Feeling? piece and wonder how that might relate, which I hope so, since > it would bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), Andy?s Academia > articles on political representation and activity/social theory are > probably relevant in some way, though Andy probably sees language as a > figure against a larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns the > figure/ground relationship around? > Henry > > > > On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Greg: > > > > (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems > > until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > > > > Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always > > present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the > way > > that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this > organization > > is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, > you > > will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by > > nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). > > Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you > are > > religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if > you > > are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature > which > > has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the > same > > thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans > vs > > res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it > (which > > in the end amount to the same thing). > > > > You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and > > "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary > > notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on > their > > relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say that > a > > Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues > or > > hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the > > condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a > > Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York > > City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz and > > blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to > > blackness. > > > > So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, Greg. > > In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there are > > tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three > > ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > > example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in > order > > to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are > > symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend > > on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic > > gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot > tell > > a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still have > > trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. > > Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like > > K-pop to her. > > > > I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; I > > think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So for > > example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing > sound > > stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff (sometimes > > lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes the > > abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also > > look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the > lips > > and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather > > something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is > itself > > not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human > > organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph > and > > think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound stuff, > > the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > > think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I think > it > > requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to > > firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with > > Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody > > has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each > > other in order and start to organize the world around them. > > > > (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of me, > > I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not > > absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very > different > > from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting is > > different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you > are > > doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson > Pollack--but > > keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered > two > > innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can > feel > > unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very > > well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. > > > > dk > > > > > > On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > >> David (and others), > >> > >> In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), > your > >> last post included this: > >> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for > meaning > >> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > >> > >> I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. > >> > >> I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends > on > >> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of > existence > >> that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of > >> trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res > extensa? > >> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). > >> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you > >> have described it? > >> > >> This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > >> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the > >> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of > >> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is > >> self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. > Worlds > >> apart. > >> > >> And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the > >> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of > >> language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed > >> ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean > approach > >> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > >> > >> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may > give > >> a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. > 102 > >> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > >> > >> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to > >> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with > >> which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and > is > >> the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > >> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found > in > >> other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic > >> function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential > and > >> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the > end > >> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and > >> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus > >> ineffable)). > >> > >> But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the > iconic > >> and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen > >> contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that > >> holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like > "buzz" > >> in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the > >> bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of > >> representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., > >> where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, > >> there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to > >> which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is > >> pointing). > >> > >> Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman > >> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't > the > >> only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's > at > >> Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can > >> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the > >> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. > >> > >> But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any > takers, > >> the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter > >> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit > but > >> slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the > Dialectics of > >> Sociolinguistics Life"). > >> > >> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in > >> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par > >> excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed > out, > >> might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general > >> structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - > words > >> are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, > "bottle" > >> is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer > to a > >> co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse > markers > >> at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), > since > >> discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is > the > >> rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development > of > >> the symbolic function. > >> > >> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is > not > >> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the > >> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. > >> > >> This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps > >> speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful > >> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given > our > >> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that > if it > >> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too > far. > >> > >> I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to > >> make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization > of > >> "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps > one > >> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the > idea > >> that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk > about > >> "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that > floats > >> around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of > the > >> material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction > that > >> anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" > >> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already > >> running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of > this is > >> to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the > concept > >> seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding > the > >> concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than > >> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n > historical) > >> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). > Concepts > >> are thus little historical text-lets. > >> > >> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to > >> return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further > now. > >> > >> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these > >> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > >> > >> I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a > young > >> scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike > the > >> rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the > other > >> for me). > >> > >> Very best, > >> greg > >> > >> > >> > >> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the > >> conditions > >>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to > >>> subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we > >> need > >>> this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if > >> sloppy > >>> formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", > "use/exchange > >>> value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating > >> activity > >>> which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on > >> other > >>> mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for > >>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed > >>> philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? > >>> > >>> I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation > >>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are > too > >>> interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently > >>> interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it > >>> is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as > >>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited > >>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally > allow > >>> generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh > >> and > >>> the exploited muscles are one and the same. > >>> > >>> Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by > >> the > >>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre > for > >>> studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a > >> wide > >>> range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by > >>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, > >> just > >>> as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't > "cause" > >>> meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense > >>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it > correlates > >>> wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it > to a > >>> context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. > >>> > >>> So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the > >> stabilization > >>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a > >> two > >>> way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. > The > >>> reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it > and > >>> compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of > >>> chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic > >> perception > >>> and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the > >> brain > >>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get > this > >>> view if not from language and from other people? > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Macquarie University > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>> > >>>> Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is > >> to > >>>> see how much alike are tables and words. > >>>> > >>>> But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was > >>>> fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed > >> under > >>>> the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a > >>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in > >>>> different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > >>>> Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as > >> philosophers > >>>> have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to > make > >>>> language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the > >>>> times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way > >>> around. > >>>> > >>>> Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to > >> understand > >>>> how tables are signs and word are material objects. > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear > >>>> project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano > keyboard > >>> in > >>>> reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure > wave > >>> and > >>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that > >>>> pressure signal.) > >>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> Andy Blunden > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on > >>> that > >>>>> distinction between words and tables? > >>>>> > >>>>> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different > >>>>> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? > >>>>> > >>>>> Alfredo > >>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> edu> > >>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg > >>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words > >>>>> > >>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift > >> for > >>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > >>>>> > >>>>> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions > of > >>>>> which they > >>>>> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., > >> the > >>>>> structure of > >>>>> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). > >>> They > >>>>> are material > >>>>> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle > >> applies > >>>>> with equal > >>>>> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually > >>> noted > >>>>> forms > >>>>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material > >>> culture. > >>>>> What > >>>>> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the > >>>>> relative prominence > >>>>> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its > >>>>> material > >>>>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, > >> or > >>> as > >>>>> writing, > >>>>> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order > >> imposed > >>> by > >>>>> thinking > >>>>> human beings." > >>>>> > >>>>> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of > >> journals > >>> by > >>>>> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is > >> the > >>>>> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full > >> of > >>>>> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > >>>>> > >>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word > >>>>> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > >>>>> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you > >>>>> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea > of > >>> the > >>>>> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could > >>>>> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > >>>>> > >>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the > >>> delightful > >>>>> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote > >> is > >>>>> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is > >> saying > >>>>> just the opposite. > >>>>> > >>>>> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil > >>>>> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he > >> mean > >>>>> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or > is > >>> he > >>>>> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and > >>> their > >>>>> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and > erasing? > >>>>> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has > >> to > >>>>> come first.) > >>>>> > >>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun May 7 18:22:15 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 7 May 2017 19:22:15 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> Message-ID: <5243D1B5-4528-41C7-86C5-468106251A94@gmail.com> You flatter me implying I am a linguist, but if not that... it?s nothing at all and I?m a fraud for being on the chat. I like Peirce a lot even if he?s not a linguist. But I just don?t entirely understand him, probably for reasons I am left in the fog on the chat quite often. I?m not complaining. When it becomes entirely clear, I?ll let you know. Meanwhile, what about firstness, secondness and thirdness? David just posted. Maybe he can help me. Henry > On May 7, 2017, at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be utterly incapable of managing his own life as the foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce was a Logician who invented two different schools of philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > > I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular because it is a logical triad which Hegel never theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is acquired by human beings, which is an idea I appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics and his Pragmaticism. > > A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> David and Andy, >> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and certainly you were part of that discussion. I would like to understand that better, also how it relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that might relate, which I hope so, since it would bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), Andy?s Academia articles on political representation and activity/social theory are probably relevant in some way, though Andy probably sees language as a figure against a larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns the figure/ground relationship around? >> Henry >> >> >>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Greg: >>> >>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems >>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) >>> >>> Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always >>> present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the way >>> that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this organization >>> is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, you >>> will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by >>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). >>> Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you are >>> religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if you >>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature which >>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the same >>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans vs >>> res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it (which >>> in the end amount to the same thing). >>> >>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and >>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary >>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on their >>> relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say that a >>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues or >>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the >>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a >>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York >>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz and >>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to >>> blackness. >>> >>> So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, Greg. >>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there are >>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three >>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for >>> example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in order >>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are >>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend >>> on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic >>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot tell >>> a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still have >>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. >>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like >>> K-pop to her. >>> >>> I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; I >>> think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So for >>> example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing sound >>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff (sometimes >>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes the >>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also >>> look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the lips >>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather >>> something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is itself >>> not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human >>> organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph and >>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound stuff, >>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't >>> think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I think it >>> requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to >>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with >>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody >>> has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each >>> other in order and start to organize the world around them. >>> >>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of me, >>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not >>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very different >>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting is >>> different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you are >>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but >>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered two >>> innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can feel >>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very >>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. >>> >>> dk >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David (and others), >>>> >>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), your >>>> last post included this: >>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning >>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >>>> >>>> I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. >>>> >>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends on >>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of existence >>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of >>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res extensa? >>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). >>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you >>>> have described it? >>>> >>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the >>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of >>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is >>>> self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. Worlds >>>> apart. >>>> >>>> And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the >>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of >>>> language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed >>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean approach >>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >>>> >>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may give >>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. 102 >>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >>>> >>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to >>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with >>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and is >>>> the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found in >>>> other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic >>>> function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential and >>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the end >>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and >>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus >>>> ineffable)). >>>> >>>> But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the iconic >>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen >>>> contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that >>>> holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" >>>> in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the >>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of >>>> representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., >>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, >>>> there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to >>>> which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is >>>> pointing). >>>> >>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman >>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the >>>> only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's at >>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can >>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the >>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. >>>> >>>> But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any takers, >>>> the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter >>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit but >>>> slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of >>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). >>>> >>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in >>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par >>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed out, >>>> might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general >>>> structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - words >>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, "bottle" >>>> is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer to a >>>> co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse markers >>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), since >>>> discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is the >>>> rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development of >>>> the symbolic function. >>>> >>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is not >>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the >>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. >>>> >>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps >>>> speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful >>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given our >>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that if it >>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too far. >>>> >>>> I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to >>>> make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization of >>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one >>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the idea >>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk about >>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that floats >>>> around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of the >>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction that >>>> anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" >>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already >>>> running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of this is >>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the concept >>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding the >>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than >>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n historical) >>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts >>>> are thus little historical text-lets. >>>> >>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to >>>> return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further now. >>>> >>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these >>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >>>> >>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a young >>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike the >>>> rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the other >>>> for me). >>>> >>>> Very best, >>>> greg >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the >>>> conditions >>>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to >>>>> subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we >>>> need >>>>> this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if >>>> sloppy >>>>> formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange >>>>> value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating >>>> activity >>>>> which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on >>>> other >>>>> mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for >>>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed >>>>> philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? >>>>> >>>>> I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation >>>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too >>>>> interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently >>>>> interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it >>>>> is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as >>>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited >>>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow >>>>> generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh >>>> and >>>>> the exploited muscles are one and the same. >>>>> >>>>> Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by >>>> the >>>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for >>>>> studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a >>>> wide >>>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by >>>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, >>>> just >>>>> as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" >>>>> meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense >>>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates >>>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a >>>>> context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. >>>>> >>>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the >>>> stabilization >>>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a >>>> two >>>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The >>>>> reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and >>>>> compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of >>>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic >>>> perception >>>>> and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the >>>> brain >>>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this >>>>> view if not from language and from other people? >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is >>>> to >>>>>> see how much alike are tables and words. >>>>>> >>>>>> But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was >>>>>> fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed >>>> under >>>>>> the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a >>>>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in >>>>>> different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >>>>>> Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as >>>> philosophers >>>>>> have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make >>>>>> language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the >>>>>> times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way >>>>> around. >>>>>> Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to >>>> understand >>>>>> how tables are signs and word are material objects. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear >>>>>> project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard >>>>> in >>>>>> reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave >>>>> and >>>>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that >>>>>> pressure signal.) >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on >>>>> that >>>>>>> distinction between words and tables? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different >>>>>>> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> edu> >>>>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg >>>>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift >>>> for >>>>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of >>>>>>> which they >>>>>>> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., >>>> the >>>>>>> structure of >>>>>>> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). >>>>> They >>>>>>> are material >>>>>>> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle >>>> applies >>>>>>> with equal >>>>>>> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually >>>>> noted >>>>>>> forms >>>>>>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material >>>>> culture. >>>>>>> What >>>>>>> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >>>>>>> relative prominence >>>>>>> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its >>>>>>> material >>>>>>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, >>>> or >>>>> as >>>>>>> writing, >>>>>>> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order >>>> imposed >>>>> by >>>>>>> thinking >>>>>>> human beings." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of >>>> journals >>>>> by >>>>>>> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is >>>> the >>>>>>> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full >>>> of >>>>>>> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >>>>>>> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >>>>>>> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >>>>>>> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of >>>>> the >>>>>>> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >>>>>>> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the >>>>> delightful >>>>>>> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote >>>> is >>>>>>> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is >>>> saying >>>>>>> just the opposite. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >>>>>>> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he >>>> mean >>>>>>> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is >>>>> he >>>>>>> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and >>>>> their >>>>>>> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? >>>>>>> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has >>>> to >>>>>>> come first.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Sun May 7 18:40:01 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 11:40:01 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <5243D1B5-4528-41C7-86C5-468106251A94@gmail.com> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> <5243D1B5-4528-41C7-86C5-468106251A94@gmail.com> Message-ID: The difficulty with understanding Peirce, Henry, is that not only was he incapable of managing his own life (repeatedly rescued from the gutter by his much-abused wife and remaining friends James and Dewey), he was also incapable of writing a book. He left us a pile of manuscripts packed with brilliant insights which others have interpreted and passed on to us. Make of him what you will. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 8/05/2017 11:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > You flatter me implying I am a linguist, but if not that... it?s nothing at all and I?m a fraud for being on the chat. I like Peirce a lot even if he?s not a linguist. But I just don?t entirely understand him, probably for reasons I am left in the fog on the chat quite often. I?m not complaining. When it becomes entirely clear, I?ll let you know. Meanwhile, what about firstness, secondness and thirdness? David just posted. Maybe he can help me. > Henry > > >> On May 7, 2017, at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be utterly incapable of managing his own life as the foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce was a Logician who invented two different schools of philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. >> >> I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular because it is a logical triad which Hegel never theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is acquired by human beings, which is an idea I appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics and his Pragmaticism. >> >> A total madman. A real Metaphysician, >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> David and Andy, >>> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and certainly you were part of that discussion. I would like to understand that better, also how it relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that might relate, which I hope so, since it would bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), Andy?s Academia articles on political representation and activity/social theory are probably relevant in some way, though Andy probably sees language as a figure against a larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns the figure/ground relationship around? >>> Henry >>> >>> >>>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> Greg: >>>> >>>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems >>>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) >>>> >>>> Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always >>>> present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the way >>>> that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this organization >>>> is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, you >>>> will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by >>>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). >>>> Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you are >>>> religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if you >>>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature which >>>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the same >>>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans vs >>>> res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it (which >>>> in the end amount to the same thing). >>>> >>>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and >>>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary >>>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on their >>>> relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say that a >>>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues or >>>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the >>>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a >>>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York >>>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz and >>>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to >>>> blackness. >>>> >>>> So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, Greg. >>>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there are >>>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three >>>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for >>>> example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in order >>>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are >>>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend >>>> on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic >>>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot tell >>>> a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still have >>>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. >>>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like >>>> K-pop to her. >>>> >>>> I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; I >>>> think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So for >>>> example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing sound >>>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff (sometimes >>>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes the >>>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also >>>> look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the lips >>>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather >>>> something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is itself >>>> not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human >>>> organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph and >>>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound stuff, >>>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't >>>> think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I think it >>>> requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to >>>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with >>>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody >>>> has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each >>>> other in order and start to organize the world around them. >>>> >>>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of me, >>>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not >>>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very different >>>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting is >>>> different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you are >>>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but >>>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered two >>>> innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can feel >>>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very >>>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. >>>> >>>> dk >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> David (and others), >>>>> >>>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), your >>>>> last post included this: >>>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning >>>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >>>>> >>>>> I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. >>>>> >>>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends on >>>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of existence >>>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of >>>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res extensa? >>>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). >>>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you >>>>> have described it? >>>>> >>>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >>>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the >>>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of >>>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is >>>>> self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. Worlds >>>>> apart. >>>>> >>>>> And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the >>>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of >>>>> language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed >>>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean approach >>>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >>>>> >>>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may give >>>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. 102 >>>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >>>>> >>>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to >>>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with >>>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and is >>>>> the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >>>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found in >>>>> other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic >>>>> function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential and >>>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the end >>>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and >>>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus >>>>> ineffable)). >>>>> >>>>> But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the iconic >>>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen >>>>> contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that >>>>> holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" >>>>> in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the >>>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of >>>>> representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., >>>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, >>>>> there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to >>>>> which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is >>>>> pointing). >>>>> >>>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman >>>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the >>>>> only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's at >>>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can >>>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the >>>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. >>>>> >>>>> But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any takers, >>>>> the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter >>>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit but >>>>> slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of >>>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). >>>>> >>>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in >>>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par >>>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed out, >>>>> might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general >>>>> structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - words >>>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, "bottle" >>>>> is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer to a >>>>> co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse markers >>>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), since >>>>> discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is the >>>>> rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development of >>>>> the symbolic function. >>>>> >>>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is not >>>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the >>>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. >>>>> >>>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps >>>>> speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful >>>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given our >>>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that if it >>>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too far. >>>>> >>>>> I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to >>>>> make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization of >>>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one >>>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the idea >>>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk about >>>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that floats >>>>> around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of the >>>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction that >>>>> anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" >>>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already >>>>> running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of this is >>>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the concept >>>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding the >>>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than >>>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n historical) >>>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts >>>>> are thus little historical text-lets. >>>>> >>>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to >>>>> return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further now. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these >>>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >>>>> >>>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a young >>>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike the >>>>> rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the other >>>>> for me). >>>>> >>>>> Very best, >>>>> greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the >>>>> conditions >>>>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to >>>>>> subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we >>>>> need >>>>>> this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if >>>>> sloppy >>>>>> formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange >>>>>> value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating >>>>> activity >>>>>> which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on >>>>> other >>>>>> mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for >>>>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed >>>>>> philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation >>>>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too >>>>>> interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently >>>>>> interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it >>>>>> is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as >>>>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited >>>>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow >>>>>> generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh >>>>> and >>>>>> the exploited muscles are one and the same. >>>>>> >>>>>> Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by >>>>> the >>>>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for >>>>>> studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a >>>>> wide >>>>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by >>>>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, >>>>> just >>>>>> as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" >>>>>> meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense >>>>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates >>>>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a >>>>>> context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. >>>>>> >>>>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the >>>>> stabilization >>>>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a >>>>> two >>>>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The >>>>>> reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and >>>>>> compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of >>>>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic >>>>> perception >>>>>> and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the >>>>> brain >>>>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this >>>>>> view if not from language and from other people? >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is >>>>> to >>>>>>> see how much alike are tables and words. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was >>>>>>> fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed >>>>> under >>>>>>> the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a >>>>>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in >>>>>>> different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >>>>>>> Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as >>>>> philosophers >>>>>>> have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make >>>>>>> language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the >>>>>>> times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way >>>>>> around. >>>>>>> Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to >>>>> understand >>>>>>> how tables are signs and word are material objects. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear >>>>>>> project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard >>>>>> in >>>>>>> reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave >>>>>> and >>>>>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that >>>>>>> pressure signal.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> distinction between words and tables? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different >>>>>>>> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> edu> >>>>>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift >>>>> for >>>>>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of >>>>>>>> which they >>>>>>>> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., >>>>> the >>>>>>>> structure of >>>>>>>> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). >>>>>> They >>>>>>>> are material >>>>>>>> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle >>>>> applies >>>>>>>> with equal >>>>>>>> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually >>>>>> noted >>>>>>>> forms >>>>>>>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material >>>>>> culture. >>>>>>>> What >>>>>>>> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >>>>>>>> relative prominence >>>>>>>> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its >>>>>>>> material >>>>>>>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, >>>>> or >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> writing, >>>>>>>> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order >>>>> imposed >>>>>> by >>>>>>>> thinking >>>>>>>> human beings." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of >>>>> journals >>>>>> by >>>>>>>> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is >>>>> the >>>>>>>> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full >>>>> of >>>>>>>> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >>>>>>>> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >>>>>>>> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >>>>>>>> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >>>>>>>> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the >>>>>> delightful >>>>>>>> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote >>>>> is >>>>>>>> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is >>>>> saying >>>>>>>> just the opposite. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >>>>>>>> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he >>>>> mean >>>>>>>> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is >>>>>> he >>>>>>>> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and >>>>>> their >>>>>>>> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? >>>>>>>> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has >>>>> to >>>>>>>> come first.) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>> >>> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun May 7 18:43:17 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 7 May 2017 19:43:17 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <4953A4D2-DBFC-4B94-B8E6-7617FBB2F13E@gmail.com> David, Having read your post, and re-reading, I end up thinking that Peirce?s firstness/secondness/thirdness distinctions doesn?t help me understand language, not like index/icon/symbol does. My loss probably. Also, your thoughts on the question, ?Is a language has only one word a language?? make me think about a question I used to ask my students in my intro to linguistics: ?Can animals have language?? They never believed me when I said that that they can't. I proved it by saying that animals don?t have the property of displacement, that is the ability to talk about things removed in time and space. After years of patiently, but firmly, rejecting their claims of animal language, I gave up. Could a language with only one word displace? Henry > On May 7, 2017, at 6:45 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Ruqaiya Hasan used to say that the natural condition of language use is a > context of situation. That is, a word like "he" or "the" or even "of" is > more typical of language use than a word like "coke bottle", and the > relationship of wording to meaning is really a natural relationship, > utterly unlike the relationship of sounding to wording (which is > conventional). > > You can see this in a lot of ways. One is simply frequency: in any English > text of sufficient size, "the" will always be twice as frequent as the next > most frequent words. In any list of the most frequent words in English, the > top one hundred or so are so-called "functors", not words like "coke" or > "bottle" or "gather". Another is, of course, ontogenesis: children start > their journey into language by referring to the context of situation; it's > hard to see how else they could possible do it. There is also a rather > abstract, technical argument by Voloshinov that I sometimes like to think > about; he is answering the question that N.Ya. Marr used to ask, whether a > language that has only one word is still a language, and what the one word > would be. Voloshinov concludes it would be a THEME (that is, it would be > indicative, demonstrative, deictic--not signifying) and it would indeed be > a language, because the essence of language is really "smysl" and not > "znachenie" (it is ever-changing dynamic theme and not self-similar > "meaning"). > > I like to think that in English it would go something like this: > > What? That! > Where? There! > When? Then! > > Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and the > "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to answer: > > a? a! > eh? eh! > e? e... > > That's a language. In fact, I rather think it's the origin of all language; > it's why Marr might just have been right to assume that there wasn't any > one original language, but that there was, possibly, an original word, > invented and reinvented hundreds of thousands of times in human history, > and constantly being reinvented by newborn children before our very eyes. > > But as you can see, Ruqaiya was right. Its natural condition of use is a > context of situation. The problem is that the natural condition of language > study is NOT a context of situation. It's more like the office I'm sitting > in, the library where I will spend most of today, or the laboratory where I > try to get back to the firstness of word stuff. That's how we get theories > like Saussure's: Saussure tries to cut off all language from "parole", that > is, from context and use, and also from history, and the result is more or > less what Greg said: a purely dualistic, entirely idealistic, and wholly > language-internal theory. > > Saussure was a brilliant phonologist; his theory is able to explain pretty > well why it is that any sound stuff can express any meaning stuff. But he > hit on the only completely conventional part of the whole language system, > and then he overgeneralized. There isn't anything conventional about the > relationship of meaning to grammar: there are very good reasons, for > example, why entities are typically nouns and processes are typically > verbs. It's not because we have that much of a universal grammar. It's > because we have that much of a universal context of situation. > > Does Peirce help much? Not if we take him at his word: I can't really > understand how, for example, a mark of graphite on paper expresses the > Euclid's idea of line or why an algebraic equation is an index and not a > symbol. Yet there is an obvious difference between the way a child learns > that everybody has two feet, the way that we see a footprint and think of > the foot that made it, and the way that we encode a foot as a "foot". These > are not completely separate kinds of meaning-making (the word "foot" is > ALSO an index, because it "points" to the vocal tract that produced it or > the pencil that wrote it, and it is ALSO an icon because it is made of the > stuff of words. So in that sense it really is a way out of the > decontextualized heads that Saussure tried to put us in. And a way back to > the natural condition of language use, which is the context of situation. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: For reasons I don't understand, I'm not getting any of Haydi's stuff. I > see people referring to it, and I sometimes see it at the end of their > posts, but it's never in my inbox. I miss you, Haydi! > > dk > > > On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> David and Andy, >> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, secondness and thirdness on the >> chat before, and certainly you were part of that discussion. I would like >> to understand that better, also how it relates to the three categories of >> signs (iconic, indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your ?Thinking >> of Feeling? piece and wonder how that might relate, which I hope so, since >> it would bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), Andy?s Academia >> articles on political representation and activity/social theory are >> probably relevant in some way, though Andy probably sees language as a >> figure against a larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns the >> figure/ground relationship around? >> Henry >> >> >>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Greg: >>> >>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems >>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) >>> >>> Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always >>> present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the >> way >>> that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this >> organization >>> is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, >> you >>> will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by >>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). >>> Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you >> are >>> religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if >> you >>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature >> which >>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the >> same >>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans >> vs >>> res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it >> (which >>> in the end amount to the same thing). >>> >>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and >>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary >>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on >> their >>> relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say that >> a >>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues >> or >>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the >>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a >>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York >>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz and >>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to >>> blackness. >>> >>> So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, Greg. >>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there are >>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three >>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for >>> example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in >> order >>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are >>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend >>> on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic >>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot >> tell >>> a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still have >>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. >>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like >>> K-pop to her. >>> >>> I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; I >>> think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So for >>> example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing >> sound >>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff (sometimes >>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes the >>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also >>> look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the >> lips >>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather >>> something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is >> itself >>> not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human >>> organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph >> and >>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound stuff, >>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't >>> think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I think >> it >>> requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to >>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with >>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody >>> has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each >>> other in order and start to organize the world around them. >>> >>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of me, >>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not >>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very >> different >>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting is >>> different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you >> are >>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson >> Pollack--but >>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered >> two >>> innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can >> feel >>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very >>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. >>> >>> dk >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David (and others), >>>> >>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), >> your >>>> last post included this: >>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for >> meaning >>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >>>> >>>> I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. >>>> >>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends >> on >>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of >> existence >>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of >>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res >> extensa? >>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). >>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you >>>> have described it? >>>> >>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the >>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of >>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is >>>> self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. >> Worlds >>>> apart. >>>> >>>> And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the >>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of >>>> language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed >>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean >> approach >>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >>>> >>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may >> give >>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. >> 102 >>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >>>> >>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to >>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with >>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and >> is >>>> the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found >> in >>>> other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic >>>> function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential >> and >>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the >> end >>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and >>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus >>>> ineffable)). >>>> >>>> But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the >> iconic >>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen >>>> contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that >>>> holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like >> "buzz" >>>> in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the >>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of >>>> representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., >>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, >>>> there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to >>>> which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is >>>> pointing). >>>> >>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman >>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't >> the >>>> only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's >> at >>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can >>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the >>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. >>>> >>>> But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any >> takers, >>>> the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter >>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit >> but >>>> slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the >> Dialectics of >>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). >>>> >>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in >>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par >>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed >> out, >>>> might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general >>>> structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - >> words >>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, >> "bottle" >>>> is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer >> to a >>>> co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse >> markers >>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), >> since >>>> discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is >> the >>>> rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development >> of >>>> the symbolic function. >>>> >>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is >> not >>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the >>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. >>>> >>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps >>>> speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful >>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given >> our >>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that >> if it >>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too >> far. >>>> >>>> I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to >>>> make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization >> of >>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps >> one >>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the >> idea >>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk >> about >>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that >> floats >>>> around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of >> the >>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction >> that >>>> anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" >>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already >>>> running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of >> this is >>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the >> concept >>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding >> the >>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than >>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n >> historical) >>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). >> Concepts >>>> are thus little historical text-lets. >>>> >>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to >>>> return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further >> now. >>>> >>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these >>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >>>> >>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a >> young >>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike >> the >>>> rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the >> other >>>> for me). >>>> >>>> Very best, >>>> greg >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the >>>> conditions >>>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to >>>>> subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we >>>> need >>>>> this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if >>>> sloppy >>>>> formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", >> "use/exchange >>>>> value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating >>>> activity >>>>> which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on >>>> other >>>>> mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for >>>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed >>>>> philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? >>>>> >>>>> I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation >>>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are >> too >>>>> interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently >>>>> interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it >>>>> is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as >>>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited >>>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally >> allow >>>>> generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh >>>> and >>>>> the exploited muscles are one and the same. >>>>> >>>>> Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by >>>> the >>>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre >> for >>>>> studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a >>>> wide >>>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by >>>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, >>>> just >>>>> as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't >> "cause" >>>>> meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense >>>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it >> correlates >>>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it >> to a >>>>> context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. >>>>> >>>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the >>>> stabilization >>>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a >>>> two >>>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. >> The >>>>> reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it >> and >>>>> compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of >>>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic >>>> perception >>>>> and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the >>>> brain >>>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get >> this >>>>> view if not from language and from other people? >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is >>>> to >>>>>> see how much alike are tables and words. >>>>>> >>>>>> But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was >>>>>> fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed >>>> under >>>>>> the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a >>>>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in >>>>>> different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >>>>>> Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as >>>> philosophers >>>>>> have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to >> make >>>>>> language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the >>>>>> times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way >>>>> around. >>>>>> >>>>>> Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to >>>> understand >>>>>> how tables are signs and word are material objects. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear >>>>>> project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano >> keyboard >>>>> in >>>>>> reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure >> wave >>>>> and >>>>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that >>>>>> pressure signal.) >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on >>>>> that >>>>>>> distinction between words and tables? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different >>>>>>> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> edu> >>>>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg >>>>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift >>>> for >>>>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions >> of >>>>>>> which they >>>>>>> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., >>>> the >>>>>>> structure of >>>>>>> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). >>>>> They >>>>>>> are material >>>>>>> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle >>>> applies >>>>>>> with equal >>>>>>> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually >>>>> noted >>>>>>> forms >>>>>>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material >>>>> culture. >>>>>>> What >>>>>>> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >>>>>>> relative prominence >>>>>>> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its >>>>>>> material >>>>>>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, >>>> or >>>>> as >>>>>>> writing, >>>>>>> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order >>>> imposed >>>>> by >>>>>>> thinking >>>>>>> human beings." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of >>>> journals >>>>> by >>>>>>> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is >>>> the >>>>>>> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full >>>> of >>>>>>> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >>>>>>> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >>>>>>> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >>>>>>> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea >> of >>>>> the >>>>>>> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >>>>>>> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the >>>>> delightful >>>>>>> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote >>>> is >>>>>>> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is >>>> saying >>>>>>> just the opposite. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >>>>>>> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he >>>> mean >>>>>>> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or >> is >>>>> he >>>>>>> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and >>>>> their >>>>>>> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and >> erasing? >>>>>>> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has >>>> to >>>>>>> come first.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >> >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun May 7 18:50:47 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 7 May 2017 19:50:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> <5243D1B5-4528-41C7-86C5-468106251A94@gmail.com> Message-ID: <59700072-1CD7-44E5-924D-46364EF77016@gmail.com> Maybe Peirce was much a poet as a philospher then, Andy. I have seen brilliant insights on the chat and actually understood them. A coherent CHAT understanding is still beyond me. So, the posts are often poetry to me. Henry > On May 7, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > The difficulty with understanding Peirce, Henry, is that not only was he incapable of managing his own life (repeatedly rescued from the gutter by his much-abused wife and remaining friends James and Dewey), he was also incapable of writing a book. He left us a pile of manuscripts packed with brilliant insights which others have interpreted and passed on to us. Make of him what you will. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 8/05/2017 11:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> You flatter me implying I am a linguist, but if not that... it?s nothing at all and I?m a fraud for being on the chat. I like Peirce a lot even if he?s not a linguist. But I just don?t entirely understand him, probably for reasons I am left in the fog on the chat quite often. I?m not complaining. When it becomes entirely clear, I?ll let you know. Meanwhile, what about firstness, secondness and thirdness? David just posted. Maybe he can help me. >> Henry >> >> >>> On May 7, 2017, at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be utterly incapable of managing his own life as the foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce was a Logician who invented two different schools of philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. >>> >>> I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular because it is a logical triad which Hegel never theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is acquired by human beings, which is an idea I appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics and his Pragmaticism. >>> >>> A total madman. A real Metaphysician, >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>> David and Andy, >>>> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and certainly you were part of that discussion. I would like to understand that better, also how it relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that might relate, which I hope so, since it would bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), Andy?s Academia articles on political representation and activity/social theory are probably relevant in some way, though Andy probably sees language as a figure against a larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns the figure/ground relationship around? >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Greg: >>>>> >>>>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems >>>>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) >>>>> >>>>> Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always >>>>> present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the way >>>>> that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this organization >>>>> is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, you >>>>> will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by >>>>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). >>>>> Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you are >>>>> religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if you >>>>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature which >>>>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the same >>>>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans vs >>>>> res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it (which >>>>> in the end amount to the same thing). >>>>> >>>>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and >>>>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary >>>>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on their >>>>> relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say that a >>>>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues or >>>>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the >>>>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a >>>>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York >>>>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz and >>>>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to >>>>> blackness. >>>>> >>>>> So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, Greg. >>>>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there are >>>>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three >>>>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for >>>>> example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in order >>>>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are >>>>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend >>>>> on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic >>>>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot tell >>>>> a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still have >>>>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. >>>>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like >>>>> K-pop to her. >>>>> >>>>> I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; I >>>>> think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So for >>>>> example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing sound >>>>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff (sometimes >>>>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes the >>>>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also >>>>> look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the lips >>>>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather >>>>> something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is itself >>>>> not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human >>>>> organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph and >>>>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound stuff, >>>>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't >>>>> think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I think it >>>>> requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to >>>>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with >>>>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody >>>>> has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each >>>>> other in order and start to organize the world around them. >>>>> >>>>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of me, >>>>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not >>>>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very different >>>>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting is >>>>> different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you are >>>>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but >>>>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered two >>>>> innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can feel >>>>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very >>>>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. >>>>> >>>>> dk >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> David (and others), >>>>>> >>>>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), your >>>>>> last post included this: >>>>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning >>>>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >>>>>> >>>>>> I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. >>>>>> >>>>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends on >>>>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of existence >>>>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of >>>>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res extensa? >>>>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). >>>>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you >>>>>> have described it? >>>>>> >>>>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >>>>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the >>>>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of >>>>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is >>>>>> self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. Worlds >>>>>> apart. >>>>>> >>>>>> And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the >>>>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of >>>>>> language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed >>>>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean approach >>>>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >>>>>> >>>>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may give >>>>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. 102 >>>>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >>>>>> >>>>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to >>>>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with >>>>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and is >>>>>> the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >>>>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found in >>>>>> other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic >>>>>> function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential and >>>>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the end >>>>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and >>>>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus >>>>>> ineffable)). >>>>>> >>>>>> But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the iconic >>>>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen >>>>>> contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that >>>>>> holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" >>>>>> in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the >>>>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of >>>>>> representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., >>>>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, >>>>>> there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to >>>>>> which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is >>>>>> pointing). >>>>>> >>>>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman >>>>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the >>>>>> only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's at >>>>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can >>>>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the >>>>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. >>>>>> >>>>>> But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any takers, >>>>>> the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter >>>>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit but >>>>>> slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of >>>>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). >>>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in >>>>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par >>>>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed out, >>>>>> might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general >>>>>> structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - words >>>>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, "bottle" >>>>>> is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer to a >>>>>> co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse markers >>>>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), since >>>>>> discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is the >>>>>> rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development of >>>>>> the symbolic function. >>>>>> >>>>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is not >>>>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the >>>>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps >>>>>> speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful >>>>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given our >>>>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that if it >>>>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too far. >>>>>> >>>>>> I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to >>>>>> make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization of >>>>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one >>>>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the idea >>>>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk about >>>>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that floats >>>>>> around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of the >>>>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction that >>>>>> anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" >>>>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already >>>>>> running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of this is >>>>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the concept >>>>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding the >>>>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than >>>>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n historical) >>>>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts >>>>>> are thus little historical text-lets. >>>>>> >>>>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to >>>>>> return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further now. >>>>>> >>>>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these >>>>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >>>>>> >>>>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a young >>>>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike the >>>>>> rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the other >>>>>> for me). >>>>>> >>>>>> Very best, >>>>>> greg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the >>>>>> conditions >>>>>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to >>>>>>> subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we >>>>>> need >>>>>>> this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if >>>>>> sloppy >>>>>>> formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", "use/exchange >>>>>>> value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating >>>>>> activity >>>>>>> which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on >>>>>> other >>>>>>> mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for >>>>>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed >>>>>>> philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation >>>>>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are too >>>>>>> interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently >>>>>>> interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it >>>>>>> is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as >>>>>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited >>>>>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally allow >>>>>>> generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh >>>>>> and >>>>>>> the exploited muscles are one and the same. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by >>>>>> the >>>>>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre for >>>>>>> studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a >>>>>> wide >>>>>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by >>>>>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, >>>>>> just >>>>>>> as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't "cause" >>>>>>> meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense >>>>>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it correlates >>>>>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it to a >>>>>>> context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the >>>>>> stabilization >>>>>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a >>>>>> two >>>>>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. The >>>>>>> reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it and >>>>>>> compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of >>>>>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic >>>>>> perception >>>>>>> and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the >>>>>> brain >>>>>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get this >>>>>>> view if not from language and from other people? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> see how much alike are tables and words. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was >>>>>>>> fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed >>>>>> under >>>>>>>> the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a >>>>>>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in >>>>>>>> different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >>>>>>>> Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as >>>>>> philosophers >>>>>>>> have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make >>>>>>>> language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the >>>>>>>> times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way >>>>>>> around. >>>>>>>> Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to >>>>>> understand >>>>>>>> how tables are signs and word are material objects. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear >>>>>>>> project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano keyboard >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure wave >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that >>>>>>>> pressure signal.) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> distinction between words and tables? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different >>>>>>>>> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> edu> >>>>>>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift >>>>>> for >>>>>>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions of >>>>>>>>> which they >>>>>>>>> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> structure of >>>>>>>>> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). >>>>>>> They >>>>>>>>> are material >>>>>>>>> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle >>>>>> applies >>>>>>>>> with equal >>>>>>>>> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually >>>>>>> noted >>>>>>>>> forms >>>>>>>>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material >>>>>>> culture. >>>>>>>>> What >>>>>>>>> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >>>>>>>>> relative prominence >>>>>>>>> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its >>>>>>>>> material >>>>>>>>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, >>>>>> or >>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>> writing, >>>>>>>>> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order >>>>>> imposed >>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> thinking >>>>>>>>> human beings." >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of >>>>>> journals >>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >>>>>>>>> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >>>>>>>>> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >>>>>>>>> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >>>>>>>>> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the >>>>>>> delightful >>>>>>>>> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is >>>>>> saying >>>>>>>>> just the opposite. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >>>>>>>>> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he >>>>>> mean >>>>>>>>> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is >>>>>>> he >>>>>>>>> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and >>>>>>> their >>>>>>>>> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? >>>>>>>>> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> come first.) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Sun May 7 18:54:13 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 11:54:13 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <4953A4D2-DBFC-4B94-B8E6-7617FBB2F13E@gmail.com> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <4953A4D2-DBFC-4B94-B8E6-7617FBB2F13E@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry, something I learnt by reading Vygotsky and Luria's book "Ape, Primitive Man and Child" was that looking for the attribute which marks the distinction between human beings and animals is a hopeless and misconceived project. The point is that whatever it is which is what makes a human being essentially human is exactly that activity (or capacity) which brings about the transformation from non-human animal to human animal and *therefore* will be found *in rudimentary form* in non-human animals. A profound insight worthy of a Hegel or a Peirce. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 8/05/2017 11:43 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > David, > Having read your post, and re-reading, I end up thinking that Peirce?s firstness/secondness/thirdness distinctions doesn?t help me understand language, not like index/icon/symbol does. My loss probably. > > Also, your thoughts on the question, ?Is a language has only one word a language?? make me think about a question I used to ask my students in my intro to linguistics: ?Can animals have language?? They never believed me when I said that that they can't. I proved it by saying that animals don?t have the property of displacement, that is the ability to talk about things removed in time and space. After years of patiently, but firmly, rejecting their claims of animal language, I gave up. Could a language with only one word displace? > > Henry > > >> On May 7, 2017, at 6:45 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Ruqaiya Hasan used to say that the natural condition of language use is a >> context of situation. That is, a word like "he" or "the" or even "of" is >> more typical of language use than a word like "coke bottle", and the >> relationship of wording to meaning is really a natural relationship, >> utterly unlike the relationship of sounding to wording (which is >> conventional). >> >> You can see this in a lot of ways. One is simply frequency: in any English >> text of sufficient size, "the" will always be twice as frequent as the next >> most frequent words. In any list of the most frequent words in English, the >> top one hundred or so are so-called "functors", not words like "coke" or >> "bottle" or "gather". Another is, of course, ontogenesis: children start >> their journey into language by referring to the context of situation; it's >> hard to see how else they could possible do it. There is also a rather >> abstract, technical argument by Voloshinov that I sometimes like to think >> about; he is answering the question that N.Ya. Marr used to ask, whether a >> language that has only one word is still a language, and what the one word >> would be. Voloshinov concludes it would be a THEME (that is, it would be >> indicative, demonstrative, deictic--not signifying) and it would indeed be >> a language, because the essence of language is really "smysl" and not >> "znachenie" (it is ever-changing dynamic theme and not self-similar >> "meaning"). >> >> I like to think that in English it would go something like this: >> >> What? That! >> Where? There! >> When? Then! >> >> Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and the >> "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to answer: >> >> a? a! >> eh? eh! >> e? e... >> >> That's a language. In fact, I rather think it's the origin of all language; >> it's why Marr might just have been right to assume that there wasn't any >> one original language, but that there was, possibly, an original word, >> invented and reinvented hundreds of thousands of times in human history, >> and constantly being reinvented by newborn children before our very eyes. >> >> But as you can see, Ruqaiya was right. Its natural condition of use is a >> context of situation. The problem is that the natural condition of language >> study is NOT a context of situation. It's more like the office I'm sitting >> in, the library where I will spend most of today, or the laboratory where I >> try to get back to the firstness of word stuff. That's how we get theories >> like Saussure's: Saussure tries to cut off all language from "parole", that >> is, from context and use, and also from history, and the result is more or >> less what Greg said: a purely dualistic, entirely idealistic, and wholly >> language-internal theory. >> >> Saussure was a brilliant phonologist; his theory is able to explain pretty >> well why it is that any sound stuff can express any meaning stuff. But he >> hit on the only completely conventional part of the whole language system, >> and then he overgeneralized. There isn't anything conventional about the >> relationship of meaning to grammar: there are very good reasons, for >> example, why entities are typically nouns and processes are typically >> verbs. It's not because we have that much of a universal grammar. It's >> because we have that much of a universal context of situation. >> >> Does Peirce help much? Not if we take him at his word: I can't really >> understand how, for example, a mark of graphite on paper expresses the >> Euclid's idea of line or why an algebraic equation is an index and not a >> symbol. Yet there is an obvious difference between the way a child learns >> that everybody has two feet, the way that we see a footprint and think of >> the foot that made it, and the way that we encode a foot as a "foot". These >> are not completely separate kinds of meaning-making (the word "foot" is >> ALSO an index, because it "points" to the vocal tract that produced it or >> the pencil that wrote it, and it is ALSO an icon because it is made of the >> stuff of words. So in that sense it really is a way out of the >> decontextualized heads that Saussure tried to put us in. And a way back to >> the natural condition of language use, which is the context of situation. >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> PS: For reasons I don't understand, I'm not getting any of Haydi's stuff. I >> see people referring to it, and I sometimes see it at the end of their >> posts, but it's never in my inbox. I miss you, Haydi! >> >> dk >> >> >> On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> David and Andy, >>> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, secondness and thirdness on the >>> chat before, and certainly you were part of that discussion. I would like >>> to understand that better, also how it relates to the three categories of >>> signs (iconic, indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your ?Thinking >>> of Feeling? piece and wonder how that might relate, which I hope so, since >>> it would bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), Andy?s Academia >>> articles on political representation and activity/social theory are >>> probably relevant in some way, though Andy probably sees language as a >>> figure against a larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns the >>> figure/ground relationship around? >>> Henry >>> >>> >>>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> Greg: >>>> >>>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems >>>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) >>>> >>>> Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always >>>> present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the >>> way >>>> that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this >>> organization >>>> is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, >>> you >>>> will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by >>>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). >>>> Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you >>> are >>>> religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if >>> you >>>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature >>> which >>>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the >>> same >>>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans >>> vs >>>> res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it >>> (which >>>> in the end amount to the same thing). >>>> >>>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and >>>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary >>>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on >>> their >>>> relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say that >>> a >>>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues >>> or >>>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the >>>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a >>>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York >>>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz and >>>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to >>>> blackness. >>>> >>>> So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, Greg. >>>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there are >>>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three >>>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for >>>> example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in >>> order >>>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are >>>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend >>>> on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic >>>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot >>> tell >>>> a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still have >>>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. >>>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like >>>> K-pop to her. >>>> >>>> I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; I >>>> think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So for >>>> example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing >>> sound >>>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff (sometimes >>>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes the >>>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also >>>> look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the >>> lips >>>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather >>>> something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is >>> itself >>>> not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human >>>> organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph >>> and >>>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound stuff, >>>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't >>>> think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I think >>> it >>>> requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to >>>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with >>>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody >>>> has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each >>>> other in order and start to organize the world around them. >>>> >>>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of me, >>>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not >>>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very >>> different >>>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting is >>>> different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you >>> are >>>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson >>> Pollack--but >>>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered >>> two >>>> innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can >>> feel >>>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very >>>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. >>>> >>>> dk >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> David (and others), >>>>> >>>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), >>> your >>>>> last post included this: >>>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for >>> meaning >>>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >>>>> >>>>> I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. >>>>> >>>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends >>> on >>>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of >>> existence >>>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of >>>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res >>> extensa? >>>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). >>>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you >>>>> have described it? >>>>> >>>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >>>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the >>>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of >>>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is >>>>> self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. >>> Worlds >>>>> apart. >>>>> >>>>> And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the >>>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of >>>>> language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed >>>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean >>> approach >>>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >>>>> >>>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may >>> give >>>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. >>> 102 >>>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >>>>> >>>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to >>>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with >>>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and >>> is >>>>> the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >>>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found >>> in >>>>> other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic >>>>> function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential >>> and >>>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the >>> end >>>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and >>>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus >>>>> ineffable)). >>>>> >>>>> But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the >>> iconic >>>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen >>>>> contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that >>>>> holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like >>> "buzz" >>>>> in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the >>>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of >>>>> representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., >>>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, >>>>> there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to >>>>> which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is >>>>> pointing). >>>>> >>>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman >>>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't >>> the >>>>> only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's >>> at >>>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can >>>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the >>>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. >>>>> >>>>> But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any >>> takers, >>>>> the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter >>>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit >>> but >>>>> slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the >>> Dialectics of >>>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). >>>>> >>>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in >>>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par >>>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed >>> out, >>>>> might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general >>>>> structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - >>> words >>>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, >>> "bottle" >>>>> is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer >>> to a >>>>> co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse >>> markers >>>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), >>> since >>>>> discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is >>> the >>>>> rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development >>> of >>>>> the symbolic function. >>>>> >>>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is >>> not >>>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the >>>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. >>>>> >>>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps >>>>> speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful >>>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given >>> our >>>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that >>> if it >>>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too >>> far. >>>>> I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to >>>>> make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization >>> of >>>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps >>> one >>>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the >>> idea >>>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk >>> about >>>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that >>> floats >>>>> around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of >>> the >>>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction >>> that >>>>> anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" >>>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already >>>>> running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of >>> this is >>>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the >>> concept >>>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding >>> the >>>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than >>>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n >>> historical) >>>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). >>> Concepts >>>>> are thus little historical text-lets. >>>>> >>>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to >>>>> return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further >>> now. >>>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these >>>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >>>>> >>>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a >>> young >>>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike >>> the >>>>> rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the >>> other >>>>> for me). >>>>> >>>>> Very best, >>>>> greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the >>>>> conditions >>>>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to >>>>>> subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we >>>>> need >>>>>> this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if >>>>> sloppy >>>>>> formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", >>> "use/exchange >>>>>> value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating >>>>> activity >>>>>> which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on >>>>> other >>>>>> mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for >>>>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed >>>>>> philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation >>>>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are >>> too >>>>>> interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently >>>>>> interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it >>>>>> is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as >>>>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited >>>>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally >>> allow >>>>>> generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh >>>>> and >>>>>> the exploited muscles are one and the same. >>>>>> >>>>>> Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by >>>>> the >>>>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre >>> for >>>>>> studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a >>>>> wide >>>>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by >>>>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, >>>>> just >>>>>> as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't >>> "cause" >>>>>> meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense >>>>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it >>> correlates >>>>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it >>> to a >>>>>> context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. >>>>>> >>>>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the >>>>> stabilization >>>>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a >>>>> two >>>>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. >>> The >>>>>> reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it >>> and >>>>>> compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of >>>>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic >>>>> perception >>>>>> and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the >>>>> brain >>>>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get >>> this >>>>>> view if not from language and from other people? >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>>>>>> Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is >>>>> to >>>>>>> see how much alike are tables and words. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was >>>>>>> fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed >>>>> under >>>>>>> the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a >>>>>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in >>>>>>> different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >>>>>>> Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as >>>>> philosophers >>>>>>> have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to >>> make >>>>>>> language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the >>>>>>> times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way >>>>>> around. >>>>>>> Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to >>>>> understand >>>>>>> how tables are signs and word are material objects. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear >>>>>>> project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano >>> keyboard >>>>>> in >>>>>>> reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure >>> wave >>>>>> and >>>>>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that >>>>>>> pressure signal.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> distinction between words and tables? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different >>>>>>>> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> edu> >>>>>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift >>>>> for >>>>>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions >>> of >>>>>>>> which they >>>>>>>> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., >>>>> the >>>>>>>> structure of >>>>>>>> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). >>>>>> They >>>>>>>> are material >>>>>>>> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle >>>>> applies >>>>>>>> with equal >>>>>>>> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually >>>>>> noted >>>>>>>> forms >>>>>>>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material >>>>>> culture. >>>>>>>> What >>>>>>>> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >>>>>>>> relative prominence >>>>>>>> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its >>>>>>>> material >>>>>>>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, >>>>> or >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> writing, >>>>>>>> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order >>>>> imposed >>>>>> by >>>>>>>> thinking >>>>>>>> human beings." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of >>>>> journals >>>>>> by >>>>>>>> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is >>>>> the >>>>>>>> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full >>>>> of >>>>>>>> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >>>>>>>> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >>>>>>>> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >>>>>>>> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea >>> of >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >>>>>>>> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the >>>>>> delightful >>>>>>>> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote >>>>> is >>>>>>>> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is >>>>> saying >>>>>>>> just the opposite. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >>>>>>>> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he >>>>> mean >>>>>>>> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or >>> is >>>>>> he >>>>>>>> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and >>>>>> their >>>>>>>> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and >>> erasing? >>>>>>>> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has >>>>> to >>>>>>>> come first.) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>> >>> > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun May 7 19:12:37 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 7 May 2017 20:12:37 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy (and others), I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are signs which have referential value but their referential value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of discourse (and without which, our discourse would be meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by following how different participant deictics are deployed. Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. Thanks, -greg On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a Linguist would see Peirce > as a Linguist, because they see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I > see Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be utterly incapable of > managing his own life as the foremost qualification for being a > philosopher. Peirce was a Logician who invented two different schools of > philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > > I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular because it is a logical > triad which Hegel never theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping > us understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, Semiotics is something > going on in Nature before it is acquired by human beings, which is an idea > I appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he overcame all kinds of > Dualism with both his Semiotics and his Pragmaticism. > > A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> David and Andy, >> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, secondness and thirdness on >> the chat before, and certainly you were part of that discussion. I would >> like to understand that better, also how it relates to the three categories >> of signs (iconic, indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your >> ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that might relate, which I hope >> so, since it would bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), Andy?s >> Academia articles on political representation and activity/social theory >> are probably relevant in some way, though Andy probably sees language as a >> figure against a larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns the >> figure/ground relationship around? >> Henry >> >> >> >>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Greg: >>> >>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems >>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) >>> >>> Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always >>> present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the >>> way >>> that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this >>> organization >>> is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, >>> you >>> will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by >>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). >>> Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you >>> are >>> religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if >>> you >>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature >>> which >>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the >>> same >>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans >>> vs >>> res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it >>> (which >>> in the end amount to the same thing). >>> >>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and >>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary >>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on >>> their >>> relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say that >>> a >>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues >>> or >>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the >>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a >>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York >>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz and >>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to >>> blackness. >>> >>> So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, Greg. >>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there are >>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three >>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for >>> example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in >>> order >>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are >>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend >>> on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic >>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot >>> tell >>> a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still have >>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. >>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like >>> K-pop to her. >>> >>> I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; I >>> think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So for >>> example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing >>> sound >>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff (sometimes >>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes the >>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also >>> look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the >>> lips >>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather >>> something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is >>> itself >>> not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human >>> organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph >>> and >>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound stuff, >>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't >>> think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I think >>> it >>> requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to >>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with >>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody >>> has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each >>> other in order and start to organize the world around them. >>> >>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of me, >>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not >>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very >>> different >>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting is >>> different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you >>> are >>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson >>> Pollack--but >>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered >>> two >>> innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can >>> feel >>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very >>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. >>> >>> dk >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson >> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> David (and others), >>>> >>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), >>>> your >>>> last post included this: >>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for >>>> meaning >>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >>>> >>>> I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose you. >>>> >>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends >>>> on >>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of >>>> existence >>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit of >>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res >>>> extensa? >>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). >>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as you >>>> have described it? >>>> >>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the >>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane of >>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is >>>> self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. >>>> Worlds >>>> apart. >>>> >>>> And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the >>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science of >>>> language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed >>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean >>>> approach >>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >>>> >>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may >>>> give >>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. >>>> 102 >>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >>>> >>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to >>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation with >>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and >>>> is >>>> the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is found >>>> in >>>> other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic >>>> function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential >>>> and >>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is the >>>> end >>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion and >>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus >>>> ineffable)). >>>> >>>> But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the >>>> iconic >>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen >>>> contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map that >>>> holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like >>>> "buzz" >>>> in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of the >>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship of >>>> representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity (e.g., >>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern twang, >>>> there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object to >>>> which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is >>>> pointing). >>>> >>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman >>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't >>>> the >>>> only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of Jakobson's >>>> at >>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we can >>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in the >>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. >>>> >>>> But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any >>>> takers, >>>> the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter >>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit >>>> but >>>> slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the >>>> Dialectics of >>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). >>>> >>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in >>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par >>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed >>>> out, >>>> might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general >>>> structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - >>>> words >>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, >>>> "bottle" >>>> is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer >>>> to a >>>> co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse >>>> markers >>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), >>>> since >>>> discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is >>>> the >>>> rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development >>>> of >>>> the symbolic function. >>>> >>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs is >>>> not >>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the >>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. >>>> >>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And perhaps >>>> speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a useful >>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts given >>>> our >>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that >>>> if it >>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too >>>> far. >>>> >>>> I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT to >>>> make a contribution to social science today is in its conceptualization >>>> of >>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps >>>> one >>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the >>>> idea >>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk >>>> about >>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that >>>> floats >>>> around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of >>>> the >>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction >>>> that >>>> anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological turn" >>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already >>>> running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of >>>> this is >>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the >>>> concept >>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of understanding >>>> the >>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than >>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n >>>> historical) >>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). >>>> Concepts >>>> are thus little historical text-lets. >>>> >>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future to >>>> return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further >>>> now. >>>> >>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to these >>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >>>> >>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a >>>> young >>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike >>>> the >>>> rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the >>>> other >>>> for me). >>>> >>>> Very best, >>>> greg >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the >>>>> >>>> conditions >>>> >>>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to >>>>> subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't we >>>>> >>>> need >>>> >>>>> this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if >>>>> >>>> sloppy >>>> >>>>> formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", >>>>> "use/exchange >>>>> value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating >>>>> >>>> activity >>>> >>>>> which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on >>>>> >>>> other >>>> >>>>> mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for >>>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed >>>>> philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? >>>>> >>>>> I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation >>>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are >>>>> too >>>>> interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently >>>>> interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps it >>>>> is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, as >>>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than exploited >>>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally >>>>> allow >>>>> generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating flesh >>>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>>> the exploited muscles are one and the same. >>>>> >>>>> Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed by >>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre >>>>> for >>>>> studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a >>>>> >>>> wide >>>> >>>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by >>>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and effect, >>>>> >>>> just >>>> >>>>> as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't >>>>> "cause" >>>>> meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that sense >>>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it >>>>> correlates >>>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it >>>>> to a >>>>> context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. >>>>> >>>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the >>>>> >>>> stabilization >>>> >>>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part of a >>>>> >>>> two >>>> >>>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. >>>>> The >>>>> reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it >>>>> and >>>>> compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece of >>>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic >>>>> >>>> perception >>>> >>>>> and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the >>>>> >>>> brain >>>> >>>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get >>>>> this >>>>> view if not from language and from other people? >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing is >>>>>> >>>>> to >>>> >>>>> see how much alike are tables and words. >>>>>> >>>>>> But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he was >>>>>> fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed >>>>>> >>>>> under >>>> >>>>> the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics against a >>>>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in >>>>>> different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >>>>>> Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as >>>>>> >>>>> philosophers >>>> >>>>> have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make >>>>>> language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in the >>>>>> times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way >>>>>> >>>>> around. >>>>> >>>>>> Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to >>>>>> >>>>> understand >>>> >>>>> how tables are signs and word are material objects. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear >>>>>> project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano >>>>>> keyboard >>>>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>>> reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure >>>>>> wave >>>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that >>>>>> pressure signal.) >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more on >>>>>>> >>>>>> that >>>>> >>>>>> distinction between words and tables? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are different >>>>>>> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>>> edu> >>>> >>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg >>>>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a Festschrift >>>>>>> >>>>>> for >>>> >>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> which they >>>>>>> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>> >>>>> structure of >>>>>>> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of writing). >>>>>>> >>>>>> They >>>>> >>>>>> are material >>>>>>> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle >>>>>>> >>>>>> applies >>>> >>>>> with equal >>>>>>> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually >>>>>>> >>>>>> noted >>>>> >>>>>> forms >>>>>>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material >>>>>>> >>>>>> culture. >>>>> >>>>>> What >>>>>>> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is the >>>>>>> relative prominence >>>>>>> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its >>>>>>> material >>>>>>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand movements, >>>>>>> >>>>>> or >>>> >>>>> as >>>>> >>>>>> writing, >>>>>>> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order >>>>>>> >>>>>> imposed >>>> >>>>> by >>>>> >>>>>> thinking >>>>>>> human beings." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of >>>>>>> >>>>>> journals >>>> >>>>> by >>>>> >>>>>> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table is >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>> >>>>> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are full >>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>>> >>>>> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a word >>>>>>> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a >>>>>>> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and you >>>>>>> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You could >>>>>>> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the >>>>>>> >>>>>> delightful >>>>> >>>>>> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the quote >>>>>>> >>>>>> is >>>> >>>>> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is >>>>>>> >>>>>> saying >>>> >>>>> just the opposite. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a pencil >>>>>>> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he >>>>>>> >>>>>> mean >>>> >>>>> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or is >>>>>>> >>>>>> he >>>>> >>>>>> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and >>>>>>> >>>>>> their >>>>> >>>>>> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and erasing? >>>>>>> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea has >>>>>>> >>>>>> to >>>> >>>>> come first.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Sun May 7 19:28:44 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 12:28:44 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> Message-ID: The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy (and others), > > I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. > > One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap > is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using > Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are > signs which have referential value but their referential > value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic > example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I > can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it > seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as > translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is > "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. > > As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the > importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He > calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of > discourse (and without which, our discourse would be > meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's > essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case > for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the > talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand > quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by > following how different participant deictics are deployed. > > Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear > about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. > > Thanks, > -greg > > > On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a > Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they > see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see > Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be > utterly incapable of managing his own life as the > foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce > was a Logician who invented two different schools of > philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > > I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular > because it is a logical triad which Hegel never > theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us > understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, > Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is > acquired by human beings, which is an idea I > appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he > overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics > and his Pragmaticism. > > A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > David and Andy, > I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, > secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and > certainly you were part of that discussion. I > would like to understand that better, also how it > relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, > indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your > ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that > might relate, which I hope so, since it would > bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), > Andy?s Academia articles on political > representation and activity/social theory are > probably relevant in some way, though Andy > probably sees language as a figure against a > larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns > the figure/ground relationship around? > Henry > > > On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > Greg: > > (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually > don't see these problems > until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > > Meaning is simply another word for > organization. Organization is always > present and never separable from matter: it's > a property of matter, the way > that the internet is a property of a computer. > Sometimes this organization > is brought about without any human > intervention (if you are religious, you > will say that it brought about divinely, and > if you are Spinozan, by > nature: it amounts to the same thing, because > "Deus Sive Natura"). > Sometimes it is brought about by human > ingenuity (but of course if you are > religious you will say that it is the divine > in humans at work, and if you > are Spinozan you will say that humans are > simply that part of nature which > has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii > think it amounts to the same > thing). So of course there are not two kinds > of substance, res cogitans vs > res extensa, only one substance and different > ways of organizing it (which > in the end amount to the same thing). > > You say that discourse particles like "Guess > what?" and "so there" and > "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say > to the contrary > notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, > insofar as they depend on their > relationship to the context of situation for > their meaning. You say that a > Southern drawl is indexical, and that the > relationship of jazz or blues or > hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, > insofar as they satisfy the > condition I just mentioned. But "because" is > also a symbol, and a > Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when > he/she moves to New York > City (and in fact you can argue they sound > more so). In Africa, jazz and > blues and hiphop in Africa are related to > Americanness and not to > blackness. > > So your division of signs into just three > categories is too simple, Greg. > In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you > will discover that there are > tens of thousands of categories, but they are > generated from three > ineffable primitives ("firstness", > "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > example all words are symbols insofar as you > have to know English in order > to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But > some words are > symbol-indices, symbols that function as > indexes, because they depend > on the context of situation for their meaning. > Without the symbolic > gateway, they cannot function as indices. My > wife, for example, cannot tell > a Southerner from a more general American > accent, and I myself still have > trouble figuring out who is an Australian and > who is an FOB bloody pom. > Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness > in hiphop--it sounds like > K-pop to her. > > I don't actually think that any signs are > associative or "prehensive"; I > think that they are all different ways of > looking or apprehending. So for > example you can apprehend a wording as a > symbol: a way of organizing sound > stuff so that it "stands for" a way of > organizing other stuff (sometimes > lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of > objects and sometimes the > abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls > "projects"). You can also > look at wording as index: not as something > that is "associated" to the lips > and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or > even continguity but rather > something that has a necessary relation to the > vocal tract (which is itself > not a physiological organ, but something > brought about by human > organization). But when I look at sound waves > on my Praat spectrograph and > think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to > get at is the sound stuff, > the noise, the firstness of the stuff of > words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > think there is any way of doing this with my > eyes or ears alone: I think it > requires a very complex combination of tools > and signs to get down to > firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if > he had breakfast with > Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by > themselves, but nobody > has ever really shown the limits of what they > can do when they put each > other in order and start to organize the world > around them. > > (And that is about as much philosophy as you > are going to get out of me, > I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: > mediating activity is not > absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or > Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > from mediating activity in tool use, for the > same reason that painting is > different from wording: in painting you CAN > leave out the human (if you are > doing a dead seal for example, or if you are > Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > keep in mind that the former committed suicide > and the latter murdered two > innocent young women). But in wording you > never ever can. Wording can feel > unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated > or it doesn't work very > well--but in reality it's even more mediated > than ever. > > dk > > > On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > David (and others), > > In the interests of disagreement (which I > know you dearly appreciate), your > last post included this: > "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide > material correlates for meaning > and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > > I was with you up until that point, but > that's where I always lose you. > > I know it is a rather trite thing to say > but I guess it really depends on > what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, > you mean some plane of existence > that runs parallel to the material stuff, > then this seems to be a bit of > trouble since this leaves us with, on the > one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" > (res cogitans? phenomena?). > Matter is easy enough to locate, but where > do we locate "meaning" as you > have described it? > > This reminds me of Saussure's classic > drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > (attached) in which "the indefinite plane > of jumbled ideas" (A in the > diagram) exists on one side of the chasm > and "the equally vague plane of > sounds" (B) exists on the other side of > the chasm. Each side is > self-contained and self-referential, and > never the twain shall meet. Worlds > apart. > > And this ties to the conversation in the > other thread about the > ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's > Marx quote about a science of > language that is shorn from life). My > suspicion is that this supposed > ineffability of meaning has everything to > do with this Saussurean approach > to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > > Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a > different approach that may give > a way out of this trouble by putting the > word back INto the world. (p. 102 > of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > > Peirce offers three kinds of relations of > representamen (signifier) to > object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. > The symbol is the relation with > which we are most familiar - it is the one > that Saussure speaks of and is > the one that is ineffable or, in > Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > "conventional". It is the stuff of words, > the meaning of which is found in > other words (hence the sense of > ineffability). With only the symbolic > function, the whole world of words would > be entirely self-referential and > thus truly ineffable (and this is why I > like to say that Derrida is the end > of the Saussurean road - he took that idea > to its logical conclusion and > discovered that the meaning of meaning is, > well, empty (and thus > ineffable)). > > But Peirce has two other relations of > representamen to object, the iconic > and the indexical. In signs functioning > iconically, the representamen > contains some quality of the object that > it represents (e.g., a map that > holds relations of the space that it > represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > in which the representamen has some of the > qualities of the sound of the > bee flying by). With signs functioning > indexically, the relationship of > representamen to object is one of temporal > or spatial contiguity (e.g., > where there is smoke there is fire, or > where there is a Southern twang, > there is a Southerner, or, most > classically, when I point, the object to > which I am pointing is spatially > contiguous with the finger that is > pointing). > > Now if I follow the argument of another of > the inheritors of Roman > Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein > (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > only inheritors of this tradition - > Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > Harvard... and he does a great impression > of Jacobson too), then we can > indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., > the symbolic function) in the > more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) > indexical function. > > But that argument is always a bit too much > for me (if there are any takers, > the best place to find this argument is in > Silverstein's chapter > "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic > Function," or in less explicit but > slightly more understandable article > "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > Sociolinguistics Life"). > > Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more > elegant and comprehensible: in > ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the > index, first as the index par > excellence, pointing (something that, as > Andy has previously pointed out, > might not be exactly how things go in a > literal sense, but the general > structure here works well, I think, as a > heuristic if nothing else - words > are first learned as indexes, temporally > and spatially collocated, "bottle" > is first uttered as a way of saying > "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > co-present object; note this is also why > young kids get discourse markers > at such a young age (and seems incredibly > precocious when they do!), since > discourse markers are primarily > indexical). The indexical function is the > rudimentary form that then provides the > groundwork for the development of > the symbolic function. > > So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) > approach, the meaning of signs is not > ineffable, there is a grounding for words, > and that grounding is the > indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in > the world and of the world. > > This seems to me a way of putting meaning > back into matter. And perhaps > speaking of words as the material > correlates of meaning can be a useful > heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk > about meanings and concepts given our > current set of meanings/concepts?). But we > should also recognize that if it > becomes more than an heuristic it can lead > us astray if we take it too far. > > I'd add here that I think one of the > greatest opportunities for CHAT to > make a contribution to social science > today is in its conceptualization of > "concepts" (and, by extension, > "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > of the most taken-for-granted aspects of > social science today is the idea > that we know what "concepts" are. In > anthropology, people easily talk about > "cultural concepts" and typically they > mean precisely something that floats > around in some ethereal plane of > "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > material stuff of the world. Yet, this > runs counter to the direction that > anthropology is heading these days with > the so-called "ontological turn" > (I'll hold off on explaining this for now > since this post is already > running way too long, but I'll just > mention that one of the aims of this is > to get to a non-dualistic social science). > CHAT's conception of the concept > seems to me to offer precisely what is > needed -- a way of understanding the > concept as a fundamentally cultural and > historical thing, rather than > simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is > the holding of a(n historical) > relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse > or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > are thus little historical text-lets. > > Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will > find some time in the future to > return to that last part, but there is no > time to develop it further now. > > Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the > opportunity to catch up to these > conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > > I'll keep reading but no promises that > I'll be able to comment (as a young > scholar, I need to be spending my time > putting stuff out - and unlike the > rest of you, I'm no good at > multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > for me). > > Very best, > greg > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David > Kellogg > > wrote: > > Well, yes. But if present day > conditions are the REVERSE of the > > conditions > > under which Vygotsky was writing--that > is, if the present trend is to > subsume labor under language instead > of the other way around--don't we > > need > > this distinction between signs and > tools more than ever? That is, if > > sloppy > > formulations like "cultural capital", > "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > value of the word" are erasing the > distinction between a mediating > > activity > > which acts on the environment and a > mediating activity which acts on > > other > > mediators and on the self, and which > therefore has the potential for > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this > exactly where the clear-eyed > philosophers need to step in and > straighten us out? > > I think that instead what is happening > is that our older generation > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present > company--usually--excluded) are too > interested in the "tool power" of > large categories and insufficiently > interested in fine distinctions that > make a difference. But perhaps it > is also that our younger generation of > misty-eyed philosophers are, as > Eagleton remarked, more interested in > copulating bodies than exploited > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that > do make a difference equally allow > generalization and abstraction and > tool power, and the copulating flesh > > and > > the exploited muscles are one and the > same. > > Take, for example, your remark about > the Fourier transform performed by > > the > > ear (not the brain--the inner ear > cochlea--I can see the world centre for > studying the cochlea from my office > window). Actually, it's part of a > > wide > > range of "realisation" phenomena that > were already being noticed by > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, > you don't have cause and effect, > > just > > as in cause and effect you don't have > "association". Words don't "cause" > meaning: they provide material > correlates for meaning and in that sense > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does > not "cause" wording; it correlates > wording to a semantics--an activity of > consciousness--and through it to a > context of situation or culture, and > in that sense "realises" it. > > So in his lecture on early childhood, > Vygotsky says that the > > stabilization > > of forms, colours, and sizes by the > eye in early childhood is part of a > > two > > way relationship, a dialogue, between > the sense organs and the brain. The > reason why we don't see a table as a > trapezoid, when we stand over it and > compare the front with the back, the > reason why we don't see a piece of > chalk at nighttime as black, the > reason why we have orthoscopic > > perception > > and we don't see a man at a distance > as a looming midget is that the > > brain > > imposes the contrary views on the eye. > And where does the brain get this > view if not from language and from > other people? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy > Blunden > wrote: > > Personally, I think the first and > most persistently important thing is > > to > > see how much alike are tables and > words. > > But ... Vygotsky was very > insistent on the distinction > because he was > fighting a battle against the idea > that speech ought to be subsumed > > under > > the larger category of labour. He > had to fight for semiotics against a > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. > But we here in 2017 are living in > different times, where we have > Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > Marxism is widely regarded as > antique. As Marx said "Just as > > philosophers > > have given thought an independent > existence, so they were bound to make > language into an independent > realm." and we live well and truly > in the > times when labour is subsumed > under language, and not the other way > > around. > > Everyone knows that a table is > unlike a word. The point it to > > understand > > how tables are signs and word are > material objects. > > Andy > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked > in an offshoot of the bionic ear > project. The ear has a little > keyboard that works like a piano > keyboard > > in > > reverse, making a real time > Fourier transform of that air > pressure wave > > and > > coding the harmonics it in nerve > impulse. The brain never hears that > pressure signal.) > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil wrote: > > David (and or Mike, Andy, > anyone else), could you give a > bit more on > > that > > distinction between words and > tables? > > And could you say how (and > whether) (human, hand) nails > are different > from tables; and then how > nails are different from words? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > edu> > > on behalf of David Kellogg > > > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff > of Words > > Gordon Wells quotes this from > an article Mike wrote in a > Festschrift > > for > > George Miller. Mike is talking > about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they > contain in coded form the > interactions of > which they > were previously a part and > which they mediate in the > present (e.g., > > the > > structure of > a pencil carries within it the > history of certain forms of > writing). > > They > > are material > in that they are embodied in > material artifacts. This principle > > applies > > with equal > force whether one is > considering language/speech or > the more usually > > noted > > forms > of artifacts such as tables > and knives which constitute > material > > culture. > > What > differentiates a word, such as > ?language? from, say, a table. > is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal > aspects. No word exists apart > from its > material > instantiation (as a > configuration of sound waves, > or hand movements, > > or > > as > > writing, > or as neuronal activity), > whereas every table embodies > an order > > imposed > > by > > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that > regularly gets me thrown out of > > journals > > by > > the ear. Mike says that the > difference between a word and > a table is > > the > > relative salience of the ideal > and the material. Sure--words > are full > > of > > the ideal, and tables are full > of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other > way around. Why? Well, because > a word > without some word-stuff (sound > or graphite) just isn't a > word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with > material sounding: change one, > and you > change the other. But with a > table, what you start with is > the idea of > > the > > table; as soon as you've got > that idea, you've got a table. > You could > change the material to > anything and you'd still have > a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out > by the ear. But he does ignore the > > delightful > > perversity in what Mike is > saying, and what he gets out > of the quote > > is > > just that words are really > just like tools. When in fact > Mike is > > saying > > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is > Mike's notion that the > structure of a pencil > carries within it the history > of certain forms of writing. > Does he > > mean > > that the length of the pencil > reflects how often it's been > used? Or is > > he > > making a more archaeological > point about graphite, wood, > rubber and > > their > > relationship to a certain > point in the history of > writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more > like tables than like > words--the idea has > > to > > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon May 8 07:52:52 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 07:52:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> Message-ID: <59108661.4733630a.a1e9a.8d06@mx.google.com> David, Is it fair to assume All words are symbols All words are indices All words are icons However, the relationality (and ways of integrating) all 3 INEFFABLE primitives is key. My attempt to follow what you refer to as being a (theme) Also the couplet (placing/displacing) seems relevant to this theme in relation to context of the situation. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: May 7, 2017 7:30 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy (and others), > > I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. > > One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap > is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using > Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are > signs which have referential value but their referential > value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic > example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I > can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it > seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as > translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is > "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. > > As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the > importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He > calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of > discourse (and without which, our discourse would be > meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's > essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case > for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the > talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand > quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by > following how different participant deictics are deployed. > > Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear > about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. > > Thanks, > -greg > > > On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a > Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they > see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see > Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be > utterly incapable of managing his own life as the > foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce > was a Logician who invented two different schools of > philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > > I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular > because it is a logical triad which Hegel never > theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us > understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, > Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is > acquired by human beings, which is an idea I > appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he > overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics > and his Pragmaticism. > > A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > David and Andy, > I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, > secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and > certainly you were part of that discussion. I > would like to understand that better, also how it > relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, > indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your > ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that > might relate, which I hope so, since it would > bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), > Andy?s Academia articles on political > representation and activity/social theory are > probably relevant in some way, though Andy > probably sees language as a figure against a > larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns > the figure/ground relationship around? > Henry > > > On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > Greg: > > (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually > don't see these problems > until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > > Meaning is simply another word for > organization. Organization is always > present and never separable from matter: it's > a property of matter, the way > that the internet is a property of a computer. > Sometimes this organization > is brought about without any human > intervention (if you are religious, you > will say that it brought about divinely, and > if you are Spinozan, by > nature: it amounts to the same thing, because > "Deus Sive Natura"). > Sometimes it is brought about by human > ingenuity (but of course if you are > religious you will say that it is the divine > in humans at work, and if you > are Spinozan you will say that humans are > simply that part of nature which > has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii > think it amounts to the same > thing). So of course there are not two kinds > of substance, res cogitans vs > res extensa, only one substance and different > ways of organizing it (which > in the end amount to the same thing). > > You say that discourse particles like "Guess > what?" and "so there" and > "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say > to the contrary > notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, > insofar as they depend on their > relationship to the context of situation for > their meaning. You say that a > Southern drawl is indexical, and that the > relationship of jazz or blues or > hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, > insofar as they satisfy the > condition I just mentioned. But "because" is > also a symbol, and a > Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when > he/she moves to New York > City (and in fact you can argue they sound > more so). In Africa, jazz and > blues and hiphop in Africa are related to > Americanness and not to > blackness. > > So your division of signs into just three > categories is too simple, Greg. > In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you > will discover that there are > tens of thousands of categories, but they are > generated from three > ineffable primitives ("firstness", > "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > example all words are symbols insofar as you > have to know English in order > to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But > some words are > symbol-indices, symbols that function as > indexes, because they depend > on the context of situation for their meaning. > Without the symbolic > gateway, they cannot function as indices. My > wife, for example, cannot tell > a Southerner from a more general American > accent, and I myself still have > trouble figuring out who is an Australian and > who is an FOB bloody pom. > Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness > in hiphop--it sounds like > K-pop to her. > > I don't actually think that any signs are > associative or "prehensive"; I > think that they are all different ways of > looking or apprehending. So for > example you can apprehend a wording as a > symbol: a way of organizing sound > stuff so that it "stands for" a way of > organizing other stuff (sometimes > lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of > objects and sometimes the > abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls > "projects"). You can also > look at wording as index: not as something > that is "associated" to the lips > and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or > even continguity but rather > something that has a necessary relation to the > vocal tract (which is itself > not a physiological organ, but something > brought about by human > organization). But when I look at sound waves > on my Praat spectrograph and > think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to > get at is the sound stuff, > the noise, the firstness of the stuff of > words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > think there is any way of doing this with my > eyes or ears alone: I think it > requires a very complex combination of tools > and signs to get down to > firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if > he had breakfast with > Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by > themselves, but nobody > has ever really shown the limits of what they > can do when they put each > other in order and start to organize the world > around them. > > (And that is about as much philosophy as you > are going to get out of me, > I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: > mediating activity is not > absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or > Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > from mediating activity in tool use, for the > same reason that painting is > different from wording: in painting you CAN > leave out the human (if you are > doing a dead seal for example, or if you are > Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > keep in mind that the former committed suicide > and the latter murdered two > innocent young women). But in wording you > never ever can. Wording can feel > unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated > or it doesn't work very > well--but in reality it's even more mediated > than ever. > > dk > > > On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > David (and others), > > In the interests of disagreement (which I > know you dearly appreciate), your > last post included this: > "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide > material correlates for meaning > and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > > I was with you up until that point, but > that's where I always lose you. > > I know it is a rather trite thing to say > but I guess it really depends on > what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, > you mean some plane of existence > that runs parallel to the material stuff, > then this seems to be a bit of > trouble since this leaves us with, on the > one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" > (res cogitans? phenomena?). > Matter is easy enough to locate, but where > do we locate "meaning" as you > have described it? > > This reminds me of Saussure's classic > drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > (attached) in which "the indefinite plane > of jumbled ideas" (A in the > diagram) exists on one side of the chasm > and "the equally vague plane of > sounds" (B) exists on the other side of > the chasm. Each side is > self-contained and self-referential, and > never the twain shall meet. Worlds > apart. > > And this ties to the conversation in the > other thread about the > ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's > Marx quote about a science of > language that is shorn from life). My > suspicion is that this supposed > ineffability of meaning has everything to > do with this Saussurean approach > to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > > Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a > different approach that may give > a way out of this trouble by putting the > word back INto the world. (p. 102 > of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > > Peirce offers three kinds of relations of > representamen (signifier) to > object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. > The symbol is the relation with > which we are most familiar - it is the one > that Saussure speaks of and is > the one that is ineffable or, in > Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > "conventional". It is the stuff of words, > the meaning of which is found in > other words (hence the sense of > ineffability). With only the symbolic > function, the whole world of words would > be entirely self-referential and > thus truly ineffable (and this is why I > like to say that Derrida is the end > of the Saussurean road - he took that idea > to its logical conclusion and > discovered that the meaning of meaning is, > well, empty (and thus > ineffable)). > > But Peirce has two other relations of > representamen to object, the iconic > and the indexical. In signs functioning > iconically, the representamen > contains some quality of the object that > it represents (e.g., a map that > holds relations of the space that it > represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > in which the representamen has some of the > qualities of the sound of the > bee flying by). With signs functioning > indexically, the relationship of > representamen to object is one of temporal > or spatial contiguity (e.g., > where there is smoke there is fire, or > where there is a Southern twang, > there is a Southerner, or, most > classically, when I point, the object to > which I am pointing is spatially > contiguous with the finger that is > pointing). > > Now if I follow the argument of another of > the inheritors of Roman > Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein > (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > only inheritors of this tradition - > Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > Harvard... and he does a great impression > of Jacobson too), then we can > indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., > the symbolic function) in the > more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) > indexical function. > > But that argument is always a bit too much > for me (if there are any takers, > the best place to find this argument is in > Silverstein's chapter > "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic > Function," or in less explicit but > slightly more understandable article > "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > Sociolinguistics Life"). > > Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more > elegant and comprehensible: in > ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the > index, first as the index par > excellence, pointing (something that, as > Andy has previously pointed out, > might not be exactly how things go in a > literal sense, but the general > structure here works well, I think, as a > heuristic if nothing else - words > are first learned as indexes, temporally > and spatially collocated, "bottle" > is first uttered as a way of saying > "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > co-present object; note this is also why > young kids get discourse markers > at such a young age (and seems incredibly > precocious when they do!), since > discourse markers are primarily > indexical). The indexical function is the > rudimentary form that then provides the > groundwork for the development of > the symbolic function. > > So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) > approach, the meaning of signs is not > ineffable, there is a grounding for words, > and that grounding is the > indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in > the world and of the world. > > This seems to me a way of putting meaning > back into matter. And perhaps > speaking of words as the material > correlates of meaning can be a useful > heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk > about meanings and concepts given our > current set of meanings/concepts?). But we > should also recognize that if it > becomes more than an heuristic it can lead > us astray if we take it too far. > > I'd add here that I think one of the > greatest opportunities for CHAT to > make a contribution to social science > today is in its conceptualization of > "concepts" (and, by extension, > "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > of the most taken-for-granted aspects of > social science today is the idea > that we know what "concepts" are. In > anthropology, people easily talk about > "cultural concepts" and typically they > mean precisely something that floats > around in some ethereal plane of > "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > material stuff of the world. Yet, this > runs counter to the direction that > anthropology is heading these days with > the so-called "ontological turn" > (I'll hold off on explaining this for now > since this post is already > running way too long, but I'll just > mention that one of the aims of this is > to get to a non-dualistic social science). > CHAT's conception of the concept > seems to me to offer precisely what is > needed -- a way of understanding the > concept as a fundamentally cultural and > historical thing, rather than > simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is > the holding of a(n historical) > relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse > or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > are thus little historical text-lets. > > Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will > find some time in the future to > return to that last part, but there is no > time to develop it further now. > > Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the > opportunity to catch up to these > conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > > I'll keep reading but no promises that > I'll be able to comment (as a young > scholar, I need to be spending my time > putting stuff out - and unlike the > rest of you, I'm no good at > multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > for me). > > Very best, > greg > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David > Kellogg > > wrote: > > Well, yes. But if present day > conditions are the REVERSE of the > > conditions > > under which Vygotsky was writing--that > is, if the present trend is to > subsume labor under language instead > of the other way around--don't we > > need > > this distinction between signs and > tools more than ever? That is, if > > sloppy > > formulations like "cultural capital", > "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > value of the word" are erasing the > distinction between a mediating > > activity > > which acts on the environment and a > mediating activity which acts on > > other > > mediators and on the self, and which > therefore has the potential for > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this > exactly where the clear-eyed > philosophers need to step in and > straighten us out? > > I think that instead what is happening > is that our older generation > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present > company--usually--excluded) are too > interested in the "tool power" of > large categories and insufficiently > interested in fine distinctions that > make a difference. But perhaps it > is also that our younger generation of > misty-eyed philosophers are, as > Eagleton remarked, more interested in > copulating bodies than exploited > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that > do make a difference equally allow > generalization and abstraction and > tool power, and the copulating flesh > > and > > the exploited muscles are one and the > same. > > Take, for example, your remark about > the Fourier transform performed by > > the > > ear (not the brain--the inner ear > cochlea--I can see the world centre for > studying the cochlea from my office > window). Actually, it's part of a > > wide > > range of "realisation" phenomena that > were already being noticed by > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, > you don't have cause and effect, > > just > > as in cause and effect you don't have > "association". Words don't "cause" > meaning: they provide material > correlates for meaning and in that sense > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does > not "cause" wording; it correlates > wording to a semantics--an activity of > consciousness--and through it to a > context of situation or culture, and > in that sense "realises" it. > > So in his lecture on early childhood, > Vygotsky says that the > > stabilization > > of forms, colours, and sizes by the > eye in early childhood is part of a > > two > > way relationship, a dialogue, between > the sense organs and the brain. The > reason why we don't see a table as a > trapezoid, when we stand over it and > compare the front with the back, the > reason why we don't see a piece of > chalk at nighttime as black, the > reason why we have orthoscopic > > perception > > and we don't see a man at a distance > as a looming midget is that the > > brain > > imposes the contrary views on the eye. > And where does the brain get this > view if not from language and from > other people? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy > Blunden > wrote: > > Personally, I think the first and > most persistently important thing is > > to > > see how much alike are tables and > words. > > But ... Vygotsky was very > insistent on the distinction > because he was > fighting a battle against the idea > that speech ought to be subsumed > > under > > the larger category of labour. He > had to fight for semiotics against a > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. > But we here in 2017 are living in > different times, where we have > Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > Marxism is widely regarded as > antique. As Marx said "Just as > > philosophers > > have given thought an independent > existence, so they were bound to make > language into an independent > realm." and we live well and truly > in the > times when labour is subsumed > under language, and not the other way > > around. > > Everyone knows that a table is > unlike a word. The point it to > > understand > > how tables are signs and word are > material objects. > > Andy > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked > in an offshoot of the bionic ear > project. The ear has a little > keyboard that works like a piano > keyboard > > in > > reverse, making a real time > Fourier transform of that air > pressure wave > > and > > coding the harmonics it in nerve > impulse. The brain never hears that > pressure signal.) > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil wrote: > > David (and or Mike, Andy, > anyone else), could you give a > bit more on > > that > > distinction between words and > tables? > > And could you say how (and > whether) (human, hand) nails > are different > from tables; and then how > nails are different from words? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > edu> > > on behalf of David Kellogg > > > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff > of Words > > Gordon Wells quotes this from > an article Mike wrote in a > Festschrift > > for > > George Miller. Mike is talking > about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they > contain in coded form the > interactions of > which they > were previously a part and > which they mediate in the > present (e.g., > > the > > structure of > a pencil carries within it the > history of certain forms of > writing). > > They > > are material > in that they are embodied in > material artifacts. This principle > > applies > > with equal > force whether one is > considering language/speech or > the more usually > > noted > > forms > of artifacts such as tables > and knives which constitute > material > > culture. > > What > differentiates a word, such as > ?language? from, say, a table. > is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal > aspects. No word exists apart > from its > material > instantiation (as a > configuration of sound waves, > or hand movements, > > or > > as > > writing, > or as neuronal activity), > whereas every table embodies > an order > > imposed > > by > > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that > regularly gets me thrown out of > > journals > > by > > the ear. Mike says that the > difference between a word and > a table is > > the > > relative salience of the ideal > and the material. Sure--words > are full > > of > > the ideal, and tables are full > of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other > way around. Why? Well, because > a word > without some word-stuff (sound > or graphite) just isn't a > word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with > material sounding: change one, > and you > change the other. But with a > table, what you start with is > the idea of > > the > > table; as soon as you've got > that idea, you've got a table. > You could > change the material to > anything and you'd still have > a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out > by the ear. But he does ignore the > > delightful > > perversity in what Mike is > saying, and what he gets out > of the quote > > is > > just that words are really > just like tools. When in fact > Mike is > > saying > > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is > Mike's notion that the > structure of a pencil > carries within it the history > of certain forms of writing. > Does he > > mean > > that the length of the pencil > reflects how often it's been > used? Or is > > he > > making a more archaeological > point about graphite, wood, > rubber and > > their > > relationship to a certain > point in the history of > writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more > like tables than like > words--the idea has > > to > > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon May 8 08:24:41 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 15:24:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> , Message-ID: <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> Hi all, on the question whether there can be a language having one word, David brings the example: "What? That! Where? There! When? Then! Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and the "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to answer: a? a! eh? eh! e? e..." I find it interesting that, in these examples, the rising and falling belong to a situational relation between two: RISE is an invitation to FALL and vice versa. It is the difference between the two what matters. And this difference seems to be a 'correlation' (if I were to use the term David has been using) of the very organic fact that actions have consequences and that it is this relation the minimal unit that living organisms are concerned about. If organisms (unlike stones) do register (encode) not just actions and not just consequences, but relations between actions and consequences, the feature of language that David is pointing at seems to be also a feature of organic life in general. I find this thought interesting if we are to think of language as an expression of biology/culture identity. I am laying this thought here without much knowledge of linguistics, but I thought that this may resonate with what the discussion is unfolding, particularly the question on indexicals as per, for example, Greg's last comments. Does it? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 08 May 2017 04:28 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy (and others), > > I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. > > One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap > is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using > Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are > signs which have referential value but their referential > value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic > example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I > can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it > seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as > translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is > "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. > > As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the > importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He > calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of > discourse (and without which, our discourse would be > meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's > essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case > for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the > talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand > quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by > following how different participant deictics are deployed. > > Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear > about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. > > Thanks, > -greg > > > On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a > Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they > see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see > Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be > utterly incapable of managing his own life as the > foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce > was a Logician who invented two different schools of > philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > > I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular > because it is a logical triad which Hegel never > theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us > understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, > Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is > acquired by human beings, which is an idea I > appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he > overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics > and his Pragmaticism. > > A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > David and Andy, > I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, > secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and > certainly you were part of that discussion. I > would like to understand that better, also how it > relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, > indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your > ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that > might relate, which I hope so, since it would > bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), > Andy?s Academia articles on political > representation and activity/social theory are > probably relevant in some way, though Andy > probably sees language as a figure against a > larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns > the figure/ground relationship around? > Henry > > > On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > Greg: > > (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually > don't see these problems > until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > > Meaning is simply another word for > organization. Organization is always > present and never separable from matter: it's > a property of matter, the way > that the internet is a property of a computer. > Sometimes this organization > is brought about without any human > intervention (if you are religious, you > will say that it brought about divinely, and > if you are Spinozan, by > nature: it amounts to the same thing, because > "Deus Sive Natura"). > Sometimes it is brought about by human > ingenuity (but of course if you are > religious you will say that it is the divine > in humans at work, and if you > are Spinozan you will say that humans are > simply that part of nature which > has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii > think it amounts to the same > thing). So of course there are not two kinds > of substance, res cogitans vs > res extensa, only one substance and different > ways of organizing it (which > in the end amount to the same thing). > > You say that discourse particles like "Guess > what?" and "so there" and > "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say > to the contrary > notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, > insofar as they depend on their > relationship to the context of situation for > their meaning. You say that a > Southern drawl is indexical, and that the > relationship of jazz or blues or > hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, > insofar as they satisfy the > condition I just mentioned. But "because" is > also a symbol, and a > Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when > he/she moves to New York > City (and in fact you can argue they sound > more so). In Africa, jazz and > blues and hiphop in Africa are related to > Americanness and not to > blackness. > > So your division of signs into just three > categories is too simple, Greg. > In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you > will discover that there are > tens of thousands of categories, but they are > generated from three > ineffable primitives ("firstness", > "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > example all words are symbols insofar as you > have to know English in order > to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But > some words are > symbol-indices, symbols that function as > indexes, because they depend > on the context of situation for their meaning. > Without the symbolic > gateway, they cannot function as indices. My > wife, for example, cannot tell > a Southerner from a more general American > accent, and I myself still have > trouble figuring out who is an Australian and > who is an FOB bloody pom. > Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness > in hiphop--it sounds like > K-pop to her. > > I don't actually think that any signs are > associative or "prehensive"; I > think that they are all different ways of > looking or apprehending. So for > example you can apprehend a wording as a > symbol: a way of organizing sound > stuff so that it "stands for" a way of > organizing other stuff (sometimes > lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of > objects and sometimes the > abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls > "projects"). You can also > look at wording as index: not as something > that is "associated" to the lips > and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or > even continguity but rather > something that has a necessary relation to the > vocal tract (which is itself > not a physiological organ, but something > brought about by human > organization). But when I look at sound waves > on my Praat spectrograph and > think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to > get at is the sound stuff, > the noise, the firstness of the stuff of > words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > think there is any way of doing this with my > eyes or ears alone: I think it > requires a very complex combination of tools > and signs to get down to > firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if > he had breakfast with > Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by > themselves, but nobody > has ever really shown the limits of what they > can do when they put each > other in order and start to organize the world > around them. > > (And that is about as much philosophy as you > are going to get out of me, > I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: > mediating activity is not > absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or > Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > from mediating activity in tool use, for the > same reason that painting is > different from wording: in painting you CAN > leave out the human (if you are > doing a dead seal for example, or if you are > Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > keep in mind that the former committed suicide > and the latter murdered two > innocent young women). But in wording you > never ever can. Wording can feel > unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated > or it doesn't work very > well--but in reality it's even more mediated > than ever. > > dk > > > On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > David (and others), > > In the interests of disagreement (which I > know you dearly appreciate), your > last post included this: > "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide > material correlates for meaning > and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > > I was with you up until that point, but > that's where I always lose you. > > I know it is a rather trite thing to say > but I guess it really depends on > what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, > you mean some plane of existence > that runs parallel to the material stuff, > then this seems to be a bit of > trouble since this leaves us with, on the > one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" > (res cogitans? phenomena?). > Matter is easy enough to locate, but where > do we locate "meaning" as you > have described it? > > This reminds me of Saussure's classic > drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > (attached) in which "the indefinite plane > of jumbled ideas" (A in the > diagram) exists on one side of the chasm > and "the equally vague plane of > sounds" (B) exists on the other side of > the chasm. Each side is > self-contained and self-referential, and > never the twain shall meet. Worlds > apart. > > And this ties to the conversation in the > other thread about the > ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's > Marx quote about a science of > language that is shorn from life). My > suspicion is that this supposed > ineffability of meaning has everything to > do with this Saussurean approach > to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > > Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a > different approach that may give > a way out of this trouble by putting the > word back INto the world. (p. 102 > of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > > Peirce offers three kinds of relations of > representamen (signifier) to > object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. > The symbol is the relation with > which we are most familiar - it is the one > that Saussure speaks of and is > the one that is ineffable or, in > Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > "conventional". It is the stuff of words, > the meaning of which is found in > other words (hence the sense of > ineffability). With only the symbolic > function, the whole world of words would > be entirely self-referential and > thus truly ineffable (and this is why I > like to say that Derrida is the end > of the Saussurean road - he took that idea > to its logical conclusion and > discovered that the meaning of meaning is, > well, empty (and thus > ineffable)). > > But Peirce has two other relations of > representamen to object, the iconic > and the indexical. In signs functioning > iconically, the representamen > contains some quality of the object that > it represents (e.g., a map that > holds relations of the space that it > represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > in which the representamen has some of the > qualities of the sound of the > bee flying by). With signs functioning > indexically, the relationship of > representamen to object is one of temporal > or spatial contiguity (e.g., > where there is smoke there is fire, or > where there is a Southern twang, > there is a Southerner, or, most > classically, when I point, the object to > which I am pointing is spatially > contiguous with the finger that is > pointing). > > Now if I follow the argument of another of > the inheritors of Roman > Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein > (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > only inheritors of this tradition - > Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > Harvard... and he does a great impression > of Jacobson too), then we can > indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., > the symbolic function) in the > more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) > indexical function. > > But that argument is always a bit too much > for me (if there are any takers, > the best place to find this argument is in > Silverstein's chapter > "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic > Function," or in less explicit but > slightly more understandable article > "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > Sociolinguistics Life"). > > Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more > elegant and comprehensible: in > ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the > index, first as the index par > excellence, pointing (something that, as > Andy has previously pointed out, > might not be exactly how things go in a > literal sense, but the general > structure here works well, I think, as a > heuristic if nothing else - words > are first learned as indexes, temporally > and spatially collocated, "bottle" > is first uttered as a way of saying > "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > co-present object; note this is also why > young kids get discourse markers > at such a young age (and seems incredibly > precocious when they do!), since > discourse markers are primarily > indexical). The indexical function is the > rudimentary form that then provides the > groundwork for the development of > the symbolic function. > > So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) > approach, the meaning of signs is not > ineffable, there is a grounding for words, > and that grounding is the > indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in > the world and of the world. > > This seems to me a way of putting meaning > back into matter. And perhaps > speaking of words as the material > correlates of meaning can be a useful > heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk > about meanings and concepts given our > current set of meanings/concepts?). But we > should also recognize that if it > becomes more than an heuristic it can lead > us astray if we take it too far. > > I'd add here that I think one of the > greatest opportunities for CHAT to > make a contribution to social science > today is in its conceptualization of > "concepts" (and, by extension, > "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > of the most taken-for-granted aspects of > social science today is the idea > that we know what "concepts" are. In > anthropology, people easily talk about > "cultural concepts" and typically they > mean precisely something that floats > around in some ethereal plane of > "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > material stuff of the world. Yet, this > runs counter to the direction that > anthropology is heading these days with > the so-called "ontological turn" > (I'll hold off on explaining this for now > since this post is already > running way too long, but I'll just > mention that one of the aims of this is > to get to a non-dualistic social science). > CHAT's conception of the concept > seems to me to offer precisely what is > needed -- a way of understanding the > concept as a fundamentally cultural and > historical thing, rather than > simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is > the holding of a(n historical) > relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse > or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > are thus little historical text-lets. > > Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will > find some time in the future to > return to that last part, but there is no > time to develop it further now. > > Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the > opportunity to catch up to these > conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > > I'll keep reading but no promises that > I'll be able to comment (as a young > scholar, I need to be spending my time > putting stuff out - and unlike the > rest of you, I'm no good at > multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > for me). > > Very best, > greg > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David > Kellogg > > wrote: > > Well, yes. But if present day > conditions are the REVERSE of the > > conditions > > under which Vygotsky was writing--that > is, if the present trend is to > subsume labor under language instead > of the other way around--don't we > > need > > this distinction between signs and > tools more than ever? That is, if > > sloppy > > formulations like "cultural capital", > "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > value of the word" are erasing the > distinction between a mediating > > activity > > which acts on the environment and a > mediating activity which acts on > > other > > mediators and on the self, and which > therefore has the potential for > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this > exactly where the clear-eyed > philosophers need to step in and > straighten us out? > > I think that instead what is happening > is that our older generation > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present > company--usually--excluded) are too > interested in the "tool power" of > large categories and insufficiently > interested in fine distinctions that > make a difference. But perhaps it > is also that our younger generation of > misty-eyed philosophers are, as > Eagleton remarked, more interested in > copulating bodies than exploited > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that > do make a difference equally allow > generalization and abstraction and > tool power, and the copulating flesh > > and > > the exploited muscles are one and the > same. > > Take, for example, your remark about > the Fourier transform performed by > > the > > ear (not the brain--the inner ear > cochlea--I can see the world centre for > studying the cochlea from my office > window). Actually, it's part of a > > wide > > range of "realisation" phenomena that > were already being noticed by > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, > you don't have cause and effect, > > just > > as in cause and effect you don't have > "association". Words don't "cause" > meaning: they provide material > correlates for meaning and in that sense > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does > not "cause" wording; it correlates > wording to a semantics--an activity of > consciousness--and through it to a > context of situation or culture, and > in that sense "realises" it. > > So in his lecture on early childhood, > Vygotsky says that the > > stabilization > > of forms, colours, and sizes by the > eye in early childhood is part of a > > two > > way relationship, a dialogue, between > the sense organs and the brain. The > reason why we don't see a table as a > trapezoid, when we stand over it and > compare the front with the back, the > reason why we don't see a piece of > chalk at nighttime as black, the > reason why we have orthoscopic > > perception > > and we don't see a man at a distance > as a looming midget is that the > > brain > > imposes the contrary views on the eye. > And where does the brain get this > view if not from language and from > other people? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy > Blunden > wrote: > > Personally, I think the first and > most persistently important thing is > > to > > see how much alike are tables and > words. > > But ... Vygotsky was very > insistent on the distinction > because he was > fighting a battle against the idea > that speech ought to be subsumed > > under > > the larger category of labour. He > had to fight for semiotics against a > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. > But we here in 2017 are living in > different times, where we have > Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > Marxism is widely regarded as > antique. As Marx said "Just as > > philosophers > > have given thought an independent > existence, so they were bound to make > language into an independent > realm." and we live well and truly > in the > times when labour is subsumed > under language, and not the other way > > around. > > Everyone knows that a table is > unlike a word. The point it to > > understand > > how tables are signs and word are > material objects. > > Andy > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked > in an offshoot of the bionic ear > project. The ear has a little > keyboard that works like a piano > keyboard > > in > > reverse, making a real time > Fourier transform of that air > pressure wave > > and > > coding the harmonics it in nerve > impulse. The brain never hears that > pressure signal.) > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil wrote: > > David (and or Mike, Andy, > anyone else), could you give a > bit more on > > that > > distinction between words and > tables? > > And could you say how (and > whether) (human, hand) nails > are different > from tables; and then how > nails are different from words? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > edu> > > on behalf of David Kellogg > > > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff > of Words > > Gordon Wells quotes this from > an article Mike wrote in a > Festschrift > > for > > George Miller. Mike is talking > about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they > contain in coded form the > interactions of > which they > were previously a part and > which they mediate in the > present (e.g., > > the > > structure of > a pencil carries within it the > history of certain forms of > writing). > > They > > are material > in that they are embodied in > material artifacts. This principle > > applies > > with equal > force whether one is > considering language/speech or > the more usually > > noted > > forms > of artifacts such as tables > and knives which constitute > material > > culture. > > What > differentiates a word, such as > ?language? from, say, a table. > is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal > aspects. No word exists apart > from its > material > instantiation (as a > configuration of sound waves, > or hand movements, > > or > > as > > writing, > or as neuronal activity), > whereas every table embodies > an order > > imposed > > by > > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that > regularly gets me thrown out of > > journals > > by > > the ear. Mike says that the > difference between a word and > a table is > > the > > relative salience of the ideal > and the material. Sure--words > are full > > of > > the ideal, and tables are full > of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other > way around. Why? Well, because > a word > without some word-stuff (sound > or graphite) just isn't a > word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with > material sounding: change one, > and you > change the other. But with a > table, what you start with is > the idea of > > the > > table; as soon as you've got > that idea, you've got a table. > You could > change the material to > anything and you'd still have > a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out > by the ear. But he does ignore the > > delightful > > perversity in what Mike is > saying, and what he gets out > of the quote > > is > > just that words are really > just like tools. When in fact > Mike is > > saying > > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is > Mike's notion that the > structure of a pencil > carries within it the history > of certain forms of writing. > Does he > > mean > > that the length of the pencil > reflects how often it's been > used? Or is > > he > > making a more archaeological > point about graphite, wood, > rubber and > > their > > relationship to a certain > point in the history of > writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more > like tables than like > words--the idea has > > to > > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon May 8 12:45:27 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 12:45:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> , <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <5910caf5.8d23240a.18be4.b1c7@mx.google.com> Alfredo, So ?.. Exploring the open boundary markers between the organic, rhythmic patterning (organizing?), please and the indexical. Then adding symbol-indices to the mix and also the notion of (values) as shared. This generating what David refers to as a common emerging theme. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: May 8, 2017 8:26 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; ablunden@mira.net Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words Hi all, on the question whether there can be a language having one word, David brings the example: "What? That! Where? There! When? Then! Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and the "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to answer: a? a! eh? eh! e? e..." I find it interesting that, in these examples, the rising and falling belong to a situational relation between two: RISE is an invitation to FALL and vice versa. It is the difference between the two what matters. And this difference seems to be a 'correlation' (if I were to use the term David has been using) of the very organic fact that actions have consequences and that it is this relation the minimal unit that living organisms are concerned about. If organisms (unlike stones) do register (encode) not just actions and not just consequences, but relations between actions and consequences, the feature of language that David is pointing at seems to be also a feature of organic life in general. I find this thought interesting if we are to think of language as an expression of biology/culture identity. I am laying this thought here without much knowledge of linguistics, but I thought that this may resonate with what the discussion is unfolding, particularly the question on indexicals as per, for example, Greg's last comments. Does it? Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 08 May 2017 04:28 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy (and others), > > I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. > > One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap > is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using > Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are > signs which have referential value but their referential > value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic > example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I > can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it > seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as > translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is > "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. > > As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the > importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He > calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of > discourse (and without which, our discourse would be > meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's > essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case > for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the > talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand > quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by > following how different participant deictics are deployed. > > Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear > about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. > > Thanks, > -greg > > > On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a > Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they > see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see > Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be > utterly incapable of managing his own life as the > foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce > was a Logician who invented two different schools of > philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > > I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular > because it is a logical triad which Hegel never > theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us > understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, > Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is > acquired by human beings, which is an idea I > appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he > overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics > and his Pragmaticism. > > A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > David and Andy, > I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, > secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and > certainly you were part of that discussion. I > would like to understand that better, also how it > relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, > indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your > ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that > might relate, which I hope so, since it would > bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), > Andy?s Academia articles on political > representation and activity/social theory are > probably relevant in some way, though Andy > probably sees language as a figure against a > larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns > the figure/ground relationship around? > Henry > > > On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > Greg: > > (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually > don't see these problems > until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > > Meaning is simply another word for > organization. Organization is always > present and never separable from matter: it's > a property of matter, the way > that the internet is a property of a computer. > Sometimes this organization > is brought about without any human > intervention (if you are religious, you > will say that it brought about divinely, and > if you are Spinozan, by > nature: it amounts to the same thing, because > "Deus Sive Natura"). > Sometimes it is brought about by human > ingenuity (but of course if you are > religious you will say that it is the divine > in humans at work, and if you > are Spinozan you will say that humans are > simply that part of nature which > has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii > think it amounts to the same > thing). So of course there are not two kinds > of substance, res cogitans vs > res extensa, only one substance and different > ways of organizing it (which > in the end amount to the same thing). > > You say that discourse particles like "Guess > what?" and "so there" and > "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say > to the contrary > notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, > insofar as they depend on their > relationship to the context of situation for > their meaning. You say that a > Southern drawl is indexical, and that the > relationship of jazz or blues or > hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, > insofar as they satisfy the > condition I just mentioned. But "because" is > also a symbol, and a > Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when > he/she moves to New York > City (and in fact you can argue they sound > more so). In Africa, jazz and > blues and hiphop in Africa are related to > Americanness and not to > blackness. > > So your division of signs into just three > categories is too simple, Greg. > In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you > will discover that there are > tens of thousands of categories, but they are > generated from three > ineffable primitives ("firstness", > "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > example all words are symbols insofar as you > have to know English in order > to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But > some words are > symbol-indices, symbols that function as > indexes, because they depend > on the context of situation for their meaning. > Without the symbolic > gateway, they cannot function as indices. My > wife, for example, cannot tell > a Southerner from a more general American > accent, and I myself still have > trouble figuring out who is an Australian and > who is an FOB bloody pom. > Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness > in hiphop--it sounds like > K-pop to her. > > I don't actually think that any signs are > associative or "prehensive"; I > think that they are all different ways of > looking or apprehending. So for > example you can apprehend a wording as a > symbol: a way of organizing sound > stuff so that it "stands for" a way of > organizing other stuff (sometimes > lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of > objects and sometimes the > abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls > "projects"). You can also > look at wording as index: not as something > that is "associated" to the lips > and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or > even continguity but rather > something that has a necessary relation to the > vocal tract (which is itself > not a physiological organ, but something > brought about by human > organization). But when I look at sound waves > on my Praat spectrograph and > think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to > get at is the sound stuff, > the noise, the firstness of the stuff of > words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > think there is any way of doing this with my > eyes or ears alone: I think it > requires a very complex combination of tools > and signs to get down to > firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if > he had breakfast with > Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by > themselves, but nobody > has ever really shown the limits of what they > can do when they put each > other in order and start to organize the world > around them. > > (And that is about as much philosophy as you > are going to get out of me, > I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: > mediating activity is not > absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or > Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > from mediating activity in tool use, for the > same reason that painting is > different from wording: in painting you CAN > leave out the human (if you are > doing a dead seal for example, or if you are > Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > keep in mind that the former committed suicide > and the latter murdered two > innocent young women). But in wording you > never ever can. Wording can feel > unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated > or it doesn't work very > well--but in reality it's even more mediated > than ever. > > dk > > > On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > David (and others), > > In the interests of disagreement (which I > know you dearly appreciate), your > last post included this: > "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide > material correlates for meaning > and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > > I was with you up until that point, but > that's where I always lose you. > > I know it is a rather trite thing to say > but I guess it really depends on > what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, > you mean some plane of existence > that runs parallel to the material stuff, > then this seems to be a bit of > trouble since this leaves us with, on the > one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" > (res cogitans? phenomena?). > Matter is easy enough to locate, but where > do we locate "meaning" as you > have described it? > > This reminds me of Saussure's classic > drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > (attached) in which "the indefinite plane > of jumbled ideas" (A in the > diagram) exists on one side of the chasm > and "the equally vague plane of > sounds" (B) exists on the other side of > the chasm. Each side is > self-contained and self-referential, and > never the twain shall meet. Worlds > apart. > > And this ties to the conversation in the > other thread about the > ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's > Marx quote about a science of > language that is shorn from life). My > suspicion is that this supposed > ineffability of meaning has everything to > do with this Saussurean approach > to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > > Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a > different approach that may give > a way out of this trouble by putting the > word back INto the world. (p. 102 > of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > > Peirce offers three kinds of relations of > representamen (signifier) to > object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. > The symbol is the relation with > which we are most familiar - it is the one > that Saussure speaks of and is > the one that is ineffable or, in > Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > "conventional". It is the stuff of words, > the meaning of which is found in > other words (hence the sense of > ineffability). With only the symbolic > function, the whole world of words would > be entirely self-referential and > thus truly ineffable (and this is why I > like to say that Derrida is the end > of the Saussurean road - he took that idea > to its logical conclusion and > discovered that the meaning of meaning is, > well, empty (and thus > ineffable)). > > But Peirce has two other relations of > representamen to object, the iconic > and the indexical. In signs functioning > iconically, the representamen > contains some quality of the object that > it represents (e.g., a map that > holds relations of the space that it > represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > in which the representamen has some of the > qualities of the sound of the > bee flying by). With signs functioning > indexically, the relationship of > representamen to object is one of temporal > or spatial contiguity (e.g., > where there is smoke there is fire, or > where there is a Southern twang, > there is a Southerner, or, most > classically, when I point, the object to > which I am pointing is spatially > contiguous with the finger that is > pointing). > > Now if I follow the argument of another of > the inheritors of Roman > Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein > (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > only inheritors of this tradition - > Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > Harvard... and he does a great impression > of Jacobson too), then we can > indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., > the symbolic function) in the > more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) > indexical function. > > But that argument is always a bit too much > for me (if there are any takers, > the best place to find this argument is in > Silverstein's chapter > "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic > Function," or in less explicit but > slightly more understandable article > "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > Sociolinguistics Life"). > > Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more > elegant and comprehensible: in > ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the > index, first as the index par > excellence, pointing (something that, as > Andy has previously pointed out, > might not be exactly how things go in a > literal sense, but the general > structure here works well, I think, as a > heuristic if nothing else - words > are first learned as indexes, temporally > and spatially collocated, "bottle" > is first uttered as a way of saying > "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > co-present object; note this is also why > young kids get discourse markers > at such a young age (and seems incredibly > precocious when they do!), since > discourse markers are primarily > indexical). The indexical function is the > rudimentary form that then provides the > groundwork for the development of > the symbolic function. > > So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) > approach, the meaning of signs is not > ineffable, there is a grounding for words, > and that grounding is the > indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in > the world and of the world. > > This seems to me a way of putting meaning > back into matter. And perhaps > speaking of words as the material > correlates of meaning can be a useful > heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk > about meanings and concepts given our > current set of meanings/concepts?). But we > should also recognize that if it > becomes more than an heuristic it can lead > us astray if we take it too far. > > I'd add here that I think one of the > greatest opportunities for CHAT to > make a contribution to social science > today is in its conceptualization of > "concepts" (and, by extension, > "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > of the most taken-for-granted aspects of > social science today is the idea > that we know what "concepts" are. In > anthropology, people easily talk about > "cultural concepts" and typically they > mean precisely something that floats > around in some ethereal plane of > "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > material stuff of the world. Yet, this > runs counter to the direction that > anthropology is heading these days with > the so-called "ontological turn" > (I'll hold off on explaining this for now > since this post is already > running way too long, but I'll just > mention that one of the aims of this is > to get to a non-dualistic social science). > CHAT's conception of the concept > seems to me to offer precisely what is > needed -- a way of understanding the > concept as a fundamentally cultural and > historical thing, rather than > simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is > the holding of a(n historical) > relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse > or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > are thus little historical text-lets. > > Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will > find some time in the future to > return to that last part, but there is no > time to develop it further now. > > Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the > opportunity to catch up to these > conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > > I'll keep reading but no promises that > I'll be able to comment (as a young > scholar, I need to be spending my time > putting stuff out - and unlike the > rest of you, I'm no good at > multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > for me). > > Very best, > greg > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David > Kellogg > > wrote: > > Well, yes. But if present day > conditions are the REVERSE of the > > conditions > > under which Vygotsky was writing--that > is, if the present trend is to > subsume labor under language instead > of the other way around--don't we > > need > > this distinction between signs and > tools more than ever? That is, if > > sloppy > > formulations like "cultural capital", > "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > value of the word" are erasing the > distinction between a mediating > > activity > > which acts on the environment and a > mediating activity which acts on > > other > > mediators and on the self, and which > therefore has the potential for > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this > exactly where the clear-eyed > philosophers need to step in and > straighten us out? > > I think that instead what is happening > is that our older generation > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present > company--usually--excluded) are too > interested in the "tool power" of > large categories and insufficiently > interested in fine distinctions that > make a difference. But perhaps it > is also that our younger generation of > misty-eyed philosophers are, as > Eagleton remarked, more interested in > copulating bodies than exploited > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that > do make a difference equally allow > generalization and abstraction and > tool power, and the copulating flesh > > and > > the exploited muscles are one and the > same. > > Take, for example, your remark about > the Fourier transform performed by > > the > > ear (not the brain--the inner ear > cochlea--I can see the world centre for > studying the cochlea from my office > window). Actually, it's part of a > > wide > > range of "realisation" phenomena that > were already being noticed by > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, > you don't have cause and effect, > > just > > as in cause and effect you don't have > "association". Words don't "cause" > meaning: they provide material > correlates for meaning and in that sense > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does > not "cause" wording; it correlates > wording to a semantics--an activity of > consciousness--and through it to a > context of situation or culture, and > in that sense "realises" it. > > So in his lecture on early childhood, > Vygotsky says that the > > stabilization > > of forms, colours, and sizes by the > eye in early childhood is part of a > > two > > way relationship, a dialogue, between > the sense organs and the brain. The > reason why we don't see a table as a > trapezoid, when we stand over it and > compare the front with the back, the > reason why we don't see a piece of > chalk at nighttime as black, the > reason why we have orthoscopic > > perception > > and we don't see a man at a distance > as a looming midget is that the > > brain > > imposes the contrary views on the eye. > And where does the brain get this > view if not from language and from > other people? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy > Blunden > wrote: > > Personally, I think the first and > most persistently important thing is > > to > > see how much alike are tables and > words. > > But ... Vygotsky was very > insistent on the distinction > because he was > fighting a battle against the idea > that speech ought to be subsumed > > under > > the larger category of labour. He > had to fight for semiotics against a > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. > But we here in 2017 are living in > different times, where we have > Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > Marxism is widely regarded as > antique. As Marx said "Just as > > philosophers > > have given thought an independent > existence, so they were bound to make > language into an independent > realm." and we live well and truly > in the > times when labour is subsumed > under language, and not the other way > > around. > > Everyone knows that a table is > unlike a word. The point it to > > understand > > how tables are signs and word are > material objects. > > Andy > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked > in an offshoot of the bionic ear > project. The ear has a little > keyboard that works like a piano > keyboard > > in > > reverse, making a real time > Fourier transform of that air > pressure wave > > and > > coding the harmonics it in nerve > impulse. The brain never hears that > pressure signal.) > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil wrote: > > David (and or Mike, Andy, > anyone else), could you give a > bit more on > > that > > distinction between words and > tables? > > And could you say how (and > whether) (human, hand) nails > are different > from tables; and then how > nails are different from words? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > edu> > > on behalf of David Kellogg > > > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff > of Words > > Gordon Wells quotes this from > an article Mike wrote in a > Festschrift > > for > > George Miller. Mike is talking > about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in that they > contain in coded form the > interactions of > which they > were previously a part and > which they mediate in the > present (e.g., > > the > > structure of > a pencil carries within it the > history of certain forms of > writing). > > They > > are material > in that they are embodied in > material artifacts. This principle > > applies > > with equal > force whether one is > considering language/speech or > the more usually > > noted > > forms > of artifacts such as tables > and knives which constitute > material > > culture. > > What > differentiates a word, such as > ?language? from, say, a table. > is the > relative prominence > of their material and ideal > aspects. No word exists apart > from its > material > instantiation (as a > configuration of sound waves, > or hand movements, > > or > > as > > writing, > or as neuronal activity), > whereas every table embodies > an order > > imposed > > by > > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of thing that > regularly gets me thrown out of > > journals > > by > > the ear. Mike says that the > difference between a word and > a table is > > the > > relative salience of the ideal > and the material. Sure--words > are full > > of > > the ideal, and tables are full > of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's the other > way around. Why? Well, because > a word > without some word-stuff (sound > or graphite) just isn't a > word. In a > word, meaning is solidary with > material sounding: change one, > and you > change the other. But with a > table, what you start with is > the idea of > > the > > table; as soon as you've got > that idea, you've got a table. > You could > change the material to > anything and you'd still have > a table. > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out > by the ear. But he does ignore the > > delightful > > perversity in what Mike is > saying, and what he gets out > of the quote > > is > > just that words are really > just like tools. When in fact > Mike is > > saying > > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is > Mike's notion that the > structure of a pencil > carries within it the history > of certain forms of writing. > Does he > > mean > > that the length of the pencil > reflects how often it's been > used? Or is > > he > > making a more archaeological > point about graphite, wood, > rubber and > > their > > relationship to a certain > point in the history of > writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more > like tables than like > words--the idea has > > to > > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon May 8 14:27:34 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 07:27:34 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <4953A4D2-DBFC-4B94-B8E6-7617FBB2F13E@gmail.com> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <4953A4D2-DBFC-4B94-B8E6-7617FBB2F13E@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry: One useful thing Peirce teaches us is to think of the pragmatic fruit of our belief rather than the truth conditions. So, Peirce taught logic at Johns Hopkins. Remember, this was during the revolutionary reconstruction of the South--and in Baltimore. In one of his classes, he began with a demonstration of the need to replace Aristotelian logic. He used this syllogism: All men have equal political rights. Negroes are men. Therefore, negroes have equal political rights with white people. Since the conclusion was absurd, Peirce argued, Aristotelian logic must be fundaementally inadequate. By their fruits... David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 11:43 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > David, > Having read your post, and re-reading, I end up thinking that Peirce?s > firstness/secondness/thirdness distinctions doesn?t help me understand > language, not like index/icon/symbol does. My loss probably. > > Also, your thoughts on the question, ?Is a language has only one word a > language?? make me think about a question I used to ask my students in my > intro to linguistics: ?Can animals have language?? They never believed me > when I said that that they can't. I proved it by saying that animals don?t > have the property of displacement, that is the ability to talk about things > removed in time and space. After years of patiently, but firmly, rejecting > their claims of animal language, I gave up. Could a language with only one > word displace? > > Henry > > > > On May 7, 2017, at 6:45 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Ruqaiya Hasan used to say that the natural condition of language use is a > > context of situation. That is, a word like "he" or "the" or even "of" is > > more typical of language use than a word like "coke bottle", and the > > relationship of wording to meaning is really a natural relationship, > > utterly unlike the relationship of sounding to wording (which is > > conventional). > > > > You can see this in a lot of ways. One is simply frequency: in any > English > > text of sufficient size, "the" will always be twice as frequent as the > next > > most frequent words. In any list of the most frequent words in English, > the > > top one hundred or so are so-called "functors", not words like "coke" or > > "bottle" or "gather". Another is, of course, ontogenesis: children start > > their journey into language by referring to the context of situation; > it's > > hard to see how else they could possible do it. There is also a rather > > abstract, technical argument by Voloshinov that I sometimes like to think > > about; he is answering the question that N.Ya. Marr used to ask, whether > a > > language that has only one word is still a language, and what the one > word > > would be. Voloshinov concludes it would be a THEME (that is, it would be > > indicative, demonstrative, deictic--not signifying) and it would indeed > be > > a language, because the essence of language is really "smysl" and not > > "znachenie" (it is ever-changing dynamic theme and not self-similar > > "meaning"). > > > > I like to think that in English it would go something like this: > > > > What? That! > > Where? There! > > When? Then! > > > > Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and > the > > "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to > answer: > > > > a? a! > > eh? eh! > > e? e... > > > > That's a language. In fact, I rather think it's the origin of all > language; > > it's why Marr might just have been right to assume that there wasn't any > > one original language, but that there was, possibly, an original word, > > invented and reinvented hundreds of thousands of times in human history, > > and constantly being reinvented by newborn children before our very eyes. > > > > But as you can see, Ruqaiya was right. Its natural condition of use is a > > context of situation. The problem is that the natural condition of > language > > study is NOT a context of situation. It's more like the office I'm > sitting > > in, the library where I will spend most of today, or the laboratory > where I > > try to get back to the firstness of word stuff. That's how we get > theories > > like Saussure's: Saussure tries to cut off all language from "parole", > that > > is, from context and use, and also from history, and the result is more > or > > less what Greg said: a purely dualistic, entirely idealistic, and wholly > > language-internal theory. > > > > Saussure was a brilliant phonologist; his theory is able to explain > pretty > > well why it is that any sound stuff can express any meaning stuff. But he > > hit on the only completely conventional part of the whole language > system, > > and then he overgeneralized. There isn't anything conventional about the > > relationship of meaning to grammar: there are very good reasons, for > > example, why entities are typically nouns and processes are typically > > verbs. It's not because we have that much of a universal grammar. It's > > because we have that much of a universal context of situation. > > > > Does Peirce help much? Not if we take him at his word: I can't really > > understand how, for example, a mark of graphite on paper expresses the > > Euclid's idea of line or why an algebraic equation is an index and not a > > symbol. Yet there is an obvious difference between the way a child learns > > that everybody has two feet, the way that we see a footprint and think of > > the foot that made it, and the way that we encode a foot as a "foot". > These > > are not completely separate kinds of meaning-making (the word "foot" is > > ALSO an index, because it "points" to the vocal tract that produced it or > > the pencil that wrote it, and it is ALSO an icon because it is made of > the > > stuff of words. So in that sense it really is a way out of the > > decontextualized heads that Saussure tried to put us in. And a way back > to > > the natural condition of language use, which is the context of situation. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > PS: For reasons I don't understand, I'm not getting any of Haydi's > stuff. I > > see people referring to it, and I sometimes see it at the end of their > > posts, but it's never in my inbox. I miss you, Haydi! > > > > dk > > > > > > On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> David and Andy, > >> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, secondness and thirdness on > the > >> chat before, and certainly you were part of that discussion. I would > like > >> to understand that better, also how it relates to the three categories > of > >> signs (iconic, indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your > ?Thinking > >> of Feeling? piece and wonder how that might relate, which I hope so, > since > >> it would bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), Andy?s Academia > >> articles on political representation and activity/social theory are > >> probably relevant in some way, though Andy probably sees language as a > >> figure against a larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns the > >> figure/ground relationship around? > >> Henry > >> > >> > >>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>> > >>> Greg: > >>> > >>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually don't see these problems > >>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > >>> > >>> Meaning is simply another word for organization. Organization is always > >>> present and never separable from matter: it's a property of matter, the > >> way > >>> that the internet is a property of a computer. Sometimes this > >> organization > >>> is brought about without any human intervention (if you are religious, > >> you > >>> will say that it brought about divinely, and if you are Spinozan, by > >>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because "Deus Sive Natura"). > >>> Sometimes it is brought about by human ingenuity (but of course if you > >> are > >>> religious you will say that it is the divine in humans at work, and if > >> you > >>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are simply that part of nature > >> which > >>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii think it amounts to the > >> same > >>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds of substance, res cogitans > >> vs > >>> res extensa, only one substance and different ways of organizing it > >> (which > >>> in the end amount to the same thing). > >>> > >>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess what?" and "so there" and > >>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say to the contrary > >>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, insofar as they depend on > >> their > >>> relationship to the context of situation for their meaning. You say > that > >> a > >>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the relationship of jazz or blues > >> or > >>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, insofar as they satisfy the > >>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is also a symbol, and a > >>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when he/she moves to New York > >>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound more so). In Africa, jazz > and > >>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to Americanness and not to > >>> blackness. > >>> > >>> So your division of signs into just three categories is too simple, > Greg. > >>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you will discover that there > are > >>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are generated from three > >>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", "secondness", and "thirdness"). So > for > >>> example all words are symbols insofar as you have to know English in > >> order > >>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But some words are > >>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as indexes, because they depend > >>> on the context of situation for their meaning. Without the symbolic > >>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My wife, for example, cannot > >> tell > >>> a Southerner from a more general American accent, and I myself still > have > >>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and who is an FOB bloody pom. > >>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness in hiphop--it sounds like > >>> K-pop to her. > >>> > >>> I don't actually think that any signs are associative or "prehensive"; > I > >>> think that they are all different ways of looking or apprehending. So > for > >>> example you can apprehend a wording as a symbol: a way of organizing > >> sound > >>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of organizing other stuff > (sometimes > >>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of objects and sometimes > the > >>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls "projects"). You can also > >>> look at wording as index: not as something that is "associated" to the > >> lips > >>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or even continguity but rather > >>> something that has a necessary relation to the vocal tract (which is > >> itself > >>> not a physiological organ, but something brought about by human > >>> organization). But when I look at sound waves on my Praat spectrograph > >> and > >>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to get at is the sound > stuff, > >>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of words. I'm not Cezanne: I > don't > >>> think there is any way of doing this with my eyes or ears alone: I > think > >> it > >>> requires a very complex combination of tools and signs to get down to > >>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if he had breakfast with > >>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by themselves, but nobody > >>> has ever really shown the limits of what they can do when they put each > >>> other in order and start to organize the world around them. > >>> > >>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you are going to get out of > me, > >>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Macquarie University > >>> > >>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: mediating activity is not > >>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or Wolff-Michael, but it is very > >> different > >>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the same reason that painting > is > >>> different from wording: in painting you CAN leave out the human (if you > >> are > >>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are Rothko or Jackson > >> Pollack--but > >>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide and the latter murdered > >> two > >>> innocent young women). But in wording you never ever can. Wording can > >> feel > >>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated or it doesn't work very > >>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated than ever. > >>> > >>> dk > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > >>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> David (and others), > >>>> > >>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I know you dearly appreciate), > >> your > >>>> last post included this: > >>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide material correlates for > >> meaning > >>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > >>>> > >>>> I was with you up until that point, but that's where I always lose > you. > >>>> > >>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say but I guess it really depends > >> on > >>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, you mean some plane of > >> existence > >>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, then this seems to be a bit > of > >>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the one hand, "matter" (res > >> extensa? > >>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" (res cogitans? phenomena?). > >>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where do we locate "meaning" as > you > >>>> have described it? > >>>> > >>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > >>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas" (A in the > >>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm and "the equally vague plane > of > >>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of the chasm. Each side is > >>>> self-contained and self-referential, and never the twain shall meet. > >> Worlds > >>>> apart. > >>>> > >>>> And this ties to the conversation in the other thread about the > >>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's Marx quote about a science > of > >>>> language that is shorn from life). My suspicion is that this supposed > >>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to do with this Saussurean > >> approach > >>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > >>>> > >>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a different approach that may > >> give > >>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the word back INto the world. (p. > >> 102 > >>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > >>>> > >>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of representamen (signifier) to > >>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. The symbol is the relation > with > >>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one that Saussure speaks of and > >> is > >>>> the one that is ineffable or, in Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > >>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, the meaning of which is > found > >> in > >>>> other words (hence the sense of ineffability). With only the symbolic > >>>> function, the whole world of words would be entirely self-referential > >> and > >>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I like to say that Derrida is > the > >> end > >>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea to its logical conclusion > and > >>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, well, empty (and thus > >>>> ineffable)). > >>>> > >>>> But Peirce has two other relations of representamen to object, the > >> iconic > >>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning iconically, the representamen > >>>> contains some quality of the object that it represents (e.g., a map > that > >>>> holds relations of the space that it represents or onomatopoeia like > >> "buzz" > >>>> in which the representamen has some of the qualities of the sound of > the > >>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning indexically, the relationship > of > >>>> representamen to object is one of temporal or spatial contiguity > (e.g., > >>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or where there is a Southern > twang, > >>>> there is a Southerner, or, most classically, when I point, the object > to > >>>> which I am pointing is spatially contiguous with the finger that is > >>>> pointing). > >>>> > >>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of the inheritors of Roman > >>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein (yes, Hasan and Halliday > weren't > >> the > >>>> only inheritors of this tradition - Michael was a student of > Jakobson's > >> at > >>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression of Jacobson too), then we > can > >>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., the symbolic function) in > the > >>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) indexical function. > >>>> > >>>> But that argument is always a bit too much for me (if there are any > >> takers, > >>>> the best place to find this argument is in Silverstein's chapter > >>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic Function," or in less explicit > >> but > >>>> slightly more understandable article "Indexical Order and the > >> Dialectics of > >>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). > >>>> > >>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more elegant and comprehensible: in > >>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the index, first as the index par > >>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as Andy has previously pointed > >> out, > >>>> might not be exactly how things go in a literal sense, but the general > >>>> structure here works well, I think, as a heuristic if nothing else - > >> words > >>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally and spatially collocated, > >> "bottle" > >>>> is first uttered as a way of saying "thirsty" and then later to refer > >> to a > >>>> co-present object; note this is also why young kids get discourse > >> markers > >>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly precocious when they do!), > >> since > >>>> discourse markers are primarily indexical). The indexical function is > >> the > >>>> rudimentary form that then provides the groundwork for the development > >> of > >>>> the symbolic function. > >>>> > >>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) approach, the meaning of signs > is > >> not > >>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, and that grounding is the > >>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in the world and of the world. > >>>> > >>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning back into matter. And > perhaps > >>>> speaking of words as the material correlates of meaning can be a > useful > >>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk about meanings and concepts > given > >> our > >>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we should also recognize that > >> if it > >>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead us astray if we take it too > >> far. > >>>> > >>>> I'd add here that I think one of the greatest opportunities for CHAT > to > >>>> make a contribution to social science today is in its > conceptualization > >> of > >>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps > >> one > >>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of social science today is the > >> idea > >>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In anthropology, people easily talk > >> about > >>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they mean precisely something that > >> floats > >>>> around in some ethereal plane of "meaningfulness" and which is not of > >> the > >>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this runs counter to the direction > >> that > >>>> anthropology is heading these days with the so-called "ontological > turn" > >>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now since this post is already > >>>> running way too long, but I'll just mention that one of the aims of > >> this is > >>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). CHAT's conception of the > >> concept > >>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is needed -- a way of > understanding > >> the > >>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and historical thing, rather than > >>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is the holding of a(n > >> historical) > >>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse or Peirce's sunflower). > >> Concepts > >>>> are thus little historical text-lets. > >>>> > >>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will find some time in the future > to > >>>> return to that last part, but there is no time to develop it further > >> now. > >>>> > >>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the opportunity to catch up to > these > >>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > >>>> > >>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that I'll be able to comment (as a > >> young > >>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time putting stuff out - and unlike > >> the > >>>> rest of you, I'm no good at multi-tasking... it's either one or the > >> other > >>>> for me). > >>>> > >>>> Very best, > >>>> greg > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David Kellogg > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Well, yes. But if present day conditions are the REVERSE of the > >>>> conditions > >>>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that is, if the present trend is to > >>>>> subsume labor under language instead of the other way around--don't > we > >>>> need > >>>>> this distinction between signs and tools more than ever? That is, if > >>>> sloppy > >>>>> formulations like "cultural capital", "symbolic violence", > >> "use/exchange > >>>>> value of the word" are erasing the distinction between a mediating > >>>> activity > >>>>> which acts on the environment and a mediating activity which acts on > >>>> other > >>>>> mediators and on the self, and which therefore has the potential for > >>>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this exactly where the clear-eyed > >>>>> philosophers need to step in and straighten us out? > >>>>> > >>>>> I think that instead what is happening is that our older generation > >>>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present company--usually--excluded) are > >> too > >>>>> interested in the "tool power" of large categories and insufficiently > >>>>> interested in fine distinctions that make a difference. But perhaps > it > >>>>> is also that our younger generation of misty-eyed philosophers are, > as > >>>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in copulating bodies than > exploited > >>>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that do make a difference equally > >> allow > >>>>> generalization and abstraction and tool power, and the copulating > flesh > >>>> and > >>>>> the exploited muscles are one and the same. > >>>>> > >>>>> Take, for example, your remark about the Fourier transform performed > by > >>>> the > >>>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear cochlea--I can see the world centre > >> for > >>>>> studying the cochlea from my office window). Actually, it's part of a > >>>> wide > >>>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that were already being noticed by > >>>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, you don't have cause and > effect, > >>>> just > >>>>> as in cause and effect you don't have "association". Words don't > >> "cause" > >>>>> meaning: they provide material correlates for meaning and in that > sense > >>>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does not "cause" wording; it > >> correlates > >>>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of consciousness--and through it > >> to a > >>>>> context of situation or culture, and in that sense "realises" it. > >>>>> > >>>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, Vygotsky says that the > >>>> stabilization > >>>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the eye in early childhood is part > of a > >>>> two > >>>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between the sense organs and the brain. > >> The > >>>>> reason why we don't see a table as a trapezoid, when we stand over it > >> and > >>>>> compare the front with the back, the reason why we don't see a piece > of > >>>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the reason why we have orthoscopic > >>>> perception > >>>>> and we don't see a man at a distance as a looming midget is that the > >>>> brain > >>>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. And where does the brain get > >> this > >>>>> view if not from language and from other people? > >>>>> > >>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Personally, I think the first and most persistently important thing > is > >>>> to > >>>>>> see how much alike are tables and words. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> But ... Vygotsky was very insistent on the distinction because he > was > >>>>>> fighting a battle against the idea that speech ought to be subsumed > >>>> under > >>>>>> the larger category of labour. He had to fight for semiotics > against a > >>>>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. But we here in 2017 are living in > >>>>>> different times, where we have Discourse Theory and Linguistics > while > >>>>>> Marxism is widely regarded as antique. As Marx said "Just as > >>>> philosophers > >>>>>> have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to > >> make > >>>>>> language into an independent realm." and we live well and truly in > the > >>>>>> times when labour is subsumed under language, and not the other way > >>>>> around. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Everyone knows that a table is unlike a word. The point it to > >>>> understand > >>>>>> how tables are signs and word are material objects. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked in an offshoot of the bionic ear > >>>>>> project. The ear has a little keyboard that works like a piano > >> keyboard > >>>>> in > >>>>>> reverse, making a real time Fourier transform of that air pressure > >> wave > >>>>> and > >>>>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve impulse. The brain never hears that > >>>>>> pressure signal.) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > >>>>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, anyone else), could you give a bit more > on > >>>>> that > >>>>>>> distinction between words and tables? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> And could you say how (and whether) (human, hand) nails are > different > >>>>>>> from tables; and then how nails are different from words? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Alfredo > >>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> edu> > >>>>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg > >>>>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff of Words > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from an article Mike wrote in a > Festschrift > >>>> for > >>>>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking about artefacts: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> "They are ideal in that they contain in coded form the interactions > >> of > >>>>>>> which they > >>>>>>> were previously a part and which they mediate in the present (e.g., > >>>> the > >>>>>>> structure of > >>>>>>> a pencil carries within it the history of certain forms of > writing). > >>>>> They > >>>>>>> are material > >>>>>>> in that they are embodied in material artifacts. This principle > >>>> applies > >>>>>>> with equal > >>>>>>> force whether one is considering language/speech or the more > usually > >>>>> noted > >>>>>>> forms > >>>>>>> of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material > >>>>> culture. > >>>>>>> What > >>>>>>> differentiates a word, such as ?language? from, say, a table. is > the > >>>>>>> relative prominence > >>>>>>> of their material and ideal aspects. No word exists apart from its > >>>>>>> material > >>>>>>> instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, or hand > movements, > >>>> or > >>>>> as > >>>>>>> writing, > >>>>>>> or as neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order > >>>> imposed > >>>>> by > >>>>>>> thinking > >>>>>>> human beings." > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> This is the kind of thing that regularly gets me thrown out of > >>>> journals > >>>>> by > >>>>>>> the ear. Mike says that the difference between a word and a table > is > >>>> the > >>>>>>> relative salience of the ideal and the material. Sure--words are > full > >>>> of > >>>>>>> the ideal, and tables are full of material. Right? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other way around. Why? Well, because a > word > >>>>>>> without some word-stuff (sound or graphite) just isn't a word. In a > >>>>>>> word, meaning is solidary with material sounding: change one, and > you > >>>>>>> change the other. But with a table, what you start with is the idea > >> of > >>>>> the > >>>>>>> table; as soon as you've got that idea, you've got a table. You > could > >>>>>>> change the material to anything and you'd still have a table. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out by the ear. But he does ignore the > >>>>> delightful > >>>>>>> perversity in what Mike is saying, and what he gets out of the > quote > >>>> is > >>>>>>> just that words are really just like tools. When in fact Mike is > >>>> saying > >>>>>>> just the opposite. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> (The part I don't get is Mike's notion that the structure of a > pencil > >>>>>>> carries within it the history of certain forms of writing. Does he > >>>> mean > >>>>>>> that the length of the pencil reflects how often it's been used? Or > >> is > >>>>> he > >>>>>>> making a more archaeological point about graphite, wood, rubber and > >>>>> their > >>>>>>> relationship to a certain point in the history of writing and > >> erasing? > >>>>>>> Actually, pencils are more like tables than like words--the idea > has > >>>> to > >>>>>>> come first.) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon May 8 14:40:46 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 07:40:46 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <59108661.4733630a.a1e9a.8d06@mx.google.com> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> <59108661.4733630a.a1e9a.8d06@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry: Vygotsky remarks that every science starts with collectors of specimens: rocks, plants, bugs...and in this case signs. I agree with Andy that Peirce isn't really a linguist (and I disagree with Andy that linguists think that everything is linguistics--we are actually pretty wary of people who assume that just because they can speak a language they can do linguistics, and we tend to feel the same wariness in approaching issues like philosophy and even semiotics). But, like a linguist, Peirce is much more interested in how signs are DISTINCT. That's what taxonomists do. It's for their students and grand-students to come up with descriptions and explanations. So, as you say (and as Alfredo's post suggests), teachers are more interested in how the different specimens and speciment types can be LINKED, and that's one reason why Peirce's trichotomy is more used than his 38,000 different varieties derived recursively from the trichotomy. So for example if a newborn child can respond to words as icons, how does that child learn to respond to words as indexes? And if a foreign language learner is noting that wordings are going up and down (iconically) and starting to think about them as requests for continuation and as compliances with requests (indexically) how does that help them break the seventh seal of symbolic meaning? As usual, Vygotsky has a bon mot for this. In the BEGINNING of semiotics was taxonomy. But that was just the beginning. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 12:52 AM, Lplarry wrote: > David, > Is it fair to assume > All words are symbols > All words are indices > All words are icons > > However, the relationality (and ways of integrating) all 3 INEFFABLE > primitives is key. > > My attempt to follow what you refer to as being a (theme) > > Also the couplet (placing/displacing) seems relevant to this theme in > relation to context of the situation. > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: May 7, 2017 7:30 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > > The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the > many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is > that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically > elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know > Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology > is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the > Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy (and others), > > > > I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. > > > > One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap > > is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using > > Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are > > signs which have referential value but their referential > > value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic > > example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I > > can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it > > seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as > > translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is > > "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. > > > > As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the > > importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He > > calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of > > discourse (and without which, our discourse would be > > meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's > > essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case > > for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the > > talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand > > quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by > > following how different participant deictics are deployed. > > > > Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear > > about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. > > > > Thanks, > > -greg > > > > > > On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a > > Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they > > see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see > > Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be > > utterly incapable of managing his own life as the > > foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce > > was a Logician who invented two different schools of > > philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > > > > I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular > > because it is a logical triad which Hegel never > > theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us > > understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, > > Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is > > acquired by human beings, which is an idea I > > appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he > > overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics > > and his Pragmaticism. > > > > A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > > > On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > David and Andy, > > I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, > > secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and > > certainly you were part of that discussion. I > > would like to understand that better, also how it > > relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, > > indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your > > ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that > > might relate, which I hope so, since it would > > bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), > > Andy?s Academia articles on political > > representation and activity/social theory are > > probably relevant in some way, though Andy > > probably sees language as a figure against a > > larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns > > the figure/ground relationship around? > > Henry > > > > > > On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > Greg: > > > > (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually > > don't see these problems > > until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > > > > Meaning is simply another word for > > organization. Organization is always > > present and never separable from matter: it's > > a property of matter, the way > > that the internet is a property of a computer. > > Sometimes this organization > > is brought about without any human > > intervention (if you are religious, you > > will say that it brought about divinely, and > > if you are Spinozan, by > > nature: it amounts to the same thing, because > > "Deus Sive Natura"). > > Sometimes it is brought about by human > > ingenuity (but of course if you are > > religious you will say that it is the divine > > in humans at work, and if you > > are Spinozan you will say that humans are > > simply that part of nature which > > has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii > > think it amounts to the same > > thing). So of course there are not two kinds > > of substance, res cogitans vs > > res extensa, only one substance and different > > ways of organizing it (which > > in the end amount to the same thing). > > > > You say that discourse particles like "Guess > > what?" and "so there" and > > "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say > > to the contrary > > notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, > > insofar as they depend on their > > relationship to the context of situation for > > their meaning. You say that a > > Southern drawl is indexical, and that the > > relationship of jazz or blues or > > hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, > > insofar as they satisfy the > > condition I just mentioned. But "because" is > > also a symbol, and a > > Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when > > he/she moves to New York > > City (and in fact you can argue they sound > > more so). In Africa, jazz and > > blues and hiphop in Africa are related to > > Americanness and not to > > blackness. > > > > So your division of signs into just three > > categories is too simple, Greg. > > In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you > > will discover that there are > > tens of thousands of categories, but they are > > generated from three > > ineffable primitives ("firstness", > > "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > > example all words are symbols insofar as you > > have to know English in order > > to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But > > some words are > > symbol-indices, symbols that function as > > indexes, because they depend > > on the context of situation for their meaning. > > Without the symbolic > > gateway, they cannot function as indices. My > > wife, for example, cannot tell > > a Southerner from a more general American > > accent, and I myself still have > > trouble figuring out who is an Australian and > > who is an FOB bloody pom. > > Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness > > in hiphop--it sounds like > > K-pop to her. > > > > I don't actually think that any signs are > > associative or "prehensive"; I > > think that they are all different ways of > > looking or apprehending. So for > > example you can apprehend a wording as a > > symbol: a way of organizing sound > > stuff so that it "stands for" a way of > > organizing other stuff (sometimes > > lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of > > objects and sometimes the > > abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls > > "projects"). You can also > > look at wording as index: not as something > > that is "associated" to the lips > > and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or > > even continguity but rather > > something that has a necessary relation to the > > vocal tract (which is itself > > not a physiological organ, but something > > brought about by human > > organization). But when I look at sound waves > > on my Praat spectrograph and > > think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to > > get at is the sound stuff, > > the noise, the firstness of the stuff of > > words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > > think there is any way of doing this with my > > eyes or ears alone: I think it > > requires a very complex combination of tools > > and signs to get down to > > firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if > > he had breakfast with > > Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by > > themselves, but nobody > > has ever really shown the limits of what they > > can do when they put each > > other in order and start to organize the world > > around them. > > > > (And that is about as much philosophy as you > > are going to get out of me, > > I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: > > mediating activity is not > > absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or > > Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > > from mediating activity in tool use, for the > > same reason that painting is > > different from wording: in painting you CAN > > leave out the human (if you are > > doing a dead seal for example, or if you are > > Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > > keep in mind that the former committed suicide > > and the latter murdered two > > innocent young women). But in wording you > > never ever can. Wording can feel > > unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated > > or it doesn't work very > > well--but in reality it's even more mediated > > than ever. > > > > dk > > > > > > On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > > > > > > wrote: > > > > David (and others), > > > > In the interests of disagreement (which I > > know you dearly appreciate), your > > last post included this: > > "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide > > material correlates for meaning > > and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > > > > I was with you up until that point, but > > that's where I always lose you. > > > > I know it is a rather trite thing to say > > but I guess it really depends on > > what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, > > you mean some plane of existence > > that runs parallel to the material stuff, > > then this seems to be a bit of > > trouble since this leaves us with, on the > > one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > > noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" > > (res cogitans? phenomena?). > > Matter is easy enough to locate, but where > > do we locate "meaning" as you > > have described it? > > > > This reminds me of Saussure's classic > > drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > > (attached) in which "the indefinite plane > > of jumbled ideas" (A in the > > diagram) exists on one side of the chasm > > and "the equally vague plane of > > sounds" (B) exists on the other side of > > the chasm. Each side is > > self-contained and self-referential, and > > never the twain shall meet. Worlds > > apart. > > > > And this ties to the conversation in the > > other thread about the > > ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's > > Marx quote about a science of > > language that is shorn from life). My > > suspicion is that this supposed > > ineffability of meaning has everything to > > do with this Saussurean approach > > to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > > > > Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a > > different approach that may give > > a way out of this trouble by putting the > > word back INto the world. (p. 102 > > of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > > > > Peirce offers three kinds of relations of > > representamen (signifier) to > > object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. > > The symbol is the relation with > > which we are most familiar - it is the one > > that Saussure speaks of and is > > the one that is ineffable or, in > > Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > > "conventional". It is the stuff of words, > > the meaning of which is found in > > other words (hence the sense of > > ineffability). With only the symbolic > > function, the whole world of words would > > be entirely self-referential and > > thus truly ineffable (and this is why I > > like to say that Derrida is the end > > of the Saussurean road - he took that idea > > to its logical conclusion and > > discovered that the meaning of meaning is, > > well, empty (and thus > > ineffable)). > > > > But Peirce has two other relations of > > representamen to object, the iconic > > and the indexical. In signs functioning > > iconically, the representamen > > contains some quality of the object that > > it represents (e.g., a map that > > holds relations of the space that it > > represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > > in which the representamen has some of the > > qualities of the sound of the > > bee flying by). With signs functioning > > indexically, the relationship of > > representamen to object is one of temporal > > or spatial contiguity (e.g., > > where there is smoke there is fire, or > > where there is a Southern twang, > > there is a Southerner, or, most > > classically, when I point, the object to > > which I am pointing is spatially > > contiguous with the finger that is > > pointing). > > > > Now if I follow the argument of another of > > the inheritors of Roman > > Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein > > (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > > only inheritors of this tradition - > > Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > > Harvard... and he does a great impression > > of Jacobson too), then we can > > indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., > > the symbolic function) in the > > more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) > > indexical function. > > > > But that argument is always a bit too much > > for me (if there are any takers, > > the best place to find this argument is in > > Silverstein's chapter > > "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic > > Function," or in less explicit but > > slightly more understandable article > > "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > > Sociolinguistics Life"). > > > > Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more > > elegant and comprehensible: in > > ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the > > index, first as the index par > > excellence, pointing (something that, as > > Andy has previously pointed out, > > might not be exactly how things go in a > > literal sense, but the general > > structure here works well, I think, as a > > heuristic if nothing else - words > > are first learned as indexes, temporally > > and spatially collocated, "bottle" > > is first uttered as a way of saying > > "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > > co-present object; note this is also why > > young kids get discourse markers > > at such a young age (and seems incredibly > > precocious when they do!), since > > discourse markers are primarily > > indexical). The indexical function is the > > rudimentary form that then provides the > > groundwork for the development of > > the symbolic function. > > > > So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) > > approach, the meaning of signs is not > > ineffable, there is a grounding for words, > > and that grounding is the > > indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in > > the world and of the world. > > > > This seems to me a way of putting meaning > > back into matter. And perhaps > > speaking of words as the material > > correlates of meaning can be a useful > > heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk > > about meanings and concepts given our > > current set of meanings/concepts?). But we > > should also recognize that if it > > becomes more than an heuristic it can lead > > us astray if we take it too far. > > > > I'd add here that I think one of the > > greatest opportunities for CHAT to > > make a contribution to social science > > today is in its conceptualization of > > "concepts" (and, by extension, > > "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > > of the most taken-for-granted aspects of > > social science today is the idea > > that we know what "concepts" are. In > > anthropology, people easily talk about > > "cultural concepts" and typically they > > mean precisely something that floats > > around in some ethereal plane of > > "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > > material stuff of the world. Yet, this > > runs counter to the direction that > > anthropology is heading these days with > > the so-called "ontological turn" > > (I'll hold off on explaining this for now > > since this post is already > > running way too long, but I'll just > > mention that one of the aims of this is > > to get to a non-dualistic social science). > > CHAT's conception of the concept > > seems to me to offer precisely what is > > needed -- a way of understanding the > > concept as a fundamentally cultural and > > historical thing, rather than > > simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is > > the holding of a(n historical) > > relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse > > or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > > are thus little historical text-lets. > > > > Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will > > find some time in the future to > > return to that last part, but there is no > > time to develop it further now. > > > > Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the > > opportunity to catch up to these > > conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > > > > I'll keep reading but no promises that > > I'll be able to comment (as a young > > scholar, I need to be spending my time > > putting stuff out - and unlike the > > rest of you, I'm no good at > > multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > > for me). > > > > Very best, > > greg > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David > > Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > Well, yes. But if present day > > conditions are the REVERSE of the > > > > conditions > > > > under which Vygotsky was writing--that > > is, if the present trend is to > > subsume labor under language instead > > of the other way around--don't we > > > > need > > > > this distinction between signs and > > tools more than ever? That is, if > > > > sloppy > > > > formulations like "cultural capital", > > "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > > value of the word" are erasing the > > distinction between a mediating > > > > activity > > > > which acts on the environment and a > > mediating activity which acts on > > > > other > > > > mediators and on the self, and which > > therefore has the potential for > > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this > > exactly where the clear-eyed > > philosophers need to step in and > > straighten us out? > > > > I think that instead what is happening > > is that our older generation > > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present > > company--usually--excluded) are too > > interested in the "tool power" of > > large categories and insufficiently > > interested in fine distinctions that > > make a difference. But perhaps it > > is also that our younger generation of > > misty-eyed philosophers are, as > > Eagleton remarked, more interested in > > copulating bodies than exploited > > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that > > do make a difference equally allow > > generalization and abstraction and > > tool power, and the copulating flesh > > > > and > > > > the exploited muscles are one and the > > same. > > > > Take, for example, your remark about > > the Fourier transform performed by > > > > the > > > > ear (not the brain--the inner ear > > cochlea--I can see the world centre for > > studying the cochlea from my office > > window). Actually, it's part of a > > > > wide > > > > range of "realisation" phenomena that > > were already being noticed by > > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, > > you don't have cause and effect, > > > > just > > > > as in cause and effect you don't have > > "association". Words don't "cause" > > meaning: they provide material > > correlates for meaning and in that sense > > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does > > not "cause" wording; it correlates > > wording to a semantics--an activity of > > consciousness--and through it to a > > context of situation or culture, and > > in that sense "realises" it. > > > > So in his lecture on early childhood, > > Vygotsky says that the > > > > stabilization > > > > of forms, colours, and sizes by the > > eye in early childhood is part of a > > > > two > > > > way relationship, a dialogue, between > > the sense organs and the brain. The > > reason why we don't see a table as a > > trapezoid, when we stand over it and > > compare the front with the back, the > > reason why we don't see a piece of > > chalk at nighttime as black, the > > reason why we have orthoscopic > > > > perception > > > > and we don't see a man at a distance > > as a looming midget is that the > > > > brain > > > > imposes the contrary views on the eye. > > And where does the brain get this > > view if not from language and from > > other people? > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy > > Blunden > > wrote: > > > > Personally, I think the first and > > most persistently important thing is > > > > to > > > > see how much alike are tables and > > words. > > > > But ... Vygotsky was very > > insistent on the distinction > > because he was > > fighting a battle against the idea > > that speech ought to be subsumed > > > > under > > > > the larger category of labour. He > > had to fight for semiotics against a > > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. > > But we here in 2017 are living in > > different times, where we have > > Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > > Marxism is widely regarded as > > antique. As Marx said "Just as > > > > philosophers > > > > have given thought an independent > > existence, so they were bound to make > > language into an independent > > realm." and we live well and truly > > in the > > times when labour is subsumed > > under language, and not the other way > > > > around. > > > > Everyone knows that a table is > > unlike a word. The point it to > > > > understand > > > > how tables are signs and word are > > material objects. > > > > Andy > > > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked > > in an offshoot of the bionic ear > > project. The ear has a little > > keyboard that works like a piano > > keyboard > > > > in > > > > reverse, making a real time > > Fourier transform of that air > > pressure wave > > > > and > > > > coding the harmonics it in nerve > > impulse. The brain never hears that > > pressure signal.) > > > > ------------------------------ > ------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/ > book/origins-collective-decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo > > Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > David (and or Mike, Andy, > > anyone else), could you give a > > bit more on > > > > that > > > > distinction between words and > > tables? > > > > And could you say how (and > > whether) (human, hand) nails > > are different > > from tables; and then how > > nails are different from words? > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > edu> > > > > on behalf of David Kellogg > > > > > > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff > > of Words > > > > Gordon Wells quotes this from > > an article Mike wrote in a > > Festschrift > > > > for > > > > George Miller. Mike is talking > > about artefacts: > > > > "They are ideal in that they > > contain in coded form the > > interactions of > > which they > > were previously a part and > > which they mediate in the > > present (e.g., > > > > the > > > > structure of > > a pencil carries within it the > > history of certain forms of > > writing). > > > > They > > > > are material > > in that they are embodied in > > material artifacts. This principle > > > > applies > > > > with equal > > force whether one is > > considering language/speech or > > the more usually > > > > noted > > > > forms > > of artifacts such as tables > > and knives which constitute > > material > > > > culture. > > > > What > > differentiates a word, such as > > ?language? from, say, a table. > > is the > > relative prominence > > of their material and ideal > > aspects. No word exists apart > > from its > > material > > instantiation (as a > > configuration of sound waves, > > or hand movements, > > > > or > > > > as > > > > writing, > > or as neuronal activity), > > whereas every table embodies > > an order > > > > imposed > > > > by > > > > thinking > > human beings." > > > > This is the kind of thing that > > regularly gets me thrown out of > > > > journals > > > > by > > > > the ear. Mike says that the > > difference between a word and > > a table is > > > > the > > > > relative salience of the ideal > > and the material. Sure--words > > are full > > > > of > > > > the ideal, and tables are full > > of material. Right? > > > > Nope. Mike says it's the other > > way around. Why? Well, because > > a word > > without some word-stuff (sound > > or graphite) just isn't a > > word. In a > > word, meaning is solidary with > > material sounding: change one, > > and you > > change the other. But with a > > table, what you start with is > > the idea of > > > > the > > > > table; as soon as you've got > > that idea, you've got a table. > > You could > > change the material to > > anything and you'd still have > > a table. > > > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out > > by the ear. But he does ignore the > > > > delightful > > > > perversity in what Mike is > > saying, and what he gets out > > of the quote > > > > is > > > > just that words are really > > just like tools. When in fact > > Mike is > > > > saying > > > > just the opposite. > > > > (The part I don't get is > > Mike's notion that the > > structure of a pencil > > carries within it the history > > of certain forms of writing. > > Does he > > > > mean > > > > that the length of the pencil > > reflects how often it's been > > used? Or is > > > > he > > > > making a more archaeological > > point about graphite, wood, > > rubber and > > > > their > > > > relationship to a certain > > point in the history of > > writing and erasing? > > Actually, pencils are more > > like tables than like > > words--the idea has > > > > to > > > > come first.) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon May 8 15:07:09 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 08:07:09 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Vygotsky knew Marr. At one point, Marr took part in the weekly discussion group that Vygotsky and Luria shared with Eisenstein. But of course Vygotsky knew Blonsky, and liked him, and that didn't shield Blonsky from more than one withering criticism from his good friend down the hall at the Krupskaya Academy where they both worked. (I am rather sceptical of the idea that Vygotsky was anything more than culturally Jewish. But it is certainly true that the Russian Jews I have known lie at the "engagement" end of Deborah Tannen's "engagement-consideration" continuum. That is, we prefer to wear you out by interrupting, disagreeing, and otherwise engaging with what you say rather than wear you out by sitting and listening silently and considerately and sometimes showing deference and considerateness by making absolutely no reply. Greg although he is really a very good talker, tends to the consideration end of the continuum while I am stuck at the extreme engagement end, and it made our cooperation in Seoul on lectures including Peirce...well, interesting.) So I wasn't surprised to read THIS in the pedological lectures (p. 257 of Vol. 5 of your English Collected Works): "??? ????? ? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ? ??? ???? ????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ?????? ?. ?. ?????, ???? ????????? ??? ??????? ?????????: ?????????????? ????? ????????????? ?????, ??? ?? ?????????? ? ?????? ?????, ?????????? ??? ??? ????? ??????. ? ?????? ??????? ????? ?????????? ????? ???. ?? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ??? ????; ??? ????????? ? ?????? ????????. ????? ?? ?? ???????, ??? ??? ????????? ?????? ???, ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ?????; ?? ??? ???????????? ????????? ????? ???????????????, ?? ???? ?????, ??????? ?????????? ???, ???? ?????? ????????? ???????????? ????, ?? ??????????? ?? ???? ??????, ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ????????? ?? ???????????? ???????. "What stands at the source of each symbol? With all of the fantastic and all the controversy of the range of propositions in the theory of N. Ya. Marr, one proposition seems to me undeniable.: the first words of human language, as he puts it?'the first word means everything or a great deal.' And the first words of child speech mean almost everything. But what are these words? Words of the type ?this is? or ?this?; they may be applied to any object. Can we say that this is a real word? No, this is only the indicative function of the word itself; from it subsequently grows something symbolizing, but it is a word that is merely a vocal pointing gesture, and it is retained in all words because each human word points to a certain object." Notice that the word "word" here doesn't mean "word"; that is, it means "wording/meaning" rather than "orthographic word". As Ruqaiya Hasan liked to say, "The meaning of 'not' is not in 'not'". (Call it indexical, if you will, but I can't help but feeling, when I read this passage, that Vygotsky likes Marr in the rather exasperated way that I sometimes feel about--say--Greg.) David Kellogg Macquarie University On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 1:24 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi all, > > on the question whether there can be a language having one word, David > brings the example: > > "What? That! > Where? There! > When? Then! > > Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and the > "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to > answer: > > a? a! > eh? eh! > e? e..." > > I find it interesting that, in these examples, the rising and falling > belong to a situational relation between two: RISE is an invitation to FALL > and vice versa. It is the difference between the two what matters. And this > difference seems to be a 'correlation' (if I were to use the term David has > been using) of the very organic fact that actions have consequences and > that it is this relation the minimal unit that living organisms are > concerned about. If organisms (unlike stones) do register (encode) not just > actions and not just consequences, but relations between actions and > consequences, the feature of language that David is pointing at seems to be > also a feature of organic life in general. I find this thought interesting > if we are to think of language as an expression of biology/culture identity. > > I am laying this thought here without much knowledge of linguistics, but I > thought that this may resonate with what the discussion is unfolding, > particularly the question on indexicals as per, for example, Greg's last > comments. Does it? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 08 May 2017 04:28 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > > The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the > many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is > that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically > elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know > Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology > is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the > Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy (and others), > > > > I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. > > > > One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap > > is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using > > Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are > > signs which have referential value but their referential > > value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic > > example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I > > can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it > > seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as > > translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is > > "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. > > > > As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the > > importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He > > calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of > > discourse (and without which, our discourse would be > > meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's > > essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case > > for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the > > talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand > > quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by > > following how different participant deictics are deployed. > > > > Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear > > about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. > > > > Thanks, > > -greg > > > > > > On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a > > Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they > > see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see > > Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be > > utterly incapable of managing his own life as the > > foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce > > was a Logician who invented two different schools of > > philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > > > > I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular > > because it is a logical triad which Hegel never > > theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us > > understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, > > Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is > > acquired by human beings, which is an idea I > > appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he > > overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics > > and his Pragmaticism. > > > > A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > > > On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > David and Andy, > > I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, > > secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and > > certainly you were part of that discussion. I > > would like to understand that better, also how it > > relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, > > indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your > > ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that > > might relate, which I hope so, since it would > > bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), > > Andy?s Academia articles on political > > representation and activity/social theory are > > probably relevant in some way, though Andy > > probably sees language as a figure against a > > larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns > > the figure/ground relationship around? > > Henry > > > > > > On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > Greg: > > > > (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually > > don't see these problems > > until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > > > > Meaning is simply another word for > > organization. Organization is always > > present and never separable from matter: it's > > a property of matter, the way > > that the internet is a property of a computer. > > Sometimes this organization > > is brought about without any human > > intervention (if you are religious, you > > will say that it brought about divinely, and > > if you are Spinozan, by > > nature: it amounts to the same thing, because > > "Deus Sive Natura"). > > Sometimes it is brought about by human > > ingenuity (but of course if you are > > religious you will say that it is the divine > > in humans at work, and if you > > are Spinozan you will say that humans are > > simply that part of nature which > > has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii > > think it amounts to the same > > thing). So of course there are not two kinds > > of substance, res cogitans vs > > res extensa, only one substance and different > > ways of organizing it (which > > in the end amount to the same thing). > > > > You say that discourse particles like "Guess > > what?" and "so there" and > > "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say > > to the contrary > > notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, > > insofar as they depend on their > > relationship to the context of situation for > > their meaning. You say that a > > Southern drawl is indexical, and that the > > relationship of jazz or blues or > > hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, > > insofar as they satisfy the > > condition I just mentioned. But "because" is > > also a symbol, and a > > Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when > > he/she moves to New York > > City (and in fact you can argue they sound > > more so). In Africa, jazz and > > blues and hiphop in Africa are related to > > Americanness and not to > > blackness. > > > > So your division of signs into just three > > categories is too simple, Greg. > > In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you > > will discover that there are > > tens of thousands of categories, but they are > > generated from three > > ineffable primitives ("firstness", > > "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > > example all words are symbols insofar as you > > have to know English in order > > to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But > > some words are > > symbol-indices, symbols that function as > > indexes, because they depend > > on the context of situation for their meaning. > > Without the symbolic > > gateway, they cannot function as indices. My > > wife, for example, cannot tell > > a Southerner from a more general American > > accent, and I myself still have > > trouble figuring out who is an Australian and > > who is an FOB bloody pom. > > Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness > > in hiphop--it sounds like > > K-pop to her. > > > > I don't actually think that any signs are > > associative or "prehensive"; I > > think that they are all different ways of > > looking or apprehending. So for > > example you can apprehend a wording as a > > symbol: a way of organizing sound > > stuff so that it "stands for" a way of > > organizing other stuff (sometimes > > lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of > > objects and sometimes the > > abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls > > "projects"). You can also > > look at wording as index: not as something > > that is "associated" to the lips > > and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or > > even continguity but rather > > something that has a necessary relation to the > > vocal tract (which is itself > > not a physiological organ, but something > > brought about by human > > organization). But when I look at sound waves > > on my Praat spectrograph and > > think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to > > get at is the sound stuff, > > the noise, the firstness of the stuff of > > words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > > think there is any way of doing this with my > > eyes or ears alone: I think it > > requires a very complex combination of tools > > and signs to get down to > > firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if > > he had breakfast with > > Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by > > themselves, but nobody > > has ever really shown the limits of what they > > can do when they put each > > other in order and start to organize the world > > around them. > > > > (And that is about as much philosophy as you > > are going to get out of me, > > I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: > > mediating activity is not > > absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or > > Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > > from mediating activity in tool use, for the > > same reason that painting is > > different from wording: in painting you CAN > > leave out the human (if you are > > doing a dead seal for example, or if you are > > Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > > keep in mind that the former committed suicide > > and the latter murdered two > > innocent young women). But in wording you > > never ever can. Wording can feel > > unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated > > or it doesn't work very > > well--but in reality it's even more mediated > > than ever. > > > > dk > > > > > > On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > > > > > > wrote: > > > > David (and others), > > > > In the interests of disagreement (which I > > know you dearly appreciate), your > > last post included this: > > "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide > > material correlates for meaning > > and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > > > > I was with you up until that point, but > > that's where I always lose you. > > > > I know it is a rather trite thing to say > > but I guess it really depends on > > what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, > > you mean some plane of existence > > that runs parallel to the material stuff, > > then this seems to be a bit of > > trouble since this leaves us with, on the > > one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > > noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" > > (res cogitans? phenomena?). > > Matter is easy enough to locate, but where > > do we locate "meaning" as you > > have described it? > > > > This reminds me of Saussure's classic > > drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > > (attached) in which "the indefinite plane > > of jumbled ideas" (A in the > > diagram) exists on one side of the chasm > > and "the equally vague plane of > > sounds" (B) exists on the other side of > > the chasm. Each side is > > self-contained and self-referential, and > > never the twain shall meet. Worlds > > apart. > > > > And this ties to the conversation in the > > other thread about the > > ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's > > Marx quote about a science of > > language that is shorn from life). My > > suspicion is that this supposed > > ineffability of meaning has everything to > > do with this Saussurean approach > > to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > > > > Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a > > different approach that may give > > a way out of this trouble by putting the > > word back INto the world. (p. 102 > > of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > > > > Peirce offers three kinds of relations of > > representamen (signifier) to > > object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. > > The symbol is the relation with > > which we are most familiar - it is the one > > that Saussure speaks of and is > > the one that is ineffable or, in > > Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > > "conventional". It is the stuff of words, > > the meaning of which is found in > > other words (hence the sense of > > ineffability). With only the symbolic > > function, the whole world of words would > > be entirely self-referential and > > thus truly ineffable (and this is why I > > like to say that Derrida is the end > > of the Saussurean road - he took that idea > > to its logical conclusion and > > discovered that the meaning of meaning is, > > well, empty (and thus > > ineffable)). > > > > But Peirce has two other relations of > > representamen to object, the iconic > > and the indexical. In signs functioning > > iconically, the representamen > > contains some quality of the object that > > it represents (e.g., a map that > > holds relations of the space that it > > represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > > in which the representamen has some of the > > qualities of the sound of the > > bee flying by). With signs functioning > > indexically, the relationship of > > representamen to object is one of temporal > > or spatial contiguity (e.g., > > where there is smoke there is fire, or > > where there is a Southern twang, > > there is a Southerner, or, most > > classically, when I point, the object to > > which I am pointing is spatially > > contiguous with the finger that is > > pointing). > > > > Now if I follow the argument of another of > > the inheritors of Roman > > Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein > > (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > > only inheritors of this tradition - > > Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > > Harvard... and he does a great impression > > of Jacobson too), then we can > > indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., > > the symbolic function) in the > > more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) > > indexical function. > > > > But that argument is always a bit too much > > for me (if there are any takers, > > the best place to find this argument is in > > Silverstein's chapter > > "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic > > Function," or in less explicit but > > slightly more understandable article > > "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > > Sociolinguistics Life"). > > > > Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more > > elegant and comprehensible: in > > ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the > > index, first as the index par > > excellence, pointing (something that, as > > Andy has previously pointed out, > > might not be exactly how things go in a > > literal sense, but the general > > structure here works well, I think, as a > > heuristic if nothing else - words > > are first learned as indexes, temporally > > and spatially collocated, "bottle" > > is first uttered as a way of saying > > "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > > co-present object; note this is also why > > young kids get discourse markers > > at such a young age (and seems incredibly > > precocious when they do!), since > > discourse markers are primarily > > indexical). The indexical function is the > > rudimentary form that then provides the > > groundwork for the development of > > the symbolic function. > > > > So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) > > approach, the meaning of signs is not > > ineffable, there is a grounding for words, > > and that grounding is the > > indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in > > the world and of the world. > > > > This seems to me a way of putting meaning > > back into matter. And perhaps > > speaking of words as the material > > correlates of meaning can be a useful > > heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk > > about meanings and concepts given our > > current set of meanings/concepts?). But we > > should also recognize that if it > > becomes more than an heuristic it can lead > > us astray if we take it too far. > > > > I'd add here that I think one of the > > greatest opportunities for CHAT to > > make a contribution to social science > > today is in its conceptualization of > > "concepts" (and, by extension, > > "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > > of the most taken-for-granted aspects of > > social science today is the idea > > that we know what "concepts" are. In > > anthropology, people easily talk about > > "cultural concepts" and typically they > > mean precisely something that floats > > around in some ethereal plane of > > "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > > material stuff of the world. Yet, this > > runs counter to the direction that > > anthropology is heading these days with > > the so-called "ontological turn" > > (I'll hold off on explaining this for now > > since this post is already > > running way too long, but I'll just > > mention that one of the aims of this is > > to get to a non-dualistic social science). > > CHAT's conception of the concept > > seems to me to offer precisely what is > > needed -- a way of understanding the > > concept as a fundamentally cultural and > > historical thing, rather than > > simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is > > the holding of a(n historical) > > relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse > > or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > > are thus little historical text-lets. > > > > Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will > > find some time in the future to > > return to that last part, but there is no > > time to develop it further now. > > > > Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the > > opportunity to catch up to these > > conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > > > > I'll keep reading but no promises that > > I'll be able to comment (as a young > > scholar, I need to be spending my time > > putting stuff out - and unlike the > > rest of you, I'm no good at > > multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > > for me). > > > > Very best, > > greg > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David > > Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > Well, yes. But if present day > > conditions are the REVERSE of the > > > > conditions > > > > under which Vygotsky was writing--that > > is, if the present trend is to > > subsume labor under language instead > > of the other way around--don't we > > > > need > > > > this distinction between signs and > > tools more than ever? That is, if > > > > sloppy > > > > formulations like "cultural capital", > > "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > > value of the word" are erasing the > > distinction between a mediating > > > > activity > > > > which acts on the environment and a > > mediating activity which acts on > > > > other > > > > mediators and on the self, and which > > therefore has the potential for > > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this > > exactly where the clear-eyed > > philosophers need to step in and > > straighten us out? > > > > I think that instead what is happening > > is that our older generation > > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present > > company--usually--excluded) are too > > interested in the "tool power" of > > large categories and insufficiently > > interested in fine distinctions that > > make a difference. But perhaps it > > is also that our younger generation of > > misty-eyed philosophers are, as > > Eagleton remarked, more interested in > > copulating bodies than exploited > > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that > > do make a difference equally allow > > generalization and abstraction and > > tool power, and the copulating flesh > > > > and > > > > the exploited muscles are one and the > > same. > > > > Take, for example, your remark about > > the Fourier transform performed by > > > > the > > > > ear (not the brain--the inner ear > > cochlea--I can see the world centre for > > studying the cochlea from my office > > window). Actually, it's part of a > > > > wide > > > > range of "realisation" phenomena that > > were already being noticed by > > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, > > you don't have cause and effect, > > > > just > > > > as in cause and effect you don't have > > "association". Words don't "cause" > > meaning: they provide material > > correlates for meaning and in that sense > > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does > > not "cause" wording; it correlates > > wording to a semantics--an activity of > > consciousness--and through it to a > > context of situation or culture, and > > in that sense "realises" it. > > > > So in his lecture on early childhood, > > Vygotsky says that the > > > > stabilization > > > > of forms, colours, and sizes by the > > eye in early childhood is part of a > > > > two > > > > way relationship, a dialogue, between > > the sense organs and the brain. The > > reason why we don't see a table as a > > trapezoid, when we stand over it and > > compare the front with the back, the > > reason why we don't see a piece of > > chalk at nighttime as black, the > > reason why we have orthoscopic > > > > perception > > > > and we don't see a man at a distance > > as a looming midget is that the > > > > brain > > > > imposes the contrary views on the eye. > > And where does the brain get this > > view if not from language and from > > other people? > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy > > Blunden > > wrote: > > > > Personally, I think the first and > > most persistently important thing is > > > > to > > > > see how much alike are tables and > > words. > > > > But ... Vygotsky was very > > insistent on the distinction > > because he was > > fighting a battle against the idea > > that speech ought to be subsumed > > > > under > > > > the larger category of labour. He > > had to fight for semiotics against a > > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. > > But we here in 2017 are living in > > different times, where we have > > Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > > Marxism is widely regarded as > > antique. As Marx said "Just as > > > > philosophers > > > > have given thought an independent > > existence, so they were bound to make > > language into an independent > > realm." and we live well and truly > > in the > > times when labour is subsumed > > under language, and not the other way > > > > around. > > > > Everyone knows that a table is > > unlike a word. The point it to > > > > understand > > > > how tables are signs and word are > > material objects. > > > > Andy > > > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked > > in an offshoot of the bionic ear > > project. The ear has a little > > keyboard that works like a piano > > keyboard > > > > in > > > > reverse, making a real time > > Fourier transform of that air > > pressure wave > > > > and > > > > coding the harmonics it in nerve > > impulse. The brain never hears that > > pressure signal.) > > > > ------------------------------ > ------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/ > book/origins-collective-decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo > > Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > David (and or Mike, Andy, > > anyone else), could you give a > > bit more on > > > > that > > > > distinction between words and > > tables? > > > > And could you say how (and > > whether) (human, hand) nails > > are different > > from tables; and then how > > nails are different from words? > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > edu> > > > > on behalf of David Kellogg > > > > > > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff > > of Words > > > > Gordon Wells quotes this from > > an article Mike wrote in a > > Festschrift > > > > for > > > > George Miller. Mike is talking > > about artefacts: > > > > "They are ideal in that they > > contain in coded form the > > interactions of > > which they > > were previously a part and > > which they mediate in the > > present (e.g., > > > > the > > > > structure of > > a pencil carries within it the > > history of certain forms of > > writing). > > > > They > > > > are material > > in that they are embodied in > > material artifacts. This principle > > > > applies > > > > with equal > > force whether one is > > considering language/speech or > > the more usually > > > > noted > > > > forms > > of artifacts such as tables > > and knives which constitute > > material > > > > culture. > > > > What > > differentiates a word, such as > > ?language? from, say, a table. > > is the > > relative prominence > > of their material and ideal > > aspects. No word exists apart > > from its > > material > > instantiation (as a > > configuration of sound waves, > > or hand movements, > > > > or > > > > as > > > > writing, > > or as neuronal activity), > > whereas every table embodies > > an order > > > > imposed > > > > by > > > > thinking > > human beings." > > > > This is the kind of thing that > > regularly gets me thrown out of > > > > journals > > > > by > > > > the ear. Mike says that the > > difference between a word and > > a table is > > > > the > > > > relative salience of the ideal > > and the material. Sure--words > > are full > > > > of > > > > the ideal, and tables are full > > of material. Right? > > > > Nope. Mike says it's the other > > way around. Why? Well, because > > a word > > without some word-stuff (sound > > or graphite) just isn't a > > word. In a > > word, meaning is solidary with > > material sounding: change one, > > and you > > change the other. But with a > > table, what you start with is > > the idea of > > > > the > > > > table; as soon as you've got > > that idea, you've got a table. > > You could > > change the material to > > anything and you'd still have > > a table. > > > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out > > by the ear. But he does ignore the > > > > delightful > > > > perversity in what Mike is > > saying, and what he gets out > > of the quote > > > > is > > > > just that words are really > > just like tools. When in fact > > Mike is > > > > saying > > > > just the opposite. > > > > (The part I don't get is > > Mike's notion that the > > structure of a pencil > > carries within it the history > > of certain forms of writing. > > Does he > > > > mean > > > > that the length of the pencil > > reflects how often it's been > > used? Or is > > > > he > > > > making a more archaeological > > point about graphite, wood, > > rubber and > > > > their > > > > relationship to a certain > > point in the history of > > writing and erasing? > > Actually, pencils are more > > like tables than like > > words--the idea has > > > > to > > > > come first.) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon May 8 20:22:57 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 21:22:57 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, My privileging of Hegel's Phenomenology is not because I think it is the only worthwhile book that he has written. Rather, it is the only book of his that I have had time to deal with in any substantial fashion. To try to make sense of a single book of his is an incredibly time-consuming task and I'm afraid am not a good enough scholar (quick enough reader, etc.) to be able to take on another one. I was simply trolling for some insight into Hegel's treatment of Here, This, Now, and how it fits into his larger work (the Logic as well). But I guess that will have to wait for another lifetime (or at least until retirement). Cheers, greg On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 8:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the many > firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is that all the rest > are found in Hegel and systematically elaborated there. But not > icon/index/symbol. As you know Greg I am not one of those that think that > The Phenomenology is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the > Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Andy (and others), >> >> I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. >> >> One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap is in Hegel's >> interest in what Silverstein calls, using Peircean language, "referential >> indexicals" (these are signs which have referential value but their >> referential value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic example, >> but see my next sentence for more examples). I can't recall where I saw >> this in Hegel's writing but it seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, >> This, Now" (as translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is >> "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. >> >> As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the importance of >> referential indexicals in everyday talk. He calls them the "skeleton" on >> which we hang the rest of discourse (and without which, our discourse would >> be meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's essay Mapping >> Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case for the importance of mapping >> participant deictics in the talk of a classroom. He argues that you can >> understand quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by >> following how different participant deictics are deployed. >> >> Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear about Hegel and >> his Here, This, Now. >> >> Thanks, >> -greg >> >> >> On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a >> Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they >> see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see >> Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be >> utterly incapable of managing his own life as the >> foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce >> was a Logician who invented two different schools of >> philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. >> >> I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular >> because it is a logical triad which Hegel never >> theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us >> understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, >> Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is >> acquired by human beings, which is an idea I >> appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he >> overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics >> and his Pragmaticism. >> >> A total madman. A real Metaphysician, >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making> >> >> On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> David and Andy, >> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, >> secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and >> certainly you were part of that discussion. I >> would like to understand that better, also how it >> relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, >> indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your >> ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that >> might relate, which I hope so, since it would >> bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), >> Andy?s Academia articles on political >> representation and activity/social theory are >> probably relevant in some way, though Andy >> probably sees language as a figure against a >> larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns >> the figure/ground relationship around? >> Henry >> >> >> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg >> > > wrote: >> >> Greg: >> >> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually >> don't see these problems >> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) >> >> Meaning is simply another word for >> organization. Organization is always >> present and never separable from matter: it's >> a property of matter, the way >> that the internet is a property of a computer. >> Sometimes this organization >> is brought about without any human >> intervention (if you are religious, you >> will say that it brought about divinely, and >> if you are Spinozan, by >> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because >> "Deus Sive Natura"). >> Sometimes it is brought about by human >> ingenuity (but of course if you are >> religious you will say that it is the divine >> in humans at work, and if you >> are Spinozan you will say that humans are >> simply that part of nature which >> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii >> think it amounts to the same >> thing). So of course there are not two kinds >> of substance, res cogitans vs >> res extensa, only one substance and different >> ways of organizing it (which >> in the end amount to the same thing). >> >> You say that discourse particles like "Guess >> what?" and "so there" and >> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say >> to the contrary >> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, >> insofar as they depend on their >> relationship to the context of situation for >> their meaning. You say that a >> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the >> relationship of jazz or blues or >> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, >> insofar as they satisfy the >> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is >> also a symbol, and a >> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when >> he/she moves to New York >> City (and in fact you can argue they sound >> more so). In Africa, jazz and >> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to >> Americanness and not to >> blackness. >> >> So your division of signs into just three >> categories is too simple, Greg. >> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you >> will discover that there are >> tens of thousands of categories, but they are >> generated from three >> ineffable primitives ("firstness", >> "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for >> example all words are symbols insofar as you >> have to know English in order >> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But >> some words are >> symbol-indices, symbols that function as >> indexes, because they depend >> on the context of situation for their meaning. >> Without the symbolic >> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My >> wife, for example, cannot tell >> a Southerner from a more general American >> accent, and I myself still have >> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and >> who is an FOB bloody pom. >> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness >> in hiphop--it sounds like >> K-pop to her. >> >> I don't actually think that any signs are >> associative or "prehensive"; I >> think that they are all different ways of >> looking or apprehending. So for >> example you can apprehend a wording as a >> symbol: a way of organizing sound >> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of >> organizing other stuff (sometimes >> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of >> objects and sometimes the >> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls >> "projects"). You can also >> look at wording as index: not as something >> that is "associated" to the lips >> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or >> even continguity but rather >> something that has a necessary relation to the >> vocal tract (which is itself >> not a physiological organ, but something >> brought about by human >> organization). But when I look at sound waves >> on my Praat spectrograph and >> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to >> get at is the sound stuff, >> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of >> words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't >> think there is any way of doing this with my >> eyes or ears alone: I think it >> requires a very complex combination of tools >> and signs to get down to >> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if >> he had breakfast with >> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by >> themselves, but nobody >> has ever really shown the limits of what they >> can do when they put each >> other in order and start to organize the world >> around them. >> >> (And that is about as much philosophy as you >> are going to get out of me, >> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: >> mediating activity is not >> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or >> Wolff-Michael, but it is very different >> from mediating activity in tool use, for the >> same reason that painting is >> different from wording: in painting you CAN >> leave out the human (if you are >> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are >> Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but >> keep in mind that the former committed suicide >> and the latter murdered two >> innocent young women). But in wording you >> never ever can. Wording can feel >> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated >> or it doesn't work very >> well--but in reality it's even more mediated >> than ever. >> >> dk >> >> >> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson >> > > >> >> wrote: >> >> David (and others), >> >> In the interests of disagreement (which I >> know you dearly appreciate), your >> last post included this: >> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide >> material correlates for meaning >> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >> >> I was with you up until that point, but >> that's where I always lose you. >> >> I know it is a rather trite thing to say >> but I guess it really depends on >> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, >> you mean some plane of existence >> that runs parallel to the material stuff, >> then this seems to be a bit of >> trouble since this leaves us with, on the >> one hand, "matter" (res extensa? >> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" >> (res cogitans? phenomena?). >> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where >> do we locate "meaning" as you >> have described it? >> >> This reminds me of Saussure's classic >> drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane >> of jumbled ideas" (A in the >> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm >> and "the equally vague plane of >> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of >> the chasm. Each side is >> self-contained and self-referential, and >> never the twain shall meet. Worlds >> apart. >> >> And this ties to the conversation in the >> other thread about the >> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's >> Marx quote about a science of >> language that is shorn from life). My >> suspicion is that this supposed >> ineffability of meaning has everything to >> do with this Saussurean approach >> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >> >> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a >> different approach that may give >> a way out of this trouble by putting the >> word back INto the world. (p. 102 >> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >> >> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of >> representamen (signifier) to >> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. >> The symbol is the relation with >> which we are most familiar - it is the one >> that Saussure speaks of and is >> the one that is ineffable or, in >> Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, >> the meaning of which is found in >> other words (hence the sense of >> ineffability). With only the symbolic >> function, the whole world of words would >> be entirely self-referential and >> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I >> like to say that Derrida is the end >> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea >> to its logical conclusion and >> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, >> well, empty (and thus >> ineffable)). >> >> But Peirce has two other relations of >> representamen to object, the iconic >> and the indexical. In signs functioning >> iconically, the representamen >> contains some quality of the object that >> it represents (e.g., a map that >> holds relations of the space that it >> represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" >> in which the representamen has some of the >> qualities of the sound of the >> bee flying by). With signs functioning >> indexically, the relationship of >> representamen to object is one of temporal >> or spatial contiguity (e.g., >> where there is smoke there is fire, or >> where there is a Southern twang, >> there is a Southerner, or, most >> classically, when I point, the object to >> which I am pointing is spatially >> contiguous with the finger that is >> pointing). >> >> Now if I follow the argument of another of >> the inheritors of Roman >> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein >> (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the >> only inheritors of this tradition - >> Michael was a student of Jakobson's at >> Harvard... and he does a great impression >> of Jacobson too), then we can >> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., >> the symbolic function) in the >> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) >> indexical function. >> >> But that argument is always a bit too much >> for me (if there are any takers, >> the best place to find this argument is in >> Silverstein's chapter >> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic >> Function," or in less explicit but >> slightly more understandable article >> "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of >> Sociolinguistics Life"). >> >> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more >> elegant and comprehensible: in >> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the >> index, first as the index par >> excellence, pointing (something that, as >> Andy has previously pointed out, >> might not be exactly how things go in a >> literal sense, but the general >> structure here works well, I think, as a >> heuristic if nothing else - words >> are first learned as indexes, temporally >> and spatially collocated, "bottle" >> is first uttered as a way of saying >> "thirsty" and then later to refer to a >> co-present object; note this is also why >> young kids get discourse markers >> at such a young age (and seems incredibly >> precocious when they do!), since >> discourse markers are primarily >> indexical). The indexical function is the >> rudimentary form that then provides the >> groundwork for the development of >> the symbolic function. >> >> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) >> approach, the meaning of signs is not >> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, >> and that grounding is the >> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in >> the world and of the world. >> >> This seems to me a way of putting meaning >> back into matter. And perhaps >> speaking of words as the material >> correlates of meaning can be a useful >> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk >> about meanings and concepts given our >> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we >> should also recognize that if it >> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead >> us astray if we take it too far. >> >> I'd add here that I think one of the >> greatest opportunities for CHAT to >> make a contribution to social science >> today is in its conceptualization of >> "concepts" (and, by extension, >> "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one >> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of >> social science today is the idea >> that we know what "concepts" are. In >> anthropology, people easily talk about >> "cultural concepts" and typically they >> mean precisely something that floats >> around in some ethereal plane of >> "meaningfulness" and which is not of the >> material stuff of the world. Yet, this >> runs counter to the direction that >> anthropology is heading these days with >> the so-called "ontological turn" >> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now >> since this post is already >> running way too long, but I'll just >> mention that one of the aims of this is >> to get to a non-dualistic social science). >> CHAT's conception of the concept >> seems to me to offer precisely what is >> needed -- a way of understanding the >> concept as a fundamentally cultural and >> historical thing, rather than >> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is >> the holding of a(n historical) >> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse >> or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts >> are thus little historical text-lets. >> >> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will >> find some time in the future to >> return to that last part, but there is no >> time to develop it further now. >> >> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the >> opportunity to catch up to these >> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >> >> I'll keep reading but no promises that >> I'll be able to comment (as a young >> scholar, I need to be spending my time >> putting stuff out - and unlike the >> rest of you, I'm no good at >> multi-tasking... it's either one or the other >> for me). >> >> Very best, >> greg >> >> >> >> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David >> Kellogg > > >> >> wrote: >> >> Well, yes. But if present day >> conditions are the REVERSE of the >> >> conditions >> >> under which Vygotsky was writing--that >> is, if the present trend is to >> subsume labor under language instead >> of the other way around--don't we >> >> need >> >> this distinction between signs and >> tools more than ever? That is, if >> >> sloppy >> >> formulations like "cultural capital", >> "symbolic violence", "use/exchange >> value of the word" are erasing the >> distinction between a mediating >> >> activity >> >> which acts on the environment and a >> mediating activity which acts on >> >> other >> >> mediators and on the self, and which >> therefore has the potential for >> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this >> exactly where the clear-eyed >> philosophers need to step in and >> straighten us out? >> >> I think that instead what is happening >> is that our older generation >> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present >> company--usually--excluded) are too >> interested in the "tool power" of >> large categories and insufficiently >> interested in fine distinctions that >> make a difference. But perhaps it >> is also that our younger generation of >> misty-eyed philosophers are, as >> Eagleton remarked, more interested in >> copulating bodies than exploited >> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that >> do make a difference equally allow >> generalization and abstraction and >> tool power, and the copulating flesh >> >> and >> >> the exploited muscles are one and the >> same. >> >> Take, for example, your remark about >> the Fourier transform performed by >> >> the >> >> ear (not the brain--the inner ear >> cochlea--I can see the world centre for >> studying the cochlea from my office >> window). Actually, it's part of a >> >> wide >> >> range of "realisation" phenomena that >> were already being noticed by >> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, >> you don't have cause and effect, >> >> just >> >> as in cause and effect you don't have >> "association". Words don't "cause" >> meaning: they provide material >> correlates for meaning and in that sense >> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does >> not "cause" wording; it correlates >> wording to a semantics--an activity of >> consciousness--and through it to a >> context of situation or culture, and >> in that sense "realises" it. >> >> So in his lecture on early childhood, >> Vygotsky says that the >> >> stabilization >> >> of forms, colours, and sizes by the >> eye in early childhood is part of a >> >> two >> >> way relationship, a dialogue, between >> the sense organs and the brain. The >> reason why we don't see a table as a >> trapezoid, when we stand over it and >> compare the front with the back, the >> reason why we don't see a piece of >> chalk at nighttime as black, the >> reason why we have orthoscopic >> >> perception >> >> and we don't see a man at a distance >> as a looming midget is that the >> >> brain >> >> imposes the contrary views on the eye. >> And where does the brain get this >> view if not from language and from >> other people? >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy >> Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Personally, I think the first and >> most persistently important thing is >> >> to >> >> see how much alike are tables and >> words. >> >> But ... Vygotsky was very >> insistent on the distinction >> because he was >> fighting a battle against the idea >> that speech ought to be subsumed >> >> under >> >> the larger category of labour. He >> had to fight for semiotics against a >> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. >> But we here in 2017 are living in >> different times, where we have >> Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >> Marxism is widely regarded as >> antique. As Marx said "Just as >> >> philosophers >> >> have given thought an independent >> existence, so they were bound to make >> language into an independent >> realm." and we live well and truly >> in the >> times when labour is subsumed >> under language, and not the other way >> >> around. >> >> Everyone knows that a table is >> unlike a word. The point it to >> >> understand >> >> how tables are signs and word are >> material objects. >> >> Andy >> >> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked >> in an offshoot of the bionic ear >> project. The ear has a little >> keyboard that works like a piano >> keyboard >> >> in >> >> reverse, making a real time >> Fourier transform of that air >> pressure wave >> >> and >> >> coding the harmonics it in nerve >> impulse. The brain never hears that >> pressure signal.) >> >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> >> http://www.brill.com/products/ >> book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > /book/origins-collective-decision-making> >> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo >> Jornet Gil wrote: >> >> David (and or Mike, Andy, >> anyone else), could you give a >> bit more on >> >> that >> >> distinction between words and >> tables? >> >> And could you say how (and >> whether) (human, hand) nails >> are different >> from tables; and then how >> nails are different from words? >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > >> edu> >> >> on behalf of David Kellogg >> > > >> >> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff >> of Words >> >> Gordon Wells quotes this from >> an article Mike wrote in a >> Festschrift >> >> for >> >> George Miller. Mike is talking >> about artefacts: >> >> "They are ideal in that they >> contain in coded form the >> interactions of >> which they >> were previously a part and >> which they mediate in the >> present (e.g., >> >> the >> >> structure of >> a pencil carries within it the >> history of certain forms of >> writing). >> >> They >> >> are material >> in that they are embodied in >> material artifacts. This principle >> >> applies >> >> with equal >> force whether one is >> considering language/speech or >> the more usually >> >> noted >> >> forms >> of artifacts such as tables >> and knives which constitute >> material >> >> culture. >> >> What >> differentiates a word, such as >> ?language? from, say, a table. >> is the >> relative prominence >> of their material and ideal >> aspects. No word exists apart >> from its >> material >> instantiation (as a >> configuration of sound waves, >> or hand movements, >> >> or >> >> as >> >> writing, >> or as neuronal activity), >> whereas every table embodies >> an order >> >> imposed >> >> by >> >> thinking >> human beings." >> >> This is the kind of thing that >> regularly gets me thrown out of >> >> journals >> >> by >> >> the ear. Mike says that the >> difference between a word and >> a table is >> >> the >> >> relative salience of the ideal >> and the material. Sure--words >> are full >> >> of >> >> the ideal, and tables are full >> of material. Right? >> >> Nope. Mike says it's the other >> way around. Why? Well, because >> a word >> without some word-stuff (sound >> or graphite) just isn't a >> word. In a >> word, meaning is solidary with >> material sounding: change one, >> and you >> change the other. But with a >> table, what you start with is >> the idea of >> >> the >> >> table; as soon as you've got >> that idea, you've got a table. >> You could >> change the material to >> anything and you'd still have >> a table. >> >> Wells doesn't throw Mike out >> by the ear. But he does ignore the >> >> delightful >> >> perversity in what Mike is >> saying, and what he gets out >> of the quote >> >> is >> >> just that words are really >> just like tools. When in fact >> Mike is >> >> saying >> >> just the opposite. >> >> (The part I don't get is >> Mike's notion that the >> structure of a pencil >> carries within it the history >> of certain forms of writing. >> Does he >> >> mean >> >> that the length of the pencil >> reflects how often it's been >> used? Or is >> >> he >> >> making a more archaeological >> point about graphite, wood, >> rubber and >> >> their >> >> relationship to a certain >> point in the history of >> writing and erasing? >> Actually, pencils are more >> like tables than like >> words--the idea has >> >> to >> >> come first.) >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Mon May 8 22:13:43 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 15:13:43 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> Message-ID: <454635f1-475c-dc97-eecc-bc2a83dbf169@mira.net> Sure Greg. I waited till I retired. It is just a pity that young people have been encouraged to prioritise the Phenomenology which is such a difficult and complex work. Have a read of this: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm - that's just 20 pages. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 9/05/2017 1:22 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > > My privileging of Hegel's Phenomenology is not because I > think it is the only worthwhile book that he has written. > Rather, it is the only book of his that I have had time to > deal with in any substantial fashion. To try to make sense > of a single book of his is an incredibly time-consuming > task and I'm afraid am not a good enough scholar (quick > enough reader, etc.) to be able to take on another one. I > was simply trolling for some insight into Hegel's > treatment of Here, This, Now, and how it fits into his > larger work (the Logic as well). But I guess that will > have to wait for another lifetime (or at least until > retirement). > > Cheers, > greg > > > On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 8:28 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all > the many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce > offers us is that all the rest are found in Hegel and > systematically elaborated there. But not > icon/index/symbol. As you know Greg I am not one of > those that think that The Phenomenology is the only > book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the Science > of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy (and others), > > I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. > > One interesting bit where there seems to be some > overlap is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein > calls, using Peircean language, "referential > indexicals" (these are signs which have > referential value but their referential value is > primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic > example, but see my next sentence for more > examples). I can't recall where I saw this in > Hegel's writing but it seems like he has a bit > somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as translated). Do > you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is "up to" > in that section? I've always wondered. > > As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit > of the importance of referential indexicals in > everyday talk. He calls them the "skeleton" on > which we hang the rest of discourse (and without > which, our discourse would be meaningless). And > closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's essay Mapping > Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case for > the importance of mapping participant deictics in > the talk of a classroom. He argues that you can > understand quite a bit about the social structure > of a classroom by following how different > participant deictics are deployed. > > Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to > hear about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. > > Thanks, > -greg > > > On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a > Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, > because they > see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see > Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be > utterly incapable of managing his own life as the > foremost qualification for being a > philosopher. Peirce > was a Logician who invented two different > schools of > philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > > I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular > because it is a logical triad which Hegel never > theorised and it nicely complements Hegel > helping us > understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, > Semiotics is something going on in Nature > before it is > acquired by human beings, which is an idea I > appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he > overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his > Semiotics > and his Pragmaticism. > > A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > David and Andy, > I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, > secondness and thirdness on the chat > before, and > certainly you were part of that discussion. I > would like to understand that better, also > how it > relates to the three categories of signs > (iconic, > indexical and symbolic). I have been > reading your > ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how > that > might relate, which I hope so, since it would > bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), > Andy?s Academia articles on political > representation and activity/social theory are > probably relevant in some way, though Andy > probably sees language as a figure against a > larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) > turns > the figure/ground relationship around? > Henry > > > On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > > >> wrote: > > Greg: > > (As usual, I don't see the problem. I > usually > don't see these problems > until the tide is well and truly over > my head.) > > Meaning is simply another word for > organization. Organization is always > present and never separable from > matter: it's > a property of matter, the way > that the internet is a property of a > computer. > Sometimes this organization > is brought about without any human > intervention (if you are religious, you > will say that it brought about > divinely, and > if you are Spinozan, by > nature: it amounts to the same thing, > because > "Deus Sive Natura"). > Sometimes it is brought about by human > ingenuity (but of course if you are > religious you will say that it is the > divine > in humans at work, and if you > are Spinozan you will say that humans are > simply that part of nature which > has become conscious of itself: once > again, Ii > think it amounts to the same > thing). So of course there are not two > kinds > of substance, res cogitans vs > res extensa, only one substance and > different > ways of organizing it (which > in the end amount to the same thing). > > You say that discourse particles like > "Guess > what?" and "so there" and > "because" and "irregardless" and "what > you say > to the contrary > notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, > insofar as they depend on their > relationship to the context of > situation for > their meaning. You say that a > Southern drawl is indexical, and that the > relationship of jazz or blues or > hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, > insofar as they satisfy the > condition I just mentioned. But > "because" is > also a symbol, and a > Southerner still sounds like a > Southerner when > he/she moves to New York > City (and in fact you can argue they sound > more so). In Africa, jazz and > blues and hiphop in Africa are related to > Americanness and not to > blackness. > > So your division of signs into just three > categories is too simple, Greg. > In fact, if you really read your > Peirce, you > will discover that there are > tens of thousands of categories, but > they are > generated from three > ineffable primitives ("firstness", > "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > example all words are symbols insofar > as you > have to know English in order > to understand "Guess what?" or > "because". But > some words are > symbol-indices, symbols that function as > indexes, because they depend > on the context of situation for their > meaning. > Without the symbolic > gateway, they cannot function as > indices. My > wife, for example, cannot tell > a Southerner from a more general American > accent, and I myself still have > trouble figuring out who is an > Australian and > who is an FOB bloody pom. > Similarly, my wife doesn't see the > blackness > in hiphop--it sounds like > K-pop to her. > > I don't actually think that any signs are > associative or "prehensive"; I > think that they are all different ways of > looking or apprehending. So for > example you can apprehend a wording as a > symbol: a way of organizing sound > stuff so that it "stands for" a way of > organizing other stuff (sometimes > lunchboxes and backpacks, actual > categories of > objects and sometimes the > abstract models-in-the-making that > Andy calls > "projects"). You can also > look at wording as index: not as something > that is "associated" to the lips > and tongue by juxtaposition or > proximity or > even continguity but rather > something that has a necessary > relation to the > vocal tract (which is itself > not a physiological organ, but something > brought about by human > organization). But when I look at > sound waves > on my Praat spectrograph and > think of the shelving sea, what I am > trying to > get at is the sound stuff, > the noise, the firstness of the stuff of > words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > think there is any way of doing this > with my > eyes or ears alone: I think it > requires a very complex combination of > tools > and signs to get down to > firstness. But as Spinoza would have > said if > he had breakfast with > Bacon, the head and the hand are not > much by > themselves, but nobody > has ever really shown the limits of > what they > can do when they put each > other in order and start to organize > the world > around them. > > (And that is about as much philosophy > as you > are going to get out of me, > I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: What I am absolutely certain of is > this: > mediating activity is not > absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or > Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > from mediating activity in tool use, > for the > same reason that painting is > different from wording: in painting > you CAN > leave out the human (if you are > doing a dead seal for example, or if > you are > Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > keep in mind that the former committed > suicide > and the latter murdered two > innocent young women). But in wording you > never ever can. Wording can feel > unmediated--in fact it has to feel > unmediated > or it doesn't work very > well--but in reality it's even more > mediated > than ever. > > dk > > > On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg > Thompson > > >> > > wrote: > > David (and others), > > In the interests of disagreement > (which I > know you dearly appreciate), your > last post included this: > "Words don't "cause" meaning: they > provide > material correlates for meaning > and in that sense "realise" them > as matter." > > I was with you up until that > point, but > that's where I always lose you. > > I know it is a rather trite thing > to say > but I guess it really depends on > what you mean by "meaning". If by > meaning, > you mean some plane of existence > that runs parallel to the material > stuff, > then this seems to be a bit of > trouble since this leaves us with, > on the > one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > noumena?), and on the other hand > "meaning" > (res cogitans? phenomena?). > Matter is easy enough to locate, > but where > do we locate "meaning" as you > have described it? > > This reminds me of Saussure's classic > drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > (attached) in which "the > indefinite plane > of jumbled ideas" (A in the > diagram) exists on one side of the > chasm > and "the equally vague plane of > sounds" (B) exists on the other > side of > the chasm. Each side is > self-contained and > self-referential, and > never the twain shall meet. Worlds > apart. > > And this ties to the conversation > in the > other thread about the > ineffability of meaning (as well > as Andy's > Marx quote about a science of > language that is shorn from life). My > suspicion is that this supposed > ineffability of meaning has > everything to > do with this Saussurean approach > to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > > Peirce's triadic view of the sign > offers a > different approach that may give > a way out of this trouble by > putting the > word back INto the world. (p. 102 > of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > > Peirce offers three kinds of > relations of > representamen (signifier) to > object: iconic, indexical, and > symbolic. > The symbol is the relation with > which we are most familiar - it is > the one > that Saussure speaks of and is > the one that is ineffable or, in > Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > "conventional". It is the stuff of > words, > the meaning of which is found in > other words (hence the sense of > ineffability). With only the symbolic > function, the whole world of words > would > be entirely self-referential and > thus truly ineffable (and this is > why I > like to say that Derrida is the end > of the Saussurean road - he took > that idea > to its logical conclusion and > discovered that the meaning of > meaning is, > well, empty (and thus > ineffable)). > > But Peirce has two other relations of > representamen to object, the iconic > and the indexical. In signs > functioning > iconically, the representamen > contains some quality of the > object that > it represents (e.g., a map that > holds relations of the space that it > represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > in which the representamen has > some of the > qualities of the sound of the > bee flying by). With signs functioning > indexically, the relationship of > representamen to object is one of > temporal > or spatial contiguity (e.g., > where there is smoke there is fire, or > where there is a Southern twang, > there is a Southerner, or, most > classically, when I point, the > object to > which I am pointing is spatially > contiguous with the finger that is > pointing). > > Now if I follow the argument of > another of > the inheritors of Roman > Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein > (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > only inheritors of this tradition - > Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > Harvard... and he does a great > impression > of Jacobson too), then we can > indeed locate a ground of the word > (i.e., > the symbolic function) in the > more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) > indexical function. > > But that argument is always a bit > too much > for me (if there are any takers, > the best place to find this > argument is in > Silverstein's chapter > "Metapragmatic Discourse, > Metapragmatic > Function," or in less explicit but > slightly more understandable article > "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > Sociolinguistics Life"). > > Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit > more > elegant and comprehensible: in > ontogeny meaningfulness begins > with the > index, first as the index par > excellence, pointing (something > that, as > Andy has previously pointed out, > might not be exactly how things go > in a > literal sense, but the general > structure here works well, I > think, as a > heuristic if nothing else - words > are first learned as indexes, > temporally > and spatially collocated, "bottle" > is first uttered as a way of saying > "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > co-present object; note this is > also why > young kids get discourse markers > at such a young age (and seems > incredibly > precocious when they do!), since > discourse markers are primarily > indexical). The indexical function > is the > rudimentary form that then > provides the > groundwork for the development of > the symbolic function. > > So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) > approach, the meaning of signs is not > ineffable, there is a grounding > for words, > and that grounding is the > indexical, the "word"/sign that is > both in > the world and of the world. > > This seems to me a way of putting > meaning > back into matter. And perhaps > speaking of words as the material > correlates of meaning can be a useful > heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk > about meanings and concepts given our > current set of > meanings/concepts?). But we > should also recognize that if it > becomes more than an heuristic it > can lead > us astray if we take it too far. > > I'd add here that I think one of the > greatest opportunities for CHAT to > make a contribution to social science > today is in its conceptualization of > "concepts" (and, by extension, > "meaningfulness"). I think that > perhaps one > of the most taken-for-granted > aspects of > social science today is the idea > that we know what "concepts" are. In > anthropology, people easily talk about > "cultural concepts" and typically they > mean precisely something that floats > around in some ethereal plane of > "meaningfulness" and which is not > of the > material stuff of the world. Yet, this > runs counter to the direction that > anthropology is heading these days > with > the so-called "ontological turn" > (I'll hold off on explaining this > for now > since this post is already > running way too long, but I'll just > mention that one of the aims of > this is > to get to a non-dualistic social > science). > CHAT's conception of the concept > seems to me to offer precisely what is > needed -- a way of understanding the > concept as a fundamentally > cultural and > historical thing, rather than > simply as an "ideal" thing. The > concept is > the holding of a(n historical) > relation across time (cf. Hebb's > synapse > or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > are thus little historical text-lets. > > Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I > will > find some time in the future to > return to that last part, but > there is no > time to develop it further now. > > Anyway, I'm glad that I finally > had the > opportunity to catch up to these > conversations. Delightful > reading/thinking. > > I'll keep reading but no promises that > I'll be able to comment (as a young > scholar, I need to be spending my time > putting stuff out - and unlike the > rest of you, I'm no good at > multi-tasking... it's either one > or the other > for me). > > Very best, > greg > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David > Kellogg > >> > > wrote: > > Well, yes. But if present day > conditions are the REVERSE of the > > conditions > > under which Vygotsky was > writing--that > is, if the present trend is to > subsume labor under language > instead > of the other way around--don't we > > need > > this distinction between signs and > tools more than ever? That is, if > > sloppy > > formulations like "cultural > capital", > "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > value of the word" are erasing the > distinction between a mediating > > activity > > which acts on the environment > and a > mediating activity which acts on > > other > > mediators and on the self, and > which > therefore has the potential for > reciprocity and recursion, > isn't this > exactly where the clear-eyed > philosophers need to step in and > straighten us out? > > I think that instead what is > happening > is that our older generation > of rheumy-eyed philosophers > (present > company--usually--excluded) > are too > interested in the "tool power" of > large categories and > insufficiently > interested in fine > distinctions that > make a difference. But perhaps it > is also that our younger > generation of > misty-eyed philosophers are, as > Eagleton remarked, more > interested in > copulating bodies than exploited > ones. Yet these fine > distinctions that > do make a difference equally allow > generalization and abstraction and > tool power, and the copulating > flesh > > and > > the exploited muscles are one > and the > same. > > Take, for example, your remark > about > the Fourier transform performed by > > the > > ear (not the brain--the inner ear > cochlea--I can see the world > centre for > studying the cochlea from my > office > window). Actually, it's part of a > > wide > > range of "realisation" > phenomena that > were already being noticed by > Vygotsky. In realisational > phenomena, > you don't have cause and effect, > > just > > as in cause and effect you > don't have > "association". Words don't "cause" > meaning: they provide material > correlates for meaning and in > that sense > "realise" them as matter. > Meaning does > not "cause" wording; it correlates > wording to a semantics--an > activity of > consciousness--and through it to a > context of situation or > culture, and > in that sense "realises" it. > > So in his lecture on early > childhood, > Vygotsky says that the > > stabilization > > of forms, colours, and sizes > by the > eye in early childhood is part > of a > > two > > way relationship, a dialogue, > between > the sense organs and the > brain. The > reason why we don't see a > table as a > trapezoid, when we stand over > it and > compare the front with the > back, the > reason why we don't see a piece of > chalk at nighttime as black, the > reason why we have orthoscopic > > perception > > and we don't see a man at a > distance > as a looming midget is that the > > brain > > imposes the contrary views on > the eye. > And where does the brain get this > view if not from language and from > other people? > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 > AM, Andy > Blunden > >> wrote: > > Personally, I think the > first and > most persistently > important thing is > > to > > see how much alike are > tables and > words. > > But ... Vygotsky was very > insistent on the distinction > because he was > fighting a battle against > the idea > that speech ought to be > subsumed > > under > > the larger category of > labour. He > had to fight for semiotics > against a > vulgar kind of orthodox > Marxism. > But we here in 2017 are > living in > different times, where we have > Discourse Theory and > Linguistics while > Marxism is widely regarded as > antique. As Marx said "Just as > > philosophers > > have given thought an > independent > existence, so they were > bound to make > language into an independent > realm." and we live well > and truly > in the > times when labour is subsumed > under language, and not > the other way > > around. > > Everyone knows that a table is > unlike a word. The point it to > > understand > > how tables are signs and > word are > material objects. > > Andy > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I > walked > in an offshoot of the > bionic ear > project. The ear has a little > keyboard that works like a > piano > keyboard > > in > > reverse, making a real time > Fourier transform of that air > pressure wave > > and > > coding the harmonics it in > nerve > impulse. The brain never > hears that > pressure signal.) > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo > Jornet Gil wrote: > > David (and or Mike, Andy, > anyone else), could > you give a > bit more on > > that > > distinction between > words and > tables? > > And could you say how (and > whether) (human, hand) > nails > are different > from tables; and then how > nails are different > from words? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > edu> > > on behalf of David Kellogg > > > >> > > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > To: eXtended Mind, > Culture, > Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] The > Stuff > of Words > > Gordon Wells quotes > this from > an article Mike wrote in a > Festschrift > > for > > George Miller. Mike is > talking > about artefacts: > > "They are ideal in > that they > contain in coded form the > interactions of > which they > were previously a part and > which they mediate in the > present (e.g., > > the > > structure of > a pencil carries > within it the > history of certain > forms of > writing). > > They > > are material > in that they are > embodied in > material artifacts. > This principle > > applies > > with equal > force whether one is > considering > language/speech or > the more usually > > noted > > forms > of artifacts such as > tables > and knives which > constitute > material > > culture. > > What > differentiates a word, > such as > ?language? from, say, > a table. > is the > relative prominence > of their material and > ideal > aspects. No word > exists apart > from its > material > instantiation (as a > configuration of sound > waves, > or hand movements, > > or > > as > > writing, > or as neuronal activity), > whereas every table > embodies > an order > > imposed > > by > > thinking > human beings." > > This is the kind of > thing that > regularly gets me > thrown out of > > journals > > by > > the ear. Mike says > that the > difference between a > word and > a table is > > the > > relative salience of > the ideal > and the material. > Sure--words > are full > > of > > the ideal, and tables > are full > of material. Right? > > Nope. Mike says it's > the other > way around. Why? Well, > because > a word > without some > word-stuff (sound > or graphite) just isn't a > word. In a > word, meaning is > solidary with > material sounding: > change one, > and you > change the other. But > with a > table, what you start > with is > the idea of > > the > > table; as soon as > you've got > that idea, you've got > a table. > You could > change the material to > anything and you'd > still have > a table. > > Wells doesn't throw > Mike out > by the ear. But he > does ignore the > > delightful > > perversity in what Mike is > saying, and what he > gets out > of the quote > > is > > just that words are really > just like tools. When > in fact > Mike is > > saying > > just the opposite. > > (The part I don't get is > Mike's notion that the > structure of a pencil > carries within it the > history > of certain forms of > writing. > Does he > > mean > > that the length of the > pencil > reflects how often > it's been > used? Or is > > he > > making a more > archaeological > point about graphite, > wood, > rubber and > > their > > relationship to a certain > point in the history of > writing and erasing? > Actually, pencils are more > like tables than like > words--the idea has > > to > > come first.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue May 9 07:35:01 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 07:35:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <5911d396.020f620a.90d8d.0915@mx.google.com> David, I do hope we are going to get some more philosophy out of you. In particular exploring the suff of words/wording. I want to take this turn to ?echo? your philosophical ways, that are in pursuit of this [theme]. See your May 5th response to Greg I will back from your forth and stay close to your philosophical wordings upon *firstness, secondness, and thirdness* as INEFFABLE. FIRSTNESS: -ICONIC When I look at ?sound waves? [natural] on my Praat Spectograph, I am trying to get at the sound stuff, the the noise, the *firstness* of the stuff of words. To get at ?this? requires a very complex *combination of* tools and signs to ?get down to? [lp-penetrate?] this level or layer of this emerging *spectrum* Moving ?up? we apprehend/look at the *vocal tract* [which itself is no longer ?firstness? as a physiological organ] but is now something brought about by human ?organization/patterning? This firstness is the way of looking/apprehending wording [as] *iconic* firstness. SECONDNESS: - INDEX Moving ?up? to look/apprehend at word stuff as indexical. This moving up is *necessarily* relating to the vocal tract within this theme. This occurs NOT through proximity or association but is necessarily related to the vocal tract. [LP-integrated??] THIRDNESS: - SYMBOL Moving ?up? When organizing/patterning sound stuff so that the sound stuff *stands for* a way of organizing/patterning other stuff. This other stuff includes: ? Abstract models-in the making ? Actual categories of objects ? Wording phrases such as - sibling society as metaphorical ? Objects such as tables and lunchboxes and backpacks David, this moving up the layers/levers within the [spectrum] are the way the suff of words/wording ALL are: *ways of apprehending/looking. They are not associative stuff. I find this philosophical explanation wery generative and germane. Would you consider transferring from the linguistics discipline and consider participating in the philosophical endeavors. Or do only madmen move in this direction?? Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: David Kellogg Sent: May 8, 2017 3:09 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words Vygotsky knew Marr. At one point, Marr took part in the weekly discussion group that Vygotsky and Luria shared with Eisenstein. But of course Vygotsky knew Blonsky, and liked him, and that didn't shield Blonsky from more than one withering criticism from his good friend down the hall at the Krupskaya Academy where they both worked. (I am rather sceptical of the idea that Vygotsky was anything more than culturally Jewish. But it is certainly true that the Russian Jews I have known lie at the "engagement" end of Deborah Tannen's "engagement-consideration" continuum. That is, we prefer to wear you out by interrupting, disagreeing, and otherwise engaging with what you say rather than wear you out by sitting and listening silently and considerately and sometimes showing deference and considerateness by making absolutely no reply. Greg although he is really a very good talker, tends to the consideration end of the continuum while I am stuck at the extreme engagement end, and it made our cooperation in Seoul on lectures including Peirce...well, interesting.) So I wasn't surprised to read THIS in the pedological lectures (p. 257 of Vol. 5 of your English Collected Works): "??? ????? ? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ? ??? ???? ????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ?????? ?. ?. ?????, ???? ????????? ??? ??????? ?????????: ?????????????? ????? ????????????? ?????, ??? ?? ?????????? ? ?????? ?????, ?????????? ??? ??? ????? ??????. ? ?????? ??????? ????? ?????????? ????? ???. ?? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ??? ????; ??? ????????? ? ?????? ????????. ????? ?? ?? ???????, ??? ??? ????????? ?????? ???, ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ?????; ?? ??? ???????????? ????????? ????? ???????????????, ?? ???? ?????, ??????? ?????????? ???, ???? ?????? ????????? ???????????? ????, ?? ??????????? ?? ???? ??????, ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ????????? ?? ???????????? ???????. "What stands at the source of each symbol? With all of the fantastic and all the controversy of the range of propositions in the theory of N. Ya. Marr, one proposition seems to me undeniable.: the first words of human language, as he puts it?'the first word means everything or a great deal.' And the first words of child speech mean almost everything. But what are these words? Words of the type ?this is? or ?this?; they may be applied to any object. Can we say that this is a real word? No, this is only the indicative function of the word itself; from it subsequently grows something symbolizing, but it is a word that is merely a vocal pointing gesture, and it is retained in all words because each human word points to a certain object." Notice that the word "word" here doesn't mean "word"; that is, it means "wording/meaning" rather than "orthographic word". As Ruqaiya Hasan liked to say, "The meaning of 'not' is not in 'not'". (Call it indexical, if you will, but I can't help but feeling, when I read this passage, that Vygotsky likes Marr in the rather exasperated way that I sometimes feel about--say--Greg.) David Kellogg Macquarie University On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 1:24 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Hi all, > > on the question whether there can be a language having one word, David > brings the example: > > "What? That! > Where? There! > When? Then! > > Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and the > "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to > answer: > > a? a! > eh? eh! > e? e..." > > I find it interesting that, in these examples, the rising and falling > belong to a situational relation between two: RISE is an invitation to FALL > and vice versa. It is the difference between the two what matters. And this > difference seems to be a 'correlation' (if I were to use the term David has > been using) of the very organic fact that actions have consequences and > that it is this relation the minimal unit that living organisms are > concerned about. If organisms (unlike stones) do register (encode) not just > actions and not just consequences, but relations between actions and > consequences, the feature of language that David is pointing at seems to be > also a feature of organic life in general. I find this thought interesting > if we are to think of language as an expression of biology/culture identity. > > I am laying this thought here without much knowledge of linguistics, but I > thought that this may resonate with what the discussion is unfolding, > particularly the question on indexicals as per, for example, Greg's last > comments. Does it? > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 08 May 2017 04:28 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > > The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the > many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is > that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically > elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know > Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology > is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the > Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy (and others), > > > > I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. > > > > One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap > > is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using > > Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are > > signs which have referential value but their referential > > value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic > > example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I > > can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it > > seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as > > translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is > > "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. > > > > As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the > > importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He > > calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of > > discourse (and without which, our discourse would be > > meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's > > essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case > > for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the > > talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand > > quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by > > following how different participant deictics are deployed. > > > > Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear > > about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. > > > > Thanks, > > -greg > > > > > > On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a > > Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they > > see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see > > Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be > > utterly incapable of managing his own life as the > > foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce > > was a Logician who invented two different schools of > > philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > > > > I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular > > because it is a logical triad which Hegel never > > theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us > > understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, > > Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is > > acquired by human beings, which is an idea I > > appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he > > overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics > > and his Pragmaticism. > > > > A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > > > On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > David and Andy, > > I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, > > secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and > > certainly you were part of that discussion. I > > would like to understand that better, also how it > > relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, > > indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your > > ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that > > might relate, which I hope so, since it would > > bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), > > Andy?s Academia articles on political > > representation and activity/social theory are > > probably relevant in some way, though Andy > > probably sees language as a figure against a > > larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns > > the figure/ground relationship around? > > Henry > > > > > > On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > Greg: > > > > (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually > > don't see these problems > > until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > > > > Meaning is simply another word for > > organization. Organization is always > > present and never separable from matter: it's > > a property of matter, the way > > that the internet is a property of a computer. > > Sometimes this organization > > is brought about without any human > > intervention (if you are religious, you > > will say that it brought about divinely, and > > if you are Spinozan, by > > nature: it amounts to the same thing, because > > "Deus Sive Natura"). > > Sometimes it is brought about by human > > ingenuity (but of course if you are > > religious you will say that it is the divine > > in humans at work, and if you > > are Spinozan you will say that humans are > > simply that part of nature which > > has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii > > think it amounts to the same > > thing). So of course there are not two kinds > > of substance, res cogitans vs > > res extensa, only one substance and different > > ways of organizing it (which > > in the end amount to the same thing). > > > > You say that discourse particles like "Guess > > what?" and "so there" and > > "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say > > to the contrary > > notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, > > insofar as they depend on their > > relationship to the context of situation for > > their meaning. You say that a > > Southern drawl is indexical, and that the > > relationship of jazz or blues or > > hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, > > insofar as they satisfy the > > condition I just mentioned. But "because" is > > also a symbol, and a > > Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when > > he/she moves to New York > > City (and in fact you can argue they sound > > more so). In Africa, jazz and > > blues and hiphop in Africa are related to > > Americanness and not to > > blackness. > > > > So your division of signs into just three > > categories is too simple, Greg. > > In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you > > will discover that there are > > tens of thousands of categories, but they are > > generated from three > > ineffable primitives ("firstness", > > "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > > example all words are symbols insofar as you > > have to know English in order > > to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But > > some words are > > symbol-indices, symbols that function as > > indexes, because they depend > > on the context of situation for their meaning. > > Without the symbolic > > gateway, they cannot function as indices. My > > wife, for example, cannot tell > > a Southerner from a more general American > > accent, and I myself still have > > trouble figuring out who is an Australian and > > who is an FOB bloody pom. > > Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness > > in hiphop--it sounds like > > K-pop to her. > > > > I don't actually think that any signs are > > associative or "prehensive"; I > > think that they are all different ways of > > looking or apprehending. So for > > example you can apprehend a wording as a > > symbol: a way of organizing sound > > stuff so that it "stands for" a way of > > organizing other stuff (sometimes > > lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of > > objects and sometimes the > > abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls > > "projects"). You can also > > look at wording as index: not as something > > that is "associated" to the lips > > and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or > > even continguity but rather > > something that has a necessary relation to the > > vocal tract (which is itself > > not a physiological organ, but something > > brought about by human > > organization). But when I look at sound waves > > on my Praat spectrograph and > > think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to > > get at is the sound stuff, > > the noise, the firstness of the stuff of > > words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > > think there is any way of doing this with my > > eyes or ears alone: I think it > > requires a very complex combination of tools > > and signs to get down to > > firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if > > he had breakfast with > > Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by > > themselves, but nobody > > has ever really shown the limits of what they > > can do when they put each > > other in order and start to organize the world > > around them. > > > > (And that is about as much philosophy as you > > are going to get out of me, > > I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: > > mediating activity is not > > absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or > > Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > > from mediating activity in tool use, for the > > same reason that painting is > > different from wording: in painting you CAN > > leave out the human (if you are > > doing a dead seal for example, or if you are > > Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > > keep in mind that the former committed suicide > > and the latter murdered two > > innocent young women). But in wording you > > never ever can. Wording can feel > > unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated > > or it doesn't work very > > well--but in reality it's even more mediated > > than ever. > > > > dk > > > > > > On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > > > > > > wrote: > > > > David (and others), > > > > In the interests of disagreement (which I > > know you dearly appreciate), your > > last post included this: > > "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide > > material correlates for meaning > > and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > > > > I was with you up until that point, but > > that's where I always lose you. > > > > I know it is a rather trite thing to say > > but I guess it really depends on > > what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, > > you mean some plane of existence > > that runs parallel to the material stuff, > > then this seems to be a bit of > > trouble since this leaves us with, on the > > one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > > noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" > > (res cogitans? phenomena?). > > Matter is easy enough to locate, but where > > do we locate "meaning" as you > > have described it? > > > > This reminds me of Saussure's classic > > drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > > (attached) in which "the indefinite plane > > of jumbled ideas" (A in the > > diagram) exists on one side of the chasm > > and "the equally vague plane of > > sounds" (B) exists on the other side of > > the chasm. Each side is > > self-contained and self-referential, and > > never the twain shall meet. Worlds > > apart. > > > > And this ties to the conversation in the > > other thread about the > > ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's > > Marx quote about a science of > > language that is shorn from life). My > > suspicion is that this supposed > > ineffability of meaning has everything to > > do with this Saussurean approach > > to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > > > > Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a > > different approach that may give > > a way out of this trouble by putting the > > word back INto the world. (p. 102 > > of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > > > > Peirce offers three kinds of relations of > > representamen (signifier) to > > object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. > > The symbol is the relation with > > which we are most familiar - it is the one > > that Saussure speaks of and is > > the one that is ineffable or, in > > Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > > "conventional". It is the stuff of words, > > the meaning of which is found in > > other words (hence the sense of > > ineffability). With only the symbolic > > function, the whole world of words would > > be entirely self-referential and > > thus truly ineffable (and this is why I > > like to say that Derrida is the end > > of the Saussurean road - he took that idea > > to its logical conclusion and > > discovered that the meaning of meaning is, > > well, empty (and thus > > ineffable)). > > > > But Peirce has two other relations of > > representamen to object, the iconic > > and the indexical. In signs functioning > > iconically, the representamen > > contains some quality of the object that > > it represents (e.g., a map that > > holds relations of the space that it > > represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > > in which the representamen has some of the > > qualities of the sound of the > > bee flying by). With signs functioning > > indexically, the relationship of > > representamen to object is one of temporal > > or spatial contiguity (e.g., > > where there is smoke there is fire, or > > where there is a Southern twang, > > there is a Southerner, or, most > > classically, when I point, the object to > > which I am pointing is spatially > > contiguous with the finger that is > > pointing). > > > > Now if I follow the argument of another of > > the inheritors of Roman > > Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein > > (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > > only inheritors of this tradition - > > Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > > Harvard... and he does a great impression > > of Jacobson too), then we can > > indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., > > the symbolic function) in the > > more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) > > indexical function. > > > > But that argument is always a bit too much > > for me (if there are any takers, > > the best place to find this argument is in > > Silverstein's chapter > > "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic > > Function," or in less explicit but > > slightly more understandable article > > "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > > Sociolinguistics Life"). > > > > Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more > > elegant and comprehensible: in > > ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the > > index, first as the index par > > excellence, pointing (something that, as > > Andy has previously pointed out, > > might not be exactly how things go in a > > literal sense, but the general > > structure here works well, I think, as a > > heuristic if nothing else - words > > are first learned as indexes, temporally > > and spatially collocated, "bottle" > > is first uttered as a way of saying > > "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > > co-present object; note this is also why > > young kids get discourse markers > > at such a young age (and seems incredibly > > precocious when they do!), since > > discourse markers are primarily > > indexical). The indexical function is the > > rudimentary form that then provides the > > groundwork for the development of > > the symbolic function. > > > > So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) > > approach, the meaning of signs is not > > ineffable, there is a grounding for words, > > and that grounding is the > > indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in > > the world and of the world. > > > > This seems to me a way of putting meaning > > back into matter. And perhaps > > speaking of words as the material > > correlates of meaning can be a useful > > heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk > > about meanings and concepts given our > > current set of meanings/concepts?). But we > > should also recognize that if it > > becomes more than an heuristic it can lead > > us astray if we take it too far. > > > > I'd add here that I think one of the > > greatest opportunities for CHAT to > > make a contribution to social science > > today is in its conceptualization of > > "concepts" (and, by extension, > > "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > > of the most taken-for-granted aspects of > > social science today is the idea > > that we know what "concepts" are. In > > anthropology, people easily talk about > > "cultural concepts" and typically they > > mean precisely something that floats > > around in some ethereal plane of > > "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > > material stuff of the world. Yet, this > > runs counter to the direction that > > anthropology is heading these days with > > the so-called "ontological turn" > > (I'll hold off on explaining this for now > > since this post is already > > running way too long, but I'll just > > mention that one of the aims of this is > > to get to a non-dualistic social science). > > CHAT's conception of the concept > > seems to me to offer precisely what is > > needed -- a way of understanding the > > concept as a fundamentally cultural and > > historical thing, rather than > > simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is > > the holding of a(n historical) > > relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse > > or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > > are thus little historical text-lets. > > > > Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will > > find some time in the future to > > return to that last part, but there is no > > time to develop it further now. > > > > Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the > > opportunity to catch up to these > > conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > > > > I'll keep reading but no promises that > > I'll be able to comment (as a young > > scholar, I need to be spending my time > > putting stuff out - and unlike the > > rest of you, I'm no good at > > multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > > for me). > > > > Very best, > > greg > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David > > Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > Well, yes. But if present day > > conditions are the REVERSE of the > > > > conditions > > > > under which Vygotsky was writing--that > > is, if the present trend is to > > subsume labor under language instead > > of the other way around--don't we > > > > need > > > > this distinction between signs and > > tools more than ever? That is, if > > > > sloppy > > > > formulations like "cultural capital", > > "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > > value of the word" are erasing the > > distinction between a mediating > > > > activity > > > > which acts on the environment and a > > mediating activity which acts on > > > > other > > > > mediators and on the self, and which > > therefore has the potential for > > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this > > exactly where the clear-eyed > > philosophers need to step in and > > straighten us out? > > > > I think that instead what is happening > > is that our older generation > > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present > > company--usually--excluded) are too > > interested in the "tool power" of > > large categories and insufficiently > > interested in fine distinctions that > > make a difference. But perhaps it > > is also that our younger generation of > > misty-eyed philosophers are, as > > Eagleton remarked, more interested in > > copulating bodies than exploited > > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that > > do make a difference equally allow > > generalization and abstraction and > > tool power, and the copulating flesh > > > > and > > > > the exploited muscles are one and the > > same. > > > > Take, for example, your remark about > > the Fourier transform performed by > > > > the > > > > ear (not the brain--the inner ear > > cochlea--I can see the world centre for > > studying the cochlea from my office > > window). Actually, it's part of a > > > > wide > > > > range of "realisation" phenomena that > > were already being noticed by > > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, > > you don't have cause and effect, > > > > just > > > > as in cause and effect you don't have > > "association". Words don't "cause" > > meaning: they provide material > > correlates for meaning and in that sense > > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does > > not "cause" wording; it correlates > > wording to a semantics--an activity of > > consciousness--and through it to a > > context of situation or culture, and > > in that sense "realises" it. > > > > So in his lecture on early childhood, > > Vygotsky says that the > > > > stabilization > > > > of forms, colours, and sizes by the > > eye in early childhood is part of a > > > > two > > > > way relationship, a dialogue, between > > the sense organs and the brain. The > > reason why we don't see a table as a > > trapezoid, when we stand over it and > > compare the front with the back, the > > reason why we don't see a piece of > > chalk at nighttime as black, the > > reason why we have orthoscopic > > > > perception > > > > and we don't see a man at a distance > > as a looming midget is that the > > > > brain > > > > imposes the contrary views on the eye. > > And where does the brain get this > > view if not from language and from > > other people? > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy > > Blunden > > wrote: > > > > Personally, I think the first and > > most persistently important thing is > > > > to > > > > see how much alike are tables and > > words. > > > > But ... Vygotsky was very > > insistent on the distinction > > because he was > > fighting a battle against the idea > > that speech ought to be subsumed > > > > under > > > > the larger category of labour. He > > had to fight for semiotics against a > > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. > > But we here in 2017 are living in > > different times, where we have > > Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > > Marxism is widely regarded as > > antique. As Marx said "Just as > > > > philosophers > > > > have given thought an independent > > existence, so they were bound to make > > language into an independent > > realm." and we live well and truly > > in the > > times when labour is subsumed > > under language, and not the other way > > > > around. > > > > Everyone knows that a table is > > unlike a word. The point it to > > > > understand > > > > how tables are signs and word are > > material objects. > > > > Andy > > > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked > > in an offshoot of the bionic ear > > project. The ear has a little > > keyboard that works like a piano > > keyboard > > > > in > > > > reverse, making a real time > > Fourier transform of that air > > pressure wave > > > > and > > > > coding the harmonics it in nerve > > impulse. The brain never hears that > > pressure signal.) > > > > ------------------------------ > ------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/ > book/origins-collective-decision-making > > collective-decision-making> > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo > > Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > David (and or Mike, Andy, > > anyone else), could you give a > > bit more on > > > > that > > > > distinction between words and > > tables? > > > > And could you say how (and > > whether) (human, hand) nails > > are different > > from tables; and then how > > nails are different from words? > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > edu> > > > > on behalf of David Kellogg > > > > > > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff > > of Words > > > > Gordon Wells quotes this from > > an article Mike wrote in a > > Festschrift > > > > for > > > > George Miller. Mike is talking > > about artefacts: > > > > "They are ideal in that they > > contain in coded form the > > interactions of > > which they > > were previously a part and > > which they mediate in the > > present (e.g., > > > > the > > > > structure of > > a pencil carries within it the > > history of certain forms of > > writing). > > > > They > > > > are material > > in that they are embodied in > > material artifacts. This principle > > > > applies > > > > with equal > > force whether one is > > considering language/speech or > > the more usually > > > > noted > > > > forms > > of artifacts such as tables > > and knives which constitute > > material > > > > culture. > > > > What > > differentiates a word, such as > > ?language? from, say, a table. > > is the > > relative prominence > > of their material and ideal > > aspects. No word exists apart > > from its > > material > > instantiation (as a > > configuration of sound waves, > > or hand movements, > > > > or > > > > as > > > > writing, > > or as neuronal activity), > > whereas every table embodies > > an order > > > > imposed > > > > by > > > > thinking > > human beings." > > > > This is the kind of thing that > > regularly gets me thrown out of > > > > journals > > > > by > > > > the ear. Mike says that the > > difference between a word and > > a table is > > > > the > > > > relative salience of the ideal > > and the material. Sure--words > > are full > > > > of > > > > the ideal, and tables are full > > of material. Right? > > > > Nope. Mike says it's the other > > way around. Why? Well, because > > a word > > without some word-stuff (sound > > or graphite) just isn't a > > word. In a > > word, meaning is solidary with > > material sounding: change one, > > and you > > change the other. But with a > > table, what you start with is > > the idea of > > > > the > > > > table; as soon as you've got > > that idea, you've got a table. > > You could > > change the material to > > anything and you'd still have > > a table. > > > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out > > by the ear. But he does ignore the > > > > delightful > > > > perversity in what Mike is > > saying, and what he gets out > > of the quote > > > > is > > > > just that words are really > > just like tools. When in fact > > Mike is > > > > saying > > > > just the opposite. > > > > (The part I don't get is > > Mike's notion that the > > structure of a pencil > > carries within it the history > > of certain forms of writing. > > Does he > > > > mean > > > > that the length of the pencil > > reflects how often it's been > > used? Or is > > > > he > > > > making a more archaeological > > point about graphite, wood, > > rubber and > > > > their > > > > relationship to a certain > > point in the history of > > writing and erasing? > > Actually, pencils are more > > like tables than like > > words--the idea has > > > > to > > > > come first.) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue May 9 16:18:54 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 10 May 2017 09:18:54 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <5911d396.020f620a.90d8d.0915@mx.google.com> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> <5911d396.020f620a.90d8d.0915@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry: One of my earliest memories--I must have been three years old or so--is climbing up a set of stairs in the University of Minnesota department of child psychology between the nursery school I attended and the laboratory where my mother was working on her PhD on childhood speech. Her experiments had something to do with dropping marbles into holes and getting M&Ms, although to be honest the only thing I really remember besides the stairs is the M&Ms and a conversation I had while climbing the stairs. I asked my mother why she was still at school (I was attending nursery school on the first floor and it seemed to me that at her age she should be somewhat higher than a room on the second floor). She said she wanted to understand how people learn to talk. I asked her why she didn't remember. She said she just forgot. The way we normally communicate--the way we are all used to, and the way we all remember--is for somebody to say something about something to someone else, and that's thirdness. We don't normally start with firstness or secondness, the way that Peirce does. I think I wrote the way I wrote, and I started this posting the way I started this posting, because there is a kind of feeling of what happens to you as it is actually happening to you, and that is firstness. It's ineffable in the sense that in order to describe it to somebody you have to destroy it by changing it into secondness (dialogue) or thirdness (narrative); The feeling of what happens to you as it is actually happening to you can be shared--my mother was there--but not communicated--I never spoke with her again about this conversation, and although I am communicating with you about it, what I am communicating is not the conversation but something like a narrative about it. Because you can share it, I don't think it's that phenomenological astonishment that is so important to Husserl; it's not the pre-verbal prehension of color that Cezanne was trying to get at, but it is pre-narrative and even pre-dialogue: it's the stairs and the M&Ms and not the conversation. Peirce calls it "firstness", and he associates it with notions like experience qua experience, qualia, the redness of redness, and of course emotion, by which he really means feeling rather than higher emotions mediated by artworks. When I look at the sea of sound on Praat, I am not experiencing the sound at all. Instead, I'm using an elaborate set of tools and signs to try to strip away the layers of meaning and wording and even the actual phonemes and just get at the bands of sound energy of which the phonemes (and thence the wordings and meanings) are made. The stuff of words is, after all, bands of acoustic energy. Polyphonic singers know this, and they are able to manipulate their vocal tracts in order to focus the four bands of energy into only two of them. Like this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vC9Qh709gas&t=237s (Now, here's a question for YOU. I could have given you THIS as an example of polyphonic singing instead: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tVGei24TdQ The singing is actually better. But it wouldn't have worked as well. Why not?) David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 12:35 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > David, > I do hope we are going to get some more philosophy out of you. In > particular exploring the suff of words/wording. > > I want to take this turn to ?echo? your philosophical ways, that are in > pursuit of this [theme]. See your May 5th response to Greg > > I will back from your forth and stay close to your philosophical wordings > upon *firstness, secondness, and thirdness* as INEFFABLE. > > FIRSTNESS: -ICONIC > When I look at ?sound waves? [natural] on my Praat Spectograph, I am > trying to get at the sound stuff, the the noise, the *firstness* of the > stuff of words. To get at ?this? requires a very complex *combination of* > tools and signs to ?get down to? [lp-penetrate?] this level or layer of > this emerging *spectrum* > > Moving ?up? we apprehend/look at the *vocal tract* [which itself is no > longer ?firstness? as a physiological organ] but is now something brought > about by human ?organization/patterning? > > This firstness is the way of looking/apprehending wording [as] *iconic* > firstness. > > SECONDNESS: - INDEX > > Moving ?up? to look/apprehend at word stuff as indexical. This moving up > is *necessarily* relating to the vocal tract within this theme. This occurs > NOT through proximity or association but is necessarily related to the > vocal tract. [LP-integrated??] > > THIRDNESS: - SYMBOL > > Moving ?up? When organizing/patterning sound stuff so that the sound stuff > *stands for* a way of organizing/patterning other stuff. This other stuff > includes: > ? Abstract models-in the making > ? Actual categories of objects > ? Wording phrases such as - sibling society as metaphorical > ? Objects such as tables and lunchboxes and backpacks > > David, this moving up the layers/levers within the [spectrum] are the way > the suff of words/wording ALL are: *ways of apprehending/looking. They are > not associative stuff. > > I find this philosophical explanation wery generative and germane. > Would you consider transferring from the linguistics discipline and > consider participating in the philosophical endeavors. Or do only madmen > move in this direction?? > > > > > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: David Kellogg > Sent: May 8, 2017 3:09 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > > Vygotsky knew Marr. At one point, Marr took part in the weekly discussion > group that Vygotsky and Luria shared with Eisenstein. But of course > Vygotsky knew Blonsky, and liked him, and that didn't shield Blonsky from > more than one withering criticism from his good friend down the hall at the > Krupskaya Academy where they both worked. > > (I am rather sceptical of the idea that Vygotsky was anything more than > culturally Jewish. But it is certainly true that the Russian Jews I have > known lie at the "engagement" end of Deborah Tannen's > "engagement-consideration" continuum. That is, we prefer to wear you out by > interrupting, disagreeing, and otherwise engaging with what you say rather > than wear you out by sitting and listening silently and considerately and > sometimes showing deference and considerateness by making absolutely no > reply. Greg although he is really a very good talker, tends to > the consideration end of the continuum while I am stuck at the extreme > engagement end, and it made our cooperation in Seoul on lectures including > Peirce...well, interesting.) > > So I wasn't surprised to read THIS in the pedological lectures (p. 257 of > Vol. 5 of your English Collected Works): > > "??? ????? ? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ? ??? ???? > ????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ?????? ?. ?. ?????, ???? ????????? ??? > ??????? ?????????: ?????????????? ????? ????????????? ?????, ??? ?? > ?????????? ? ?????? ?????, ?????????? ??? ??? ????? ??????. ? ?????? > ??????? ????? ?????????? ????? ???. ?? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ????? > ??? ????; ??? ????????? ? ?????? ????????. ????? ?? ?? ???????, ??? ??? > ????????? ?????? ???, ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ?????; ?? ??? > ???????????? ????????? ????? ???????????????, ?? ???? ?????, ??????? > ?????????? ???, ???? ?????? ????????? ???????????? ????, ?? ??????????? ?? > ???? ??????, ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ????????? ?? ???????????? > ???????. > > > "What stands at the source of each symbol? With all of the fantastic and > all the controversy of the range of propositions in the theory of N. Ya. > Marr, one proposition seems to me undeniable.: the first words of human > language, as he puts it?'the first word means everything or a great deal.' > And the first words of child speech mean almost everything. But what are > these words? Words of the type ?this is? or ?this?; they may be applied to > any object. Can we say that this is a real word? No, this is only the > indicative function of the word itself; from it subsequently grows > something symbolizing, but it is a word that is merely a vocal pointing > gesture, and it is retained in all words because each human word points to > a certain object." > > Notice that the word "word" here doesn't mean "word"; that is, it means > "wording/meaning" rather than "orthographic word". As Ruqaiya Hasan liked > to say, "The meaning of 'not' is not in 'not'". > > (Call it indexical, if you will, but I can't help but feeling, when I read > this passage, that Vygotsky likes Marr in the rather exasperated way that I > sometimes feel about--say--Greg.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 1:24 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > > Hi all, > > > > on the question whether there can be a language having one word, David > > brings the example: > > > > "What? That! > > Where? There! > > When? Then! > > > > Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and > the > > "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to > > answer: > > > > a? a! > > eh? eh! > > e? e..." > > > > I find it interesting that, in these examples, the rising and falling > > belong to a situational relation between two: RISE is an invitation to > FALL > > and vice versa. It is the difference between the two what matters. And > this > > difference seems to be a 'correlation' (if I were to use the term David > has > > been using) of the very organic fact that actions have consequences and > > that it is this relation the minimal unit that living organisms are > > concerned about. If organisms (unlike stones) do register (encode) not > just > > actions and not just consequences, but relations between actions and > > consequences, the feature of language that David is pointing at seems to > be > > also a feature of organic life in general. I find this thought > interesting > > if we are to think of language as an expression of biology/culture > identity. > > > > I am laying this thought here without much knowledge of linguistics, but > I > > thought that this may resonate with what the discussion is unfolding, > > particularly the question on indexicals as per, for example, Greg's last > > comments. Does it? > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: 08 May 2017 04:28 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > > > > The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the > > many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is > > that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically > > elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know > > Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology > > is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the > > Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > Andy (and others), > > > > > > I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. > > > > > > One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap > > > is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using > > > Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are > > > signs which have referential value but their referential > > > value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic > > > example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I > > > can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it > > > seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as > > > translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is > > > "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. > > > > > > As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the > > > importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He > > > calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of > > > discourse (and without which, our discourse would be > > > meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's > > > essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case > > > for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the > > > talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand > > > quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by > > > following how different participant deictics are deployed. > > > > > > Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear > > > about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > > Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a > > > Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they > > > see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see > > > Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be > > > utterly incapable of managing his own life as the > > > foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce > > > was a Logician who invented two different schools of > > > philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > > > > > > I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular > > > because it is a logical triad which Hegel never > > > theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us > > > understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, > > > Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is > > > acquired by human beings, which is an idea I > > > appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he > > > overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics > > > and his Pragmaticism. > > > > > > A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > > decision-making > > > > collective-decision-making> > > > > > > On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > > David and Andy, > > > I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, > > > secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and > > > certainly you were part of that discussion. I > > > would like to understand that better, also how it > > > relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, > > > indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your > > > ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that > > > might relate, which I hope so, since it would > > > bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), > > > Andy?s Academia articles on political > > > representation and activity/social theory are > > > probably relevant in some way, though Andy > > > probably sees language as a figure against a > > > larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns > > > the figure/ground relationship around? > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > Greg: > > > > > > (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually > > > don't see these problems > > > until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > > > > > > Meaning is simply another word for > > > organization. Organization is always > > > present and never separable from matter: it's > > > a property of matter, the way > > > that the internet is a property of a computer. > > > Sometimes this organization > > > is brought about without any human > > > intervention (if you are religious, you > > > will say that it brought about divinely, and > > > if you are Spinozan, by > > > nature: it amounts to the same thing, because > > > "Deus Sive Natura"). > > > Sometimes it is brought about by human > > > ingenuity (but of course if you are > > > religious you will say that it is the divine > > > in humans at work, and if you > > > are Spinozan you will say that humans are > > > simply that part of nature which > > > has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii > > > think it amounts to the same > > > thing). So of course there are not two kinds > > > of substance, res cogitans vs > > > res extensa, only one substance and different > > > ways of organizing it (which > > > in the end amount to the same thing). > > > > > > You say that discourse particles like "Guess > > > what?" and "so there" and > > > "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say > > > to the contrary > > > notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, > > > insofar as they depend on their > > > relationship to the context of situation for > > > their meaning. You say that a > > > Southern drawl is indexical, and that the > > > relationship of jazz or blues or > > > hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, > > > insofar as they satisfy the > > > condition I just mentioned. But "because" is > > > also a symbol, and a > > > Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when > > > he/she moves to New York > > > City (and in fact you can argue they sound > > > more so). In Africa, jazz and > > > blues and hiphop in Africa are related to > > > Americanness and not to > > > blackness. > > > > > > So your division of signs into just three > > > categories is too simple, Greg. > > > In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you > > > will discover that there are > > > tens of thousands of categories, but they are > > > generated from three > > > ineffable primitives ("firstness", > > > "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > > > example all words are symbols insofar as you > > > have to know English in order > > > to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But > > > some words are > > > symbol-indices, symbols that function as > > > indexes, because they depend > > > on the context of situation for their meaning. > > > Without the symbolic > > > gateway, they cannot function as indices. My > > > wife, for example, cannot tell > > > a Southerner from a more general American > > > accent, and I myself still have > > > trouble figuring out who is an Australian and > > > who is an FOB bloody pom. > > > Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness > > > in hiphop--it sounds like > > > K-pop to her. > > > > > > I don't actually think that any signs are > > > associative or "prehensive"; I > > > think that they are all different ways of > > > looking or apprehending. So for > > > example you can apprehend a wording as a > > > symbol: a way of organizing sound > > > stuff so that it "stands for" a way of > > > organizing other stuff (sometimes > > > lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of > > > objects and sometimes the > > > abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls > > > "projects"). You can also > > > look at wording as index: not as something > > > that is "associated" to the lips > > > and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or > > > even continguity but rather > > > something that has a necessary relation to the > > > vocal tract (which is itself > > > not a physiological organ, but something > > > brought about by human > > > organization). But when I look at sound waves > > > on my Praat spectrograph and > > > think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to > > > get at is the sound stuff, > > > the noise, the firstness of the stuff of > > > words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > > > think there is any way of doing this with my > > > eyes or ears alone: I think it > > > requires a very complex combination of tools > > > and signs to get down to > > > firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if > > > he had breakfast with > > > Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by > > > themselves, but nobody > > > has ever really shown the limits of what they > > > can do when they put each > > > other in order and start to organize the world > > > around them. > > > > > > (And that is about as much philosophy as you > > > are going to get out of me, > > > I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: > > > mediating activity is not > > > absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or > > > Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > > > from mediating activity in tool use, for the > > > same reason that painting is > > > different from wording: in painting you CAN > > > leave out the human (if you are > > > doing a dead seal for example, or if you are > > > Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > > > keep in mind that the former committed suicide > > > and the latter murdered two > > > innocent young women). But in wording you > > > never ever can. Wording can feel > > > unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated > > > or it doesn't work very > > > well--but in reality it's even more mediated > > > than ever. > > > > > > dk > > > > > > > > > On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > David (and others), > > > > > > In the interests of disagreement (which I > > > know you dearly appreciate), your > > > last post included this: > > > "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide > > > material correlates for meaning > > > and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > > > > > > I was with you up until that point, but > > > that's where I always lose you. > > > > > > I know it is a rather trite thing to say > > > but I guess it really depends on > > > what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, > > > you mean some plane of existence > > > that runs parallel to the material stuff, > > > then this seems to be a bit of > > > trouble since this leaves us with, on the > > > one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > > > noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" > > > (res cogitans? phenomena?). > > > Matter is easy enough to locate, but where > > > do we locate "meaning" as you > > > have described it? > > > > > > This reminds me of Saussure's classic > > > drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > > > (attached) in which "the indefinite plane > > > of jumbled ideas" (A in the > > > diagram) exists on one side of the chasm > > > and "the equally vague plane of > > > sounds" (B) exists on the other side of > > > the chasm. Each side is > > > self-contained and self-referential, and > > > never the twain shall meet. Worlds > > > apart. > > > > > > And this ties to the conversation in the > > > other thread about the > > > ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's > > > Marx quote about a science of > > > language that is shorn from life). My > > > suspicion is that this supposed > > > ineffability of meaning has everything to > > > do with this Saussurean approach > > > to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > > > > > > Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a > > > different approach that may give > > > a way out of this trouble by putting the > > > word back INto the world. (p. 102 > > > of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > > > > > > Peirce offers three kinds of relations of > > > representamen (signifier) to > > > object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. > > > The symbol is the relation with > > > which we are most familiar - it is the one > > > that Saussure speaks of and is > > > the one that is ineffable or, in > > > Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > > > "conventional". It is the stuff of words, > > > the meaning of which is found in > > > other words (hence the sense of > > > ineffability). With only the symbolic > > > function, the whole world of words would > > > be entirely self-referential and > > > thus truly ineffable (and this is why I > > > like to say that Derrida is the end > > > of the Saussurean road - he took that idea > > > to its logical conclusion and > > > discovered that the meaning of meaning is, > > > well, empty (and thus > > > ineffable)). > > > > > > But Peirce has two other relations of > > > representamen to object, the iconic > > > and the indexical. In signs functioning > > > iconically, the representamen > > > contains some quality of the object that > > > it represents (e.g., a map that > > > holds relations of the space that it > > > represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > > > in which the representamen has some of the > > > qualities of the sound of the > > > bee flying by). With signs functioning > > > indexically, the relationship of > > > representamen to object is one of temporal > > > or spatial contiguity (e.g., > > > where there is smoke there is fire, or > > > where there is a Southern twang, > > > there is a Southerner, or, most > > > classically, when I point, the object to > > > which I am pointing is spatially > > > contiguous with the finger that is > > > pointing). > > > > > > Now if I follow the argument of another of > > > the inheritors of Roman > > > Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein > > > (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > > > only inheritors of this tradition - > > > Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > > > Harvard... and he does a great impression > > > of Jacobson too), then we can > > > indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., > > > the symbolic function) in the > > > more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) > > > indexical function. > > > > > > But that argument is always a bit too much > > > for me (if there are any takers, > > > the best place to find this argument is in > > > Silverstein's chapter > > > "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic > > > Function," or in less explicit but > > > slightly more understandable article > > > "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > > > Sociolinguistics Life"). > > > > > > Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more > > > elegant and comprehensible: in > > > ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the > > > index, first as the index par > > > excellence, pointing (something that, as > > > Andy has previously pointed out, > > > might not be exactly how things go in a > > > literal sense, but the general > > > structure here works well, I think, as a > > > heuristic if nothing else - words > > > are first learned as indexes, temporally > > > and spatially collocated, "bottle" > > > is first uttered as a way of saying > > > "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > > > co-present object; note this is also why > > > young kids get discourse markers > > > at such a young age (and seems incredibly > > > precocious when they do!), since > > > discourse markers are primarily > > > indexical). The indexical function is the > > > rudimentary form that then provides the > > > groundwork for the development of > > > the symbolic function. > > > > > > So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) > > > approach, the meaning of signs is not > > > ineffable, there is a grounding for words, > > > and that grounding is the > > > indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in > > > the world and of the world. > > > > > > This seems to me a way of putting meaning > > > back into matter. And perhaps > > > speaking of words as the material > > > correlates of meaning can be a useful > > > heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk > > > about meanings and concepts given our > > > current set of meanings/concepts?). But we > > > should also recognize that if it > > > becomes more than an heuristic it can lead > > > us astray if we take it too far. > > > > > > I'd add here that I think one of the > > > greatest opportunities for CHAT to > > > make a contribution to social science > > > today is in its conceptualization of > > > "concepts" (and, by extension, > > > "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > > > of the most taken-for-granted aspects of > > > social science today is the idea > > > that we know what "concepts" are. In > > > anthropology, people easily talk about > > > "cultural concepts" and typically they > > > mean precisely something that floats > > > around in some ethereal plane of > > > "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > > > material stuff of the world. Yet, this > > > runs counter to the direction that > > > anthropology is heading these days with > > > the so-called "ontological turn" > > > (I'll hold off on explaining this for now > > > since this post is already > > > running way too long, but I'll just > > > mention that one of the aims of this is > > > to get to a non-dualistic social science). > > > CHAT's conception of the concept > > > seems to me to offer precisely what is > > > needed -- a way of understanding the > > > concept as a fundamentally cultural and > > > historical thing, rather than > > > simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is > > > the holding of a(n historical) > > > relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse > > > or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > > > are thus little historical text-lets. > > > > > > Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will > > > find some time in the future to > > > return to that last part, but there is no > > > time to develop it further now. > > > > > > Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the > > > opportunity to catch up to these > > > conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > > > > > > I'll keep reading but no promises that > > > I'll be able to comment (as a young > > > scholar, I need to be spending my time > > > putting stuff out - and unlike the > > > rest of you, I'm no good at > > > multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > > > for me). > > > > > > Very best, > > > greg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David > > > Kellogg > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > Well, yes. But if present day > > > conditions are the REVERSE of the > > > > > > conditions > > > > > > under which Vygotsky was writing--that > > > is, if the present trend is to > > > subsume labor under language instead > > > of the other way around--don't we > > > > > > need > > > > > > this distinction between signs and > > > tools more than ever? That is, if > > > > > > sloppy > > > > > > formulations like "cultural capital", > > > "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > > > value of the word" are erasing the > > > distinction between a mediating > > > > > > activity > > > > > > which acts on the environment and a > > > mediating activity which acts on > > > > > > other > > > > > > mediators and on the self, and which > > > therefore has the potential for > > > reciprocity and recursion, isn't this > > > exactly where the clear-eyed > > > philosophers need to step in and > > > straighten us out? > > > > > > I think that instead what is happening > > > is that our older generation > > > of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present > > > company--usually--excluded) are too > > > interested in the "tool power" of > > > large categories and insufficiently > > > interested in fine distinctions that > > > make a difference. But perhaps it > > > is also that our younger generation of > > > misty-eyed philosophers are, as > > > Eagleton remarked, more interested in > > > copulating bodies than exploited > > > ones. Yet these fine distinctions that > > > do make a difference equally allow > > > generalization and abstraction and > > > tool power, and the copulating flesh > > > > > > and > > > > > > the exploited muscles are one and the > > > same. > > > > > > Take, for example, your remark about > > > the Fourier transform performed by > > > > > > the > > > > > > ear (not the brain--the inner ear > > > cochlea--I can see the world centre for > > > studying the cochlea from my office > > > window). Actually, it's part of a > > > > > > wide > > > > > > range of "realisation" phenomena that > > > were already being noticed by > > > Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, > > > you don't have cause and effect, > > > > > > just > > > > > > as in cause and effect you don't have > > > "association". Words don't "cause" > > > meaning: they provide material > > > correlates for meaning and in that sense > > > "realise" them as matter. Meaning does > > > not "cause" wording; it correlates > > > wording to a semantics--an activity of > > > consciousness--and through it to a > > > context of situation or culture, and > > > in that sense "realises" it. > > > > > > So in his lecture on early childhood, > > > Vygotsky says that the > > > > > > stabilization > > > > > > of forms, colours, and sizes by the > > > eye in early childhood is part of a > > > > > > two > > > > > > way relationship, a dialogue, between > > > the sense organs and the brain. The > > > reason why we don't see a table as a > > > trapezoid, when we stand over it and > > > compare the front with the back, the > > > reason why we don't see a piece of > > > chalk at nighttime as black, the > > > reason why we have orthoscopic > > > > > > perception > > > > > > and we don't see a man at a distance > > > as a looming midget is that the > > > > > > brain > > > > > > imposes the contrary views on the eye. > > > And where does the brain get this > > > view if not from language and from > > > other people? > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy > > > Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > > > Personally, I think the first and > > > most persistently important thing is > > > > > > to > > > > > > see how much alike are tables and > > > words. > > > > > > But ... Vygotsky was very > > > insistent on the distinction > > > because he was > > > fighting a battle against the idea > > > that speech ought to be subsumed > > > > > > under > > > > > > the larger category of labour. He > > > had to fight for semiotics against a > > > vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. > > > But we here in 2017 are living in > > > different times, where we have > > > Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > > > Marxism is widely regarded as > > > antique. As Marx said "Just as > > > > > > philosophers > > > > > > have given thought an independent > > > existence, so they were bound to make > > > language into an independent > > > realm." and we live well and truly > > > in the > > > times when labour is subsumed > > > under language, and not the other way > > > > > > around. > > > > > > Everyone knows that a table is > > > unlike a word. The point it to > > > > > > understand > > > > > > how tables are signs and word are > > > material objects. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked > > > in an offshoot of the bionic ear > > > project. The ear has a little > > > keyboard that works like a piano > > > keyboard > > > > > > in > > > > > > reverse, making a real time > > > Fourier transform of that air > > > pressure wave > > > > > > and > > > > > > coding the harmonics it in nerve > > > impulse. The brain never hears that > > > pressure signal.) > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > ------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/ > > book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > collective-decision-making> > > > On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo > > > Jornet Gil wrote: > > > > > > David (and or Mike, Andy, > > > anyone else), could you give a > > > bit more on > > > > > > that > > > > > > distinction between words and > > > tables? > > > > > > And could you say how (and > > > whether) (human, hand) nails > > > are different > > > from tables; and then how > > > nails are different from words? > > > > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > > > edu> > > > > > > on behalf of David Kellogg > > > > > > > > > Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > > > Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff > > > of Words > > > > > > Gordon Wells quotes this from > > > an article Mike wrote in a > > > Festschrift > > > > > > for > > > > > > George Miller. Mike is talking > > > about artefacts: > > > > > > "They are ideal in that they > > > contain in coded form the > > > interactions of > > > which they > > > were previously a part and > > > which they mediate in the > > > present (e.g., > > > > > > the > > > > > > structure of > > > a pencil carries within it the > > > history of certain forms of > > > writing). > > > > > > They > > > > > > are material > > > in that they are embodied in > > > material artifacts. This principle > > > > > > applies > > > > > > with equal > > > force whether one is > > > considering language/speech or > > > the more usually > > > > > > noted > > > > > > forms > > > of artifacts such as tables > > > and knives which constitute > > > material > > > > > > culture. > > > > > > What > > > differentiates a word, such as > > > ?language? from, say, a table. > > > is the > > > relative prominence > > > of their material and ideal > > > aspects. No word exists apart > > > from its > > > material > > > instantiation (as a > > > configuration of sound waves, > > > or hand movements, > > > > > > or > > > > > > as > > > > > > writing, > > > or as neuronal activity), > > > whereas every table embodies > > > an order > > > > > > imposed > > > > > > by > > > > > > thinking > > > human beings." > > > > > > This is the kind of thing that > > > regularly gets me thrown out of > > > > > > journals > > > > > > by > > > > > > the ear. Mike says that the > > > difference between a word and > > > a table is > > > > > > the > > > > > > relative salience of the ideal > > > and the material. Sure--words > > > are full > > > > > > of > > > > > > the ideal, and tables are full > > > of material. Right? > > > > > > Nope. Mike says it's the other > > > way around. Why? Well, because > > > a word > > > without some word-stuff (sound > > > or graphite) just isn't a > > > word. In a > > > word, meaning is solidary with > > > material sounding: change one, > > > and you > > > change the other. But with a > > > table, what you start with is > > > the idea of > > > > > > the > > > > > > table; as soon as you've got > > > that idea, you've got a table. > > > You could > > > change the material to > > > anything and you'd still have > > > a table. > > > > > > Wells doesn't throw Mike out > > > by the ear. But he does ignore the > > > > > > delightful > > > > > > perversity in what Mike is > > > saying, and what he gets out > > > of the quote > > > > > > is > > > > > > just that words are really > > > just like tools. When in fact > > > Mike is > > > > > > saying > > > > > > just the opposite. > > > > > > (The part I don't get is > > > Mike's notion that the > > > structure of a pencil > > > carries within it the history > > > of certain forms of writing. > > > Does he > > > > > > mean > > > > > > that the length of the pencil > > > reflects how often it's been > > > used? Or is > > > > > > he > > > > > > making a more archaeological > > > point about graphite, wood, > > > rubber and > > > > > > their > > > > > > relationship to a certain > > > point in the history of > > > writing and erasing? > > > Actually, pencils are more > > > like tables than like > > > words--the idea has > > > > > > to > > > > > > come first.) > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue May 9 21:33:06 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 22:33:06 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> <5911d396.020f620a.90d8d.0915@mx.google.com> Message-ID: David, I?d like to take a crack at answering your question. I take it that you mean the first link explains in scientific terms with cutting edge tecnologies (in the domain of acoustic phonetics) what the Mongolian throat singer (in the second link) learned from infancy directly from older throat singers, who learned from even older throat singers, and so on. But throat singing and playing the fiddle in the second link are tecnological feats too. And the woman in the first link is pretty darned good. I?m guessing she spent time in Mongolia, maybe as a child. Also, am I right that being able to deliberately, and with great control, sing two notes at once is based on the same control you and I have in making vowels. And vowels are best understood through the tools of acoustics, as contrasted with the tools of articulatory phonetics. In other words I can?t explain vowels, or throat singing, without a lot of hardware, but I can explain consonants with nothing more than words. Is there something here about direct and mediated experience? Firstness the most direct (sensing?), secondness less so (feeling?) and thirdness (emoting) with lots of mediation? So, I am answering your question with a lot of questions. Maybe I?m trying to hang onto my firstness here, while dialoging and narrating? Juggling? I really loved mashing these two beautiful demonstrations of how the human voice works. Thank you very much for sharing! Henry > On May 9, 2017, at 5:18 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Larry: > > One of my earliest memories--I must have been three years old or so--is > climbing up a set of stairs in the University of Minnesota department of > child psychology between the nursery school I attended and the laboratory > where my mother was working on her PhD on childhood speech. Her experiments > had something to do with dropping marbles into holes and getting M&Ms, > although to be honest the only thing I really remember besides the > stairs is the M&Ms and a conversation I had while climbing the stairs. I > asked my mother why she was still at school (I was attending nursery school > on the first floor and it seemed to me that at her age she should be > somewhat higher than a room on the second floor). She said she wanted to > understand how people learn to talk. I asked her why she didn't remember. > She said she just forgot. > > The way we normally communicate--the way we are all used to, and the way we > all remember--is for somebody to say something about something to someone > else, and that's thirdness. We don't normally start with firstness or > secondness, the way that Peirce does. I think I wrote the way I wrote, and > I started this posting the way I started this posting, because there is a > kind of feeling of what happens to you as it is actually happening to you, > and that is firstness. It's ineffable in the sense that in order to > describe it to somebody you have to destroy it by changing it into > secondness (dialogue) or thirdness (narrative); The feeling of what happens > to you as it is actually happening to you can be shared--my mother was > there--but not communicated--I never spoke with her again about this > conversation, and although I am communicating with you about it, what I am > communicating is not the conversation but something like a narrative about > it. Because you can share it, I don't think it's that phenomenological > astonishment that is so important to Husserl; it's not the pre-verbal > prehension of color that Cezanne was trying to get at, but it is > pre-narrative and even pre-dialogue: it's the stairs and the M&Ms and not > the conversation. Peirce calls it "firstness", and he associates it with > notions like experience qua experience, qualia, the redness of redness, and > of course emotion, by which he really means feeling rather than higher > emotions mediated by artworks. > > When I look at the sea of sound on Praat, I am not experiencing the sound > at all. Instead, I'm using an elaborate set of tools and signs to try to > strip away the layers of meaning and wording and even the actual phonemes > and just get at the bands of sound energy of which the phonemes (and thence > the wordings and meanings) are made. The stuff of words is, after all, > bands of acoustic energy. Polyphonic singers know this, and they are able > to manipulate their vocal tracts in order to focus the four bands of energy > into only two of them. Like this: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vC9Qh709gas&t=237s > > (Now, here's a question for YOU. I could have given you THIS as an example > of polyphonic singing instead: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tVGei24TdQ > > The singing is actually better. But it wouldn't have worked as well. Why > not?) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 12:35 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> David, >> I do hope we are going to get some more philosophy out of you. In >> particular exploring the suff of words/wording. >> >> I want to take this turn to ?echo? your philosophical ways, that are in >> pursuit of this [theme]. See your May 5th response to Greg >> >> I will back from your forth and stay close to your philosophical wordings >> upon *firstness, secondness, and thirdness* as INEFFABLE. >> >> FIRSTNESS: -ICONIC >> When I look at ?sound waves? [natural] on my Praat Spectograph, I am >> trying to get at the sound stuff, the the noise, the *firstness* of the >> stuff of words. To get at ?this? requires a very complex *combination of* >> tools and signs to ?get down to? [lp-penetrate?] this level or layer of >> this emerging *spectrum* >> >> Moving ?up? we apprehend/look at the *vocal tract* [which itself is no >> longer ?firstness? as a physiological organ] but is now something brought >> about by human ?organization/patterning? >> >> This firstness is the way of looking/apprehending wording [as] *iconic* >> firstness. >> >> SECONDNESS: - INDEX >> >> Moving ?up? to look/apprehend at word stuff as indexical. This moving up >> is *necessarily* relating to the vocal tract within this theme. This occurs >> NOT through proximity or association but is necessarily related to the >> vocal tract. [LP-integrated??] >> >> THIRDNESS: - SYMBOL >> >> Moving ?up? When organizing/patterning sound stuff so that the sound stuff >> *stands for* a way of organizing/patterning other stuff. This other stuff >> includes: >> ? Abstract models-in the making >> ? Actual categories of objects >> ? Wording phrases such as - sibling society as metaphorical >> ? Objects such as tables and lunchboxes and backpacks >> >> David, this moving up the layers/levers within the [spectrum] are the way >> the suff of words/wording ALL are: *ways of apprehending/looking. They are >> not associative stuff. >> >> I find this philosophical explanation wery generative and germane. >> Would you consider transferring from the linguistics discipline and >> consider participating in the philosophical endeavors. Or do only madmen >> move in this direction?? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >> From: David Kellogg >> Sent: May 8, 2017 3:09 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words >> >> Vygotsky knew Marr. At one point, Marr took part in the weekly discussion >> group that Vygotsky and Luria shared with Eisenstein. But of course >> Vygotsky knew Blonsky, and liked him, and that didn't shield Blonsky from >> more than one withering criticism from his good friend down the hall at the >> Krupskaya Academy where they both worked. >> >> (I am rather sceptical of the idea that Vygotsky was anything more than >> culturally Jewish. But it is certainly true that the Russian Jews I have >> known lie at the "engagement" end of Deborah Tannen's >> "engagement-consideration" continuum. That is, we prefer to wear you out by >> interrupting, disagreeing, and otherwise engaging with what you say rather >> than wear you out by sitting and listening silently and considerately and >> sometimes showing deference and considerateness by making absolutely no >> reply. Greg although he is really a very good talker, tends to >> the consideration end of the continuum while I am stuck at the extreme >> engagement end, and it made our cooperation in Seoul on lectures including >> Peirce...well, interesting.) >> >> So I wasn't surprised to read THIS in the pedological lectures (p. 257 of >> Vol. 5 of your English Collected Works): >> >> "??? ????? ? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ? ??? ???? >> ????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ?????? ?. ?. ?????, ???? ????????? ??? >> ??????? ?????????: ?????????????? ????? ????????????? ?????, ??? ?? >> ?????????? ? ?????? ?????, ?????????? ??? ??? ????? ??????. ? ?????? >> ??????? ????? ?????????? ????? ???. ?? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ????? >> ??? ????; ??? ????????? ? ?????? ????????. ????? ?? ?? ???????, ??? ??? >> ????????? ?????? ???, ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ?????; ?? ??? >> ???????????? ????????? ????? ???????????????, ?? ???? ?????, ??????? >> ?????????? ???, ???? ?????? ????????? ???????????? ????, ?? ??????????? ?? >> ???? ??????, ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ????????? ?? ???????????? >> ???????. >> >> >> "What stands at the source of each symbol? With all of the fantastic and >> all the controversy of the range of propositions in the theory of N. Ya. >> Marr, one proposition seems to me undeniable.: the first words of human >> language, as he puts it?'the first word means everything or a great deal.' >> And the first words of child speech mean almost everything. But what are >> these words? Words of the type ?this is? or ?this?; they may be applied to >> any object. Can we say that this is a real word? No, this is only the >> indicative function of the word itself; from it subsequently grows >> something symbolizing, but it is a word that is merely a vocal pointing >> gesture, and it is retained in all words because each human word points to >> a certain object." >> >> Notice that the word "word" here doesn't mean "word"; that is, it means >> "wording/meaning" rather than "orthographic word". As Ruqaiya Hasan liked >> to say, "The meaning of 'not' is not in 'not'". >> >> (Call it indexical, if you will, but I can't help but feeling, when I read >> this passage, that Vygotsky likes Marr in the rather exasperated way that I >> sometimes feel about--say--Greg.) >> >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> >> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 1:24 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> wrote: >> >>> Hi all, >>> >>> on the question whether there can be a language having one word, David >>> brings the example: >>> >>> "What? That! >>> Where? There! >>> When? Then! >>> >>> Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and >> the >>> "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to >>> answer: >>> >>> a? a! >>> eh? eh! >>> e? e..." >>> >>> I find it interesting that, in these examples, the rising and falling >>> belong to a situational relation between two: RISE is an invitation to >> FALL >>> and vice versa. It is the difference between the two what matters. And >> this >>> difference seems to be a 'correlation' (if I were to use the term David >> has >>> been using) of the very organic fact that actions have consequences and >>> that it is this relation the minimal unit that living organisms are >>> concerned about. If organisms (unlike stones) do register (encode) not >> just >>> actions and not just consequences, but relations between actions and >>> consequences, the feature of language that David is pointing at seems to >> be >>> also a feature of organic life in general. I find this thought >> interesting >>> if we are to think of language as an expression of biology/culture >> identity. >>> >>> I am laying this thought here without much knowledge of linguistics, but >> I >>> thought that this may resonate with what the discussion is unfolding, >>> particularly the question on indexicals as per, for example, Greg's last >>> comments. Does it? >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: 08 May 2017 04:28 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words >>> >>> The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the >>> many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is >>> that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically >>> elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know >>> Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology >>> is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the >>> Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> Andy Blunden >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>> >>> On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: >>>> Andy (and others), >>>> >>>> I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. >>>> >>>> One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap >>>> is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using >>>> Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are >>>> signs which have referential value but their referential >>>> value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic >>>> example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I >>>> can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it >>>> seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as >>>> translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is >>>> "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. >>>> >>>> As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the >>>> importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He >>>> calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of >>>> discourse (and without which, our discourse would be >>>> meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's >>>> essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case >>>> for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the >>>> talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand >>>> quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by >>>> following how different participant deictics are deployed. >>>> >>>> Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear >>>> about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a >>>> Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they >>>> see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see >>>> Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be >>>> utterly incapable of managing his own life as the >>>> foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce >>>> was a Logician who invented two different schools of >>>> philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. >>>> >>>> I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular >>>> because it is a logical triad which Hegel never >>>> theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us >>>> understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, >>>> Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is >>>> acquired by human beings, which is an idea I >>>> appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he >>>> overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics >>>> and his Pragmaticism. >>>> >>>> A total madman. A real Metaphysician, >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- >>> decision-making >>>> >> collective-decision-making> >>>> >>>> On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>> >>>> David and Andy, >>>> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, >>>> secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and >>>> certainly you were part of that discussion. I >>>> would like to understand that better, also how it >>>> relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, >>>> indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your >>>> ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that >>>> might relate, which I hope so, since it would >>>> bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), >>>> Andy?s Academia articles on political >>>> representation and activity/social theory are >>>> probably relevant in some way, though Andy >>>> probably sees language as a figure against a >>>> larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns >>>> the figure/ground relationship around? >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg >>>> >>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> Greg: >>>> >>>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually >>>> don't see these problems >>>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) >>>> >>>> Meaning is simply another word for >>>> organization. Organization is always >>>> present and never separable from matter: it's >>>> a property of matter, the way >>>> that the internet is a property of a computer. >>>> Sometimes this organization >>>> is brought about without any human >>>> intervention (if you are religious, you >>>> will say that it brought about divinely, and >>>> if you are Spinozan, by >>>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because >>>> "Deus Sive Natura"). >>>> Sometimes it is brought about by human >>>> ingenuity (but of course if you are >>>> religious you will say that it is the divine >>>> in humans at work, and if you >>>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are >>>> simply that part of nature which >>>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii >>>> think it amounts to the same >>>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds >>>> of substance, res cogitans vs >>>> res extensa, only one substance and different >>>> ways of organizing it (which >>>> in the end amount to the same thing). >>>> >>>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess >>>> what?" and "so there" and >>>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say >>>> to the contrary >>>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, >>>> insofar as they depend on their >>>> relationship to the context of situation for >>>> their meaning. You say that a >>>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the >>>> relationship of jazz or blues or >>>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, >>>> insofar as they satisfy the >>>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is >>>> also a symbol, and a >>>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when >>>> he/she moves to New York >>>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound >>>> more so). In Africa, jazz and >>>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to >>>> Americanness and not to >>>> blackness. >>>> >>>> So your division of signs into just three >>>> categories is too simple, Greg. >>>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you >>>> will discover that there are >>>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are >>>> generated from three >>>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", >>>> "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for >>>> example all words are symbols insofar as you >>>> have to know English in order >>>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But >>>> some words are >>>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as >>>> indexes, because they depend >>>> on the context of situation for their meaning. >>>> Without the symbolic >>>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My >>>> wife, for example, cannot tell >>>> a Southerner from a more general American >>>> accent, and I myself still have >>>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and >>>> who is an FOB bloody pom. >>>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness >>>> in hiphop--it sounds like >>>> K-pop to her. >>>> >>>> I don't actually think that any signs are >>>> associative or "prehensive"; I >>>> think that they are all different ways of >>>> looking or apprehending. So for >>>> example you can apprehend a wording as a >>>> symbol: a way of organizing sound >>>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of >>>> organizing other stuff (sometimes >>>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of >>>> objects and sometimes the >>>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls >>>> "projects"). You can also >>>> look at wording as index: not as something >>>> that is "associated" to the lips >>>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or >>>> even continguity but rather >>>> something that has a necessary relation to the >>>> vocal tract (which is itself >>>> not a physiological organ, but something >>>> brought about by human >>>> organization). But when I look at sound waves >>>> on my Praat spectrograph and >>>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to >>>> get at is the sound stuff, >>>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of >>>> words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't >>>> think there is any way of doing this with my >>>> eyes or ears alone: I think it >>>> requires a very complex combination of tools >>>> and signs to get down to >>>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if >>>> he had breakfast with >>>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by >>>> themselves, but nobody >>>> has ever really shown the limits of what they >>>> can do when they put each >>>> other in order and start to organize the world >>>> around them. >>>> >>>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you >>>> are going to get out of me, >>>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: >>>> mediating activity is not >>>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or >>>> Wolff-Michael, but it is very different >>>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the >>>> same reason that painting is >>>> different from wording: in painting you CAN >>>> leave out the human (if you are >>>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are >>>> Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but >>>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide >>>> and the latter murdered two >>>> innocent young women). But in wording you >>>> never ever can. Wording can feel >>>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated >>>> or it doesn't work very >>>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated >>>> than ever. >>>> >>>> dk >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> >>> > >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> David (and others), >>>> >>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I >>>> know you dearly appreciate), your >>>> last post included this: >>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide >>>> material correlates for meaning >>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >>>> >>>> I was with you up until that point, but >>>> that's where I always lose you. >>>> >>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say >>>> but I guess it really depends on >>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, >>>> you mean some plane of existence >>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, >>>> then this seems to be a bit of >>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the >>>> one hand, "matter" (res extensa? >>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" >>>> (res cogitans? phenomena?). >>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where >>>> do we locate "meaning" as you >>>> have described it? >>>> >>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic >>>> drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane >>>> of jumbled ideas" (A in the >>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm >>>> and "the equally vague plane of >>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of >>>> the chasm. Each side is >>>> self-contained and self-referential, and >>>> never the twain shall meet. Worlds >>>> apart. >>>> >>>> And this ties to the conversation in the >>>> other thread about the >>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's >>>> Marx quote about a science of >>>> language that is shorn from life). My >>>> suspicion is that this supposed >>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to >>>> do with this Saussurean approach >>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >>>> >>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a >>>> different approach that may give >>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the >>>> word back INto the world. (p. 102 >>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >>>> >>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of >>>> representamen (signifier) to >>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. >>>> The symbol is the relation with >>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one >>>> that Saussure speaks of and is >>>> the one that is ineffable or, in >>>> Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, >>>> the meaning of which is found in >>>> other words (hence the sense of >>>> ineffability). With only the symbolic >>>> function, the whole world of words would >>>> be entirely self-referential and >>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I >>>> like to say that Derrida is the end >>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea >>>> to its logical conclusion and >>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, >>>> well, empty (and thus >>>> ineffable)). >>>> >>>> But Peirce has two other relations of >>>> representamen to object, the iconic >>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning >>>> iconically, the representamen >>>> contains some quality of the object that >>>> it represents (e.g., a map that >>>> holds relations of the space that it >>>> represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" >>>> in which the representamen has some of the >>>> qualities of the sound of the >>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning >>>> indexically, the relationship of >>>> representamen to object is one of temporal >>>> or spatial contiguity (e.g., >>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or >>>> where there is a Southern twang, >>>> there is a Southerner, or, most >>>> classically, when I point, the object to >>>> which I am pointing is spatially >>>> contiguous with the finger that is >>>> pointing). >>>> >>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of >>>> the inheritors of Roman >>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein >>>> (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the >>>> only inheritors of this tradition - >>>> Michael was a student of Jakobson's at >>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression >>>> of Jacobson too), then we can >>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., >>>> the symbolic function) in the >>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) >>>> indexical function. >>>> >>>> But that argument is always a bit too much >>>> for me (if there are any takers, >>>> the best place to find this argument is in >>>> Silverstein's chapter >>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic >>>> Function," or in less explicit but >>>> slightly more understandable article >>>> "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of >>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). >>>> >>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more >>>> elegant and comprehensible: in >>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the >>>> index, first as the index par >>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as >>>> Andy has previously pointed out, >>>> might not be exactly how things go in a >>>> literal sense, but the general >>>> structure here works well, I think, as a >>>> heuristic if nothing else - words >>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally >>>> and spatially collocated, "bottle" >>>> is first uttered as a way of saying >>>> "thirsty" and then later to refer to a >>>> co-present object; note this is also why >>>> young kids get discourse markers >>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly >>>> precocious when they do!), since >>>> discourse markers are primarily >>>> indexical). The indexical function is the >>>> rudimentary form that then provides the >>>> groundwork for the development of >>>> the symbolic function. >>>> >>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) >>>> approach, the meaning of signs is not >>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, >>>> and that grounding is the >>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in >>>> the world and of the world. >>>> >>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning >>>> back into matter. And perhaps >>>> speaking of words as the material >>>> correlates of meaning can be a useful >>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk >>>> about meanings and concepts given our >>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we >>>> should also recognize that if it >>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead >>>> us astray if we take it too far. >>>> >>>> I'd add here that I think one of the >>>> greatest opportunities for CHAT to >>>> make a contribution to social science >>>> today is in its conceptualization of >>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, >>>> "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one >>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of >>>> social science today is the idea >>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In >>>> anthropology, people easily talk about >>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they >>>> mean precisely something that floats >>>> around in some ethereal plane of >>>> "meaningfulness" and which is not of the >>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this >>>> runs counter to the direction that >>>> anthropology is heading these days with >>>> the so-called "ontological turn" >>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now >>>> since this post is already >>>> running way too long, but I'll just >>>> mention that one of the aims of this is >>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). >>>> CHAT's conception of the concept >>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is >>>> needed -- a way of understanding the >>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and >>>> historical thing, rather than >>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is >>>> the holding of a(n historical) >>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse >>>> or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts >>>> are thus little historical text-lets. >>>> >>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will >>>> find some time in the future to >>>> return to that last part, but there is no >>>> time to develop it further now. >>>> >>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the >>>> opportunity to catch up to these >>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >>>> >>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that >>>> I'll be able to comment (as a young >>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time >>>> putting stuff out - and unlike the >>>> rest of you, I'm no good at >>>> multi-tasking... it's either one or the other >>>> for me). >>>> >>>> Very best, >>>> greg >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David >>>> Kellogg >>> > >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Well, yes. But if present day >>>> conditions are the REVERSE of the >>>> >>>> conditions >>>> >>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that >>>> is, if the present trend is to >>>> subsume labor under language instead >>>> of the other way around--don't we >>>> >>>> need >>>> >>>> this distinction between signs and >>>> tools more than ever? That is, if >>>> >>>> sloppy >>>> >>>> formulations like "cultural capital", >>>> "symbolic violence", "use/exchange >>>> value of the word" are erasing the >>>> distinction between a mediating >>>> >>>> activity >>>> >>>> which acts on the environment and a >>>> mediating activity which acts on >>>> >>>> other >>>> >>>> mediators and on the self, and which >>>> therefore has the potential for >>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this >>>> exactly where the clear-eyed >>>> philosophers need to step in and >>>> straighten us out? >>>> >>>> I think that instead what is happening >>>> is that our older generation >>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present >>>> company--usually--excluded) are too >>>> interested in the "tool power" of >>>> large categories and insufficiently >>>> interested in fine distinctions that >>>> make a difference. But perhaps it >>>> is also that our younger generation of >>>> misty-eyed philosophers are, as >>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in >>>> copulating bodies than exploited >>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that >>>> do make a difference equally allow >>>> generalization and abstraction and >>>> tool power, and the copulating flesh >>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>> the exploited muscles are one and the >>>> same. >>>> >>>> Take, for example, your remark about >>>> the Fourier transform performed by >>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear >>>> cochlea--I can see the world centre for >>>> studying the cochlea from my office >>>> window). Actually, it's part of a >>>> >>>> wide >>>> >>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that >>>> were already being noticed by >>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, >>>> you don't have cause and effect, >>>> >>>> just >>>> >>>> as in cause and effect you don't have >>>> "association". Words don't "cause" >>>> meaning: they provide material >>>> correlates for meaning and in that sense >>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does >>>> not "cause" wording; it correlates >>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of >>>> consciousness--and through it to a >>>> context of situation or culture, and >>>> in that sense "realises" it. >>>> >>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, >>>> Vygotsky says that the >>>> >>>> stabilization >>>> >>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the >>>> eye in early childhood is part of a >>>> >>>> two >>>> >>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between >>>> the sense organs and the brain. The >>>> reason why we don't see a table as a >>>> trapezoid, when we stand over it and >>>> compare the front with the back, the >>>> reason why we don't see a piece of >>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the >>>> reason why we have orthoscopic >>>> >>>> perception >>>> >>>> and we don't see a man at a distance >>>> as a looming midget is that the >>>> >>>> brain >>>> >>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. >>>> And where does the brain get this >>>> view if not from language and from >>>> other people? >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy >>>> Blunden >>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> Personally, I think the first and >>>> most persistently important thing is >>>> >>>> to >>>> >>>> see how much alike are tables and >>>> words. >>>> >>>> But ... Vygotsky was very >>>> insistent on the distinction >>>> because he was >>>> fighting a battle against the idea >>>> that speech ought to be subsumed >>>> >>>> under >>>> >>>> the larger category of labour. He >>>> had to fight for semiotics against a >>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. >>>> But we here in 2017 are living in >>>> different times, where we have >>>> Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >>>> Marxism is widely regarded as >>>> antique. As Marx said "Just as >>>> >>>> philosophers >>>> >>>> have given thought an independent >>>> existence, so they were bound to make >>>> language into an independent >>>> realm." and we live well and truly >>>> in the >>>> times when labour is subsumed >>>> under language, and not the other way >>>> >>>> around. >>>> >>>> Everyone knows that a table is >>>> unlike a word. The point it to >>>> >>>> understand >>>> >>>> how tables are signs and word are >>>> material objects. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked >>>> in an offshoot of the bionic ear >>>> project. The ear has a little >>>> keyboard that works like a piano >>>> keyboard >>>> >>>> in >>>> >>>> reverse, making a real time >>>> Fourier transform of that air >>>> pressure wave >>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve >>>> impulse. The brain never hears that >>>> pressure signal.) >>>> >>>> ------------------------------ >>> ------------------------------ >>>> Andy Blunden >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>> >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/ >>> book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>> >> collective-decision-making> >>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo >>>> Jornet Gil wrote: >>>> >>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, >>>> anyone else), could you give a >>>> bit more on >>>> >>>> that >>>> >>>> distinction between words and >>>> tables? >>>> >>>> And could you say how (and >>>> whether) (human, hand) nails >>>> are different >>>> from tables; and then how >>>> nails are different from words? >>>> >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> >>> >>>> edu> >>>> >>>> on behalf of David Kellogg >>>> >>> > >>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>> Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff >>>> of Words >>>> >>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from >>>> an article Mike wrote in a >>>> Festschrift >>>> >>>> for >>>> >>>> George Miller. Mike is talking >>>> about artefacts: >>>> >>>> "They are ideal in that they >>>> contain in coded form the >>>> interactions of >>>> which they >>>> were previously a part and >>>> which they mediate in the >>>> present (e.g., >>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>> structure of >>>> a pencil carries within it the >>>> history of certain forms of >>>> writing). >>>> >>>> They >>>> >>>> are material >>>> in that they are embodied in >>>> material artifacts. This principle >>>> >>>> applies >>>> >>>> with equal >>>> force whether one is >>>> considering language/speech or >>>> the more usually >>>> >>>> noted >>>> >>>> forms >>>> of artifacts such as tables >>>> and knives which constitute >>>> material >>>> >>>> culture. >>>> >>>> What >>>> differentiates a word, such as >>>> ?language? from, say, a table. >>>> is the >>>> relative prominence >>>> of their material and ideal >>>> aspects. No word exists apart >>>> from its >>>> material >>>> instantiation (as a >>>> configuration of sound waves, >>>> or hand movements, >>>> >>>> or >>>> >>>> as >>>> >>>> writing, >>>> or as neuronal activity), >>>> whereas every table embodies >>>> an order >>>> >>>> imposed >>>> >>>> by >>>> >>>> thinking >>>> human beings." >>>> >>>> This is the kind of thing that >>>> regularly gets me thrown out of >>>> >>>> journals >>>> >>>> by >>>> >>>> the ear. Mike says that the >>>> difference between a word and >>>> a table is >>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>> relative salience of the ideal >>>> and the material. Sure--words >>>> are full >>>> >>>> of >>>> >>>> the ideal, and tables are full >>>> of material. Right? >>>> >>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other >>>> way around. Why? Well, because >>>> a word >>>> without some word-stuff (sound >>>> or graphite) just isn't a >>>> word. In a >>>> word, meaning is solidary with >>>> material sounding: change one, >>>> and you >>>> change the other. But with a >>>> table, what you start with is >>>> the idea of >>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>> table; as soon as you've got >>>> that idea, you've got a table. >>>> You could >>>> change the material to >>>> anything and you'd still have >>>> a table. >>>> >>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out >>>> by the ear. But he does ignore the >>>> >>>> delightful >>>> >>>> perversity in what Mike is >>>> saying, and what he gets out >>>> of the quote >>>> >>>> is >>>> >>>> just that words are really >>>> just like tools. When in fact >>>> Mike is >>>> >>>> saying >>>> >>>> just the opposite. >>>> >>>> (The part I don't get is >>>> Mike's notion that the >>>> structure of a pencil >>>> carries within it the history >>>> of certain forms of writing. >>>> Does he >>>> >>>> mean >>>> >>>> that the length of the pencil >>>> reflects how often it's been >>>> used? Or is >>>> >>>> he >>>> >>>> making a more archaeological >>>> point about graphite, wood, >>>> rubber and >>>> >>>> their >>>> >>>> relationship to a certain >>>> point in the history of >>>> writing and erasing? >>>> Actually, pencils are more >>>> like tables than like >>>> words--the idea has >>>> >>>> to >>>> >>>> come first.) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed May 10 15:21:35 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 08:21:35 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> <5911d396.020f620a.90d8d.0915@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Thanks, Henry. I am a PhD student, but I'm afraid worked as a professor for nearly thirty years, and so I know all about the "known answer" questions that professors like to ask. I would like to warn my fellow students about them--to show them the rather simple tricks that professors play during examinations, particularly since a lot of these tricks are based on the functional method of dual stimulation, and you can easily find the answer to their questions in the questions themselves. But sometimes the battle-terror of my comrades interferes. So for example yesterday we had a presentation by a wonderful young university teacher in Wonju in South Korea, who wants to use scaffolding methods for teaching science concepts from everyday concepts worked out for elementary school and middle school here in Australia in order to teach her undergraduates. She's got the usual experimental group vs. control group (using the so-called "traditional method") horse-race all cued up. And I asked: a) Isn't it true that a lot of the "scaffolding" techniques we use with elementary school and even middle school kids just make undergraduates feel impatient or patronized or condescended to or profsplained? b) Isn't it true that a lot of the techniques we work out for native speakers here in Australia assume that the natural progression is from everyday to science concepts--and in Korea it's often the other way around? And then I asked: c) What will you do if your control group does better than your experimental group? (This is what, unsurprisingly, happened in her pilot study). All of the professors could immediately see what I was doing, and they held their breath (we all wanted her to do well). But she was too frightened by the length of the question, and so she just did what frightened students do, which is to seize upon a word from the last part of the question (e.g. "control group") and riff. So we got a long explanation, which we did not want, on why it was important to have a control group. Henry totally lacks any battle-terror, and he has marvellous patience for my long questions (and even long answers like this one). But notice how he assumes that Anna-Maria Helfele grew up in Mongolia! As far as I know, she grew up in Munich. Notice how the second throat singer, who is singing a long song about the glories of Genghis Khan (that's what "Cengiz Han'a" refers to), has a backdrop of the Altai mountains and wears traditional dress. THAT'S what Greg meant when he said that hiphop and jazz and blues have an indexical relationship to blackness. The relationship seems so close, you feel it must be a natural one--an associative one. But it isn't. (When I argued that this was not true for people in Korea or in Africa, someone wrote to me off-list to protest that it WAS true in South Africa. That in itself is interesting--what is true in South Africa is not true in Sudan. This suggests--to me--the conventionality of symbol and not the natural relationship of an index.) David Kellogg Macquarie University On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 2:33 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > David, > I?d like to take a crack at answering your question. I take it that you > mean the first link explains in scientific terms with cutting edge > tecnologies (in the domain of acoustic phonetics) what the Mongolian throat > singer (in the second link) learned from infancy directly from older throat > singers, who learned from even older throat singers, and so on. But throat > singing and playing the fiddle in the second link are tecnological feats > too. And the woman in the first link is pretty darned good. I?m guessing > she spent time in Mongolia, maybe as a child. Also, am I right that being > able to deliberately, and with great control, sing two notes at once is > based on the same control you and I have in making vowels. And vowels are > best understood through the tools of acoustics, as contrasted with the > tools of articulatory phonetics. In other words I can?t explain vowels, or > throat singing, without a lot of hardware, but I can explain consonants > with nothing more than words. Is there something here about direct and > mediated experience? Firstness the most direct (sensing?), secondness less > so (feeling?) and thirdness (emoting) with lots of mediation? So, I am > answering your question with a lot of questions. Maybe I?m trying to hang > onto my firstness here, while dialoging and narrating? Juggling? > > I really loved mashing these two beautiful demonstrations of how the human > voice works. Thank you very much for sharing! > Henry > > > > On May 9, 2017, at 5:18 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Larry: > > > > One of my earliest memories--I must have been three years old or so--is > > climbing up a set of stairs in the University of Minnesota department of > > child psychology between the nursery school I attended and the laboratory > > where my mother was working on her PhD on childhood speech. Her > experiments > > had something to do with dropping marbles into holes and getting M&Ms, > > although to be honest the only thing I really remember besides the > > stairs is the M&Ms and a conversation I had while climbing the stairs. I > > asked my mother why she was still at school (I was attending nursery > school > > on the first floor and it seemed to me that at her age she should be > > somewhat higher than a room on the second floor). She said she wanted to > > understand how people learn to talk. I asked her why she didn't remember. > > She said she just forgot. > > > > The way we normally communicate--the way we are all used to, and the way > we > > all remember--is for somebody to say something about something to someone > > else, and that's thirdness. We don't normally start with firstness or > > secondness, the way that Peirce does. I think I wrote the way I wrote, > and > > I started this posting the way I started this posting, because there is a > > kind of feeling of what happens to you as it is actually happening to > you, > > and that is firstness. It's ineffable in the sense that in order to > > describe it to somebody you have to destroy it by changing it into > > secondness (dialogue) or thirdness (narrative); The feeling of what > happens > > to you as it is actually happening to you can be shared--my mother was > > there--but not communicated--I never spoke with her again about this > > conversation, and although I am communicating with you about it, what I > am > > communicating is not the conversation but something like a narrative > about > > it. Because you can share it, I don't think it's that phenomenological > > astonishment that is so important to Husserl; it's not the pre-verbal > > prehension of color that Cezanne was trying to get at, but it is > > pre-narrative and even pre-dialogue: it's the stairs and the M&Ms and not > > the conversation. Peirce calls it "firstness", and he associates it with > > notions like experience qua experience, qualia, the redness of redness, > and > > of course emotion, by which he really means feeling rather than higher > > emotions mediated by artworks. > > > > When I look at the sea of sound on Praat, I am not experiencing the sound > > at all. Instead, I'm using an elaborate set of tools and signs to try to > > strip away the layers of meaning and wording and even the actual phonemes > > and just get at the bands of sound energy of which the phonemes (and > thence > > the wordings and meanings) are made. The stuff of words is, after all, > > bands of acoustic energy. Polyphonic singers know this, and they are able > > to manipulate their vocal tracts in order to focus the four bands of > energy > > into only two of them. Like this: > > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vC9Qh709gas&t=237s > > > > (Now, here's a question for YOU. I could have given you THIS as an > example > > of polyphonic singing instead: > > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tVGei24TdQ > > > > The singing is actually better. But it wouldn't have worked as well. Why > > not?) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 12:35 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > >> David, > >> I do hope we are going to get some more philosophy out of you. In > >> particular exploring the suff of words/wording. > >> > >> I want to take this turn to ?echo? your philosophical ways, that are in > >> pursuit of this [theme]. See your May 5th response to Greg > >> > >> I will back from your forth and stay close to your philosophical > wordings > >> upon *firstness, secondness, and thirdness* as INEFFABLE. > >> > >> FIRSTNESS: -ICONIC > >> When I look at ?sound waves? [natural] on my Praat Spectograph, I am > >> trying to get at the sound stuff, the the noise, the *firstness* of the > >> stuff of words. To get at ?this? requires a very complex *combination > of* > >> tools and signs to ?get down to? [lp-penetrate?] this level or layer of > >> this emerging *spectrum* > >> > >> Moving ?up? we apprehend/look at the *vocal tract* [which itself is no > >> longer ?firstness? as a physiological organ] but is now something > brought > >> about by human ?organization/patterning? > >> > >> This firstness is the way of looking/apprehending wording [as] *iconic* > >> firstness. > >> > >> SECONDNESS: - INDEX > >> > >> Moving ?up? to look/apprehend at word stuff as indexical. This moving > up > >> is *necessarily* relating to the vocal tract within this theme. This > occurs > >> NOT through proximity or association but is necessarily related to the > >> vocal tract. [LP-integrated??] > >> > >> THIRDNESS: - SYMBOL > >> > >> Moving ?up? When organizing/patterning sound stuff so that the sound > stuff > >> *stands for* a way of organizing/patterning other stuff. This other > stuff > >> includes: > >> ? Abstract models-in the making > >> ? Actual categories of objects > >> ? Wording phrases such as - sibling society as metaphorical > >> ? Objects such as tables and lunchboxes and backpacks > >> > >> David, this moving up the layers/levers within the [spectrum] are the > way > >> the suff of words/wording ALL are: *ways of apprehending/looking. They > are > >> not associative stuff. > >> > >> I find this philosophical explanation wery generative and germane. > >> Would you consider transferring from the linguistics discipline and > >> consider participating in the philosophical endeavors. Or do only madmen > >> move in this direction?? > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >> > >> From: David Kellogg > >> Sent: May 8, 2017 3:09 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > >> > >> Vygotsky knew Marr. At one point, Marr took part in the weekly > discussion > >> group that Vygotsky and Luria shared with Eisenstein. But of course > >> Vygotsky knew Blonsky, and liked him, and that didn't shield Blonsky > from > >> more than one withering criticism from his good friend down the hall at > the > >> Krupskaya Academy where they both worked. > >> > >> (I am rather sceptical of the idea that Vygotsky was anything more than > >> culturally Jewish. But it is certainly true that the Russian Jews I have > >> known lie at the "engagement" end of Deborah Tannen's > >> "engagement-consideration" continuum. That is, we prefer to wear you > out by > >> interrupting, disagreeing, and otherwise engaging with what you say > rather > >> than wear you out by sitting and listening silently and considerately > and > >> sometimes showing deference and considerateness by making absolutely no > >> reply. Greg although he is really a very good talker, tends to > >> the consideration end of the continuum while I am stuck at the extreme > >> engagement end, and it made our cooperation in Seoul on lectures > including > >> Peirce...well, interesting.) > >> > >> So I wasn't surprised to read THIS in the pedological lectures (p. 257 > of > >> Vol. 5 of your English Collected Works): > >> > >> "??? ????? ? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ? ??? ???? > >> ????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ?????? ?. ?. ?????, ???? ????????? ??? > >> ??????? ?????????: ?????????????? ????? ????????????? ?????, ??? ?? > >> ?????????? ? ?????? ?????, ?????????? ??? ??? ????? ??????. ? ?????? > >> ??????? ????? ?????????? ????? ???. ?? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ????? > >> ??? ????; ??? ????????? ? ?????? ????????. ????? ?? ?? ???????, ??? ??? > >> ????????? ?????? ???, ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ?????; ?? > ??? > >> ???????????? ????????? ????? ???????????????, ?? ???? ?????, ??????? > >> ?????????? ???, ???? ?????? ????????? ???????????? ????, ?? ??????????? > ?? > >> ???? ??????, ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ????????? ?? ???????????? > >> ???????. > >> > >> > >> "What stands at the source of each symbol? With all of the fantastic and > >> all the controversy of the range of propositions in the theory of N. Ya. > >> Marr, one proposition seems to me undeniable.: the first words of human > >> language, as he puts it?'the first word means everything or a great > deal.' > >> And the first words of child speech mean almost everything. But what are > >> these words? Words of the type ?this is? or ?this?; they may be applied > to > >> any object. Can we say that this is a real word? No, this is only the > >> indicative function of the word itself; from it subsequently grows > >> something symbolizing, but it is a word that is merely a vocal pointing > >> gesture, and it is retained in all words because each human word points > to > >> a certain object." > >> > >> Notice that the word "word" here doesn't mean "word"; that is, it means > >> "wording/meaning" rather than "orthographic word". As Ruqaiya Hasan > liked > >> to say, "The meaning of 'not' is not in 'not'". > >> > >> (Call it indexical, if you will, but I can't help but feeling, when I > read > >> this passage, that Vygotsky likes Marr in the rather exasperated way > that I > >> sometimes feel about--say--Greg.) > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> > >> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 1:24 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Hi all, > >>> > >>> on the question whether there can be a language having one word, David > >>> brings the example: > >>> > >>> "What? That! > >>> Where? There! > >>> When? Then! > >>> > >>> Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and > >> the > >>> "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to > >>> answer: > >>> > >>> a? a! > >>> eh? eh! > >>> e? e..." > >>> > >>> I find it interesting that, in these examples, the rising and falling > >>> belong to a situational relation between two: RISE is an invitation to > >> FALL > >>> and vice versa. It is the difference between the two what matters. And > >> this > >>> difference seems to be a 'correlation' (if I were to use the term David > >> has > >>> been using) of the very organic fact that actions have consequences and > >>> that it is this relation the minimal unit that living organisms are > >>> concerned about. If organisms (unlike stones) do register (encode) not > >> just > >>> actions and not just consequences, but relations between actions and > >>> consequences, the feature of language that David is pointing at seems > to > >> be > >>> also a feature of organic life in general. I find this thought > >> interesting > >>> if we are to think of language as an expression of biology/culture > >> identity. > >>> > >>> I am laying this thought here without much knowledge of linguistics, > but > >> I > >>> thought that this may resonate with what the discussion is unfolding, > >>> particularly the question on indexicals as per, for example, Greg's > last > >>> comments. Does it? > >>> > >>> Alfredo > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > >>> Sent: 08 May 2017 04:28 > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > >>> > >>> The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the > >>> many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is > >>> that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically > >>> elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know > >>> Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology > >>> is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the > >>> Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> Andy Blunden > >>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>> > >>> On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >>>> Andy (and others), > >>>> > >>>> I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. > >>>> > >>>> One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap > >>>> is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using > >>>> Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are > >>>> signs which have referential value but their referential > >>>> value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic > >>>> example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I > >>>> can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it > >>>> seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as > >>>> translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is > >>>> "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. > >>>> > >>>> As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the > >>>> importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He > >>>> calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of > >>>> discourse (and without which, our discourse would be > >>>> meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's > >>>> essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case > >>>> for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the > >>>> talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand > >>>> quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by > >>>> following how different participant deictics are deployed. > >>>> > >>>> Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear > >>>> about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. > >>>> > >>>> Thanks, > >>>> -greg > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a > >>>> Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they > >>>> see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see > >>>> Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be > >>>> utterly incapable of managing his own life as the > >>>> foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce > >>>> was a Logician who invented two different schools of > >>>> philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > >>>> > >>>> I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular > >>>> because it is a logical triad which Hegel never > >>>> theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us > >>>> understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, > >>>> Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is > >>>> acquired by human beings, which is an idea I > >>>> appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he > >>>> overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics > >>>> and his Pragmaticism. > >>>> > >>>> A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> Andy Blunden > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > >>> decision-making > >>>> >>> collective-decision-making> > >>>> > >>>> On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >>>> > >>>> David and Andy, > >>>> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, > >>>> secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and > >>>> certainly you were part of that discussion. I > >>>> would like to understand that better, also how it > >>>> relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, > >>>> indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your > >>>> ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that > >>>> might relate, which I hope so, since it would > >>>> bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), > >>>> Andy?s Academia articles on political > >>>> representation and activity/social theory are > >>>> probably relevant in some way, though Andy > >>>> probably sees language as a figure against a > >>>> larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns > >>>> the figure/ground relationship around? > >>>> Henry > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > >>>> >>>> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Greg: > >>>> > >>>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually > >>>> don't see these problems > >>>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > >>>> > >>>> Meaning is simply another word for > >>>> organization. Organization is always > >>>> present and never separable from matter: it's > >>>> a property of matter, the way > >>>> that the internet is a property of a computer. > >>>> Sometimes this organization > >>>> is brought about without any human > >>>> intervention (if you are religious, you > >>>> will say that it brought about divinely, and > >>>> if you are Spinozan, by > >>>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because > >>>> "Deus Sive Natura"). > >>>> Sometimes it is brought about by human > >>>> ingenuity (but of course if you are > >>>> religious you will say that it is the divine > >>>> in humans at work, and if you > >>>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are > >>>> simply that part of nature which > >>>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii > >>>> think it amounts to the same > >>>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds > >>>> of substance, res cogitans vs > >>>> res extensa, only one substance and different > >>>> ways of organizing it (which > >>>> in the end amount to the same thing). > >>>> > >>>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess > >>>> what?" and "so there" and > >>>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say > >>>> to the contrary > >>>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, > >>>> insofar as they depend on their > >>>> relationship to the context of situation for > >>>> their meaning. You say that a > >>>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the > >>>> relationship of jazz or blues or > >>>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, > >>>> insofar as they satisfy the > >>>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is > >>>> also a symbol, and a > >>>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when > >>>> he/she moves to New York > >>>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound > >>>> more so). In Africa, jazz and > >>>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to > >>>> Americanness and not to > >>>> blackness. > >>>> > >>>> So your division of signs into just three > >>>> categories is too simple, Greg. > >>>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you > >>>> will discover that there are > >>>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are > >>>> generated from three > >>>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", > >>>> "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > >>>> example all words are symbols insofar as you > >>>> have to know English in order > >>>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But > >>>> some words are > >>>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as > >>>> indexes, because they depend > >>>> on the context of situation for their meaning. > >>>> Without the symbolic > >>>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My > >>>> wife, for example, cannot tell > >>>> a Southerner from a more general American > >>>> accent, and I myself still have > >>>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and > >>>> who is an FOB bloody pom. > >>>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness > >>>> in hiphop--it sounds like > >>>> K-pop to her. > >>>> > >>>> I don't actually think that any signs are > >>>> associative or "prehensive"; I > >>>> think that they are all different ways of > >>>> looking or apprehending. So for > >>>> example you can apprehend a wording as a > >>>> symbol: a way of organizing sound > >>>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of > >>>> organizing other stuff (sometimes > >>>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of > >>>> objects and sometimes the > >>>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls > >>>> "projects"). You can also > >>>> look at wording as index: not as something > >>>> that is "associated" to the lips > >>>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or > >>>> even continguity but rather > >>>> something that has a necessary relation to the > >>>> vocal tract (which is itself > >>>> not a physiological organ, but something > >>>> brought about by human > >>>> organization). But when I look at sound waves > >>>> on my Praat spectrograph and > >>>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to > >>>> get at is the sound stuff, > >>>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of > >>>> words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > >>>> think there is any way of doing this with my > >>>> eyes or ears alone: I think it > >>>> requires a very complex combination of tools > >>>> and signs to get down to > >>>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if > >>>> he had breakfast with > >>>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by > >>>> themselves, but nobody > >>>> has ever really shown the limits of what they > >>>> can do when they put each > >>>> other in order and start to organize the world > >>>> around them. > >>>> > >>>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you > >>>> are going to get out of me, > >>>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Macquarie University > >>>> > >>>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: > >>>> mediating activity is not > >>>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or > >>>> Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > >>>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the > >>>> same reason that painting is > >>>> different from wording: in painting you CAN > >>>> leave out the human (if you are > >>>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are > >>>> Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > >>>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide > >>>> and the latter murdered two > >>>> innocent young women). But in wording you > >>>> never ever can. Wording can feel > >>>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated > >>>> or it doesn't work very > >>>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated > >>>> than ever. > >>>> > >>>> dk > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > >>>> >>>> > > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> David (and others), > >>>> > >>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I > >>>> know you dearly appreciate), your > >>>> last post included this: > >>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide > >>>> material correlates for meaning > >>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > >>>> > >>>> I was with you up until that point, but > >>>> that's where I always lose you. > >>>> > >>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say > >>>> but I guess it really depends on > >>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, > >>>> you mean some plane of existence > >>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, > >>>> then this seems to be a bit of > >>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the > >>>> one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > >>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" > >>>> (res cogitans? phenomena?). > >>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where > >>>> do we locate "meaning" as you > >>>> have described it? > >>>> > >>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic > >>>> drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > >>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane > >>>> of jumbled ideas" (A in the > >>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm > >>>> and "the equally vague plane of > >>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of > >>>> the chasm. Each side is > >>>> self-contained and self-referential, and > >>>> never the twain shall meet. Worlds > >>>> apart. > >>>> > >>>> And this ties to the conversation in the > >>>> other thread about the > >>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's > >>>> Marx quote about a science of > >>>> language that is shorn from life). My > >>>> suspicion is that this supposed > >>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to > >>>> do with this Saussurean approach > >>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > >>>> > >>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a > >>>> different approach that may give > >>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the > >>>> word back INto the world. (p. 102 > >>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > >>>> > >>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of > >>>> representamen (signifier) to > >>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. > >>>> The symbol is the relation with > >>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one > >>>> that Saussure speaks of and is > >>>> the one that is ineffable or, in > >>>> Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > >>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, > >>>> the meaning of which is found in > >>>> other words (hence the sense of > >>>> ineffability). With only the symbolic > >>>> function, the whole world of words would > >>>> be entirely self-referential and > >>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I > >>>> like to say that Derrida is the end > >>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea > >>>> to its logical conclusion and > >>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, > >>>> well, empty (and thus > >>>> ineffable)). > >>>> > >>>> But Peirce has two other relations of > >>>> representamen to object, the iconic > >>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning > >>>> iconically, the representamen > >>>> contains some quality of the object that > >>>> it represents (e.g., a map that > >>>> holds relations of the space that it > >>>> represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > >>>> in which the representamen has some of the > >>>> qualities of the sound of the > >>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning > >>>> indexically, the relationship of > >>>> representamen to object is one of temporal > >>>> or spatial contiguity (e.g., > >>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or > >>>> where there is a Southern twang, > >>>> there is a Southerner, or, most > >>>> classically, when I point, the object to > >>>> which I am pointing is spatially > >>>> contiguous with the finger that is > >>>> pointing). > >>>> > >>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of > >>>> the inheritors of Roman > >>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein > >>>> (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > >>>> only inheritors of this tradition - > >>>> Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > >>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression > >>>> of Jacobson too), then we can > >>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., > >>>> the symbolic function) in the > >>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) > >>>> indexical function. > >>>> > >>>> But that argument is always a bit too much > >>>> for me (if there are any takers, > >>>> the best place to find this argument is in > >>>> Silverstein's chapter > >>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic > >>>> Function," or in less explicit but > >>>> slightly more understandable article > >>>> "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > >>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). > >>>> > >>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more > >>>> elegant and comprehensible: in > >>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the > >>>> index, first as the index par > >>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as > >>>> Andy has previously pointed out, > >>>> might not be exactly how things go in a > >>>> literal sense, but the general > >>>> structure here works well, I think, as a > >>>> heuristic if nothing else - words > >>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally > >>>> and spatially collocated, "bottle" > >>>> is first uttered as a way of saying > >>>> "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > >>>> co-present object; note this is also why > >>>> young kids get discourse markers > >>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly > >>>> precocious when they do!), since > >>>> discourse markers are primarily > >>>> indexical). The indexical function is the > >>>> rudimentary form that then provides the > >>>> groundwork for the development of > >>>> the symbolic function. > >>>> > >>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) > >>>> approach, the meaning of signs is not > >>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, > >>>> and that grounding is the > >>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in > >>>> the world and of the world. > >>>> > >>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning > >>>> back into matter. And perhaps > >>>> speaking of words as the material > >>>> correlates of meaning can be a useful > >>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk > >>>> about meanings and concepts given our > >>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we > >>>> should also recognize that if it > >>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead > >>>> us astray if we take it too far. > >>>> > >>>> I'd add here that I think one of the > >>>> greatest opportunities for CHAT to > >>>> make a contribution to social science > >>>> today is in its conceptualization of > >>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, > >>>> "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > >>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of > >>>> social science today is the idea > >>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In > >>>> anthropology, people easily talk about > >>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they > >>>> mean precisely something that floats > >>>> around in some ethereal plane of > >>>> "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > >>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this > >>>> runs counter to the direction that > >>>> anthropology is heading these days with > >>>> the so-called "ontological turn" > >>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now > >>>> since this post is already > >>>> running way too long, but I'll just > >>>> mention that one of the aims of this is > >>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). > >>>> CHAT's conception of the concept > >>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is > >>>> needed -- a way of understanding the > >>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and > >>>> historical thing, rather than > >>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is > >>>> the holding of a(n historical) > >>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse > >>>> or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > >>>> are thus little historical text-lets. > >>>> > >>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will > >>>> find some time in the future to > >>>> return to that last part, but there is no > >>>> time to develop it further now. > >>>> > >>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the > >>>> opportunity to catch up to these > >>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > >>>> > >>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that > >>>> I'll be able to comment (as a young > >>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time > >>>> putting stuff out - and unlike the > >>>> rest of you, I'm no good at > >>>> multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > >>>> for me). > >>>> > >>>> Very best, > >>>> greg > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David > >>>> Kellogg >>>> > > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Well, yes. But if present day > >>>> conditions are the REVERSE of the > >>>> > >>>> conditions > >>>> > >>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that > >>>> is, if the present trend is to > >>>> subsume labor under language instead > >>>> of the other way around--don't we > >>>> > >>>> need > >>>> > >>>> this distinction between signs and > >>>> tools more than ever? That is, if > >>>> > >>>> sloppy > >>>> > >>>> formulations like "cultural capital", > >>>> "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > >>>> value of the word" are erasing the > >>>> distinction between a mediating > >>>> > >>>> activity > >>>> > >>>> which acts on the environment and a > >>>> mediating activity which acts on > >>>> > >>>> other > >>>> > >>>> mediators and on the self, and which > >>>> therefore has the potential for > >>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this > >>>> exactly where the clear-eyed > >>>> philosophers need to step in and > >>>> straighten us out? > >>>> > >>>> I think that instead what is happening > >>>> is that our older generation > >>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present > >>>> company--usually--excluded) are too > >>>> interested in the "tool power" of > >>>> large categories and insufficiently > >>>> interested in fine distinctions that > >>>> make a difference. But perhaps it > >>>> is also that our younger generation of > >>>> misty-eyed philosophers are, as > >>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in > >>>> copulating bodies than exploited > >>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that > >>>> do make a difference equally allow > >>>> generalization and abstraction and > >>>> tool power, and the copulating flesh > >>>> > >>>> and > >>>> > >>>> the exploited muscles are one and the > >>>> same. > >>>> > >>>> Take, for example, your remark about > >>>> the Fourier transform performed by > >>>> > >>>> the > >>>> > >>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear > >>>> cochlea--I can see the world centre for > >>>> studying the cochlea from my office > >>>> window). Actually, it's part of a > >>>> > >>>> wide > >>>> > >>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that > >>>> were already being noticed by > >>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, > >>>> you don't have cause and effect, > >>>> > >>>> just > >>>> > >>>> as in cause and effect you don't have > >>>> "association". Words don't "cause" > >>>> meaning: they provide material > >>>> correlates for meaning and in that sense > >>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does > >>>> not "cause" wording; it correlates > >>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of > >>>> consciousness--and through it to a > >>>> context of situation or culture, and > >>>> in that sense "realises" it. > >>>> > >>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, > >>>> Vygotsky says that the > >>>> > >>>> stabilization > >>>> > >>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the > >>>> eye in early childhood is part of a > >>>> > >>>> two > >>>> > >>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between > >>>> the sense organs and the brain. The > >>>> reason why we don't see a table as a > >>>> trapezoid, when we stand over it and > >>>> compare the front with the back, the > >>>> reason why we don't see a piece of > >>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the > >>>> reason why we have orthoscopic > >>>> > >>>> perception > >>>> > >>>> and we don't see a man at a distance > >>>> as a looming midget is that the > >>>> > >>>> brain > >>>> > >>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. > >>>> And where does the brain get this > >>>> view if not from language and from > >>>> other people? > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Macquarie University > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy > >>>> Blunden >>>> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Personally, I think the first and > >>>> most persistently important thing is > >>>> > >>>> to > >>>> > >>>> see how much alike are tables and > >>>> words. > >>>> > >>>> But ... Vygotsky was very > >>>> insistent on the distinction > >>>> because he was > >>>> fighting a battle against the idea > >>>> that speech ought to be subsumed > >>>> > >>>> under > >>>> > >>>> the larger category of labour. He > >>>> had to fight for semiotics against a > >>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. > >>>> But we here in 2017 are living in > >>>> different times, where we have > >>>> Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > >>>> Marxism is widely regarded as > >>>> antique. As Marx said "Just as > >>>> > >>>> philosophers > >>>> > >>>> have given thought an independent > >>>> existence, so they were bound to make > >>>> language into an independent > >>>> realm." and we live well and truly > >>>> in the > >>>> times when labour is subsumed > >>>> under language, and not the other way > >>>> > >>>> around. > >>>> > >>>> Everyone knows that a table is > >>>> unlike a word. The point it to > >>>> > >>>> understand > >>>> > >>>> how tables are signs and word are > >>>> material objects. > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked > >>>> in an offshoot of the bionic ear > >>>> project. The ear has a little > >>>> keyboard that works like a piano > >>>> keyboard > >>>> > >>>> in > >>>> > >>>> reverse, making a real time > >>>> Fourier transform of that air > >>>> pressure wave > >>>> > >>>> and > >>>> > >>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve > >>>> impulse. The brain never hears that > >>>> pressure signal.) > >>>> > >>>> ------------------------------ > >>> ------------------------------ > >>>> Andy Blunden > >>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>> > >>>> http://www.brill.com/products/ > >>> book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>> >>> collective-decision-making> > >>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo > >>>> Jornet Gil wrote: > >>>> > >>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, > >>>> anyone else), could you give a > >>>> bit more on > >>>> > >>>> that > >>>> > >>>> distinction between words and > >>>> tables? > >>>> > >>>> And could you say how (and > >>>> whether) (human, hand) nails > >>>> are different > >>>> from tables; and then how > >>>> nails are different from words? > >>>> > >>>> Alfredo > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: > >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> > >>>> >>>> > >>>> edu> > >>>> > >>>> on behalf of David Kellogg > >>>> >>>> > > >>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > >>>> Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff > >>>> of Words > >>>> > >>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from > >>>> an article Mike wrote in a > >>>> Festschrift > >>>> > >>>> for > >>>> > >>>> George Miller. Mike is talking > >>>> about artefacts: > >>>> > >>>> "They are ideal in that they > >>>> contain in coded form the > >>>> interactions of > >>>> which they > >>>> were previously a part and > >>>> which they mediate in the > >>>> present (e.g., > >>>> > >>>> the > >>>> > >>>> structure of > >>>> a pencil carries within it the > >>>> history of certain forms of > >>>> writing). > >>>> > >>>> They > >>>> > >>>> are material > >>>> in that they are embodied in > >>>> material artifacts. This principle > >>>> > >>>> applies > >>>> > >>>> with equal > >>>> force whether one is > >>>> considering language/speech or > >>>> the more usually > >>>> > >>>> noted > >>>> > >>>> forms > >>>> of artifacts such as tables > >>>> and knives which constitute > >>>> material > >>>> > >>>> culture. > >>>> > >>>> What > >>>> differentiates a word, such as > >>>> ?language? from, say, a table. > >>>> is the > >>>> relative prominence > >>>> of their material and ideal > >>>> aspects. No word exists apart > >>>> from its > >>>> material > >>>> instantiation (as a > >>>> configuration of sound waves, > >>>> or hand movements, > >>>> > >>>> or > >>>> > >>>> as > >>>> > >>>> writing, > >>>> or as neuronal activity), > >>>> whereas every table embodies > >>>> an order > >>>> > >>>> imposed > >>>> > >>>> by > >>>> > >>>> thinking > >>>> human beings." > >>>> > >>>> This is the kind of thing that > >>>> regularly gets me thrown out of > >>>> > >>>> journals > >>>> > >>>> by > >>>> > >>>> the ear. Mike says that the > >>>> difference between a word and > >>>> a table is > >>>> > >>>> the > >>>> > >>>> relative salience of the ideal > >>>> and the material. Sure--words > >>>> are full > >>>> > >>>> of > >>>> > >>>> the ideal, and tables are full > >>>> of material. Right? > >>>> > >>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other > >>>> way around. Why? Well, because > >>>> a word > >>>> without some word-stuff (sound > >>>> or graphite) just isn't a > >>>> word. In a > >>>> word, meaning is solidary with > >>>> material sounding: change one, > >>>> and you > >>>> change the other. But with a > >>>> table, what you start with is > >>>> the idea of > >>>> > >>>> the > >>>> > >>>> table; as soon as you've got > >>>> that idea, you've got a table. > >>>> You could > >>>> change the material to > >>>> anything and you'd still have > >>>> a table. > >>>> > >>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out > >>>> by the ear. But he does ignore the > >>>> > >>>> delightful > >>>> > >>>> perversity in what Mike is > >>>> saying, and what he gets out > >>>> of the quote > >>>> > >>>> is > >>>> > >>>> just that words are really > >>>> just like tools. When in fact > >>>> Mike is > >>>> > >>>> saying > >>>> > >>>> just the opposite. > >>>> > >>>> (The part I don't get is > >>>> Mike's notion that the > >>>> structure of a pencil > >>>> carries within it the history > >>>> of certain forms of writing. > >>>> Does he > >>>> > >>>> mean > >>>> > >>>> that the length of the pencil > >>>> reflects how often it's been > >>>> used? Or is > >>>> > >>>> he > >>>> > >>>> making a more archaeological > >>>> point about graphite, wood, > >>>> rubber and > >>>> > >>>> their > >>>> > >>>> relationship to a certain > >>>> point in the history of > >>>> writing and erasing? > >>>> Actually, pencils are more > >>>> like tables than like > >>>> words--the idea has > >>>> > >>>> to > >>>> > >>>> come first.) > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Macquarie University > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu May 11 08:40:21 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 09:40:21 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Hegel's notion of The Notion Message-ID: ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you suggested (I don't think you truly appreciate how slow of a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy shared can be found here: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm), and I came across this notion of The Notion by Hegel in Section 1279: "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition but as the *absolute foundation*, yet it can be so only in so far as it has *made* itself the foundation. Abstract immediacy is no doubt a *first*; yet in so far as it is abstract it is, on the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be grasped in its truth its foundation must first be sought. Hence this foundation, though indeed an immediate, must have made itself immediate through the sublation of mediation."? This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, remains a revolutionary conception today. The idea here seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective presupposition" but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can this be? There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest objection comes from 20th century social science's preoccupation with social construction. In this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, subjective and maybe also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might say "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much different take - one in which concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? And, what is this business about the "sublation of mediation"? (and where does this last bit jibe with CHAT? Many people in CHAT speak of mediation but I don't recall anyone speaking of the "sublation of mediation"). Any help with this text would be appreciated. (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" but I still felt that this needed a new thread.). -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Thu May 11 08:48:30 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 01:48:30 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> Concepts are first of all things which exist; because they exist, the mind is capable of grasping them, in fact, they are exactly the way the mind grasps the world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way they exist is in human activity and the artifacts we use in that activity. Since you have made a start on this Greg, I have to say that I think you need this and also the section to follow called "The Subjective Notion" to get a decent picture. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you > suggested (I don't think you truly appreciate how slow of > a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy shared can be found > here: > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm), > and I came across this notion of The Notion by Hegel in > Section 1279: > > "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be > regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition but as > the /absolute foundation/, yet it can be so only in so far > as it has /made/ itself the foundation. Abstract immediacy > is no doubt a /first/; yet in so far as it is abstract it > is, on the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be > grasped in its truth its foundation must first be sought. > Hence this foundation, though indeed an immediate, must > have made itself immediate through the sublation of > mediation."? > > This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is > building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, remains > a revolutionary conception today. The idea here seems to > be that the Notion is not a "subjective presupposition" > but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm > wondering HOW can this be? > > There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest > objection comes from 20th century social science's > preoccupation with social construction. In this tradition, > concepts are things held in the head, subjective and maybe > also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might > say "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much > different take - one in which concepts are much more > primary. Am I right here? > > And, what is this business about the "sublation of > mediation"? (and where does this last bit jibe with CHAT? > Many people in CHAT speak of mediation but I don't recall > anyone speaking of the "sublation of mediation"). > > Any help with this text would be appreciated. > > (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" but I > still felt that this needed a new thread.). > > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu May 11 09:07:15 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 16:07:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> References: , <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> Message-ID: <1494518834670.15186@iped.uio.no> Greg, Andy, thanks for making Hegel more accessible to all of us not so familiar. Andy, can you add a link to the section you mention, I could not find it following the link Greg provided or the index. Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 11 May 2017 17:48 To: Greg Thompson; xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion Concepts are first of all things which exist; because they exist, the mind is capable of grasping them, in fact, they are exactly the way the mind grasps the world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way they exist is in human activity and the artifacts we use in that activity. Since you have made a start on this Greg, I have to say that I think you need this and also the section to follow called "The Subjective Notion" to get a decent picture. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you > suggested (I don't think you truly appreciate how slow of > a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy shared can be found > here: > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm), > and I came across this notion of The Notion by Hegel in > Section 1279: > > "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be > regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition but as > the /absolute foundation/, yet it can be so only in so far > as it has /made/ itself the foundation. Abstract immediacy > is no doubt a /first/; yet in so far as it is abstract it > is, on the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be > grasped in its truth its foundation must first be sought. > Hence this foundation, though indeed an immediate, must > have made itself immediate through the sublation of > mediation."? > > This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is > building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, remains > a revolutionary conception today. The idea here seems to > be that the Notion is not a "subjective presupposition" > but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm > wondering HOW can this be? > > There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest > objection comes from 20th century social science's > preoccupation with social construction. In this tradition, > concepts are things held in the head, subjective and maybe > also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might > say "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much > different take - one in which concepts are much more > primary. Am I right here? > > And, what is this business about the "sublation of > mediation"? (and where does this last bit jibe with CHAT? > Many people in CHAT speak of mediation but I don't recall > anyone speaking of the "sublation of mediation"). > > Any help with this text would be appreciated. > > (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" but I > still felt that this needed a new thread.). > > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu May 11 09:07:15 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 16:07:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> References: , <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> Message-ID: <1494518834670.15186@iped.uio.no> Greg, Andy, thanks for making Hegel more accessible to all of us not so familiar. Andy, can you add a link to the section you mention, I could not find it following the link Greg provided or the index. Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 11 May 2017 17:48 To: Greg Thompson; xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion Concepts are first of all things which exist; because they exist, the mind is capable of grasping them, in fact, they are exactly the way the mind grasps the world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way they exist is in human activity and the artifacts we use in that activity. Since you have made a start on this Greg, I have to say that I think you need this and also the section to follow called "The Subjective Notion" to get a decent picture. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you > suggested (I don't think you truly appreciate how slow of > a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy shared can be found > here: > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm), > and I came across this notion of The Notion by Hegel in > Section 1279: > > "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be > regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition but as > the /absolute foundation/, yet it can be so only in so far > as it has /made/ itself the foundation. Abstract immediacy > is no doubt a /first/; yet in so far as it is abstract it > is, on the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be > grasped in its truth its foundation must first be sought. > Hence this foundation, though indeed an immediate, must > have made itself immediate through the sublation of > mediation."? > > This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is > building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, remains > a revolutionary conception today. The idea here seems to > be that the Notion is not a "subjective presupposition" > but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm > wondering HOW can this be? > > There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest > objection comes from 20th century social science's > preoccupation with social construction. In this tradition, > concepts are things held in the head, subjective and maybe > also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might > say "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much > different take - one in which concepts are much more > primary. Am I right here? > > And, what is this business about the "sublation of > mediation"? (and where does this last bit jibe with CHAT? > Many people in CHAT speak of mediation but I don't recall > anyone speaking of the "sublation of mediation"). > > Any help with this text would be appreciated. > > (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" but I > still felt that this needed a new thread.). > > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Thu May 11 09:17:17 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 09:17:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> Message-ID: To me the question is not that they exist---we use concepts, like *Expressionism *(in painting, in music, in poetry...), but HOW do they exist. This is where the major theoretical divides will show itself. And concerning the mind, I would search in a direction that Anglo-Saxons really have a hard time with, it is SENSE (Sinn, smysl), a direction Vygotsky w Michael -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 8:48 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Concepts are first of all things which exist; because they exist, the mind > is capable of grasping them, in fact, they are exactly the way the mind > grasps the world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way they exist is > in human activity and the artifacts we use in that activity. Since you have > made a start on this Greg, I have to say that I think you need this and > also the section to follow called "The Subjective Notion" to get a decent > picture. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you suggested (I don't >> think you truly appreciate how slow of a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy >> shared can be found here: https://www.marxists.org/refer >> ence/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm), and I came across this notion >> of The Notion by Hegel in Section 1279: >> >> "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be regarded, not merely as >> a subjective presupposition but as the /absolute foundation/, yet it can be >> so only in so far as it has /made/ itself the foundation. Abstract >> immediacy is no doubt a /first/; yet in so far as it is abstract it is, on >> the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be grasped in its truth >> its foundation must first be sought. Hence this foundation, though indeed >> an immediate, must have made itself immediate through the sublation of >> mediation."? >> >> This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is building up (a >> realism of concepts) and, I think, remains a revolutionary conception >> today. The idea here seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective >> presupposition" but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm >> wondering HOW can this be? >> >> There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest objection comes >> from 20th century social science's preoccupation with social construction. >> In this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, subjective and >> maybe also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might say >> "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much different take - one in >> which concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? >> >> And, what is this business about the "sublation of mediation"? (and where >> does this last bit jibe with CHAT? Many people in CHAT speak of mediation >> but I don't recall anyone speaking of the "sublation of mediation"). >> >> Any help with this text would be appreciated. >> >> (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" but I still felt >> that this needed a new thread.). >> >> -greg >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > From wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com Thu May 11 09:21:09 2017 From: wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com (Wolff-Michael Roth) Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 09:21:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> Message-ID: Vygotsky was heading, but never made progress because of his intellectualism (see Zavershneva). Max Weber (sinnorientierte Handlung), then A. Sch?tz (taking up Weber), later Ric?ur (action sens?e) all focus on that dimension. Ric?ur also works out the relation between our practical comprehension (compr?hension) and explication. All of this will lead to the insight that concepts are not things (e.g. see Merleau-Ponty on how we know and understand a CUBE dynamically, which is acknowledged and reified by the research on mirror neurons---see Rizzolatti et al, 1997, in SCIENCE). Michael -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied Cognitive Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics * On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 9:17 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth < wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote: > To me the question is not that they exist---we use concepts, like *Expressionism > *(in painting, in music, in poetry...), but HOW do they exist. This is > where the major theoretical divides will show itself. And concerning the > mind, I would search in a direction that Anglo-Saxons really have a hard > time with, it is SENSE (Sinn, smysl), a direction Vygotsky w Michael > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------- > Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor > Applied Cognitive Science > MacLaurin Building A567 > University of Victoria > Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2 > http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth > > New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics > * > > On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 8:48 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Concepts are first of all things which exist; because they exist, the >> mind is capable of grasping them, in fact, they are exactly the way the >> mind grasps the world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way they >> exist is in human activity and the artifacts we use in that activity. Since >> you have made a start on this Greg, I have to say that I think you need >> this and also the section to follow called "The Subjective Notion" to get a >> decent picture. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >>> ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you suggested (I don't >>> think you truly appreciate how slow of a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy >>> shared can be found here: https://www.marxists.org/refer >>> ence/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm), and I came across this >>> notion of The Notion by Hegel in Section 1279: >>> >>> "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be regarded, not merely >>> as a subjective presupposition but as the /absolute foundation/, yet it can >>> be so only in so far as it has /made/ itself the foundation. Abstract >>> immediacy is no doubt a /first/; yet in so far as it is abstract it is, on >>> the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be grasped in its truth >>> its foundation must first be sought. Hence this foundation, though indeed >>> an immediate, must have made itself immediate through the sublation of >>> mediation."? >>> >>> This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is building up (a >>> realism of concepts) and, I think, remains a revolutionary conception >>> today. The idea here seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective >>> presupposition" but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm >>> wondering HOW can this be? >>> >>> There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest objection comes >>> from 20th century social science's preoccupation with social construction. >>> In this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, subjective and >>> maybe also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might say >>> "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much different take - one in >>> which concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? >>> >>> And, what is this business about the "sublation of mediation"? (and >>> where does this last bit jibe with CHAT? Many people in CHAT speak of >>> mediation but I don't recall anyone speaking of the "sublation of >>> mediation"). >>> >>> Any help with this text would be appreciated. >>> >>> (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" but I still felt >>> that this needed a new thread.). >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Thu May 11 09:24:53 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 02:24:53 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: <1494518834670.15186@iped.uio.no> References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> <1494518834670.15186@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <77fb5699-70ca-83b1-6fe6-d8c7710d0584@mira.net> I meant https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlsubjec.htm down to about 1345 In my Hegel reading group we tend to take about 2 years, reading once a week, to get through one Hegel book. So take your time. Wolf-Michael, of coursed "expressionism" exists. It is an art movement, and took the form of various literary activities in the domain of art criticism as well as certain related art practices as such. Activities exist. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 12/05/2017 2:07 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Greg, Andy, > thanks for making Hegel more accessible to all of us not so familiar. Andy, can you add a link to the section you mention, I could not find it following the link Greg provided or the index. Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 11 May 2017 17:48 > To: Greg Thompson; xmca-l@ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion > > Concepts are first of all things which exist; because they > exist, the mind is capable of grasping them, in fact, they > are exactly the way the mind grasps the world > (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way they exist is > in human activity and the artifacts we use in that activity. > Since you have made a start on this Greg, I have to say that > I think you need this and also the section to follow called > "The Subjective Notion" to get a decent picture. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you >> suggested (I don't think you truly appreciate how slow of >> a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy shared can be found >> here: >> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm), >> and I came across this notion of The Notion by Hegel in >> Section 1279: >> >> "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be >> regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition but as >> the /absolute foundation/, yet it can be so only in so far >> as it has /made/ itself the foundation. Abstract immediacy >> is no doubt a /first/; yet in so far as it is abstract it >> is, on the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be >> grasped in its truth its foundation must first be sought. >> Hence this foundation, though indeed an immediate, must >> have made itself immediate through the sublation of >> mediation."? >> >> This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is >> building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, remains >> a revolutionary conception today. The idea here seems to >> be that the Notion is not a "subjective presupposition" >> but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm >> wondering HOW can this be? >> >> There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest >> objection comes from 20th century social science's >> preoccupation with social construction. In this tradition, >> concepts are things held in the head, subjective and maybe >> also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might >> say "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much >> different take - one in which concepts are much more >> primary. Am I right here? >> >> And, what is this business about the "sublation of >> mediation"? (and where does this last bit jibe with CHAT? >> Many people in CHAT speak of mediation but I don't recall >> anyone speaking of the "sublation of mediation"). >> >> Any help with this text would be appreciated. >> >> (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" but I >> still felt that this needed a new thread.). >> >> -greg >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Thu May 11 09:24:53 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 02:24:53 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: <1494518834670.15186@iped.uio.no> References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> <1494518834670.15186@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <77fb5699-70ca-83b1-6fe6-d8c7710d0584@mira.net> I meant https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlsubjec.htm down to about 1345 In my Hegel reading group we tend to take about 2 years, reading once a week, to get through one Hegel book. So take your time. Wolf-Michael, of coursed "expressionism" exists. It is an art movement, and took the form of various literary activities in the domain of art criticism as well as certain related art practices as such. Activities exist. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 12/05/2017 2:07 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Greg, Andy, > thanks for making Hegel more accessible to all of us not so familiar. Andy, can you add a link to the section you mention, I could not find it following the link Greg provided or the index. Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 11 May 2017 17:48 > To: Greg Thompson; xmca-l@ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion > > Concepts are first of all things which exist; because they > exist, the mind is capable of grasping them, in fact, they > are exactly the way the mind grasps the world > (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way they exist is > in human activity and the artifacts we use in that activity. > Since you have made a start on this Greg, I have to say that > I think you need this and also the section to follow called > "The Subjective Notion" to get a decent picture. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you >> suggested (I don't think you truly appreciate how slow of >> a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy shared can be found >> here: >> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm), >> and I came across this notion of The Notion by Hegel in >> Section 1279: >> >> "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be >> regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition but as >> the /absolute foundation/, yet it can be so only in so far >> as it has /made/ itself the foundation. Abstract immediacy >> is no doubt a /first/; yet in so far as it is abstract it >> is, on the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be >> grasped in its truth its foundation must first be sought. >> Hence this foundation, though indeed an immediate, must >> have made itself immediate through the sublation of >> mediation."? >> >> This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is >> building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, remains >> a revolutionary conception today. The idea here seems to >> be that the Notion is not a "subjective presupposition" >> but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm >> wondering HOW can this be? >> >> There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest >> objection comes from 20th century social science's >> preoccupation with social construction. In this tradition, >> concepts are things held in the head, subjective and maybe >> also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might >> say "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much >> different take - one in which concepts are much more >> primary. Am I right here? >> >> And, what is this business about the "sublation of >> mediation"? (and where does this last bit jibe with CHAT? >> Many people in CHAT speak of mediation but I don't recall >> anyone speaking of the "sublation of mediation"). >> >> Any help with this text would be appreciated. >> >> (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" but I >> still felt that this needed a new thread.). >> >> -greg >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu May 11 21:37:28 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 21:37:28 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: <77fb5699-70ca-83b1-6fe6-d8c7710d0584@mira.net> References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> <1494518834670.15186@iped.uio.no> <77fb5699-70ca-83b1-6fe6-d8c7710d0584@mira.net> Message-ID: <59153c26.4a37630a.27c5a.96fc@mx.google.com> Alfredo, I also want to thank Greg, Andy, and Wolf-Michael for opening up access to this exploration of what concepts are. I will just add a paragraph that Andy wrote when discussing the concept of perezhivanie. ?Before Hegel, concepts were understood to consist of a set of attributes that were necessary and sufficient for an object to be subsumed under the concept. On THIS basis, the objects found within a field of study could be categorized by genus and type. Hegel gave us a completely different approach. For Hegel, all the concepts relevant to a domain of science are unfolded from (a) foundational concept (form of activity) and therefore stand in developmental RELATIONS TO one another?.? My turn is up and I will throw this theme back and hope to get a grasp on this theme as it unfolds. A very generative opening inquiry Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: May 11, 2017 9:26 AM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; xmca-l@ucsd.edu; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion I meant https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlsubjec.htm down to about 1345 In my Hegel reading group we tend to take about 2 years, reading once a week, to get through one Hegel book. So take your time. Wolf-Michael, of coursed "expressionism" exists. It is an art movement, and took the form of various literary activities in the domain of art criticism as well as certain related art practices as such. Activities exist. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 12/05/2017 2:07 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Greg, Andy, > thanks for making Hegel more accessible to all of us not so familiar. Andy, can you add a link to the section you mention, I could not find it following the link Greg provided or the index. Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 11 May 2017 17:48 > To: Greg Thompson; xmca-l@ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion > > Concepts are first of all things which exist; because they > exist, the mind is capable of grasping them, in fact, they > are exactly the way the mind grasps the world > (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way they exist is > in human activity and the artifacts we use in that activity. > Since you have made a start on this Greg, I have to say that > I think you need this and also the section to follow called > "The Subjective Notion" to get a decent picture. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you >> suggested (I don't think you truly appreciate how slow of >> a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy shared can be found >> here: >> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm), >> and I came across this notion of The Notion by Hegel in >> Section 1279: >> >> "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be >> regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition but as >> the /absolute foundation/, yet it can be so only in so far >> as it has /made/ itself the foundation. Abstract immediacy >> is no doubt a /first/; yet in so far as it is abstract it >> is, on the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be >> grasped in its truth its foundation must first be sought. >> Hence this foundation, though indeed an immediate, must >> have made itself immediate through the sublation of >> mediation."? >> >> This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is >> building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, remains >> a revolutionary conception today. The idea here seems to >> be that the Notion is not a "subjective presupposition" >> but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm >> wondering HOW can this be? >> >> There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest >> objection comes from 20th century social science's >> preoccupation with social construction. In this tradition, >> concepts are things held in the head, subjective and maybe >> also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might >> say "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much >> different take - one in which concepts are much more >> primary. Am I right here? >> >> And, what is this business about the "sublation of >> mediation"? (and where does this last bit jibe with CHAT? >> Many people in CHAT speak of mediation but I don't recall >> anyone speaking of the "sublation of mediation"). >> >> Any help with this text would be appreciated. >> >> (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" but I >> still felt that this needed a new thread.). >> >> -greg >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu May 11 21:37:28 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 11 May 2017 21:37:28 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: <77fb5699-70ca-83b1-6fe6-d8c7710d0584@mira.net> References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> <1494518834670.15186@iped.uio.no> <77fb5699-70ca-83b1-6fe6-d8c7710d0584@mira.net> Message-ID: <59153c26.4a37630a.27c5a.96fc@mx.google.com> Alfredo, I also want to thank Greg, Andy, and Wolf-Michael for opening up access to this exploration of what concepts are. I will just add a paragraph that Andy wrote when discussing the concept of perezhivanie. ?Before Hegel, concepts were understood to consist of a set of attributes that were necessary and sufficient for an object to be subsumed under the concept. On THIS basis, the objects found within a field of study could be categorized by genus and type. Hegel gave us a completely different approach. For Hegel, all the concepts relevant to a domain of science are unfolded from (a) foundational concept (form of activity) and therefore stand in developmental RELATIONS TO one another?.? My turn is up and I will throw this theme back and hope to get a grasp on this theme as it unfolds. A very generative opening inquiry Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Andy Blunden Sent: May 11, 2017 9:26 AM To: Alfredo Jornet Gil; Greg Thompson; xmca-l@ucsd.edu; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion I meant https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlsubjec.htm down to about 1345 In my Hegel reading group we tend to take about 2 years, reading once a week, to get through one Hegel book. So take your time. Wolf-Michael, of coursed "expressionism" exists. It is an art movement, and took the form of various literary activities in the domain of art criticism as well as certain related art practices as such. Activities exist. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 12/05/2017 2:07 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Greg, Andy, > thanks for making Hegel more accessible to all of us not so familiar. Andy, can you add a link to the section you mention, I could not find it following the link Greg provided or the index. Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 11 May 2017 17:48 > To: Greg Thompson; xmca-l@ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion > > Concepts are first of all things which exist; because they > exist, the mind is capable of grasping them, in fact, they > are exactly the way the mind grasps the world > (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way they exist is > in human activity and the artifacts we use in that activity. > Since you have made a start on this Greg, I have to say that > I think you need this and also the section to follow called > "The Subjective Notion" to get a decent picture. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you >> suggested (I don't think you truly appreciate how slow of >> a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy shared can be found >> here: >> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm), >> and I came across this notion of The Notion by Hegel in >> Section 1279: >> >> "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be >> regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition but as >> the /absolute foundation/, yet it can be so only in so far >> as it has /made/ itself the foundation. Abstract immediacy >> is no doubt a /first/; yet in so far as it is abstract it >> is, on the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be >> grasped in its truth its foundation must first be sought. >> Hence this foundation, though indeed an immediate, must >> have made itself immediate through the sublation of >> mediation."? >> >> This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is >> building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, remains >> a revolutionary conception today. The idea here seems to >> be that the Notion is not a "subjective presupposition" >> but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm >> wondering HOW can this be? >> >> There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest >> objection comes from 20th century social science's >> preoccupation with social construction. In this tradition, >> concepts are things held in the head, subjective and maybe >> also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might >> say "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much >> different take - one in which concepts are much more >> primary. Am I right here? >> >> And, what is this business about the "sublation of >> mediation"? (and where does this last bit jibe with CHAT? >> Many people in CHAT speak of mediation but I don't recall >> anyone speaking of the "sublation of mediation"). >> >> Any help with this text would be appreciated. >> >> (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" but I >> still felt that this needed a new thread.). >> >> -greg >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri May 12 12:27:58 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 13:27:58 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, So does your response mean that all of my questions in my previous post are non-starters? -greg On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 9:48 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Concepts are first of all things which exist; because they exist, the mind > is capable of grasping them, in fact, they are exactly the way the mind > grasps the world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way they exist is > in human activity and the artifacts we use in that activity. Since you have > made a start on this Greg, I have to say that I think you need this and > also the section to follow called "The Subjective Notion" to get a decent > picture. > > Andy > ------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you suggested (I don't > think you truly appreciate how slow of a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy > shared can be found here: https://www.marxists. > org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm), and I came across > this notion of The Notion by Hegel in Section 1279: > > "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be regarded, not merely as > a subjective presupposition but as the *absolute foundation*, yet it can > be so only in so far as it has *made* itself the foundation. Abstract > immediacy is no doubt a *first*; yet in so far as it is abstract it is, > on the contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be grasped in its truth > its foundation must first be sought. Hence this foundation, though indeed > an immediate, must have made itself immediate through the sublation of > mediation."? > > This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is building up (a > realism of concepts) and, I think, remains a revolutionary conception > today. The idea here seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective > presupposition" but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm > wondering HOW can this be? > > There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest objection comes > from 20th century social science's preoccupation with social construction. > In this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, subjective and > maybe also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might say > "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much different take - one in > which concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? > > And, what is this business about the "sublation of mediation"? (and where > does this last bit jibe with CHAT? Many people in CHAT speak of mediation > but I don't recall anyone speaking of the "sublation of mediation"). > > Any help with this text would be appreciated. > > (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" but I still felt that > this needed a new thread.). > > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri May 12 15:00:46 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 16:00:46 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> <5911d396.020f620a.90d8d.0915@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <9C1E88B1-A5C7-4CFB-9E85-5A8802B6543C@gmail.com> David, I read your ?battle terror? response to answer to your throat-singing question on my wife?s birthday. Didn?t answer?priorities?and time to cogitate. First, you?re probably right that Ana Maria came by her wonderful ability to sing two notes at once, without living, or maybe even travelling, to Mongolia. I admit I am in awe that she can do something I have known since I first heard a real-deal throat singer (naturally, it seems to me) from Mongolia do that thing, someting that I can?t do myself, but maybe could have if I had been born there. The ?battle terror? you talk of brings to my mind Gramsci?s 1949 article ?The Intellectuals?, which I ran across when I was clearing and archiving my desktop texts from the chat. Here?s the first paragraph of the introduction: "The central argument of Gramsci?s essay on the formation of the intellectuals is simple. The notion of ?the intellectuals? as a distinct social category independent of class is a myth. All men are potentially intellectuals in the sense of having an intellect and using it, but not all are intellectuals by social function. Intellectuals in the functional sense fall into two groups. In the first place there are the ?traditional? professional intellectuals, literary, scientific and so on, whose position in the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it but derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an attachment to various historical class formations. Secondly, there are the ?organic? intellectuals the thinking and organising element of a particular fundamental-social class. These organic intellectuals are distinguished less by their profession, which may be any job characteristic of their class, than by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong.? I won?t presume to prof-splain a connection between Gramsci and your post and also with the on-going interchanges on Hegel. I hope that I can hold to my essential motive for engaging in the chat is to go organic, especially after three decades of my own ?splaining to students. I usually cringe when I see my old self from here and now. I admire the commitment it takes to belong in either camp: traditional or organic. And I am not sure the prototype in either camp is what intellectuals have to be. But forget whether any of us are intellectuals at all, or even want to be. Just seems to me that we are doing some interesting thinking in interesting times. As were Spinoza, Hegel and Vygotsky, to name a few thinkers who give us shoulders to stand on. The swamp is deep and it?s unlikely to be drained soon. Phew! Some days it?s worse than others. And I am worse some days than others. I?ve had some good days lately. Colbert is on a roll as Trump continues to feed him great material. Comedians are organic intellectuals. Organic intellectuals tend to be comedians, some grumpier, some cheekier than others. "Make of that what you will,? I think Andy said to me a few days ago. :-) Henry > On May 10, 2017, at 4:21 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Thanks, Henry. I am a PhD student, but I'm afraid worked as a professor for > nearly thirty years, and so I know all about the "known answer" questions > that professors like to ask. I would like to warn my fellow students about > them--to show them the rather simple tricks that professors play during > examinations, particularly since a lot of these tricks are based on the > functional method of dual stimulation, and you can easily find the answer > to their questions in the questions themselves. > > But sometimes the battle-terror of my comrades interferes. So for example > yesterday we had a presentation by a wonderful young university teacher in > Wonju in South Korea, who wants to use scaffolding methods for teaching > science concepts from everyday concepts worked out for elementary school > and middle school here in Australia in order to teach her undergraduates. > She's got the usual experimental group vs. control group (using the > so-called "traditional method") horse-race all cued up. And I asked: > > a) Isn't it true that a lot of the "scaffolding" techniques we use with > elementary school and even middle school kids just make undergraduates feel > impatient or patronized or condescended to or profsplained? > b) Isn't it true that a lot of the techniques we work out for native > speakers here in Australia assume that the natural progression is from > everyday to science concepts--and in Korea it's often the other way around? > > And then I asked: > > c) What will you do if your control group does better than your > experimental group? (This is what, unsurprisingly, happened in her pilot > study). > > All of the professors could immediately see what I was doing, and they held > their breath (we all wanted her to do well). But she was too frightened by > the length of the question, and so she just did what frightened students > do, which is to seize upon a word from the last part of the question (e.g. > "control group") and riff. So we got a long explanation, which we did not > want, on why it was important to have a control group. > > Henry totally lacks any battle-terror, and he has marvellous patience for > my long questions (and even long answers like this one). But notice how he > assumes that Anna-Maria Helfele grew up in Mongolia! As far as I know, she > grew up in Munich. Notice how the second throat singer, who is singing a > long song about the glories of Genghis Khan (that's what "Cengiz Han'a" > refers to), has a backdrop of the Altai mountains and wears traditional > dress. THAT'S what Greg meant when he said that hiphop and jazz and blues > have an indexical relationship to blackness. The relationship seems so > close, you feel it must be a natural one--an associative one. But it isn't. > > (When I argued that this was not true for people in Korea or in Africa, > someone wrote to me off-list to protest that it WAS true in South Africa. > That in itself is interesting--what is true in South Africa is not true in > Sudan. This suggests--to me--the conventionality of symbol and not the > natural relationship of an index.) > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 2:33 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> David, >> I?d like to take a crack at answering your question. I take it that you >> mean the first link explains in scientific terms with cutting edge >> tecnologies (in the domain of acoustic phonetics) what the Mongolian throat >> singer (in the second link) learned from infancy directly from older throat >> singers, who learned from even older throat singers, and so on. But throat >> singing and playing the fiddle in the second link are tecnological feats >> too. And the woman in the first link is pretty darned good. I?m guessing >> she spent time in Mongolia, maybe as a child. Also, am I right that being >> able to deliberately, and with great control, sing two notes at once is >> based on the same control you and I have in making vowels. And vowels are >> best understood through the tools of acoustics, as contrasted with the >> tools of articulatory phonetics. In other words I can?t explain vowels, or >> throat singing, without a lot of hardware, but I can explain consonants >> with nothing more than words. Is there something here about direct and >> mediated experience? Firstness the most direct (sensing?), secondness less >> so (feeling?) and thirdness (emoting) with lots of mediation? So, I am >> answering your question with a lot of questions. Maybe I?m trying to hang >> onto my firstness here, while dialoging and narrating? Juggling? >> >> I really loved mashing these two beautiful demonstrations of how the human >> voice works. Thank you very much for sharing! >> Henry >> >> >>> On May 9, 2017, at 5:18 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Larry: >>> >>> One of my earliest memories--I must have been three years old or so--is >>> climbing up a set of stairs in the University of Minnesota department of >>> child psychology between the nursery school I attended and the laboratory >>> where my mother was working on her PhD on childhood speech. Her >> experiments >>> had something to do with dropping marbles into holes and getting M&Ms, >>> although to be honest the only thing I really remember besides the >>> stairs is the M&Ms and a conversation I had while climbing the stairs. I >>> asked my mother why she was still at school (I was attending nursery >> school >>> on the first floor and it seemed to me that at her age she should be >>> somewhat higher than a room on the second floor). She said she wanted to >>> understand how people learn to talk. I asked her why she didn't remember. >>> She said she just forgot. >>> >>> The way we normally communicate--the way we are all used to, and the way >> we >>> all remember--is for somebody to say something about something to someone >>> else, and that's thirdness. We don't normally start with firstness or >>> secondness, the way that Peirce does. I think I wrote the way I wrote, >> and >>> I started this posting the way I started this posting, because there is a >>> kind of feeling of what happens to you as it is actually happening to >> you, >>> and that is firstness. It's ineffable in the sense that in order to >>> describe it to somebody you have to destroy it by changing it into >>> secondness (dialogue) or thirdness (narrative); The feeling of what >> happens >>> to you as it is actually happening to you can be shared--my mother was >>> there--but not communicated--I never spoke with her again about this >>> conversation, and although I am communicating with you about it, what I >> am >>> communicating is not the conversation but something like a narrative >> about >>> it. Because you can share it, I don't think it's that phenomenological >>> astonishment that is so important to Husserl; it's not the pre-verbal >>> prehension of color that Cezanne was trying to get at, but it is >>> pre-narrative and even pre-dialogue: it's the stairs and the M&Ms and not >>> the conversation. Peirce calls it "firstness", and he associates it with >>> notions like experience qua experience, qualia, the redness of redness, >> and >>> of course emotion, by which he really means feeling rather than higher >>> emotions mediated by artworks. >>> >>> When I look at the sea of sound on Praat, I am not experiencing the sound >>> at all. Instead, I'm using an elaborate set of tools and signs to try to >>> strip away the layers of meaning and wording and even the actual phonemes >>> and just get at the bands of sound energy of which the phonemes (and >> thence >>> the wordings and meanings) are made. The stuff of words is, after all, >>> bands of acoustic energy. Polyphonic singers know this, and they are able >>> to manipulate their vocal tracts in order to focus the four bands of >> energy >>> into only two of them. Like this: >>> >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vC9Qh709gas&t=237s >>> >>> (Now, here's a question for YOU. I could have given you THIS as an >> example >>> of polyphonic singing instead: >>> >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tVGei24TdQ >>> >>> The singing is actually better. But it wouldn't have worked as well. Why >>> not?) >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 12:35 AM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> I do hope we are going to get some more philosophy out of you. In >>>> particular exploring the suff of words/wording. >>>> >>>> I want to take this turn to ?echo? your philosophical ways, that are in >>>> pursuit of this [theme]. See your May 5th response to Greg >>>> >>>> I will back from your forth and stay close to your philosophical >> wordings >>>> upon *firstness, secondness, and thirdness* as INEFFABLE. >>>> >>>> FIRSTNESS: -ICONIC >>>> When I look at ?sound waves? [natural] on my Praat Spectograph, I am >>>> trying to get at the sound stuff, the the noise, the *firstness* of the >>>> stuff of words. To get at ?this? requires a very complex *combination >> of* >>>> tools and signs to ?get down to? [lp-penetrate?] this level or layer of >>>> this emerging *spectrum* >>>> >>>> Moving ?up? we apprehend/look at the *vocal tract* [which itself is no >>>> longer ?firstness? as a physiological organ] but is now something >> brought >>>> about by human ?organization/patterning? >>>> >>>> This firstness is the way of looking/apprehending wording [as] *iconic* >>>> firstness. >>>> >>>> SECONDNESS: - INDEX >>>> >>>> Moving ?up? to look/apprehend at word stuff as indexical. This moving >> up >>>> is *necessarily* relating to the vocal tract within this theme. This >> occurs >>>> NOT through proximity or association but is necessarily related to the >>>> vocal tract. [LP-integrated??] >>>> >>>> THIRDNESS: - SYMBOL >>>> >>>> Moving ?up? When organizing/patterning sound stuff so that the sound >> stuff >>>> *stands for* a way of organizing/patterning other stuff. This other >> stuff >>>> includes: >>>> ? Abstract models-in the making >>>> ? Actual categories of objects >>>> ? Wording phrases such as - sibling society as metaphorical >>>> ? Objects such as tables and lunchboxes and backpacks >>>> >>>> David, this moving up the layers/levers within the [spectrum] are the >> way >>>> the suff of words/wording ALL are: *ways of apprehending/looking. They >> are >>>> not associative stuff. >>>> >>>> I find this philosophical explanation wery generative and germane. >>>> Would you consider transferring from the linguistics discipline and >>>> consider participating in the philosophical endeavors. Or do only madmen >>>> move in this direction?? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>> >>>> From: David Kellogg >>>> Sent: May 8, 2017 3:09 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words >>>> >>>> Vygotsky knew Marr. At one point, Marr took part in the weekly >> discussion >>>> group that Vygotsky and Luria shared with Eisenstein. But of course >>>> Vygotsky knew Blonsky, and liked him, and that didn't shield Blonsky >> from >>>> more than one withering criticism from his good friend down the hall at >> the >>>> Krupskaya Academy where they both worked. >>>> >>>> (I am rather sceptical of the idea that Vygotsky was anything more than >>>> culturally Jewish. But it is certainly true that the Russian Jews I have >>>> known lie at the "engagement" end of Deborah Tannen's >>>> "engagement-consideration" continuum. That is, we prefer to wear you >> out by >>>> interrupting, disagreeing, and otherwise engaging with what you say >> rather >>>> than wear you out by sitting and listening silently and considerately >> and >>>> sometimes showing deference and considerateness by making absolutely no >>>> reply. Greg although he is really a very good talker, tends to >>>> the consideration end of the continuum while I am stuck at the extreme >>>> engagement end, and it made our cooperation in Seoul on lectures >> including >>>> Peirce...well, interesting.) >>>> >>>> So I wasn't surprised to read THIS in the pedological lectures (p. 257 >> of >>>> Vol. 5 of your English Collected Works): >>>> >>>> "??? ????? ? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ? ??? ???? >>>> ????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ?????? ?. ?. ?????, ???? ????????? ??? >>>> ??????? ?????????: ?????????????? ????? ????????????? ?????, ??? ?? >>>> ?????????? ? ?????? ?????, ?????????? ??? ??? ????? ??????. ? ?????? >>>> ??????? ????? ?????????? ????? ???. ?? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ????? >>>> ??? ????; ??? ????????? ? ?????? ????????. ????? ?? ?? ???????, ??? ??? >>>> ????????? ?????? ???, ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ?????; ?? >> ??? >>>> ???????????? ????????? ????? ???????????????, ?? ???? ?????, ??????? >>>> ?????????? ???, ???? ?????? ????????? ???????????? ????, ?? ??????????? >> ?? >>>> ???? ??????, ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ????????? ?? ???????????? >>>> ???????. >>>> >>>> >>>> "What stands at the source of each symbol? With all of the fantastic and >>>> all the controversy of the range of propositions in the theory of N. Ya. >>>> Marr, one proposition seems to me undeniable.: the first words of human >>>> language, as he puts it?'the first word means everything or a great >> deal.' >>>> And the first words of child speech mean almost everything. But what are >>>> these words? Words of the type ?this is? or ?this?; they may be applied >> to >>>> any object. Can we say that this is a real word? No, this is only the >>>> indicative function of the word itself; from it subsequently grows >>>> something symbolizing, but it is a word that is merely a vocal pointing >>>> gesture, and it is retained in all words because each human word points >> to >>>> a certain object." >>>> >>>> Notice that the word "word" here doesn't mean "word"; that is, it means >>>> "wording/meaning" rather than "orthographic word". As Ruqaiya Hasan >> liked >>>> to say, "The meaning of 'not' is not in 'not'". >>>> >>>> (Call it indexical, if you will, but I can't help but feeling, when I >> read >>>> this passage, that Vygotsky likes Marr in the rather exasperated way >> that I >>>> sometimes feel about--say--Greg.) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 1:24 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi all, >>>>> >>>>> on the question whether there can be a language having one word, David >>>>> brings the example: >>>>> >>>>> "What? That! >>>>> Where? There! >>>>> When? Then! >>>>> >>>>> Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" and >>>> the >>>>> "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to >>>>> answer: >>>>> >>>>> a? a! >>>>> eh? eh! >>>>> e? e..." >>>>> >>>>> I find it interesting that, in these examples, the rising and falling >>>>> belong to a situational relation between two: RISE is an invitation to >>>> FALL >>>>> and vice versa. It is the difference between the two what matters. And >>>> this >>>>> difference seems to be a 'correlation' (if I were to use the term David >>>> has >>>>> been using) of the very organic fact that actions have consequences and >>>>> that it is this relation the minimal unit that living organisms are >>>>> concerned about. If organisms (unlike stones) do register (encode) not >>>> just >>>>> actions and not just consequences, but relations between actions and >>>>> consequences, the feature of language that David is pointing at seems >> to >>>> be >>>>> also a feature of organic life in general. I find this thought >>>> interesting >>>>> if we are to think of language as an expression of biology/culture >>>> identity. >>>>> >>>>> I am laying this thought here without much knowledge of linguistics, >> but >>>> I >>>>> thought that this may resonate with what the discussion is unfolding, >>>>> particularly the question on indexicals as per, for example, Greg's >> last >>>>> comments. Does it? >>>>> >>>>> Alfredo >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>>> Sent: 08 May 2017 04:28 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words >>>>> >>>>> The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the >>>>> many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is >>>>> that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically >>>>> elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know >>>>> Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology >>>>> is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the >>>>> Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>> >>>>> On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>> Andy (and others), >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. >>>>>> >>>>>> One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap >>>>>> is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using >>>>>> Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are >>>>>> signs which have referential value but their referential >>>>>> value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic >>>>>> example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I >>>>>> can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it >>>>>> seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as >>>>>> translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is >>>>>> "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. >>>>>> >>>>>> As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the >>>>>> importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He >>>>>> calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of >>>>>> discourse (and without which, our discourse would be >>>>>> meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's >>>>>> essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case >>>>>> for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the >>>>>> talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand >>>>>> quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by >>>>>> following how different participant deictics are deployed. >>>>>> >>>>>> Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear >>>>>> about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks, >>>>>> -greg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a >>>>>> Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they >>>>>> see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see >>>>>> Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be >>>>>> utterly incapable of managing his own life as the >>>>>> foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce >>>>>> was a Logician who invented two different schools of >>>>>> philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. >>>>>> >>>>>> I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular >>>>>> because it is a logical triad which Hegel never >>>>>> theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us >>>>>> understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, >>>>>> Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is >>>>>> acquired by human beings, which is an idea I >>>>>> appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he >>>>>> overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics >>>>>> and his Pragmaticism. >>>>>> >>>>>> A total madman. A real Metaphysician, >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- >>>>> decision-making >>>>>> >>>> collective-decision-making> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> David and Andy, >>>>>> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, >>>>>> secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and >>>>>> certainly you were part of that discussion. I >>>>>> would like to understand that better, also how it >>>>>> relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, >>>>>> indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your >>>>>> ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that >>>>>> might relate, which I hope so, since it would >>>>>> bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), >>>>>> Andy?s Academia articles on political >>>>>> representation and activity/social theory are >>>>>> probably relevant in some way, though Andy >>>>>> probably sees language as a figure against a >>>>>> larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns >>>>>> the figure/ground relationship around? >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Greg: >>>>>> >>>>>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually >>>>>> don't see these problems >>>>>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) >>>>>> >>>>>> Meaning is simply another word for >>>>>> organization. Organization is always >>>>>> present and never separable from matter: it's >>>>>> a property of matter, the way >>>>>> that the internet is a property of a computer. >>>>>> Sometimes this organization >>>>>> is brought about without any human >>>>>> intervention (if you are religious, you >>>>>> will say that it brought about divinely, and >>>>>> if you are Spinozan, by >>>>>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because >>>>>> "Deus Sive Natura"). >>>>>> Sometimes it is brought about by human >>>>>> ingenuity (but of course if you are >>>>>> religious you will say that it is the divine >>>>>> in humans at work, and if you >>>>>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are >>>>>> simply that part of nature which >>>>>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii >>>>>> think it amounts to the same >>>>>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds >>>>>> of substance, res cogitans vs >>>>>> res extensa, only one substance and different >>>>>> ways of organizing it (which >>>>>> in the end amount to the same thing). >>>>>> >>>>>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess >>>>>> what?" and "so there" and >>>>>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say >>>>>> to the contrary >>>>>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, >>>>>> insofar as they depend on their >>>>>> relationship to the context of situation for >>>>>> their meaning. You say that a >>>>>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the >>>>>> relationship of jazz or blues or >>>>>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, >>>>>> insofar as they satisfy the >>>>>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is >>>>>> also a symbol, and a >>>>>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when >>>>>> he/she moves to New York >>>>>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound >>>>>> more so). In Africa, jazz and >>>>>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to >>>>>> Americanness and not to >>>>>> blackness. >>>>>> >>>>>> So your division of signs into just three >>>>>> categories is too simple, Greg. >>>>>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you >>>>>> will discover that there are >>>>>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are >>>>>> generated from three >>>>>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", >>>>>> "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for >>>>>> example all words are symbols insofar as you >>>>>> have to know English in order >>>>>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But >>>>>> some words are >>>>>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as >>>>>> indexes, because they depend >>>>>> on the context of situation for their meaning. >>>>>> Without the symbolic >>>>>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My >>>>>> wife, for example, cannot tell >>>>>> a Southerner from a more general American >>>>>> accent, and I myself still have >>>>>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and >>>>>> who is an FOB bloody pom. >>>>>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness >>>>>> in hiphop--it sounds like >>>>>> K-pop to her. >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't actually think that any signs are >>>>>> associative or "prehensive"; I >>>>>> think that they are all different ways of >>>>>> looking or apprehending. So for >>>>>> example you can apprehend a wording as a >>>>>> symbol: a way of organizing sound >>>>>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of >>>>>> organizing other stuff (sometimes >>>>>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of >>>>>> objects and sometimes the >>>>>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls >>>>>> "projects"). You can also >>>>>> look at wording as index: not as something >>>>>> that is "associated" to the lips >>>>>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or >>>>>> even continguity but rather >>>>>> something that has a necessary relation to the >>>>>> vocal tract (which is itself >>>>>> not a physiological organ, but something >>>>>> brought about by human >>>>>> organization). But when I look at sound waves >>>>>> on my Praat spectrograph and >>>>>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to >>>>>> get at is the sound stuff, >>>>>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of >>>>>> words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't >>>>>> think there is any way of doing this with my >>>>>> eyes or ears alone: I think it >>>>>> requires a very complex combination of tools >>>>>> and signs to get down to >>>>>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if >>>>>> he had breakfast with >>>>>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by >>>>>> themselves, but nobody >>>>>> has ever really shown the limits of what they >>>>>> can do when they put each >>>>>> other in order and start to organize the world >>>>>> around them. >>>>>> >>>>>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you >>>>>> are going to get out of me, >>>>>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: >>>>>> mediating activity is not >>>>>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or >>>>>> Wolff-Michael, but it is very different >>>>>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the >>>>>> same reason that painting is >>>>>> different from wording: in painting you CAN >>>>>> leave out the human (if you are >>>>>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are >>>>>> Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but >>>>>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide >>>>>> and the latter murdered two >>>>>> innocent young women). But in wording you >>>>>> never ever can. Wording can feel >>>>>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated >>>>>> or it doesn't work very >>>>>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated >>>>>> than ever. >>>>>> >>>>>> dk >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson >>>>>> >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> David (and others), >>>>>> >>>>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I >>>>>> know you dearly appreciate), your >>>>>> last post included this: >>>>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide >>>>>> material correlates for meaning >>>>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >>>>>> >>>>>> I was with you up until that point, but >>>>>> that's where I always lose you. >>>>>> >>>>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say >>>>>> but I guess it really depends on >>>>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, >>>>>> you mean some plane of existence >>>>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, >>>>>> then this seems to be a bit of >>>>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the >>>>>> one hand, "matter" (res extensa? >>>>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" >>>>>> (res cogitans? phenomena?). >>>>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where >>>>>> do we locate "meaning" as you >>>>>> have described it? >>>>>> >>>>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic >>>>>> drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >>>>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane >>>>>> of jumbled ideas" (A in the >>>>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm >>>>>> and "the equally vague plane of >>>>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of >>>>>> the chasm. Each side is >>>>>> self-contained and self-referential, and >>>>>> never the twain shall meet. Worlds >>>>>> apart. >>>>>> >>>>>> And this ties to the conversation in the >>>>>> other thread about the >>>>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's >>>>>> Marx quote about a science of >>>>>> language that is shorn from life). My >>>>>> suspicion is that this supposed >>>>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to >>>>>> do with this Saussurean approach >>>>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >>>>>> >>>>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a >>>>>> different approach that may give >>>>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the >>>>>> word back INto the world. (p. 102 >>>>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >>>>>> >>>>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of >>>>>> representamen (signifier) to >>>>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. >>>>>> The symbol is the relation with >>>>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one >>>>>> that Saussure speaks of and is >>>>>> the one that is ineffable or, in >>>>>> Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >>>>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, >>>>>> the meaning of which is found in >>>>>> other words (hence the sense of >>>>>> ineffability). With only the symbolic >>>>>> function, the whole world of words would >>>>>> be entirely self-referential and >>>>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I >>>>>> like to say that Derrida is the end >>>>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea >>>>>> to its logical conclusion and >>>>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, >>>>>> well, empty (and thus >>>>>> ineffable)). >>>>>> >>>>>> But Peirce has two other relations of >>>>>> representamen to object, the iconic >>>>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning >>>>>> iconically, the representamen >>>>>> contains some quality of the object that >>>>>> it represents (e.g., a map that >>>>>> holds relations of the space that it >>>>>> represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" >>>>>> in which the representamen has some of the >>>>>> qualities of the sound of the >>>>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning >>>>>> indexically, the relationship of >>>>>> representamen to object is one of temporal >>>>>> or spatial contiguity (e.g., >>>>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or >>>>>> where there is a Southern twang, >>>>>> there is a Southerner, or, most >>>>>> classically, when I point, the object to >>>>>> which I am pointing is spatially >>>>>> contiguous with the finger that is >>>>>> pointing). >>>>>> >>>>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of >>>>>> the inheritors of Roman >>>>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein >>>>>> (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the >>>>>> only inheritors of this tradition - >>>>>> Michael was a student of Jakobson's at >>>>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression >>>>>> of Jacobson too), then we can >>>>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., >>>>>> the symbolic function) in the >>>>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) >>>>>> indexical function. >>>>>> >>>>>> But that argument is always a bit too much >>>>>> for me (if there are any takers, >>>>>> the best place to find this argument is in >>>>>> Silverstein's chapter >>>>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic >>>>>> Function," or in less explicit but >>>>>> slightly more understandable article >>>>>> "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of >>>>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). >>>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more >>>>>> elegant and comprehensible: in >>>>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the >>>>>> index, first as the index par >>>>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as >>>>>> Andy has previously pointed out, >>>>>> might not be exactly how things go in a >>>>>> literal sense, but the general >>>>>> structure here works well, I think, as a >>>>>> heuristic if nothing else - words >>>>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally >>>>>> and spatially collocated, "bottle" >>>>>> is first uttered as a way of saying >>>>>> "thirsty" and then later to refer to a >>>>>> co-present object; note this is also why >>>>>> young kids get discourse markers >>>>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly >>>>>> precocious when they do!), since >>>>>> discourse markers are primarily >>>>>> indexical). The indexical function is the >>>>>> rudimentary form that then provides the >>>>>> groundwork for the development of >>>>>> the symbolic function. >>>>>> >>>>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) >>>>>> approach, the meaning of signs is not >>>>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, >>>>>> and that grounding is the >>>>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in >>>>>> the world and of the world. >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning >>>>>> back into matter. And perhaps >>>>>> speaking of words as the material >>>>>> correlates of meaning can be a useful >>>>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk >>>>>> about meanings and concepts given our >>>>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we >>>>>> should also recognize that if it >>>>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead >>>>>> us astray if we take it too far. >>>>>> >>>>>> I'd add here that I think one of the >>>>>> greatest opportunities for CHAT to >>>>>> make a contribution to social science >>>>>> today is in its conceptualization of >>>>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, >>>>>> "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one >>>>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of >>>>>> social science today is the idea >>>>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In >>>>>> anthropology, people easily talk about >>>>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they >>>>>> mean precisely something that floats >>>>>> around in some ethereal plane of >>>>>> "meaningfulness" and which is not of the >>>>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this >>>>>> runs counter to the direction that >>>>>> anthropology is heading these days with >>>>>> the so-called "ontological turn" >>>>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now >>>>>> since this post is already >>>>>> running way too long, but I'll just >>>>>> mention that one of the aims of this is >>>>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). >>>>>> CHAT's conception of the concept >>>>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is >>>>>> needed -- a way of understanding the >>>>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and >>>>>> historical thing, rather than >>>>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is >>>>>> the holding of a(n historical) >>>>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse >>>>>> or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts >>>>>> are thus little historical text-lets. >>>>>> >>>>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will >>>>>> find some time in the future to >>>>>> return to that last part, but there is no >>>>>> time to develop it further now. >>>>>> >>>>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the >>>>>> opportunity to catch up to these >>>>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >>>>>> >>>>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that >>>>>> I'll be able to comment (as a young >>>>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time >>>>>> putting stuff out - and unlike the >>>>>> rest of you, I'm no good at >>>>>> multi-tasking... it's either one or the other >>>>>> for me). >>>>>> >>>>>> Very best, >>>>>> greg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David >>>>>> Kellogg >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Well, yes. But if present day >>>>>> conditions are the REVERSE of the >>>>>> >>>>>> conditions >>>>>> >>>>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that >>>>>> is, if the present trend is to >>>>>> subsume labor under language instead >>>>>> of the other way around--don't we >>>>>> >>>>>> need >>>>>> >>>>>> this distinction between signs and >>>>>> tools more than ever? That is, if >>>>>> >>>>>> sloppy >>>>>> >>>>>> formulations like "cultural capital", >>>>>> "symbolic violence", "use/exchange >>>>>> value of the word" are erasing the >>>>>> distinction between a mediating >>>>>> >>>>>> activity >>>>>> >>>>>> which acts on the environment and a >>>>>> mediating activity which acts on >>>>>> >>>>>> other >>>>>> >>>>>> mediators and on the self, and which >>>>>> therefore has the potential for >>>>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this >>>>>> exactly where the clear-eyed >>>>>> philosophers need to step in and >>>>>> straighten us out? >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that instead what is happening >>>>>> is that our older generation >>>>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present >>>>>> company--usually--excluded) are too >>>>>> interested in the "tool power" of >>>>>> large categories and insufficiently >>>>>> interested in fine distinctions that >>>>>> make a difference. But perhaps it >>>>>> is also that our younger generation of >>>>>> misty-eyed philosophers are, as >>>>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in >>>>>> copulating bodies than exploited >>>>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that >>>>>> do make a difference equally allow >>>>>> generalization and abstraction and >>>>>> tool power, and the copulating flesh >>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>> the exploited muscles are one and the >>>>>> same. >>>>>> >>>>>> Take, for example, your remark about >>>>>> the Fourier transform performed by >>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear >>>>>> cochlea--I can see the world centre for >>>>>> studying the cochlea from my office >>>>>> window). Actually, it's part of a >>>>>> >>>>>> wide >>>>>> >>>>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that >>>>>> were already being noticed by >>>>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, >>>>>> you don't have cause and effect, >>>>>> >>>>>> just >>>>>> >>>>>> as in cause and effect you don't have >>>>>> "association". Words don't "cause" >>>>>> meaning: they provide material >>>>>> correlates for meaning and in that sense >>>>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does >>>>>> not "cause" wording; it correlates >>>>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of >>>>>> consciousness--and through it to a >>>>>> context of situation or culture, and >>>>>> in that sense "realises" it. >>>>>> >>>>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, >>>>>> Vygotsky says that the >>>>>> >>>>>> stabilization >>>>>> >>>>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the >>>>>> eye in early childhood is part of a >>>>>> >>>>>> two >>>>>> >>>>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between >>>>>> the sense organs and the brain. The >>>>>> reason why we don't see a table as a >>>>>> trapezoid, when we stand over it and >>>>>> compare the front with the back, the >>>>>> reason why we don't see a piece of >>>>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the >>>>>> reason why we have orthoscopic >>>>>> >>>>>> perception >>>>>> >>>>>> and we don't see a man at a distance >>>>>> as a looming midget is that the >>>>>> >>>>>> brain >>>>>> >>>>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. >>>>>> And where does the brain get this >>>>>> view if not from language and from >>>>>> other people? >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy >>>>>> Blunden >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Personally, I think the first and >>>>>> most persistently important thing is >>>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>> see how much alike are tables and >>>>>> words. >>>>>> >>>>>> But ... Vygotsky was very >>>>>> insistent on the distinction >>>>>> because he was >>>>>> fighting a battle against the idea >>>>>> that speech ought to be subsumed >>>>>> >>>>>> under >>>>>> >>>>>> the larger category of labour. He >>>>>> had to fight for semiotics against a >>>>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. >>>>>> But we here in 2017 are living in >>>>>> different times, where we have >>>>>> Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >>>>>> Marxism is widely regarded as >>>>>> antique. As Marx said "Just as >>>>>> >>>>>> philosophers >>>>>> >>>>>> have given thought an independent >>>>>> existence, so they were bound to make >>>>>> language into an independent >>>>>> realm." and we live well and truly >>>>>> in the >>>>>> times when labour is subsumed >>>>>> under language, and not the other way >>>>>> >>>>>> around. >>>>>> >>>>>> Everyone knows that a table is >>>>>> unlike a word. The point it to >>>>>> >>>>>> understand >>>>>> >>>>>> how tables are signs and word are >>>>>> material objects. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked >>>>>> in an offshoot of the bionic ear >>>>>> project. The ear has a little >>>>>> keyboard that works like a piano >>>>>> keyboard >>>>>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>>> reverse, making a real time >>>>>> Fourier transform of that air >>>>>> pressure wave >>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve >>>>>> impulse. The brain never hears that >>>>>> pressure signal.) >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/ >>>>> book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>> >>>> collective-decision-making> >>>>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo >>>>>> Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, >>>>>> anyone else), could you give a >>>>>> bit more on >>>>>> >>>>>> that >>>>>> >>>>>> distinction between words and >>>>>> tables? >>>>>> >>>>>> And could you say how (and >>>>>> whether) (human, hand) nails >>>>>> are different >>>>>> from tables; and then how >>>>>> nails are different from words? >>>>>> >>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> edu> >>>>>> >>>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>> > >>>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>>> Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff >>>>>> of Words >>>>>> >>>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from >>>>>> an article Mike wrote in a >>>>>> Festschrift >>>>>> >>>>>> for >>>>>> >>>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking >>>>>> about artefacts: >>>>>> >>>>>> "They are ideal in that they >>>>>> contain in coded form the >>>>>> interactions of >>>>>> which they >>>>>> were previously a part and >>>>>> which they mediate in the >>>>>> present (e.g., >>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> structure of >>>>>> a pencil carries within it the >>>>>> history of certain forms of >>>>>> writing). >>>>>> >>>>>> They >>>>>> >>>>>> are material >>>>>> in that they are embodied in >>>>>> material artifacts. This principle >>>>>> >>>>>> applies >>>>>> >>>>>> with equal >>>>>> force whether one is >>>>>> considering language/speech or >>>>>> the more usually >>>>>> >>>>>> noted >>>>>> >>>>>> forms >>>>>> of artifacts such as tables >>>>>> and knives which constitute >>>>>> material >>>>>> >>>>>> culture. >>>>>> >>>>>> What >>>>>> differentiates a word, such as >>>>>> ?language? from, say, a table. >>>>>> is the >>>>>> relative prominence >>>>>> of their material and ideal >>>>>> aspects. No word exists apart >>>>>> from its >>>>>> material >>>>>> instantiation (as a >>>>>> configuration of sound waves, >>>>>> or hand movements, >>>>>> >>>>>> or >>>>>> >>>>>> as >>>>>> >>>>>> writing, >>>>>> or as neuronal activity), >>>>>> whereas every table embodies >>>>>> an order >>>>>> >>>>>> imposed >>>>>> >>>>>> by >>>>>> >>>>>> thinking >>>>>> human beings." >>>>>> >>>>>> This is the kind of thing that >>>>>> regularly gets me thrown out of >>>>>> >>>>>> journals >>>>>> >>>>>> by >>>>>> >>>>>> the ear. Mike says that the >>>>>> difference between a word and >>>>>> a table is >>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> relative salience of the ideal >>>>>> and the material. Sure--words >>>>>> are full >>>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>> the ideal, and tables are full >>>>>> of material. Right? >>>>>> >>>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other >>>>>> way around. Why? Well, because >>>>>> a word >>>>>> without some word-stuff (sound >>>>>> or graphite) just isn't a >>>>>> word. In a >>>>>> word, meaning is solidary with >>>>>> material sounding: change one, >>>>>> and you >>>>>> change the other. But with a >>>>>> table, what you start with is >>>>>> the idea of >>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> table; as soon as you've got >>>>>> that idea, you've got a table. >>>>>> You could >>>>>> change the material to >>>>>> anything and you'd still have >>>>>> a table. >>>>>> >>>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out >>>>>> by the ear. But he does ignore the >>>>>> >>>>>> delightful >>>>>> >>>>>> perversity in what Mike is >>>>>> saying, and what he gets out >>>>>> of the quote >>>>>> >>>>>> is >>>>>> >>>>>> just that words are really >>>>>> just like tools. When in fact >>>>>> Mike is >>>>>> >>>>>> saying >>>>>> >>>>>> just the opposite. >>>>>> >>>>>> (The part I don't get is >>>>>> Mike's notion that the >>>>>> structure of a pencil >>>>>> carries within it the history >>>>>> of certain forms of writing. >>>>>> Does he >>>>>> >>>>>> mean >>>>>> >>>>>> that the length of the pencil >>>>>> reflects how often it's been >>>>>> used? Or is >>>>>> >>>>>> he >>>>>> >>>>>> making a more archaeological >>>>>> point about graphite, wood, >>>>>> rubber and >>>>>> >>>>>> their >>>>>> >>>>>> relationship to a certain >>>>>> point in the history of >>>>>> writing and erasing? >>>>>> Actually, pencils are more >>>>>> like tables than like >>>>>> words--the idea has >>>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>> come first.) >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri May 12 16:07:50 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 13 May 2017 09:07:50 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: <9C1E88B1-A5C7-4CFB-9E85-5A8802B6543C@gmail.com> References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> <5911d396.020f620a.90d8d.0915@mx.google.com> <9C1E88B1-A5C7-4CFB-9E85-5A8802B6543C@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry: Take a look at this one: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIUvX7hebBA Komm, lieber Mai, und mache die B?ume wieder gr?n, und lass mir an dem Bache die kleinen Veilchen bl?h?n! Wie m?cht? ich doch so gerne ein Veilchen wieder seh?n! Ach, lieber Mai, wie gerne einmal spazieren geh?n! (Come, dear May and make The trees all green once more And leave me by the lake The violets I long for! I want so much to see again Those violets in the lane Ach, dear May, I wanta saunter And scramble down the lane.) It's Mozart's song about child cabin fever (the song goes on to talk about the pleasures of winter days and then makes an invidious contrast with the rumpus you can raise outdoors). In order to sing it during an MRI scan, Anna Maria had her hair shaved off, and with the scan you can see exactly what she is doing, and how it is related to normal vowels. As you say (and as you see) it's all in the vowel. The normal vowels that she sings, e.g. the "o" in "Komm", are when the whole mouth is open, and the soundwaves are able to bounce around as they do inside a guitar or violin. This means they come out of the mouth and interfere with each other in various ways, sometimes constructively and sometimes destructively, but they tend to consolidate in four discernible bands of energy, which is why our vowels sound like a string quartet with a bass formant, a tenor, an alto, and a soprano. And as you see, when she sings polyphonically, she uses her tongue to greatly restrict the oral cavity and only allow a very small band of energy to escape. What is not so clear is that she is also using muscles around the esophagus to change the shape of the throat so that the lungs and the throat do not cause interference with the overtone she is isolating. I think that consonants are really byproducts of articulatory phonetics. That is, they are just the interface between one syllable and another, and by themselves they are not very meaningful. We've exapted them as phonemes, As Stephen J. Gould said, the spandrels at San Marco in Venice are just "there"--they are what happens when you put a round dome over a square hole, but people exapted them for the most beautiful and meaningful murals in the cathedral. Now, when we look at a syllable, we see that it has a vowel and then it CAN have two or more consonants on the ends: (k) O (mm) Go up one level, to the level of the word, and think of meaning instead of sounding. A word or word group usually has a "head" and then it CAN have two or more suffixes or prefixes: (re)arriv(al) of May (per)ambul(ation) in the lane And we can go up one level and look at the level of the clause the same way: (Wanting to see violets again,) the little boy looked out the window (where the leaves were turning green). violets I used to think that this "fractal" design--where the same kind of structure appears at higher levels, was evidence of intelligent design, or perhaps of the kind of uintelligent design we see in chaos-complexity theory. Now I think it is just like Gould and Lewontin's spandrels. It's not the case that every level has some "independent" element and then we start deliberately attaching dependent elements. It's the case that independent elements have borders, and these borders are interpreted as dependent elements. David Kellogg Macquarie University PS: On "organic" intellectuals. I disagree with Gramsci: I think that every class has fuzzy borders, and these get fuzzier and fuzzier when classes collide and conflict. Petty-bourgeois intellectuals like me and working-class intellectuals like my wife are simply the outliers; we have a certain autonomy, and we can always be interpreted one way or the other. Intellectuals are consonants, which makes us salient. But it is the vowels that make social formations sing. dk I want to make a similar argument . On Sat, May 13, 2017 at 8:00 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > David, > I read your ?battle terror? response to answer to your throat-singing > question on my wife?s birthday. Didn?t answer?priorities?and time to > cogitate. > > First, you?re probably right that Ana Maria came by her wonderful ability > to sing two notes at once, without living, or maybe even travelling, to > Mongolia. I admit I am in awe that she can do something I have known since > I first heard a real-deal throat singer (naturally, it seems to me) from > Mongolia do that thing, someting that I can?t do myself, but maybe could > have if I had been born there. > > The ?battle terror? you talk of brings to my mind Gramsci?s 1949 article > ?The Intellectuals?, which I ran across when I was clearing and archiving > my desktop texts from the chat. Here?s the first paragraph of the > introduction: > > "The central argument of Gramsci?s essay on the formation of the > intellectuals is simple. The notion of ?the intellectuals? as a distinct > social category independent of class is a myth. All men are potentially > intellectuals in the sense of having an intellect and using it, but not all > are intellectuals by social function. Intellectuals in the functional sense > fall into two groups. In the first place there are the ?traditional? > professional intellectuals, literary, scientific and so on, whose position > in the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it but > derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an > attachment to various historical class formations. Secondly, there are the > ?organic? intellectuals the thinking and organising element of a particular > fundamental-social class. These organic intellectuals are distinguished > less by their profession, which may be any job characteristic of their > class, than by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the > class to which they organically belong.? > > I won?t presume to prof-splain a connection between Gramsci and your post > and also with the on-going interchanges on Hegel. I hope that I can hold to > my essential motive for engaging in the chat is to go organic, especially > after three decades of my own ?splaining to students. I usually cringe when > I see my old self from here and now. I admire the commitment it takes to > belong in either camp: traditional or organic. And I am not sure the > prototype in either camp is what intellectuals have to be. > > But forget whether any of us are intellectuals at all, or even want to be. > Just seems to me that we are doing some interesting thinking in interesting > times. As were Spinoza, Hegel and Vygotsky, to name a few thinkers who give > us shoulders to stand on. The swamp is deep and it?s unlikely to be drained > soon. Phew! Some days it?s worse than others. And I am worse some days > than others. I?ve had some good days lately. Colbert is on a roll as Trump > continues to feed him great material. Comedians are organic intellectuals. > Organic intellectuals tend to be comedians, some grumpier, some cheekier > than others. "Make of that what you will,? I think Andy said to me a few > days ago. :-) > > Henry > > > > > > > On May 10, 2017, at 4:21 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Thanks, Henry. I am a PhD student, but I'm afraid worked as a professor > for > > nearly thirty years, and so I know all about the "known answer" questions > > that professors like to ask. I would like to warn my fellow students > about > > them--to show them the rather simple tricks that professors play during > > examinations, particularly since a lot of these tricks are based on the > > functional method of dual stimulation, and you can easily find the answer > > to their questions in the questions themselves. > > > > But sometimes the battle-terror of my comrades interferes. So for example > > yesterday we had a presentation by a wonderful young university teacher > in > > Wonju in South Korea, who wants to use scaffolding methods for teaching > > science concepts from everyday concepts worked out for elementary school > > and middle school here in Australia in order to teach her undergraduates. > > She's got the usual experimental group vs. control group (using the > > so-called "traditional method") horse-race all cued up. And I asked: > > > > a) Isn't it true that a lot of the "scaffolding" techniques we use with > > elementary school and even middle school kids just make undergraduates > feel > > impatient or patronized or condescended to or profsplained? > > b) Isn't it true that a lot of the techniques we work out for native > > speakers here in Australia assume that the natural progression is from > > everyday to science concepts--and in Korea it's often the other way > around? > > > > And then I asked: > > > > c) What will you do if your control group does better than your > > experimental group? (This is what, unsurprisingly, happened in her pilot > > study). > > > > All of the professors could immediately see what I was doing, and they > held > > their breath (we all wanted her to do well). But she was too frightened > by > > the length of the question, and so she just did what frightened students > > do, which is to seize upon a word from the last part of the question > (e.g. > > "control group") and riff. So we got a long explanation, which we did not > > want, on why it was important to have a control group. > > > > Henry totally lacks any battle-terror, and he has marvellous patience for > > my long questions (and even long answers like this one). But notice how > he > > assumes that Anna-Maria Helfele grew up in Mongolia! As far as I know, > she > > grew up in Munich. Notice how the second throat singer, who is singing a > > long song about the glories of Genghis Khan (that's what "Cengiz Han'a" > > refers to), has a backdrop of the Altai mountains and wears traditional > > dress. THAT'S what Greg meant when he said that hiphop and jazz and blues > > have an indexical relationship to blackness. The relationship seems so > > close, you feel it must be a natural one--an associative one. But it > isn't. > > > > (When I argued that this was not true for people in Korea or in Africa, > > someone wrote to me off-list to protest that it WAS true in South Africa. > > That in itself is interesting--what is true in South Africa is not true > in > > Sudan. This suggests--to me--the conventionality of symbol and not the > > natural relationship of an index.) > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 2:33 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> David, > >> I?d like to take a crack at answering your question. I take it that you > >> mean the first link explains in scientific terms with cutting edge > >> tecnologies (in the domain of acoustic phonetics) what the Mongolian > throat > >> singer (in the second link) learned from infancy directly from older > throat > >> singers, who learned from even older throat singers, and so on. But > throat > >> singing and playing the fiddle in the second link are tecnological feats > >> too. And the woman in the first link is pretty darned good. I?m guessing > >> she spent time in Mongolia, maybe as a child. Also, am I right that > being > >> able to deliberately, and with great control, sing two notes at once is > >> based on the same control you and I have in making vowels. And vowels > are > >> best understood through the tools of acoustics, as contrasted with the > >> tools of articulatory phonetics. In other words I can?t explain vowels, > or > >> throat singing, without a lot of hardware, but I can explain consonants > >> with nothing more than words. Is there something here about direct and > >> mediated experience? Firstness the most direct (sensing?), secondness > less > >> so (feeling?) and thirdness (emoting) with lots of mediation? So, I am > >> answering your question with a lot of questions. Maybe I?m trying to > hang > >> onto my firstness here, while dialoging and narrating? Juggling? > >> > >> I really loved mashing these two beautiful demonstrations of how the > human > >> voice works. Thank you very much for sharing! > >> Henry > >> > >> > >>> On May 9, 2017, at 5:18 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>> > >>> Larry: > >>> > >>> One of my earliest memories--I must have been three years old or so--is > >>> climbing up a set of stairs in the University of Minnesota department > of > >>> child psychology between the nursery school I attended and the > laboratory > >>> where my mother was working on her PhD on childhood speech. Her > >> experiments > >>> had something to do with dropping marbles into holes and getting M&Ms, > >>> although to be honest the only thing I really remember besides the > >>> stairs is the M&Ms and a conversation I had while climbing the stairs. > I > >>> asked my mother why she was still at school (I was attending nursery > >> school > >>> on the first floor and it seemed to me that at her age she should be > >>> somewhat higher than a room on the second floor). She said she wanted > to > >>> understand how people learn to talk. I asked her why she didn't > remember. > >>> She said she just forgot. > >>> > >>> The way we normally communicate--the way we are all used to, and the > way > >> we > >>> all remember--is for somebody to say something about something to > someone > >>> else, and that's thirdness. We don't normally start with firstness or > >>> secondness, the way that Peirce does. I think I wrote the way I wrote, > >> and > >>> I started this posting the way I started this posting, because there > is a > >>> kind of feeling of what happens to you as it is actually happening to > >> you, > >>> and that is firstness. It's ineffable in the sense that in order to > >>> describe it to somebody you have to destroy it by changing it into > >>> secondness (dialogue) or thirdness (narrative); The feeling of what > >> happens > >>> to you as it is actually happening to you can be shared--my mother was > >>> there--but not communicated--I never spoke with her again about this > >>> conversation, and although I am communicating with you about it, what I > >> am > >>> communicating is not the conversation but something like a narrative > >> about > >>> it. Because you can share it, I don't think it's that phenomenological > >>> astonishment that is so important to Husserl; it's not the pre-verbal > >>> prehension of color that Cezanne was trying to get at, but it is > >>> pre-narrative and even pre-dialogue: it's the stairs and the M&Ms and > not > >>> the conversation. Peirce calls it "firstness", and he associates it > with > >>> notions like experience qua experience, qualia, the redness of redness, > >> and > >>> of course emotion, by which he really means feeling rather than higher > >>> emotions mediated by artworks. > >>> > >>> When I look at the sea of sound on Praat, I am not experiencing the > sound > >>> at all. Instead, I'm using an elaborate set of tools and signs to try > to > >>> strip away the layers of meaning and wording and even the actual > phonemes > >>> and just get at the bands of sound energy of which the phonemes (and > >> thence > >>> the wordings and meanings) are made. The stuff of words is, after all, > >>> bands of acoustic energy. Polyphonic singers know this, and they are > able > >>> to manipulate their vocal tracts in order to focus the four bands of > >> energy > >>> into only two of them. Like this: > >>> > >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vC9Qh709gas&t=237s > >>> > >>> (Now, here's a question for YOU. I could have given you THIS as an > >> example > >>> of polyphonic singing instead: > >>> > >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tVGei24TdQ > >>> > >>> The singing is actually better. But it wouldn't have worked as well. > Why > >>> not?) > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Macquarie University > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 12:35 AM, Larry Purss > >> wrote: > >>> > >>>> David, > >>>> I do hope we are going to get some more philosophy out of you. In > >>>> particular exploring the suff of words/wording. > >>>> > >>>> I want to take this turn to ?echo? your philosophical ways, that are > in > >>>> pursuit of this [theme]. See your May 5th response to Greg > >>>> > >>>> I will back from your forth and stay close to your philosophical > >> wordings > >>>> upon *firstness, secondness, and thirdness* as INEFFABLE. > >>>> > >>>> FIRSTNESS: -ICONIC > >>>> When I look at ?sound waves? [natural] on my Praat Spectograph, I am > >>>> trying to get at the sound stuff, the the noise, the *firstness* of > the > >>>> stuff of words. To get at ?this? requires a very complex *combination > >> of* > >>>> tools and signs to ?get down to? [lp-penetrate?] this level or layer > of > >>>> this emerging *spectrum* > >>>> > >>>> Moving ?up? we apprehend/look at the *vocal tract* [which itself is no > >>>> longer ?firstness? as a physiological organ] but is now something > >> brought > >>>> about by human ?organization/patterning? > >>>> > >>>> This firstness is the way of looking/apprehending wording [as] > *iconic* > >>>> firstness. > >>>> > >>>> SECONDNESS: - INDEX > >>>> > >>>> Moving ?up? to look/apprehend at word stuff as indexical. This moving > >> up > >>>> is *necessarily* relating to the vocal tract within this theme. This > >> occurs > >>>> NOT through proximity or association but is necessarily related to the > >>>> vocal tract. [LP-integrated??] > >>>> > >>>> THIRDNESS: - SYMBOL > >>>> > >>>> Moving ?up? When organizing/patterning sound stuff so that the sound > >> stuff > >>>> *stands for* a way of organizing/patterning other stuff. This other > >> stuff > >>>> includes: > >>>> ? Abstract models-in the making > >>>> ? Actual categories of objects > >>>> ? Wording phrases such as - sibling society as metaphorical > >>>> ? Objects such as tables and lunchboxes and backpacks > >>>> > >>>> David, this moving up the layers/levers within the [spectrum] are the > >> way > >>>> the suff of words/wording ALL are: *ways of apprehending/looking. > They > >> are > >>>> not associative stuff. > >>>> > >>>> I find this philosophical explanation wery generative and germane. > >>>> Would you consider transferring from the linguistics discipline and > >>>> consider participating in the philosophical endeavors. Or do only > madmen > >>>> move in this direction?? > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > >>>> > >>>> From: David Kellogg > >>>> Sent: May 8, 2017 3:09 PM > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > >>>> > >>>> Vygotsky knew Marr. At one point, Marr took part in the weekly > >> discussion > >>>> group that Vygotsky and Luria shared with Eisenstein. But of course > >>>> Vygotsky knew Blonsky, and liked him, and that didn't shield Blonsky > >> from > >>>> more than one withering criticism from his good friend down the hall > at > >> the > >>>> Krupskaya Academy where they both worked. > >>>> > >>>> (I am rather sceptical of the idea that Vygotsky was anything more > than > >>>> culturally Jewish. But it is certainly true that the Russian Jews I > have > >>>> known lie at the "engagement" end of Deborah Tannen's > >>>> "engagement-consideration" continuum. That is, we prefer to wear you > >> out by > >>>> interrupting, disagreeing, and otherwise engaging with what you say > >> rather > >>>> than wear you out by sitting and listening silently and considerately > >> and > >>>> sometimes showing deference and considerateness by making absolutely > no > >>>> reply. Greg although he is really a very good talker, tends to > >>>> the consideration end of the continuum while I am stuck at the extreme > >>>> engagement end, and it made our cooperation in Seoul on lectures > >> including > >>>> Peirce...well, interesting.) > >>>> > >>>> So I wasn't surprised to read THIS in the pedological lectures (p. 257 > >> of > >>>> Vol. 5 of your English Collected Works): > >>>> > >>>> "??? ????? ? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ? ??? > ???? > >>>> ????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ?????? ?. ?. ?????, ???? ????????? ??? > >>>> ??????? ?????????: ?????????????? ????? ????????????? ?????, ??? ?? > >>>> ?????????? ? ?????? ?????, ?????????? ??? ??? ????? ??????. ? ?????? > >>>> ??????? ????? ?????????? ????? ???. ?? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? > ????? > >>>> ??? ????; ??? ????????? ? ?????? ????????. ????? ?? ?? ???????, ??? > ??? > >>>> ????????? ?????? ???, ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ?????; ?? > >> ??? > >>>> ???????????? ????????? ????? ???????????????, ?? ???? ?????, ??????? > >>>> ?????????? ???, ???? ?????? ????????? ???????????? ????, ?? > ??????????? > >> ?? > >>>> ???? ??????, ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ????????? ?? > ???????????? > >>>> ???????. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> "What stands at the source of each symbol? With all of the fantastic > and > >>>> all the controversy of the range of propositions in the theory of N. > Ya. > >>>> Marr, one proposition seems to me undeniable.: the first words of > human > >>>> language, as he puts it?'the first word means everything or a great > >> deal.' > >>>> And the first words of child speech mean almost everything. But what > are > >>>> these words? Words of the type ?this is? or ?this?; they may be > applied > >> to > >>>> any object. Can we say that this is a real word? No, this is only the > >>>> indicative function of the word itself; from it subsequently grows > >>>> something symbolizing, but it is a word that is merely a vocal > pointing > >>>> gesture, and it is retained in all words because each human word > points > >> to > >>>> a certain object." > >>>> > >>>> Notice that the word "word" here doesn't mean "word"; that is, it > means > >>>> "wording/meaning" rather than "orthographic word". As Ruqaiya Hasan > >> liked > >>>> to say, "The meaning of 'not' is not in 'not'". > >>>> > >>>> (Call it indexical, if you will, but I can't help but feeling, when I > >> read > >>>> this passage, that Vygotsky likes Marr in the rather exasperated way > >> that I > >>>> sometimes feel about--say--Greg.) > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Macquarie University > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 1:24 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil < > a.j.gil@iped.uio.no > >>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi all, > >>>>> > >>>>> on the question whether there can be a language having one word, > David > >>>>> brings the example: > >>>>> > >>>>> "What? That! > >>>>> Where? There! > >>>>> When? Then! > >>>>> > >>>>> Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" > and > >>>> the > >>>>> "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to > >>>>> answer: > >>>>> > >>>>> a? a! > >>>>> eh? eh! > >>>>> e? e..." > >>>>> > >>>>> I find it interesting that, in these examples, the rising and falling > >>>>> belong to a situational relation between two: RISE is an invitation > to > >>>> FALL > >>>>> and vice versa. It is the difference between the two what matters. > And > >>>> this > >>>>> difference seems to be a 'correlation' (if I were to use the term > David > >>>> has > >>>>> been using) of the very organic fact that actions have consequences > and > >>>>> that it is this relation the minimal unit that living organisms are > >>>>> concerned about. If organisms (unlike stones) do register (encode) > not > >>>> just > >>>>> actions and not just consequences, but relations between actions and > >>>>> consequences, the feature of language that David is pointing at seems > >> to > >>>> be > >>>>> also a feature of organic life in general. I find this thought > >>>> interesting > >>>>> if we are to think of language as an expression of biology/culture > >>>> identity. > >>>>> > >>>>> I am laying this thought here without much knowledge of linguistics, > >> but > >>>> I > >>>>> thought that this may resonate with what the discussion is unfolding, > >>>>> particularly the question on indexicals as per, for example, Greg's > >> last > >>>>> comments. Does it? > >>>>> > >>>>> Alfredo > >>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu edu > >>> > >>>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > >>>>> Sent: 08 May 2017 04:28 > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words > >>>>> > >>>>> The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the > >>>>> many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is > >>>>> that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically > >>>>> elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know > >>>>> Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology > >>>>> is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the > >>>>> Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > >>>>> > >>>>> On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >>>>>> Andy (and others), > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap > >>>>>> is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using > >>>>>> Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are > >>>>>> signs which have referential value but their referential > >>>>>> value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic > >>>>>> example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I > >>>>>> can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it > >>>>>> seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as > >>>>>> translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is > >>>>>> "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the > >>>>>> importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He > >>>>>> calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of > >>>>>> discourse (and without which, our discourse would be > >>>>>> meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's > >>>>>> essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case > >>>>>> for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the > >>>>>> talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand > >>>>>> quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by > >>>>>> following how different participant deictics are deployed. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear > >>>>>> about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thanks, > >>>>>> -greg > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a > >>>>>> Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they > >>>>>> see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see > >>>>>> Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be > >>>>>> utterly incapable of managing his own life as the > >>>>>> foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce > >>>>>> was a Logician who invented two different schools of > >>>>>> philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular > >>>>>> because it is a logical triad which Hegel never > >>>>>> theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us > >>>>>> understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, > >>>>>> Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is > >>>>>> acquired by human beings, which is an idea I > >>>>>> appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he > >>>>>> overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics > >>>>>> and his Pragmaticism. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> A total madman. A real Metaphysician, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > >>>>> decision-making > >>>>>> >>>>> collective-decision-making> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David and Andy, > >>>>>> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, > >>>>>> secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and > >>>>>> certainly you were part of that discussion. I > >>>>>> would like to understand that better, also how it > >>>>>> relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, > >>>>>> indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your > >>>>>> ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that > >>>>>> might relate, which I hope so, since it would > >>>>>> bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), > >>>>>> Andy?s Academia articles on political > >>>>>> representation and activity/social theory are > >>>>>> probably relevant in some way, though Andy > >>>>>> probably sees language as a figure against a > >>>>>> larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns > >>>>>> the figure/ground relationship around? > >>>>>> Henry > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg > >>>>>> >>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Greg: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually > >>>>>> don't see these problems > >>>>>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Meaning is simply another word for > >>>>>> organization. Organization is always > >>>>>> present and never separable from matter: it's > >>>>>> a property of matter, the way > >>>>>> that the internet is a property of a computer. > >>>>>> Sometimes this organization > >>>>>> is brought about without any human > >>>>>> intervention (if you are religious, you > >>>>>> will say that it brought about divinely, and > >>>>>> if you are Spinozan, by > >>>>>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because > >>>>>> "Deus Sive Natura"). > >>>>>> Sometimes it is brought about by human > >>>>>> ingenuity (but of course if you are > >>>>>> religious you will say that it is the divine > >>>>>> in humans at work, and if you > >>>>>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are > >>>>>> simply that part of nature which > >>>>>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii > >>>>>> think it amounts to the same > >>>>>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds > >>>>>> of substance, res cogitans vs > >>>>>> res extensa, only one substance and different > >>>>>> ways of organizing it (which > >>>>>> in the end amount to the same thing). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess > >>>>>> what?" and "so there" and > >>>>>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say > >>>>>> to the contrary > >>>>>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, > >>>>>> insofar as they depend on their > >>>>>> relationship to the context of situation for > >>>>>> their meaning. You say that a > >>>>>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the > >>>>>> relationship of jazz or blues or > >>>>>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, > >>>>>> insofar as they satisfy the > >>>>>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is > >>>>>> also a symbol, and a > >>>>>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when > >>>>>> he/she moves to New York > >>>>>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound > >>>>>> more so). In Africa, jazz and > >>>>>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to > >>>>>> Americanness and not to > >>>>>> blackness. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So your division of signs into just three > >>>>>> categories is too simple, Greg. > >>>>>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you > >>>>>> will discover that there are > >>>>>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are > >>>>>> generated from three > >>>>>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", > >>>>>> "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for > >>>>>> example all words are symbols insofar as you > >>>>>> have to know English in order > >>>>>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But > >>>>>> some words are > >>>>>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as > >>>>>> indexes, because they depend > >>>>>> on the context of situation for their meaning. > >>>>>> Without the symbolic > >>>>>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My > >>>>>> wife, for example, cannot tell > >>>>>> a Southerner from a more general American > >>>>>> accent, and I myself still have > >>>>>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and > >>>>>> who is an FOB bloody pom. > >>>>>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness > >>>>>> in hiphop--it sounds like > >>>>>> K-pop to her. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I don't actually think that any signs are > >>>>>> associative or "prehensive"; I > >>>>>> think that they are all different ways of > >>>>>> looking or apprehending. So for > >>>>>> example you can apprehend a wording as a > >>>>>> symbol: a way of organizing sound > >>>>>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of > >>>>>> organizing other stuff (sometimes > >>>>>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of > >>>>>> objects and sometimes the > >>>>>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls > >>>>>> "projects"). You can also > >>>>>> look at wording as index: not as something > >>>>>> that is "associated" to the lips > >>>>>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or > >>>>>> even continguity but rather > >>>>>> something that has a necessary relation to the > >>>>>> vocal tract (which is itself > >>>>>> not a physiological organ, but something > >>>>>> brought about by human > >>>>>> organization). But when I look at sound waves > >>>>>> on my Praat spectrograph and > >>>>>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to > >>>>>> get at is the sound stuff, > >>>>>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of > >>>>>> words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't > >>>>>> think there is any way of doing this with my > >>>>>> eyes or ears alone: I think it > >>>>>> requires a very complex combination of tools > >>>>>> and signs to get down to > >>>>>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if > >>>>>> he had breakfast with > >>>>>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by > >>>>>> themselves, but nobody > >>>>>> has ever really shown the limits of what they > >>>>>> can do when they put each > >>>>>> other in order and start to organize the world > >>>>>> around them. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you > >>>>>> are going to get out of me, > >>>>>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>> > >>>>>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: > >>>>>> mediating activity is not > >>>>>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or > >>>>>> Wolff-Michael, but it is very different > >>>>>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the > >>>>>> same reason that painting is > >>>>>> different from wording: in painting you CAN > >>>>>> leave out the human (if you are > >>>>>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are > >>>>>> Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but > >>>>>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide > >>>>>> and the latter murdered two > >>>>>> innocent young women). But in wording you > >>>>>> never ever can. Wording can feel > >>>>>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated > >>>>>> or it doesn't work very > >>>>>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated > >>>>>> than ever. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> dk > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson > >>>>>> >>>>>> > > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David (and others), > >>>>>> > >>>>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I > >>>>>> know you dearly appreciate), your > >>>>>> last post included this: > >>>>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide > >>>>>> material correlates for meaning > >>>>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I was with you up until that point, but > >>>>>> that's where I always lose you. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say > >>>>>> but I guess it really depends on > >>>>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, > >>>>>> you mean some plane of existence > >>>>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, > >>>>>> then this seems to be a bit of > >>>>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the > >>>>>> one hand, "matter" (res extensa? > >>>>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" > >>>>>> (res cogitans? phenomena?). > >>>>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where > >>>>>> do we locate "meaning" as you > >>>>>> have described it? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic > >>>>>> drawing on p. 112 of his Cours > >>>>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane > >>>>>> of jumbled ideas" (A in the > >>>>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm > >>>>>> and "the equally vague plane of > >>>>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of > >>>>>> the chasm. Each side is > >>>>>> self-contained and self-referential, and > >>>>>> never the twain shall meet. Worlds > >>>>>> apart. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> And this ties to the conversation in the > >>>>>> other thread about the > >>>>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's > >>>>>> Marx quote about a science of > >>>>>> language that is shorn from life). My > >>>>>> suspicion is that this supposed > >>>>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to > >>>>>> do with this Saussurean approach > >>>>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a > >>>>>> different approach that may give > >>>>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the > >>>>>> word back INto the world. (p. 102 > >>>>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of > >>>>>> representamen (signifier) to > >>>>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. > >>>>>> The symbol is the relation with > >>>>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one > >>>>>> that Saussure speaks of and is > >>>>>> the one that is ineffable or, in > >>>>>> Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. > >>>>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, > >>>>>> the meaning of which is found in > >>>>>> other words (hence the sense of > >>>>>> ineffability). With only the symbolic > >>>>>> function, the whole world of words would > >>>>>> be entirely self-referential and > >>>>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I > >>>>>> like to say that Derrida is the end > >>>>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea > >>>>>> to its logical conclusion and > >>>>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, > >>>>>> well, empty (and thus > >>>>>> ineffable)). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> But Peirce has two other relations of > >>>>>> representamen to object, the iconic > >>>>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning > >>>>>> iconically, the representamen > >>>>>> contains some quality of the object that > >>>>>> it represents (e.g., a map that > >>>>>> holds relations of the space that it > >>>>>> represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" > >>>>>> in which the representamen has some of the > >>>>>> qualities of the sound of the > >>>>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning > >>>>>> indexically, the relationship of > >>>>>> representamen to object is one of temporal > >>>>>> or spatial contiguity (e.g., > >>>>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or > >>>>>> where there is a Southern twang, > >>>>>> there is a Southerner, or, most > >>>>>> classically, when I point, the object to > >>>>>> which I am pointing is spatially > >>>>>> contiguous with the finger that is > >>>>>> pointing). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of > >>>>>> the inheritors of Roman > >>>>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein > >>>>>> (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the > >>>>>> only inheritors of this tradition - > >>>>>> Michael was a student of Jakobson's at > >>>>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression > >>>>>> of Jacobson too), then we can > >>>>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., > >>>>>> the symbolic function) in the > >>>>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) > >>>>>> indexical function. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> But that argument is always a bit too much > >>>>>> for me (if there are any takers, > >>>>>> the best place to find this argument is in > >>>>>> Silverstein's chapter > >>>>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic > >>>>>> Function," or in less explicit but > >>>>>> slightly more understandable article > >>>>>> "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of > >>>>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more > >>>>>> elegant and comprehensible: in > >>>>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the > >>>>>> index, first as the index par > >>>>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as > >>>>>> Andy has previously pointed out, > >>>>>> might not be exactly how things go in a > >>>>>> literal sense, but the general > >>>>>> structure here works well, I think, as a > >>>>>> heuristic if nothing else - words > >>>>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally > >>>>>> and spatially collocated, "bottle" > >>>>>> is first uttered as a way of saying > >>>>>> "thirsty" and then later to refer to a > >>>>>> co-present object; note this is also why > >>>>>> young kids get discourse markers > >>>>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly > >>>>>> precocious when they do!), since > >>>>>> discourse markers are primarily > >>>>>> indexical). The indexical function is the > >>>>>> rudimentary form that then provides the > >>>>>> groundwork for the development of > >>>>>> the symbolic function. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) > >>>>>> approach, the meaning of signs is not > >>>>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, > >>>>>> and that grounding is the > >>>>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in > >>>>>> the world and of the world. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning > >>>>>> back into matter. And perhaps > >>>>>> speaking of words as the material > >>>>>> correlates of meaning can be a useful > >>>>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk > >>>>>> about meanings and concepts given our > >>>>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we > >>>>>> should also recognize that if it > >>>>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead > >>>>>> us astray if we take it too far. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I'd add here that I think one of the > >>>>>> greatest opportunities for CHAT to > >>>>>> make a contribution to social science > >>>>>> today is in its conceptualization of > >>>>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, > >>>>>> "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one > >>>>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of > >>>>>> social science today is the idea > >>>>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In > >>>>>> anthropology, people easily talk about > >>>>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they > >>>>>> mean precisely something that floats > >>>>>> around in some ethereal plane of > >>>>>> "meaningfulness" and which is not of the > >>>>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this > >>>>>> runs counter to the direction that > >>>>>> anthropology is heading these days with > >>>>>> the so-called "ontological turn" > >>>>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now > >>>>>> since this post is already > >>>>>> running way too long, but I'll just > >>>>>> mention that one of the aims of this is > >>>>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). > >>>>>> CHAT's conception of the concept > >>>>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is > >>>>>> needed -- a way of understanding the > >>>>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and > >>>>>> historical thing, rather than > >>>>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is > >>>>>> the holding of a(n historical) > >>>>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse > >>>>>> or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts > >>>>>> are thus little historical text-lets. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will > >>>>>> find some time in the future to > >>>>>> return to that last part, but there is no > >>>>>> time to develop it further now. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the > >>>>>> opportunity to catch up to these > >>>>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that > >>>>>> I'll be able to comment (as a young > >>>>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time > >>>>>> putting stuff out - and unlike the > >>>>>> rest of you, I'm no good at > >>>>>> multi-tasking... it's either one or the other > >>>>>> for me). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Very best, > >>>>>> greg > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David > >>>>>> Kellogg >>>>>> > > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Well, yes. But if present day > >>>>>> conditions are the REVERSE of the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> conditions > >>>>>> > >>>>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that > >>>>>> is, if the present trend is to > >>>>>> subsume labor under language instead > >>>>>> of the other way around--don't we > >>>>>> > >>>>>> need > >>>>>> > >>>>>> this distinction between signs and > >>>>>> tools more than ever? That is, if > >>>>>> > >>>>>> sloppy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> formulations like "cultural capital", > >>>>>> "symbolic violence", "use/exchange > >>>>>> value of the word" are erasing the > >>>>>> distinction between a mediating > >>>>>> > >>>>>> activity > >>>>>> > >>>>>> which acts on the environment and a > >>>>>> mediating activity which acts on > >>>>>> > >>>>>> other > >>>>>> > >>>>>> mediators and on the self, and which > >>>>>> therefore has the potential for > >>>>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this > >>>>>> exactly where the clear-eyed > >>>>>> philosophers need to step in and > >>>>>> straighten us out? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think that instead what is happening > >>>>>> is that our older generation > >>>>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present > >>>>>> company--usually--excluded) are too > >>>>>> interested in the "tool power" of > >>>>>> large categories and insufficiently > >>>>>> interested in fine distinctions that > >>>>>> make a difference. But perhaps it > >>>>>> is also that our younger generation of > >>>>>> misty-eyed philosophers are, as > >>>>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in > >>>>>> copulating bodies than exploited > >>>>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that > >>>>>> do make a difference equally allow > >>>>>> generalization and abstraction and > >>>>>> tool power, and the copulating flesh > >>>>>> > >>>>>> and > >>>>>> > >>>>>> the exploited muscles are one and the > >>>>>> same. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Take, for example, your remark about > >>>>>> the Fourier transform performed by > >>>>>> > >>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear > >>>>>> cochlea--I can see the world centre for > >>>>>> studying the cochlea from my office > >>>>>> window). Actually, it's part of a > >>>>>> > >>>>>> wide > >>>>>> > >>>>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that > >>>>>> were already being noticed by > >>>>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, > >>>>>> you don't have cause and effect, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> just > >>>>>> > >>>>>> as in cause and effect you don't have > >>>>>> "association". Words don't "cause" > >>>>>> meaning: they provide material > >>>>>> correlates for meaning and in that sense > >>>>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does > >>>>>> not "cause" wording; it correlates > >>>>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of > >>>>>> consciousness--and through it to a > >>>>>> context of situation or culture, and > >>>>>> in that sense "realises" it. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, > >>>>>> Vygotsky says that the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> stabilization > >>>>>> > >>>>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the > >>>>>> eye in early childhood is part of a > >>>>>> > >>>>>> two > >>>>>> > >>>>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between > >>>>>> the sense organs and the brain. The > >>>>>> reason why we don't see a table as a > >>>>>> trapezoid, when we stand over it and > >>>>>> compare the front with the back, the > >>>>>> reason why we don't see a piece of > >>>>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the > >>>>>> reason why we have orthoscopic > >>>>>> > >>>>>> perception > >>>>>> > >>>>>> and we don't see a man at a distance > >>>>>> as a looming midget is that the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> brain > >>>>>> > >>>>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. > >>>>>> And where does the brain get this > >>>>>> view if not from language and from > >>>>>> other people? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy > >>>>>> Blunden >>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Personally, I think the first and > >>>>>> most persistently important thing is > >>>>>> > >>>>>> to > >>>>>> > >>>>>> see how much alike are tables and > >>>>>> words. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> But ... Vygotsky was very > >>>>>> insistent on the distinction > >>>>>> because he was > >>>>>> fighting a battle against the idea > >>>>>> that speech ought to be subsumed > >>>>>> > >>>>>> under > >>>>>> > >>>>>> the larger category of labour. He > >>>>>> had to fight for semiotics against a > >>>>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. > >>>>>> But we here in 2017 are living in > >>>>>> different times, where we have > >>>>>> Discourse Theory and Linguistics while > >>>>>> Marxism is widely regarded as > >>>>>> antique. As Marx said "Just as > >>>>>> > >>>>>> philosophers > >>>>>> > >>>>>> have given thought an independent > >>>>>> existence, so they were bound to make > >>>>>> language into an independent > >>>>>> realm." and we live well and truly > >>>>>> in the > >>>>>> times when labour is subsumed > >>>>>> under language, and not the other way > >>>>>> > >>>>>> around. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Everyone knows that a table is > >>>>>> unlike a word. The point it to > >>>>>> > >>>>>> understand > >>>>>> > >>>>>> how tables are signs and word are > >>>>>> material objects. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked > >>>>>> in an offshoot of the bionic ear > >>>>>> project. The ear has a little > >>>>>> keyboard that works like a piano > >>>>>> keyboard > >>>>>> > >>>>>> in > >>>>>> > >>>>>> reverse, making a real time > >>>>>> Fourier transform of that air > >>>>>> pressure wave > >>>>>> > >>>>>> and > >>>>>> > >>>>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve > >>>>>> impulse. The brain never hears that > >>>>>> pressure signal.) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------ > >>>>> ------------------------------ > >>>>>> Andy Blunden > >>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/ > >>>>> book/origins-collective-decision-making > >>>>>> >>>>> collective-decision-making> > >>>>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo > >>>>>> Jornet Gil wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, > >>>>>> anyone else), could you give a > >>>>>> bit more on > >>>>>> > >>>>>> that > >>>>>> > >>>>>> distinction between words and > >>>>>> tables? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> And could you say how (and > >>>>>> whether) (human, hand) nails > >>>>>> are different > >>>>>> from tables; and then how > >>>>>> nails are different from words? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Alfredo > >>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>> From: > >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> edu> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg > >>>>>> >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, > >>>>>> Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff > >>>>>> of Words > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from > >>>>>> an article Mike wrote in a > >>>>>> Festschrift > >>>>>> > >>>>>> for > >>>>>> > >>>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking > >>>>>> about artefacts: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> "They are ideal in that they > >>>>>> contain in coded form the > >>>>>> interactions of > >>>>>> which they > >>>>>> were previously a part and > >>>>>> which they mediate in the > >>>>>> present (e.g., > >>>>>> > >>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> structure of > >>>>>> a pencil carries within it the > >>>>>> history of certain forms of > >>>>>> writing). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> They > >>>>>> > >>>>>> are material > >>>>>> in that they are embodied in > >>>>>> material artifacts. This principle > >>>>>> > >>>>>> applies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> with equal > >>>>>> force whether one is > >>>>>> considering language/speech or > >>>>>> the more usually > >>>>>> > >>>>>> noted > >>>>>> > >>>>>> forms > >>>>>> of artifacts such as tables > >>>>>> and knives which constitute > >>>>>> material > >>>>>> > >>>>>> culture. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> What > >>>>>> differentiates a word, such as > >>>>>> ?language? from, say, a table. > >>>>>> is the > >>>>>> relative prominence > >>>>>> of their material and ideal > >>>>>> aspects. No word exists apart > >>>>>> from its > >>>>>> material > >>>>>> instantiation (as a > >>>>>> configuration of sound waves, > >>>>>> or hand movements, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> or > >>>>>> > >>>>>> as > >>>>>> > >>>>>> writing, > >>>>>> or as neuronal activity), > >>>>>> whereas every table embodies > >>>>>> an order > >>>>>> > >>>>>> imposed > >>>>>> > >>>>>> by > >>>>>> > >>>>>> thinking > >>>>>> human beings." > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This is the kind of thing that > >>>>>> regularly gets me thrown out of > >>>>>> > >>>>>> journals > >>>>>> > >>>>>> by > >>>>>> > >>>>>> the ear. Mike says that the > >>>>>> difference between a word and > >>>>>> a table is > >>>>>> > >>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> relative salience of the ideal > >>>>>> and the material. Sure--words > >>>>>> are full > >>>>>> > >>>>>> of > >>>>>> > >>>>>> the ideal, and tables are full > >>>>>> of material. Right? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other > >>>>>> way around. Why? Well, because > >>>>>> a word > >>>>>> without some word-stuff (sound > >>>>>> or graphite) just isn't a > >>>>>> word. In a > >>>>>> word, meaning is solidary with > >>>>>> material sounding: change one, > >>>>>> and you > >>>>>> change the other. But with a > >>>>>> table, what you start with is > >>>>>> the idea of > >>>>>> > >>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> table; as soon as you've got > >>>>>> that idea, you've got a table. > >>>>>> You could > >>>>>> change the material to > >>>>>> anything and you'd still have > >>>>>> a table. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out > >>>>>> by the ear. But he does ignore the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> delightful > >>>>>> > >>>>>> perversity in what Mike is > >>>>>> saying, and what he gets out > >>>>>> of the quote > >>>>>> > >>>>>> is > >>>>>> > >>>>>> just that words are really > >>>>>> just like tools. When in fact > >>>>>> Mike is > >>>>>> > >>>>>> saying > >>>>>> > >>>>>> just the opposite. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (The part I don't get is > >>>>>> Mike's notion that the > >>>>>> structure of a pencil > >>>>>> carries within it the history > >>>>>> of certain forms of writing. > >>>>>> Does he > >>>>>> > >>>>>> mean > >>>>>> > >>>>>> that the length of the pencil > >>>>>> reflects how often it's been > >>>>>> used? Or is > >>>>>> > >>>>>> he > >>>>>> > >>>>>> making a more archaeological > >>>>>> point about graphite, wood, > >>>>>> rubber and > >>>>>> > >>>>>> their > >>>>>> > >>>>>> relationship to a certain > >>>>>> point in the history of > >>>>>> writing and erasing? > >>>>>> Actually, pencils are more > >>>>>> like tables than like > >>>>>> words--the idea has > >>>>>> > >>>>>> to > >>>>>> > >>>>>> come first.) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Macquarie University > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri May 12 19:18:56 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 20:18:56 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words In-Reply-To: References: <1493759179005.5048@iped.uio.no> <40980198-472c-d7b4-2023-f2e64ebac306@mira.net> <1494257080561.72109@iped.uio.no> <5911d396.020f620a.90d8d.0915@mx.google.com> <9C1E88B1-A5C7-4CFB-9E85-5A8802B6543C@gmail.com> Message-ID: <0C0E9BA8-77F9-42DB-90C8-3B041DF6B739@gmail.com> David, Great thanks for the link! Okay, so Anna Maria and the Mongolian singer have more in common than I realized. It?s opera. I couldn?t help thinking of Julie Andrews at the start of the Sound of Music...?The hills come alive with the sound of music.? That dates me. But that x-ray, real-time image of Anna Maria as she sang, with exactly the coordination of movements of the tongue and the esophogus you mentioned?that is beautiful science. The exaption of technology for art? Performance art at that. My wife and I have been enjoying your post a lot. Consonants are finite constraints. Vowels are infinite potential. Consonants connect, vowels sing. In opera especially. I think there?s room here for talking about sound symbolism, a (fuzzzy) tendency for some sounds and some combinations of sounds to be acoustic gestures towards something displaced in time and space. I?m in over my head here. When you say intelligent design, I go to Spinoza, though I can?t be sure why. I am a big fan of fractals: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pozcRbMLBE4&feature=player_embedded Fifty years ago, when I saw a proof of the cantor set (sometimes called a dust set, based on an algorithm of the removal of thirds from a line segment) I saw math and art come together. I see dynamic fractal imagery like that in the link above as the embodiment of the human imagination. Could Cantor have sensed when he lived and worked what we can see now with a computer? I think you are right that language in use does not structure itself neatly in phonemes, morphemes, and clauses. So much of discourse is elliptical grammatically, fuzzy semantically and tribal pragmatically that Trump seems incoherent to some yet totally coherent to others. I recorded on of my linguistics profs (early 80s) who seemed as incoherent as Trump. I transcribed a lecture, and analyzed the transcript as a paper for the course. I guess I did this to shame his incoherence. I realize now that I was looking for the neat language structures. Shame on me I guess. He introduced me to Langacker, who still infuses my thinking. It?s what I read of his, not what I heard from in lectures about him, that captured my imagination. With Vygotsky I have relied less on reading Vygotsky?s work and more on reading articles and emails of Vygotskians. Much more than Greg, I am short on time on task when it comes to in-depth CHAT reading. And I am older and retired. So, who am I to be impatient with anyone? Henry > On May 12, 2017, at 5:07 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Henry: > > Take a look at this one: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIUvX7hebBA > > Komm, lieber Mai, und mache > die B?ume wieder gr?n, > und lass mir an dem Bache > die kleinen Veilchen bl?h?n! > Wie m?cht? ich doch so gerne > ein Veilchen wieder seh?n! > Ach, lieber Mai, wie gerne > einmal spazieren geh?n! > > (Come, dear May and make > The trees all green once more > And leave me by the lake > The violets I long for! > I want so much to see again > Those violets in the lane > Ach, dear May, I wanta saunter > And scramble down the lane.) > > It's Mozart's song about child cabin fever (the song goes on to talk about > the pleasures of winter days and then makes an invidious contrast with the > rumpus you can raise outdoors). In order to sing it during an MRI scan, > Anna Maria had her hair shaved off, and with the scan you can see exactly > what she is doing, and how it is related to normal vowels. > > As you say (and as you see) it's all in the vowel. The normal vowels that > she sings, e.g. the "o" in "Komm", are when the whole mouth is open, and > the soundwaves are able to bounce around as they do inside a guitar or > violin. This means they come out of the mouth and interfere with each other > in various ways, sometimes constructively and sometimes destructively, but > they tend to consolidate in four discernible bands of energy, which is why > our vowels sound like a string quartet with a bass formant, a tenor, an > alto, and a soprano. > > And as you see, when she sings polyphonically, she uses her tongue to > greatly restrict the oral cavity and only allow a very small band of energy > to escape. What is not so clear is that she is also using muscles around > the esophagus to change the shape of the throat so that the lungs and the > throat do not cause interference with the overtone she is isolating. > > I think that consonants are really byproducts of articulatory phonetics. > That is, they are just the interface between one syllable and another, and > by themselves they are not very meaningful. We've exapted them as > phonemes, As Stephen J. Gould said, the spandrels at San Marco in Venice > are just "there"--they are what happens when you put a round dome over a > square hole, but people exapted them for the most beautiful and meaningful > murals in the cathedral. > > Now, when we look at a syllable, we see that it has a vowel and then it CAN > have two or more consonants on the ends: > > (k) O (mm) > > Go up one level, to the level of the word, and think of meaning instead of > sounding. A word or word group usually has a "head" and then it CAN have > two or more suffixes or prefixes: > > (re)arriv(al) of May > > (per)ambul(ation) in the lane > > And we can go up one level and look at the level of the clause the same way: > > (Wanting to see violets again,) the little boy looked out the window (where > the leaves were turning green). violets > > I used to think that this "fractal" design--where the same kind of > structure appears at higher levels, was evidence of intelligent design, or > perhaps of the kind of uintelligent design we see in chaos-complexity > theory. Now I think it is just like Gould and Lewontin's spandrels. It's > not the case that every level has some "independent" element and then we > start deliberately attaching dependent elements. It's the case that > independent elements have borders, and these borders are interpreted as > dependent elements. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > PS: On "organic" intellectuals. I disagree with Gramsci: I think that every > class has fuzzy borders, and these get fuzzier and fuzzier when classes > collide and conflict. Petty-bourgeois intellectuals like me and > working-class intellectuals like my wife are simply the outliers; we have a > certain autonomy, and we can always be interpreted one way or the other. > Intellectuals are consonants, which makes us salient. But it is the vowels > that make social formations sing. > > dk > > > > I want to make a similar argument . > > > > On Sat, May 13, 2017 at 8:00 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> David, >> I read your ?battle terror? response to answer to your throat-singing >> question on my wife?s birthday. Didn?t answer?priorities?and time to >> cogitate. >> >> First, you?re probably right that Ana Maria came by her wonderful ability >> to sing two notes at once, without living, or maybe even travelling, to >> Mongolia. I admit I am in awe that she can do something I have known since >> I first heard a real-deal throat singer (naturally, it seems to me) from >> Mongolia do that thing, someting that I can?t do myself, but maybe could >> have if I had been born there. >> >> The ?battle terror? you talk of brings to my mind Gramsci?s 1949 article >> ?The Intellectuals?, which I ran across when I was clearing and archiving >> my desktop texts from the chat. Here?s the first paragraph of the >> introduction: >> >> "The central argument of Gramsci?s essay on the formation of the >> intellectuals is simple. The notion of ?the intellectuals? as a distinct >> social category independent of class is a myth. All men are potentially >> intellectuals in the sense of having an intellect and using it, but not all >> are intellectuals by social function. Intellectuals in the functional sense >> fall into two groups. In the first place there are the ?traditional? >> professional intellectuals, literary, scientific and so on, whose position >> in the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it but >> derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an >> attachment to various historical class formations. Secondly, there are the >> ?organic? intellectuals the thinking and organising element of a particular >> fundamental-social class. These organic intellectuals are distinguished >> less by their profession, which may be any job characteristic of their >> class, than by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the >> class to which they organically belong.? >> >> I won?t presume to prof-splain a connection between Gramsci and your post >> and also with the on-going interchanges on Hegel. I hope that I can hold to >> my essential motive for engaging in the chat is to go organic, especially >> after three decades of my own ?splaining to students. I usually cringe when >> I see my old self from here and now. I admire the commitment it takes to >> belong in either camp: traditional or organic. And I am not sure the >> prototype in either camp is what intellectuals have to be. >> >> But forget whether any of us are intellectuals at all, or even want to be. >> Just seems to me that we are doing some interesting thinking in interesting >> times. As were Spinoza, Hegel and Vygotsky, to name a few thinkers who give >> us shoulders to stand on. The swamp is deep and it?s unlikely to be drained >> soon. Phew! Some days it?s worse than others. And I am worse some days >> than others. I?ve had some good days lately. Colbert is on a roll as Trump >> continues to feed him great material. Comedians are organic intellectuals. >> Organic intellectuals tend to be comedians, some grumpier, some cheekier >> than others. "Make of that what you will,? I think Andy said to me a few >> days ago. :-) >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >>> On May 10, 2017, at 4:21 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Thanks, Henry. I am a PhD student, but I'm afraid worked as a professor >> for >>> nearly thirty years, and so I know all about the "known answer" questions >>> that professors like to ask. I would like to warn my fellow students >> about >>> them--to show them the rather simple tricks that professors play during >>> examinations, particularly since a lot of these tricks are based on the >>> functional method of dual stimulation, and you can easily find the answer >>> to their questions in the questions themselves. >>> >>> But sometimes the battle-terror of my comrades interferes. So for example >>> yesterday we had a presentation by a wonderful young university teacher >> in >>> Wonju in South Korea, who wants to use scaffolding methods for teaching >>> science concepts from everyday concepts worked out for elementary school >>> and middle school here in Australia in order to teach her undergraduates. >>> She's got the usual experimental group vs. control group (using the >>> so-called "traditional method") horse-race all cued up. And I asked: >>> >>> a) Isn't it true that a lot of the "scaffolding" techniques we use with >>> elementary school and even middle school kids just make undergraduates >> feel >>> impatient or patronized or condescended to or profsplained? >>> b) Isn't it true that a lot of the techniques we work out for native >>> speakers here in Australia assume that the natural progression is from >>> everyday to science concepts--and in Korea it's often the other way >> around? >>> >>> And then I asked: >>> >>> c) What will you do if your control group does better than your >>> experimental group? (This is what, unsurprisingly, happened in her pilot >>> study). >>> >>> All of the professors could immediately see what I was doing, and they >> held >>> their breath (we all wanted her to do well). But she was too frightened >> by >>> the length of the question, and so she just did what frightened students >>> do, which is to seize upon a word from the last part of the question >> (e.g. >>> "control group") and riff. So we got a long explanation, which we did not >>> want, on why it was important to have a control group. >>> >>> Henry totally lacks any battle-terror, and he has marvellous patience for >>> my long questions (and even long answers like this one). But notice how >> he >>> assumes that Anna-Maria Helfele grew up in Mongolia! As far as I know, >> she >>> grew up in Munich. Notice how the second throat singer, who is singing a >>> long song about the glories of Genghis Khan (that's what "Cengiz Han'a" >>> refers to), has a backdrop of the Altai mountains and wears traditional >>> dress. THAT'S what Greg meant when he said that hiphop and jazz and blues >>> have an indexical relationship to blackness. The relationship seems so >>> close, you feel it must be a natural one--an associative one. But it >> isn't. >>> >>> (When I argued that this was not true for people in Korea or in Africa, >>> someone wrote to me off-list to protest that it WAS true in South Africa. >>> That in itself is interesting--what is true in South Africa is not true >> in >>> Sudan. This suggests--to me--the conventionality of symbol and not the >>> natural relationship of an index.) >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 2:33 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> I?d like to take a crack at answering your question. I take it that you >>>> mean the first link explains in scientific terms with cutting edge >>>> tecnologies (in the domain of acoustic phonetics) what the Mongolian >> throat >>>> singer (in the second link) learned from infancy directly from older >> throat >>>> singers, who learned from even older throat singers, and so on. But >> throat >>>> singing and playing the fiddle in the second link are tecnological feats >>>> too. And the woman in the first link is pretty darned good. I?m guessing >>>> she spent time in Mongolia, maybe as a child. Also, am I right that >> being >>>> able to deliberately, and with great control, sing two notes at once is >>>> based on the same control you and I have in making vowels. And vowels >> are >>>> best understood through the tools of acoustics, as contrasted with the >>>> tools of articulatory phonetics. In other words I can?t explain vowels, >> or >>>> throat singing, without a lot of hardware, but I can explain consonants >>>> with nothing more than words. Is there something here about direct and >>>> mediated experience? Firstness the most direct (sensing?), secondness >> less >>>> so (feeling?) and thirdness (emoting) with lots of mediation? So, I am >>>> answering your question with a lot of questions. Maybe I?m trying to >> hang >>>> onto my firstness here, while dialoging and narrating? Juggling? >>>> >>>> I really loved mashing these two beautiful demonstrations of how the >> human >>>> voice works. Thank you very much for sharing! >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>>> On May 9, 2017, at 5:18 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Larry: >>>>> >>>>> One of my earliest memories--I must have been three years old or so--is >>>>> climbing up a set of stairs in the University of Minnesota department >> of >>>>> child psychology between the nursery school I attended and the >> laboratory >>>>> where my mother was working on her PhD on childhood speech. Her >>>> experiments >>>>> had something to do with dropping marbles into holes and getting M&Ms, >>>>> although to be honest the only thing I really remember besides the >>>>> stairs is the M&Ms and a conversation I had while climbing the stairs. >> I >>>>> asked my mother why she was still at school (I was attending nursery >>>> school >>>>> on the first floor and it seemed to me that at her age she should be >>>>> somewhat higher than a room on the second floor). She said she wanted >> to >>>>> understand how people learn to talk. I asked her why she didn't >> remember. >>>>> She said she just forgot. >>>>> >>>>> The way we normally communicate--the way we are all used to, and the >> way >>>> we >>>>> all remember--is for somebody to say something about something to >> someone >>>>> else, and that's thirdness. We don't normally start with firstness or >>>>> secondness, the way that Peirce does. I think I wrote the way I wrote, >>>> and >>>>> I started this posting the way I started this posting, because there >> is a >>>>> kind of feeling of what happens to you as it is actually happening to >>>> you, >>>>> and that is firstness. It's ineffable in the sense that in order to >>>>> describe it to somebody you have to destroy it by changing it into >>>>> secondness (dialogue) or thirdness (narrative); The feeling of what >>>> happens >>>>> to you as it is actually happening to you can be shared--my mother was >>>>> there--but not communicated--I never spoke with her again about this >>>>> conversation, and although I am communicating with you about it, what I >>>> am >>>>> communicating is not the conversation but something like a narrative >>>> about >>>>> it. Because you can share it, I don't think it's that phenomenological >>>>> astonishment that is so important to Husserl; it's not the pre-verbal >>>>> prehension of color that Cezanne was trying to get at, but it is >>>>> pre-narrative and even pre-dialogue: it's the stairs and the M&Ms and >> not >>>>> the conversation. Peirce calls it "firstness", and he associates it >> with >>>>> notions like experience qua experience, qualia, the redness of redness, >>>> and >>>>> of course emotion, by which he really means feeling rather than higher >>>>> emotions mediated by artworks. >>>>> >>>>> When I look at the sea of sound on Praat, I am not experiencing the >> sound >>>>> at all. Instead, I'm using an elaborate set of tools and signs to try >> to >>>>> strip away the layers of meaning and wording and even the actual >> phonemes >>>>> and just get at the bands of sound energy of which the phonemes (and >>>> thence >>>>> the wordings and meanings) are made. The stuff of words is, after all, >>>>> bands of acoustic energy. Polyphonic singers know this, and they are >> able >>>>> to manipulate their vocal tracts in order to focus the four bands of >>>> energy >>>>> into only two of them. Like this: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vC9Qh709gas&t=237s >>>>> >>>>> (Now, here's a question for YOU. I could have given you THIS as an >>>> example >>>>> of polyphonic singing instead: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tVGei24TdQ >>>>> >>>>> The singing is actually better. But it wouldn't have worked as well. >> Why >>>>> not?) >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Macquarie University >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 12:35 AM, Larry Purss >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> David, >>>>>> I do hope we are going to get some more philosophy out of you. In >>>>>> particular exploring the suff of words/wording. >>>>>> >>>>>> I want to take this turn to ?echo? your philosophical ways, that are >> in >>>>>> pursuit of this [theme]. See your May 5th response to Greg >>>>>> >>>>>> I will back from your forth and stay close to your philosophical >>>> wordings >>>>>> upon *firstness, secondness, and thirdness* as INEFFABLE. >>>>>> >>>>>> FIRSTNESS: -ICONIC >>>>>> When I look at ?sound waves? [natural] on my Praat Spectograph, I am >>>>>> trying to get at the sound stuff, the the noise, the *firstness* of >> the >>>>>> stuff of words. To get at ?this? requires a very complex *combination >>>> of* >>>>>> tools and signs to ?get down to? [lp-penetrate?] this level or layer >> of >>>>>> this emerging *spectrum* >>>>>> >>>>>> Moving ?up? we apprehend/look at the *vocal tract* [which itself is no >>>>>> longer ?firstness? as a physiological organ] but is now something >>>> brought >>>>>> about by human ?organization/patterning? >>>>>> >>>>>> This firstness is the way of looking/apprehending wording [as] >> *iconic* >>>>>> firstness. >>>>>> >>>>>> SECONDNESS: - INDEX >>>>>> >>>>>> Moving ?up? to look/apprehend at word stuff as indexical. This moving >>>> up >>>>>> is *necessarily* relating to the vocal tract within this theme. This >>>> occurs >>>>>> NOT through proximity or association but is necessarily related to the >>>>>> vocal tract. [LP-integrated??] >>>>>> >>>>>> THIRDNESS: - SYMBOL >>>>>> >>>>>> Moving ?up? When organizing/patterning sound stuff so that the sound >>>> stuff >>>>>> *stands for* a way of organizing/patterning other stuff. This other >>>> stuff >>>>>> includes: >>>>>> ? Abstract models-in the making >>>>>> ? Actual categories of objects >>>>>> ? Wording phrases such as - sibling society as metaphorical >>>>>> ? Objects such as tables and lunchboxes and backpacks >>>>>> >>>>>> David, this moving up the layers/levers within the [spectrum] are the >>>> way >>>>>> the suff of words/wording ALL are: *ways of apprehending/looking. >> They >>>> are >>>>>> not associative stuff. >>>>>> >>>>>> I find this philosophical explanation wery generative and germane. >>>>>> Would you consider transferring from the linguistics discipline and >>>>>> consider participating in the philosophical endeavors. Or do only >> madmen >>>>>> move in this direction?? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>>>> >>>>>> From: David Kellogg >>>>>> Sent: May 8, 2017 3:09 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words >>>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky knew Marr. At one point, Marr took part in the weekly >>>> discussion >>>>>> group that Vygotsky and Luria shared with Eisenstein. But of course >>>>>> Vygotsky knew Blonsky, and liked him, and that didn't shield Blonsky >>>> from >>>>>> more than one withering criticism from his good friend down the hall >> at >>>> the >>>>>> Krupskaya Academy where they both worked. >>>>>> >>>>>> (I am rather sceptical of the idea that Vygotsky was anything more >> than >>>>>> culturally Jewish. But it is certainly true that the Russian Jews I >> have >>>>>> known lie at the "engagement" end of Deborah Tannen's >>>>>> "engagement-consideration" continuum. That is, we prefer to wear you >>>> out by >>>>>> interrupting, disagreeing, and otherwise engaging with what you say >>>> rather >>>>>> than wear you out by sitting and listening silently and considerately >>>> and >>>>>> sometimes showing deference and considerateness by making absolutely >> no >>>>>> reply. Greg although he is really a very good talker, tends to >>>>>> the consideration end of the continuum while I am stuck at the extreme >>>>>> engagement end, and it made our cooperation in Seoul on lectures >>>> including >>>>>> Peirce...well, interesting.) >>>>>> >>>>>> So I wasn't surprised to read THIS in the pedological lectures (p. 257 >>>> of >>>>>> Vol. 5 of your English Collected Works): >>>>>> >>>>>> "??? ????? ? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ? ??? >> ???? >>>>>> ????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ?????? ?. ?. ?????, ???? ????????? ??? >>>>>> ??????? ?????????: ?????????????? ????? ????????????? ?????, ??? ?? >>>>>> ?????????? ? ?????? ?????, ?????????? ??? ??? ????? ??????. ? ?????? >>>>>> ??????? ????? ?????????? ????? ???. ?? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? >> ????? >>>>>> ??? ????; ??? ????????? ? ?????? ????????. ????? ?? ?? ???????, ??? >> ??? >>>>>> ????????? ?????? ???, ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ?????; ?? >>>> ??? >>>>>> ???????????? ????????? ????? ???????????????, ?? ???? ?????, ??????? >>>>>> ?????????? ???, ???? ?????? ????????? ???????????? ????, ?? >> ??????????? >>>> ?? >>>>>> ???? ??????, ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ????????? ?? >> ???????????? >>>>>> ???????. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> "What stands at the source of each symbol? With all of the fantastic >> and >>>>>> all the controversy of the range of propositions in the theory of N. >> Ya. >>>>>> Marr, one proposition seems to me undeniable.: the first words of >> human >>>>>> language, as he puts it?'the first word means everything or a great >>>> deal.' >>>>>> And the first words of child speech mean almost everything. But what >> are >>>>>> these words? Words of the type ?this is? or ?this?; they may be >> applied >>>> to >>>>>> any object. Can we say that this is a real word? No, this is only the >>>>>> indicative function of the word itself; from it subsequently grows >>>>>> something symbolizing, but it is a word that is merely a vocal >> pointing >>>>>> gesture, and it is retained in all words because each human word >> points >>>> to >>>>>> a certain object." >>>>>> >>>>>> Notice that the word "word" here doesn't mean "word"; that is, it >> means >>>>>> "wording/meaning" rather than "orthographic word". As Ruqaiya Hasan >>>> liked >>>>>> to say, "The meaning of 'not' is not in 'not'". >>>>>> >>>>>> (Call it indexical, if you will, but I can't help but feeling, when I >>>> read >>>>>> this passage, that Vygotsky likes Marr in the rather exasperated way >>>> that I >>>>>> sometimes feel about--say--Greg.) >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 1:24 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil < >> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi all, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> on the question whether there can be a language having one word, >> David >>>>>>> brings the example: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "What? That! >>>>>>> Where? There! >>>>>>> When? Then! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Now--take away the beginnings and endings, the "wh~" and the "th~" >> and >>>>>> the >>>>>>> "~t", "~re", "~n". SING the result; that is, RISE to ask and FALL to >>>>>>> answer: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> a? a! >>>>>>> eh? eh! >>>>>>> e? e..." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I find it interesting that, in these examples, the rising and falling >>>>>>> belong to a situational relation between two: RISE is an invitation >> to >>>>>> FALL >>>>>>> and vice versa. It is the difference between the two what matters. >> And >>>>>> this >>>>>>> difference seems to be a 'correlation' (if I were to use the term >> David >>>>>> has >>>>>>> been using) of the very organic fact that actions have consequences >> and >>>>>>> that it is this relation the minimal unit that living organisms are >>>>>>> concerned about. If organisms (unlike stones) do register (encode) >> not >>>>>> just >>>>>>> actions and not just consequences, but relations between actions and >>>>>>> consequences, the feature of language that David is pointing at seems >>>> to >>>>>> be >>>>>>> also a feature of organic life in general. I find this thought >>>>>> interesting >>>>>>> if we are to think of language as an expression of biology/culture >>>>>> identity. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I am laying this thought here without much knowledge of linguistics, >>>> but >>>>>> I >>>>>>> thought that this may resonate with what the discussion is unfolding, >>>>>>> particularly the question on indexicals as per, for example, Greg's >>>> last >>>>>>> comments. Does it? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > edu >>>>> >>>>>>> on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>>>>> Sent: 08 May 2017 04:28 >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Stuff of Words >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The reason why I picked out icon/index/symbol of all the >>>>>>> many firstness/secondness/thirdnesses Peirce offers us is >>>>>>> that all the rest are found in Hegel and systematically >>>>>>> elaborated there. But not icon/index/symbol. As you know >>>>>>> Greg I am not one of those that think that The Phenomenology >>>>>>> is the only book Hegel wrote, so I will refer you to the >>>>>>> Science of Logic, chapter on the Concept (a.k.a. Notion). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- >> decision-making >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 8/05/2017 12:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>> Andy (and others), >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree that Peirce seems a good complement to Hegel. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> One interesting bit where there seems to be some overlap >>>>>>>> is in Hegel's interest in what Silverstein calls, using >>>>>>>> Peircean language, "referential indexicals" (these are >>>>>>>> signs which have referential value but their referential >>>>>>>> value is primarily indexical - pronouns are a classic >>>>>>>> example, but see my next sentence for more examples). I >>>>>>>> can't recall where I saw this in Hegel's writing but it >>>>>>>> seems like he has a bit somewhere on "Here, This, Now" (as >>>>>>>> translated). Do you recall where this is? Or what Hegel is >>>>>>>> "up to" in that section? I've always wondered. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As mentioned above, Silverstein makes quite a bit of the >>>>>>>> importance of referential indexicals in everyday talk. He >>>>>>>> calls them the "skeleton" on which we hang the rest of >>>>>>>> discourse (and without which, our discourse would be >>>>>>>> meaningless). And closer to home, in Stanton Wortham's >>>>>>>> essay Mapping Participant Deictics, Wortham makes the case >>>>>>>> for the importance of mapping participant deictics in the >>>>>>>> talk of a classroom. He argues that you can understand >>>>>>>> quite a bit about the social structure of a classroom by >>>>>>>> following how different participant deictics are deployed. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Anyway, back to Hegel, Andy, I'd be interested to hear >>>>>>>> about Hegel and his Here, This, Now. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks, >>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 6:32 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Oh Henry I don't see Peirce as Linguist. Only a >>>>>>>> Linguist would see Peirce as a Linguist, because they >>>>>>>> see everything as a branch of Linguistics. I see >>>>>>>> Peirce as a Philosopher. And he could claim to be >>>>>>>> utterly incapable of managing his own life as the >>>>>>>> foremost qualification for being a philosopher. Peirce >>>>>>>> was a Logician who invented two different schools of >>>>>>>> philosophy: Pragmatism and Semiotics. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I value Peirce's Icon/Index/Symbol in particular >>>>>>>> because it is a logical triad which Hegel never >>>>>>>> theorised and it nicely complements Hegel helping us >>>>>>>> understand how Logic is in the world. For Peirce, >>>>>>>> Semiotics is something going on in Nature before it is >>>>>>>> acquired by human beings, which is an idea I >>>>>>>> appreciate. He is also worthy of praise for how he >>>>>>>> overcame all kinds of Dualism with both his Semiotics >>>>>>>> and his Pragmaticism. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> A total madman. A real Metaphysician, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- >>>>>>> decision-making >>>>>>>> >>>>>> collective-decision-making> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 8/05/2017 3:22 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David and Andy, >>>>>>>> I have seen Peirce?s categories firstness, >>>>>>>> secondness and thirdness on the chat before, and >>>>>>>> certainly you were part of that discussion. I >>>>>>>> would like to understand that better, also how it >>>>>>>> relates to the three categories of signs (iconic, >>>>>>>> indexical and symbolic). I have been reading your >>>>>>>> ?Thinking of Feeling? piece and wonder how that >>>>>>>> might relate, which I hope so, since it would >>>>>>>> bring development into the mix. Also (sorry!), >>>>>>>> Andy?s Academia articles on political >>>>>>>> representation and activity/social theory are >>>>>>>> probably relevant in some way, though Andy >>>>>>>> probably sees language as a figure against a >>>>>>>> larger ground and a linguist (like Peirce) turns >>>>>>>> the figure/ground relationship around? >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On May 5, 2017, at 4:01 PM, David Kellogg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (As usual, I don't see the problem. I usually >>>>>>>> don't see these problems >>>>>>>> until the tide is well and truly over my head.) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Meaning is simply another word for >>>>>>>> organization. Organization is always >>>>>>>> present and never separable from matter: it's >>>>>>>> a property of matter, the way >>>>>>>> that the internet is a property of a computer. >>>>>>>> Sometimes this organization >>>>>>>> is brought about without any human >>>>>>>> intervention (if you are religious, you >>>>>>>> will say that it brought about divinely, and >>>>>>>> if you are Spinozan, by >>>>>>>> nature: it amounts to the same thing, because >>>>>>>> "Deus Sive Natura"). >>>>>>>> Sometimes it is brought about by human >>>>>>>> ingenuity (but of course if you are >>>>>>>> religious you will say that it is the divine >>>>>>>> in humans at work, and if you >>>>>>>> are Spinozan you will say that humans are >>>>>>>> simply that part of nature which >>>>>>>> has become conscious of itself: once again, Ii >>>>>>>> think it amounts to the same >>>>>>>> thing). So of course there are not two kinds >>>>>>>> of substance, res cogitans vs >>>>>>>> res extensa, only one substance and different >>>>>>>> ways of organizing it (which >>>>>>>> in the end amount to the same thing). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You say that discourse particles like "Guess >>>>>>>> what?" and "so there" and >>>>>>>> "because" and "irregardless" and "what you say >>>>>>>> to the contrary >>>>>>>> notwithstanding" are "indexical". I agree, >>>>>>>> insofar as they depend on their >>>>>>>> relationship to the context of situation for >>>>>>>> their meaning. You say that a >>>>>>>> Southern drawl is indexical, and that the >>>>>>>> relationship of jazz or blues or >>>>>>>> hiphop to blackness is indexical. I agree, >>>>>>>> insofar as they satisfy the >>>>>>>> condition I just mentioned. But "because" is >>>>>>>> also a symbol, and a >>>>>>>> Southerner still sounds like a Southerner when >>>>>>>> he/she moves to New York >>>>>>>> City (and in fact you can argue they sound >>>>>>>> more so). In Africa, jazz and >>>>>>>> blues and hiphop in Africa are related to >>>>>>>> Americanness and not to >>>>>>>> blackness. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So your division of signs into just three >>>>>>>> categories is too simple, Greg. >>>>>>>> In fact, if you really read your Peirce, you >>>>>>>> will discover that there are >>>>>>>> tens of thousands of categories, but they are >>>>>>>> generated from three >>>>>>>> ineffable primitives ("firstness", >>>>>>>> "secondness", and "thirdness"). So for >>>>>>>> example all words are symbols insofar as you >>>>>>>> have to know English in order >>>>>>>> to understand "Guess what?" or "because". But >>>>>>>> some words are >>>>>>>> symbol-indices, symbols that function as >>>>>>>> indexes, because they depend >>>>>>>> on the context of situation for their meaning. >>>>>>>> Without the symbolic >>>>>>>> gateway, they cannot function as indices. My >>>>>>>> wife, for example, cannot tell >>>>>>>> a Southerner from a more general American >>>>>>>> accent, and I myself still have >>>>>>>> trouble figuring out who is an Australian and >>>>>>>> who is an FOB bloody pom. >>>>>>>> Similarly, my wife doesn't see the blackness >>>>>>>> in hiphop--it sounds like >>>>>>>> K-pop to her. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't actually think that any signs are >>>>>>>> associative or "prehensive"; I >>>>>>>> think that they are all different ways of >>>>>>>> looking or apprehending. So for >>>>>>>> example you can apprehend a wording as a >>>>>>>> symbol: a way of organizing sound >>>>>>>> stuff so that it "stands for" a way of >>>>>>>> organizing other stuff (sometimes >>>>>>>> lunchboxes and backpacks, actual categories of >>>>>>>> objects and sometimes the >>>>>>>> abstract models-in-the-making that Andy calls >>>>>>>> "projects"). You can also >>>>>>>> look at wording as index: not as something >>>>>>>> that is "associated" to the lips >>>>>>>> and tongue by juxtaposition or proximity or >>>>>>>> even continguity but rather >>>>>>>> something that has a necessary relation to the >>>>>>>> vocal tract (which is itself >>>>>>>> not a physiological organ, but something >>>>>>>> brought about by human >>>>>>>> organization). But when I look at sound waves >>>>>>>> on my Praat spectrograph and >>>>>>>> think of the shelving sea, what I am trying to >>>>>>>> get at is the sound stuff, >>>>>>>> the noise, the firstness of the stuff of >>>>>>>> words. I'm not Cezanne: I don't >>>>>>>> think there is any way of doing this with my >>>>>>>> eyes or ears alone: I think it >>>>>>>> requires a very complex combination of tools >>>>>>>> and signs to get down to >>>>>>>> firstness. But as Spinoza would have said if >>>>>>>> he had breakfast with >>>>>>>> Bacon, the head and the hand are not much by >>>>>>>> themselves, but nobody >>>>>>>> has ever really shown the limits of what they >>>>>>>> can do when they put each >>>>>>>> other in order and start to organize the world >>>>>>>> around them. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (And that is about as much philosophy as you >>>>>>>> are going to get out of me, >>>>>>>> I'm afraid. The tide is galloping in....) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> PS: What I am absolutely certain of is this: >>>>>>>> mediating activity is not >>>>>>>> absent in sign use, pace Alfredo or >>>>>>>> Wolff-Michael, but it is very different >>>>>>>> from mediating activity in tool use, for the >>>>>>>> same reason that painting is >>>>>>>> different from wording: in painting you CAN >>>>>>>> leave out the human (if you are >>>>>>>> doing a dead seal for example, or if you are >>>>>>>> Rothko or Jackson Pollack--but >>>>>>>> keep in mind that the former committed suicide >>>>>>>> and the latter murdered two >>>>>>>> innocent young women). But in wording you >>>>>>>> never ever can. Wording can feel >>>>>>>> unmediated--in fact it has to feel unmediated >>>>>>>> or it doesn't work very >>>>>>>> well--but in reality it's even more mediated >>>>>>>> than ever. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> dk >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, May 6, 2017 at 1:09 AM, Greg Thompson >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David (and others), >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the interests of disagreement (which I >>>>>>>> know you dearly appreciate), your >>>>>>>> last post included this: >>>>>>>> "Words don't "cause" meaning: they provide >>>>>>>> material correlates for meaning >>>>>>>> and in that sense "realise" them as matter." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I was with you up until that point, but >>>>>>>> that's where I always lose you. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I know it is a rather trite thing to say >>>>>>>> but I guess it really depends on >>>>>>>> what you mean by "meaning". If by meaning, >>>>>>>> you mean some plane of existence >>>>>>>> that runs parallel to the material stuff, >>>>>>>> then this seems to be a bit of >>>>>>>> trouble since this leaves us with, on the >>>>>>>> one hand, "matter" (res extensa? >>>>>>>> noumena?), and on the other hand "meaning" >>>>>>>> (res cogitans? phenomena?). >>>>>>>> Matter is easy enough to locate, but where >>>>>>>> do we locate "meaning" as you >>>>>>>> have described it? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This reminds me of Saussure's classic >>>>>>>> drawing on p. 112 of his Cours >>>>>>>> (attached) in which "the indefinite plane >>>>>>>> of jumbled ideas" (A in the >>>>>>>> diagram) exists on one side of the chasm >>>>>>>> and "the equally vague plane of >>>>>>>> sounds" (B) exists on the other side of >>>>>>>> the chasm. Each side is >>>>>>>> self-contained and self-referential, and >>>>>>>> never the twain shall meet. Worlds >>>>>>>> apart. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And this ties to the conversation in the >>>>>>>> other thread about the >>>>>>>> ineffability of meaning (as well as Andy's >>>>>>>> Marx quote about a science of >>>>>>>> language that is shorn from life). My >>>>>>>> suspicion is that this supposed >>>>>>>> ineffability of meaning has everything to >>>>>>>> do with this Saussurean approach >>>>>>>> to semiotics (i.e., meaningfulness). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peirce's triadic view of the sign offers a >>>>>>>> different approach that may give >>>>>>>> a way out of this trouble by putting the >>>>>>>> word back INto the world. (p. 102 >>>>>>>> of the attached Logic as Semiotic). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Peirce offers three kinds of relations of >>>>>>>> representamen (signifier) to >>>>>>>> object: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. >>>>>>>> The symbol is the relation with >>>>>>>> which we are most familiar - it is the one >>>>>>>> that Saussure speaks of and is >>>>>>>> the one that is ineffable or, in >>>>>>>> Saussure's words, "arbitrary", i.e. >>>>>>>> "conventional". It is the stuff of words, >>>>>>>> the meaning of which is found in >>>>>>>> other words (hence the sense of >>>>>>>> ineffability). With only the symbolic >>>>>>>> function, the whole world of words would >>>>>>>> be entirely self-referential and >>>>>>>> thus truly ineffable (and this is why I >>>>>>>> like to say that Derrida is the end >>>>>>>> of the Saussurean road - he took that idea >>>>>>>> to its logical conclusion and >>>>>>>> discovered that the meaning of meaning is, >>>>>>>> well, empty (and thus >>>>>>>> ineffable)). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But Peirce has two other relations of >>>>>>>> representamen to object, the iconic >>>>>>>> and the indexical. In signs functioning >>>>>>>> iconically, the representamen >>>>>>>> contains some quality of the object that >>>>>>>> it represents (e.g., a map that >>>>>>>> holds relations of the space that it >>>>>>>> represents or onomatopoeia like "buzz" >>>>>>>> in which the representamen has some of the >>>>>>>> qualities of the sound of the >>>>>>>> bee flying by). With signs functioning >>>>>>>> indexically, the relationship of >>>>>>>> representamen to object is one of temporal >>>>>>>> or spatial contiguity (e.g., >>>>>>>> where there is smoke there is fire, or >>>>>>>> where there is a Southern twang, >>>>>>>> there is a Southerner, or, most >>>>>>>> classically, when I point, the object to >>>>>>>> which I am pointing is spatially >>>>>>>> contiguous with the finger that is >>>>>>>> pointing). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Now if I follow the argument of another of >>>>>>>> the inheritors of Roman >>>>>>>> Jakobson's legacy, Michael Silverstein >>>>>>>> (yes, Hasan and Halliday weren't the >>>>>>>> only inheritors of this tradition - >>>>>>>> Michael was a student of Jakobson's at >>>>>>>> Harvard... and he does a great impression >>>>>>>> of Jacobson too), then we can >>>>>>>> indeed locate a ground of the word (i.e., >>>>>>>> the symbolic function) in the >>>>>>>> more primitive (i.e., rudimentary) >>>>>>>> indexical function. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But that argument is always a bit too much >>>>>>>> for me (if there are any takers, >>>>>>>> the best place to find this argument is in >>>>>>>> Silverstein's chapter >>>>>>>> "Metapragmatic Discourse, Metapragmatic >>>>>>>> Function," or in less explicit but >>>>>>>> slightly more understandable article >>>>>>>> "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of >>>>>>>> Sociolinguistics Life"). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's argument is quite a bit more >>>>>>>> elegant and comprehensible: in >>>>>>>> ontogeny meaningfulness begins with the >>>>>>>> index, first as the index par >>>>>>>> excellence, pointing (something that, as >>>>>>>> Andy has previously pointed out, >>>>>>>> might not be exactly how things go in a >>>>>>>> literal sense, but the general >>>>>>>> structure here works well, I think, as a >>>>>>>> heuristic if nothing else - words >>>>>>>> are first learned as indexes, temporally >>>>>>>> and spatially collocated, "bottle" >>>>>>>> is first uttered as a way of saying >>>>>>>> "thirsty" and then later to refer to a >>>>>>>> co-present object; note this is also why >>>>>>>> young kids get discourse markers >>>>>>>> at such a young age (and seems incredibly >>>>>>>> precocious when they do!), since >>>>>>>> discourse markers are primarily >>>>>>>> indexical). The indexical function is the >>>>>>>> rudimentary form that then provides the >>>>>>>> groundwork for the development of >>>>>>>> the symbolic function. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So then, in this Peircean(Vygotskian) >>>>>>>> approach, the meaning of signs is not >>>>>>>> ineffable, there is a grounding for words, >>>>>>>> and that grounding is the >>>>>>>> indexical, the "word"/sign that is both in >>>>>>>> the world and of the world. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This seems to me a way of putting meaning >>>>>>>> back into matter. And perhaps >>>>>>>> speaking of words as the material >>>>>>>> correlates of meaning can be a useful >>>>>>>> heuristic (i.e., how else can we talk >>>>>>>> about meanings and concepts given our >>>>>>>> current set of meanings/concepts?). But we >>>>>>>> should also recognize that if it >>>>>>>> becomes more than an heuristic it can lead >>>>>>>> us astray if we take it too far. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'd add here that I think one of the >>>>>>>> greatest opportunities for CHAT to >>>>>>>> make a contribution to social science >>>>>>>> today is in its conceptualization of >>>>>>>> "concepts" (and, by extension, >>>>>>>> "meaningfulness"). I think that perhaps one >>>>>>>> of the most taken-for-granted aspects of >>>>>>>> social science today is the idea >>>>>>>> that we know what "concepts" are. In >>>>>>>> anthropology, people easily talk about >>>>>>>> "cultural concepts" and typically they >>>>>>>> mean precisely something that floats >>>>>>>> around in some ethereal plane of >>>>>>>> "meaningfulness" and which is not of the >>>>>>>> material stuff of the world. Yet, this >>>>>>>> runs counter to the direction that >>>>>>>> anthropology is heading these days with >>>>>>>> the so-called "ontological turn" >>>>>>>> (I'll hold off on explaining this for now >>>>>>>> since this post is already >>>>>>>> running way too long, but I'll just >>>>>>>> mention that one of the aims of this is >>>>>>>> to get to a non-dualistic social science). >>>>>>>> CHAT's conception of the concept >>>>>>>> seems to me to offer precisely what is >>>>>>>> needed -- a way of understanding the >>>>>>>> concept as a fundamentally cultural and >>>>>>>> historical thing, rather than >>>>>>>> simply as an "ideal" thing. The concept is >>>>>>>> the holding of a(n historical) >>>>>>>> relation across time (cf. Hebb's synapse >>>>>>>> or Peirce's sunflower). Concepts >>>>>>>> are thus little historical text-lets. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Okay, that was too much. Perhaps I will >>>>>>>> find some time in the future to >>>>>>>> return to that last part, but there is no >>>>>>>> time to develop it further now. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Anyway, I'm glad that I finally had the >>>>>>>> opportunity to catch up to these >>>>>>>> conversations. Delightful reading/thinking. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'll keep reading but no promises that >>>>>>>> I'll be able to comment (as a young >>>>>>>> scholar, I need to be spending my time >>>>>>>> putting stuff out - and unlike the >>>>>>>> rest of you, I'm no good at >>>>>>>> multi-tasking... it's either one or the other >>>>>>>> for me). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Very best, >>>>>>>> greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 4:18 PM, David >>>>>>>> Kellogg >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well, yes. But if present day >>>>>>>> conditions are the REVERSE of the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> conditions >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> under which Vygotsky was writing--that >>>>>>>> is, if the present trend is to >>>>>>>> subsume labor under language instead >>>>>>>> of the other way around--don't we >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> need >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> this distinction between signs and >>>>>>>> tools more than ever? That is, if >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> sloppy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> formulations like "cultural capital", >>>>>>>> "symbolic violence", "use/exchange >>>>>>>> value of the word" are erasing the >>>>>>>> distinction between a mediating >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> which acts on the environment and a >>>>>>>> mediating activity which acts on >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mediators and on the self, and which >>>>>>>> therefore has the potential for >>>>>>>> reciprocity and recursion, isn't this >>>>>>>> exactly where the clear-eyed >>>>>>>> philosophers need to step in and >>>>>>>> straighten us out? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think that instead what is happening >>>>>>>> is that our older generation >>>>>>>> of rheumy-eyed philosophers (present >>>>>>>> company--usually--excluded) are too >>>>>>>> interested in the "tool power" of >>>>>>>> large categories and insufficiently >>>>>>>> interested in fine distinctions that >>>>>>>> make a difference. But perhaps it >>>>>>>> is also that our younger generation of >>>>>>>> misty-eyed philosophers are, as >>>>>>>> Eagleton remarked, more interested in >>>>>>>> copulating bodies than exploited >>>>>>>> ones. Yet these fine distinctions that >>>>>>>> do make a difference equally allow >>>>>>>> generalization and abstraction and >>>>>>>> tool power, and the copulating flesh >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the exploited muscles are one and the >>>>>>>> same. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Take, for example, your remark about >>>>>>>> the Fourier transform performed by >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ear (not the brain--the inner ear >>>>>>>> cochlea--I can see the world centre for >>>>>>>> studying the cochlea from my office >>>>>>>> window). Actually, it's part of a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wide >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> range of "realisation" phenomena that >>>>>>>> were already being noticed by >>>>>>>> Vygotsky. In realisational phenomena, >>>>>>>> you don't have cause and effect, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> as in cause and effect you don't have >>>>>>>> "association". Words don't "cause" >>>>>>>> meaning: they provide material >>>>>>>> correlates for meaning and in that sense >>>>>>>> "realise" them as matter. Meaning does >>>>>>>> not "cause" wording; it correlates >>>>>>>> wording to a semantics--an activity of >>>>>>>> consciousness--and through it to a >>>>>>>> context of situation or culture, and >>>>>>>> in that sense "realises" it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So in his lecture on early childhood, >>>>>>>> Vygotsky says that the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> stabilization >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of forms, colours, and sizes by the >>>>>>>> eye in early childhood is part of a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> way relationship, a dialogue, between >>>>>>>> the sense organs and the brain. The >>>>>>>> reason why we don't see a table as a >>>>>>>> trapezoid, when we stand over it and >>>>>>>> compare the front with the back, the >>>>>>>> reason why we don't see a piece of >>>>>>>> chalk at nighttime as black, the >>>>>>>> reason why we have orthoscopic >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> perception >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and we don't see a man at a distance >>>>>>>> as a looming midget is that the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> brain >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> imposes the contrary views on the eye. >>>>>>>> And where does the brain get this >>>>>>>> view if not from language and from >>>>>>>> other people? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:55 AM, Andy >>>>>>>> Blunden >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Personally, I think the first and >>>>>>>> most persistently important thing is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> see how much alike are tables and >>>>>>>> words. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But ... Vygotsky was very >>>>>>>> insistent on the distinction >>>>>>>> because he was >>>>>>>> fighting a battle against the idea >>>>>>>> that speech ought to be subsumed >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> under >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the larger category of labour. He >>>>>>>> had to fight for semiotics against a >>>>>>>> vulgar kind of orthodox Marxism. >>>>>>>> But we here in 2017 are living in >>>>>>>> different times, where we have >>>>>>>> Discourse Theory and Linguistics while >>>>>>>> Marxism is widely regarded as >>>>>>>> antique. As Marx said "Just as >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> philosophers >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> have given thought an independent >>>>>>>> existence, so they were bound to make >>>>>>>> language into an independent >>>>>>>> realm." and we live well and truly >>>>>>>> in the >>>>>>>> times when labour is subsumed >>>>>>>> under language, and not the other way >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> around. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Everyone knows that a table is >>>>>>>> unlike a word. The point it to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> understand >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> how tables are signs and word are >>>>>>>> material objects. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (BTW David, back in 1986 I walked >>>>>>>> in an offshoot of the bionic ear >>>>>>>> project. The ear has a little >>>>>>>> keyboard that works like a piano >>>>>>>> keyboard >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> reverse, making a real time >>>>>>>> Fourier transform of that air >>>>>>>> pressure wave >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> coding the harmonics it in nerve >>>>>>>> impulse. The brain never hears that >>>>>>>> pressure signal.) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/ >>>>>>> book/origins-collective-decision-making >>>>>>>> >>>>>> collective-decision-making> >>>>>>>> On 3/05/2017 7:06 AM, Alfredo >>>>>>>> Jornet Gil wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David (and or Mike, Andy, >>>>>>>> anyone else), could you give a >>>>>>>> bit more on >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> distinction between words and >>>>>>>> tables? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And could you say how (and >>>>>>>> whether) (human, hand) nails >>>>>>>> are different >>>>>>>> from tables; and then how >>>>>>>> nails are different from words? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> edu> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> on behalf of David Kellogg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Sent: 01 May 2017 08:43 >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>>>>> Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Stuff >>>>>>>> of Words >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Gordon Wells quotes this from >>>>>>>> an article Mike wrote in a >>>>>>>> Festschrift >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> George Miller. Mike is talking >>>>>>>> about artefacts: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "They are ideal in that they >>>>>>>> contain in coded form the >>>>>>>> interactions of >>>>>>>> which they >>>>>>>> were previously a part and >>>>>>>> which they mediate in the >>>>>>>> present (e.g., >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> structure of >>>>>>>> a pencil carries within it the >>>>>>>> history of certain forms of >>>>>>>> writing). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> They >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> are material >>>>>>>> in that they are embodied in >>>>>>>> material artifacts. This principle >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> applies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> with equal >>>>>>>> force whether one is >>>>>>>> considering language/speech or >>>>>>>> the more usually >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> noted >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> forms >>>>>>>> of artifacts such as tables >>>>>>>> and knives which constitute >>>>>>>> material >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> culture. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What >>>>>>>> differentiates a word, such as >>>>>>>> ?language? from, say, a table. >>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>> relative prominence >>>>>>>> of their material and ideal >>>>>>>> aspects. No word exists apart >>>>>>>> from its >>>>>>>> material >>>>>>>> instantiation (as a >>>>>>>> configuration of sound waves, >>>>>>>> or hand movements, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> writing, >>>>>>>> or as neuronal activity), >>>>>>>> whereas every table embodies >>>>>>>> an order >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> imposed >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> thinking >>>>>>>> human beings." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is the kind of thing that >>>>>>>> regularly gets me thrown out of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> journals >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> by >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the ear. Mike says that the >>>>>>>> difference between a word and >>>>>>>> a table is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> relative salience of the ideal >>>>>>>> and the material. Sure--words >>>>>>>> are full >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the ideal, and tables are full >>>>>>>> of material. Right? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Nope. Mike says it's the other >>>>>>>> way around. Why? Well, because >>>>>>>> a word >>>>>>>> without some word-stuff (sound >>>>>>>> or graphite) just isn't a >>>>>>>> word. In a >>>>>>>> word, meaning is solidary with >>>>>>>> material sounding: change one, >>>>>>>> and you >>>>>>>> change the other. But with a >>>>>>>> table, what you start with is >>>>>>>> the idea of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> table; as soon as you've got >>>>>>>> that idea, you've got a table. >>>>>>>> You could >>>>>>>> change the material to >>>>>>>> anything and you'd still have >>>>>>>> a table. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Wells doesn't throw Mike out >>>>>>>> by the ear. But he does ignore the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> delightful >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> perversity in what Mike is >>>>>>>> saying, and what he gets out >>>>>>>> of the quote >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> just that words are really >>>>>>>> just like tools. When in fact >>>>>>>> Mike is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> saying >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> just the opposite. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (The part I don't get is >>>>>>>> Mike's notion that the >>>>>>>> structure of a pencil >>>>>>>> carries within it the history >>>>>>>> of certain forms of writing. >>>>>>>> Does he >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mean >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that the length of the pencil >>>>>>>> reflects how often it's been >>>>>>>> used? Or is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> he >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> making a more archaeological >>>>>>>> point about graphite, wood, >>>>>>>> rubber and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> their >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> relationship to a certain >>>>>>>> point in the history of >>>>>>>> writing and erasing? >>>>>>>> Actually, pencils are more >>>>>>>> like tables than like >>>>>>>> words--the idea has >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> come first.) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From ablunden@mira.net Fri May 12 19:22:37 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 13 May 2017 12:22:37 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> Message-ID: <33c01f54-8796-9607-55bf-525f925aaf7e@mira.net> Not at all, Greg. I just appreciated that you were turning to *read Hegel* to get your answers and I was giving you time for that. Let me see ... Q: This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, remains a revolutionary conception today. The idea here seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective presupposition" but is rather much more real than that. But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can this be? Yes, utterly realistic. We live in a world in which people share, more or less, a great range of beliefs and importantly act according to those beliefs, so, objectively, this world is one of activities, including the artefacts incorporated in those activities. The unit of all that activity is concepts rather than things or acts. Each concept is implicit in an aggregate of actions functioning as the object of the activity. If you think that I am just making this up to make it sound like Activity Theory, have a look at this paper which includes an extended quote from a Finnish Hegelian who knows nothing about Activity Theory and hates Marxism. https://www.academia.edu/30657582/Response_to_Heikki_Ik%C3%A4heimo_on_Normative_Essentialism_ - the quote begins on the first page. Q: There are multiple objections, but perhaps the biggest objection comes from 20th century social science's preoccupation with social construction. In this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, subjective and maybe also intersubjective, but always mediated (and some might say "derivative"). Hegel seems to be offering a much different take - one in which concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? Yes, Hegel is sometimes called an "objective idealist." Ideas or thought is something which exists in the world and only as a result of that are thinkers able to grasp. The idea of Zeitgeist is well-known and I don't see it as problematic, and just broaden that to Geist and you have what Hegel is talking about, literally. Q: And, what is this business about the "sublation of mediation"? Everything Hegel says is very general, so it's hard to paraphrase him without degrading his idea. But think of this. A new practice (or technical tool, or word) is invented in response to some situation; it then becomes part of the world, and new situations. That's what he means. In my answer to Q1 above there is obviously a chicken-and-egg situation: activity is conscious, but the content of consciousness is objective activity. Sublation of mediation responds to that chicken-and-egg problem. Does that help? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 13/05/2017 5:27 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > So does your response mean that all of my questions in my > previous post are non-starters? > -greg > > On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 9:48 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Concepts are first of all things which exist; because > they exist, the mind is capable of grasping them, in > fact, they are exactly the way the mind grasps the > world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way > they exist is in human activity and the artifacts we > use in that activity. Since you have made a start on > this Greg, I have to say that I think you need this > and also the section to follow called "The Subjective > Notion" to get a decent picture. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you >> suggested (I don't think you truly appreciate how >> slow of a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy shared can >> be found here: >> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm >> ), >> and I came across this notion of The Notion by Hegel >> in Section 1279: >> >> "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be >> regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition >> but as the /absolute foundation/, yet it can be so >> only in so far as it has /made/ itself the >> foundation. Abstract immediacy is no doubt a /first/; >> yet in so far as it is abstract it is, on the >> contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be >> grasped in its truth its foundation must first be >> sought. Hence this foundation, though indeed an >> immediate, must have made itself immediate through >> the sublation of mediation."? >> >> This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is >> building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, >> remains a revolutionary conception today. The idea >> here seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective >> presupposition" but is rather much more real than >> that. But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can this be? >> >> There are multiple objections, but perhaps the >> biggest objection comes from 20th century social >> science's preoccupation with social construction. In >> this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, >> subjective and maybe also intersubjective, but always >> mediated (and some might say "derivative"). Hegel >> seems to be offering a much different take - one in >> which concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? >> >> And, what is this business about the "sublation of >> mediation"? (and where does this last bit jibe with >> CHAT? Many people in CHAT speak of mediation but I >> don't recall anyone speaking of the "sublation of >> mediation"). >> >> Any help with this text would be appreciated. >> >> (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" >> but I still felt that this needed a new thread.). >> >> -greg >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri May 12 20:20:31 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 21:20:31 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: <33c01f54-8796-9607-55bf-525f925aaf7e@mira.net> References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> <33c01f54-8796-9607-55bf-525f925aaf7e@mira.net> Message-ID: Well, I have to admit Andy, I didn't get very far with the Hegel reading. And actually, I've read some of that section before (perhaps at your suggestion some years ago?). I had also previously had a look at your review of Ikaheimo as well! But couldn't make much sense of either text or what to do with what little I could comprehend. So maybe I can try and paraphrase the little that I can squeeze out of Hegel with regard to his notion of the notion (or should I say "his notion of the notion of the notion"? viz. section 1291). As I understand it, for Hegel notions are objective because they are Universal. By this I assume that he means some kind of radical intersubjectivity. I assume that some people interpret this as referring to some kind of superaddressee like God or some such, but I assume that you don't see it this way. So then how do you see it? What does Hegel mean by "the Universal"? Is it the intersubjectivity of some community? "universal" would suggest a global community of all people, but, as an anthropologist, that doesn't quite seem to hold muster. So, what does Hegel mean by "Universal"? Seems important to understanding the reality of the notion but I may be on the wrong track, please feel free to correct course if necessary. -greg On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 8:22 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Not at all, Greg. I just appreciated that you were turning to *read Hegel* > to get your answers and I was giving you time for that. Let me see ... > > Q: This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is > building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, > remains a revolutionary conception today. The idea here > seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective > presupposition" but is rather much more real than that. > But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can this be? > > Yes, utterly realistic. We live in a world in which people share, more or > less, a great range of beliefs and importantly act according to those > beliefs, so, objectively, this world is one of activities, including the > artefacts incorporated in those activities. The unit of all that activity > is concepts rather than things or acts. Each concept is implicit in an > aggregate of actions functioning as the object of the activity. If you > think that I am just making this up to make it sound like Activity Theory, > have a look at this paper which includes an extended quote from a Finnish > Hegelian who knows nothing about Activity Theory and hates Marxism. > https://www.academia.edu/30657582/Response_to_Heikki_Ik%C3% > A4heimo_on_Normative_Essentialism_ - the quote begins on the first page. > > Q: There are multiple objections, but perhaps the > biggest objection comes from 20th century social > science's preoccupation with social construction. In > this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, > subjective and maybe also intersubjective, but always > mediated (and some might say "derivative"). Hegel seems > to be offering a much different take - one in which > concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? > > Yes, Hegel is sometimes called an "objective idealist." Ideas or thought > is something which exists in the world and only as a result of that are > thinkers able to grasp. The idea of Zeitgeist is well-known and I don't see > it as problematic, and just broaden that to Geist and you have what Hegel > is talking about, literally. > > Q: And, what is this business about the "sublation of > mediation"? > > Everything Hegel says is very general, so it's hard to paraphrase him > without degrading his idea. But think of this. A new practice (or technical > tool, or word) is invented in response to some situation; it then becomes > part of the world, and new situations. That's what he means. In my answer > to Q1 above there is obviously a chicken-and-egg situation: activity is > conscious, but the content of consciousness is objective activity. > Sublation of mediation responds to that chicken-and-egg problem. > > Does that help? > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 13/05/2017 5:27 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Andy, >> So does your response mean that all of my questions in my previous post >> are non-starters? >> -greg >> >> On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 9:48 AM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Concepts are first of all things which exist; because >> they exist, the mind is capable of grasping them, in >> fact, they are exactly the way the mind grasps the >> world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way >> they exist is in human activity and the artifacts we >> use in that activity. Since you have made a start on >> this Greg, I have to say that I think you need this >> and also the section to follow called "The Subjective >> Notion" to get a decent picture. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making> >> >> On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >>> ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you >>> suggested (I don't think you truly appreciate how >>> slow of a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy shared can >>> be found here: >>> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/ >>> hlnotion.htm >>> >> hlnotion.htm>), >>> and I came across this notion of The Notion by Hegel >>> in Section 1279: >>> >>> "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be >>> regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition >>> but as the /absolute foundation/, yet it can be so >>> only in so far as it has /made/ itself the >>> foundation. Abstract immediacy is no doubt a /first/; >>> >>> yet in so far as it is abstract it is, on the >>> contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be >>> grasped in its truth its foundation must first be >>> sought. Hence this foundation, though indeed an >>> immediate, must have made itself immediate through >>> the sublation of mediation."? >>> >>> This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is >>> building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, >>> remains a revolutionary conception today. The idea >>> here seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective >>> presupposition" but is rather much more real than >>> that. But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can this be? >>> >>> There are multiple objections, but perhaps the >>> biggest objection comes from 20th century social >>> science's preoccupation with social construction. In >>> this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, >>> subjective and maybe also intersubjective, but always >>> mediated (and some might say "derivative"). Hegel >>> seems to be offering a much different take - one in >>> which concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? >>> >>> And, what is this business about the "sublation of >>> mediation"? (and where does this last bit jibe with >>> CHAT? Many people in CHAT speak of mediation but I >>> don't recall anyone speaking of the "sublation of >>> mediation"). >>> >>> Any help with this text would be appreciated. >>> >>> (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" >>> but I still felt that this needed a new thread.). >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri May 12 20:20:31 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 21:20:31 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: <33c01f54-8796-9607-55bf-525f925aaf7e@mira.net> References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> <33c01f54-8796-9607-55bf-525f925aaf7e@mira.net> Message-ID: Well, I have to admit Andy, I didn't get very far with the Hegel reading. And actually, I've read some of that section before (perhaps at your suggestion some years ago?). I had also previously had a look at your review of Ikaheimo as well! But couldn't make much sense of either text or what to do with what little I could comprehend. So maybe I can try and paraphrase the little that I can squeeze out of Hegel with regard to his notion of the notion (or should I say "his notion of the notion of the notion"? viz. section 1291). As I understand it, for Hegel notions are objective because they are Universal. By this I assume that he means some kind of radical intersubjectivity. I assume that some people interpret this as referring to some kind of superaddressee like God or some such, but I assume that you don't see it this way. So then how do you see it? What does Hegel mean by "the Universal"? Is it the intersubjectivity of some community? "universal" would suggest a global community of all people, but, as an anthropologist, that doesn't quite seem to hold muster. So, what does Hegel mean by "Universal"? Seems important to understanding the reality of the notion but I may be on the wrong track, please feel free to correct course if necessary. -greg On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 8:22 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Not at all, Greg. I just appreciated that you were turning to *read Hegel* > to get your answers and I was giving you time for that. Let me see ... > > Q: This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is > building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, > remains a revolutionary conception today. The idea here > seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective > presupposition" but is rather much more real than that. > But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can this be? > > Yes, utterly realistic. We live in a world in which people share, more or > less, a great range of beliefs and importantly act according to those > beliefs, so, objectively, this world is one of activities, including the > artefacts incorporated in those activities. The unit of all that activity > is concepts rather than things or acts. Each concept is implicit in an > aggregate of actions functioning as the object of the activity. If you > think that I am just making this up to make it sound like Activity Theory, > have a look at this paper which includes an extended quote from a Finnish > Hegelian who knows nothing about Activity Theory and hates Marxism. > https://www.academia.edu/30657582/Response_to_Heikki_Ik%C3% > A4heimo_on_Normative_Essentialism_ - the quote begins on the first page. > > Q: There are multiple objections, but perhaps the > biggest objection comes from 20th century social > science's preoccupation with social construction. In > this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, > subjective and maybe also intersubjective, but always > mediated (and some might say "derivative"). Hegel seems > to be offering a much different take - one in which > concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? > > Yes, Hegel is sometimes called an "objective idealist." Ideas or thought > is something which exists in the world and only as a result of that are > thinkers able to grasp. The idea of Zeitgeist is well-known and I don't see > it as problematic, and just broaden that to Geist and you have what Hegel > is talking about, literally. > > Q: And, what is this business about the "sublation of > mediation"? > > Everything Hegel says is very general, so it's hard to paraphrase him > without degrading his idea. But think of this. A new practice (or technical > tool, or word) is invented in response to some situation; it then becomes > part of the world, and new situations. That's what he means. In my answer > to Q1 above there is obviously a chicken-and-egg situation: activity is > conscious, but the content of consciousness is objective activity. > Sublation of mediation responds to that chicken-and-egg problem. > > Does that help? > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 13/05/2017 5:27 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Andy, >> So does your response mean that all of my questions in my previous post >> are non-starters? >> -greg >> >> On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 9:48 AM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Concepts are first of all things which exist; because >> they exist, the mind is capable of grasping them, in >> fact, they are exactly the way the mind grasps the >> world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way >> they exist is in human activity and the artifacts we >> use in that activity. Since you have made a start on >> this Greg, I have to say that I think you need this >> and also the section to follow called "The Subjective >> Notion" to get a decent picture. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making> >> >> On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: >> >>> ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel text that you >>> suggested (I don't think you truly appreciate how >>> slow of a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy shared can >>> be found here: >>> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/ >>> hlnotion.htm >>> >> hlnotion.htm>), >>> and I came across this notion of The Notion by Hegel >>> in Section 1279: >>> >>> "Now although it is true that the Notion is to be >>> regarded, not merely as a subjective presupposition >>> but as the /absolute foundation/, yet it can be so >>> only in so far as it has /made/ itself the >>> foundation. Abstract immediacy is no doubt a /first/; >>> >>> yet in so far as it is abstract it is, on the >>> contrary mediated, and therefore if it is to be >>> grasped in its truth its foundation must first be >>> sought. Hence this foundation, though indeed an >>> immediate, must have made itself immediate through >>> the sublation of mediation."? >>> >>> This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is >>> building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, >>> remains a revolutionary conception today. The idea >>> here seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective >>> presupposition" but is rather much more real than >>> that. But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can this be? >>> >>> There are multiple objections, but perhaps the >>> biggest objection comes from 20th century social >>> science's preoccupation with social construction. In >>> this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, >>> subjective and maybe also intersubjective, but always >>> mediated (and some might say "derivative"). Hegel >>> seems to be offering a much different take - one in >>> which concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? >>> >>> And, what is this business about the "sublation of >>> mediation"? (and where does this last bit jibe with >>> CHAT? Many people in CHAT speak of mediation but I >>> don't recall anyone speaking of the "sublation of >>> mediation"). >>> >>> Any help with this text would be appreciated. >>> >>> (and this is closely related to "the stuff of words" >>> but I still felt that this needed a new thread.). >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Fri May 12 20:41:21 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 13 May 2017 13:41:21 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> <33c01f54-8796-9607-55bf-525f925aaf7e@mira.net> Message-ID: The only truly universal is the material world, but insofar as we are concerned with a specific community (and Hegel does not take much interest in cross-cultural issues; he's generally dealing with a single community) the words in the language (not their meanings, just the material objects themselves) are universal as are the entire material infrastructure - the land, its crops and animals, the buildings, machinery etc. Different particular groups may have different access to those things, may use them differently, and they may mean different things, but there is still something there which is for everyone. But Universal does not really mean "material" because all these terms are to be interpreted as norms. The universal is the norm to which a material artefact is conforming or not. Does that make sense? But Universal does not mean Objective (this was A N Leontyev's main error, he confused the Universal with the Objective, which is why he comes across as so dogmatic and has such a thoroughgoing dualism in his thinking). Because the relation between the Universal and the Individual is mediated by the particular, that is, by Activity and social position. BTW, English translations of Hegel are translating the German Begriff as "Notion" and Begriff really means "Concept". Griffen means to grip, or grasp. Does that help? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 13/05/2017 1:20 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Well, I have to admit Andy, I didn't get very far with the > Hegel reading. And actually, I've read some of that > section before (perhaps at your suggestion some years > ago?). I had also previously had a look at your review of > Ikaheimo as well! But couldn't make much sense of either > text or what to do with what little I could comprehend. > > So maybe I can try and paraphrase the little that I can > squeeze out of Hegel with regard to his notion of the > notion (or should I say "his notion of the notion of the > notion"? viz. section 1291). > > As I understand it, for Hegel notions are objective > because they are Universal. By this I assume that he means > some kind of radical intersubjectivity. I assume that some > people interpret this as referring to some kind of > superaddressee like God or some such, but I assume that > you don't see it this way. So then how do you see it? What > does Hegel mean by "the Universal"? Is it the > intersubjectivity of some community? "universal" would > suggest a global community of all people, but, as an > anthropologist, that doesn't quite seem to hold muster. > > So, what does Hegel mean by "Universal"? > > Seems important to understanding the reality of the notion > but I may be on the wrong track, please feel free to > correct course if necessary. > > -greg > > > > > > On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 8:22 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Not at all, Greg. I just appreciated that you were > turning to *read Hegel* to get your answers and I was > giving you time for that. Let me see ... > > Q: This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is > building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, > remains a revolutionary conception today. The idea here > seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective > presupposition" but is rather much more real than that. > But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can this be? > > Yes, utterly realistic. We live in a world in which > people share, more or less, a great range of beliefs > and importantly act according to those beliefs, so, > objectively, this world is one of activities, > including the artefacts incorporated in those > activities. The unit of all that activity is concepts > rather than things or acts. Each concept is implicit > in an aggregate of actions functioning as the object > of the activity. If you think that I am just making > this up to make it sound like Activity Theory, have a > look at this paper which includes an extended quote > from a Finnish Hegelian who knows nothing about > Activity Theory and hates Marxism. > https://www.academia.edu/30657582/Response_to_Heikki_Ik%C3%A4heimo_on_Normative_Essentialism_ > > - the quote begins on the first page. > > Q: There are multiple objections, but perhaps the > biggest objection comes from 20th century social > science's preoccupation with social construction. In > this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, > subjective and maybe also intersubjective, but always > mediated (and some might say "derivative"). Hegel seems > to be offering a much different take - one in which > concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? > > Yes, Hegel is sometimes called an "objective > idealist." Ideas or thought is something which exists > in the world and only as a result of that are thinkers > able to grasp. The idea of Zeitgeist is well-known and > I don't see it as problematic, and just broaden that > to Geist and you have what Hegel is talking about, > literally. > > Q: And, what is this business about the "sublation of > mediation"? > > Everything Hegel says is very general, so it's hard to > paraphrase him without degrading his idea. But think > of this. A new practice (or technical tool, or word) > is invented in response to some situation; it then > becomes part of the world, and new situations. That's > what he means. In my answer to Q1 above there is > obviously a chicken-and-egg situation: activity is > conscious, but the content of consciousness is > objective activity. Sublation of mediation responds to > that chicken-and-egg problem. > > Does that help? > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 13/05/2017 5:27 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > So does your response mean that all of my > questions in my previous post are non-starters? > -greg > > On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 9:48 AM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Concepts are first of all things which exist; > because > they exist, the mind is capable of grasping > them, in > fact, they are exactly the way the mind grasps the > world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way > they exist is in human activity and the > artifacts we > use in that activity. Since you have made a > start on > this Greg, I have to say that I think you need > this > and also the section to follow called "The > Subjective > Notion" to get a decent picture. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel > text that you > suggested (I don't think you truly > appreciate how > slow of a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy > shared can > be found here: > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm > > > >), > and I came across this notion of The > Notion by Hegel > in Section 1279: > > "Now although it is true that the Notion > is to be > regarded, not merely as a subjective > presupposition > but as the /absolute foundation/, yet it > can be so > only in so far as it has /made/ itself the > foundation. Abstract immediacy is no doubt > a /first/; > > yet in so far as it is abstract it is, on the > contrary mediated, and therefore if it is > to be > grasped in its truth its foundation must > first be > sought. Hence this foundation, though > indeed an > immediate, must have made itself immediate > through > the sublation of mediation."? > > This seems core to the kind of realism > that Hegel is > building up (a realism of concepts) and, I > think, > remains a revolutionary conception today. > The idea > here seems to be that the Notion is not a > "subjective > presupposition" but is rather much more > real than > that. But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can > this be? > > There are multiple objections, but perhaps the > biggest objection comes from 20th century > social > science's preoccupation with social > construction. In > this tradition, concepts are things held > in the head, > subjective and maybe also intersubjective, > but always > mediated (and some might say > "derivative"). Hegel > seems to be offering a much different take > - one in > which concepts are much more primary. Am I > right here? > > And, what is this business about the > "sublation of > mediation"? (and where does this last bit > jibe with > CHAT? Many people in CHAT speak of > mediation but I > don't recall anyone speaking of the > "sublation of > mediation"). > > Any help with this text would be appreciated. > > (and this is closely related to "the stuff > of words" > but I still felt that this needed a new > thread.). > > -greg > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Fri May 12 20:41:21 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 13 May 2017 13:41:21 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's notion of The Notion In-Reply-To: References: <1a2f7456-4758-c5e6-1dca-e72ebcc49a54@mira.net> <33c01f54-8796-9607-55bf-525f925aaf7e@mira.net> Message-ID: The only truly universal is the material world, but insofar as we are concerned with a specific community (and Hegel does not take much interest in cross-cultural issues; he's generally dealing with a single community) the words in the language (not their meanings, just the material objects themselves) are universal as are the entire material infrastructure - the land, its crops and animals, the buildings, machinery etc. Different particular groups may have different access to those things, may use them differently, and they may mean different things, but there is still something there which is for everyone. But Universal does not really mean "material" because all these terms are to be interpreted as norms. The universal is the norm to which a material artefact is conforming or not. Does that make sense? But Universal does not mean Objective (this was A N Leontyev's main error, he confused the Universal with the Objective, which is why he comes across as so dogmatic and has such a thoroughgoing dualism in his thinking). Because the relation between the Universal and the Individual is mediated by the particular, that is, by Activity and social position. BTW, English translations of Hegel are translating the German Begriff as "Notion" and Begriff really means "Concept". Griffen means to grip, or grasp. Does that help? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 13/05/2017 1:20 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Well, I have to admit Andy, I didn't get very far with the > Hegel reading. And actually, I've read some of that > section before (perhaps at your suggestion some years > ago?). I had also previously had a look at your review of > Ikaheimo as well! But couldn't make much sense of either > text or what to do with what little I could comprehend. > > So maybe I can try and paraphrase the little that I can > squeeze out of Hegel with regard to his notion of the > notion (or should I say "his notion of the notion of the > notion"? viz. section 1291). > > As I understand it, for Hegel notions are objective > because they are Universal. By this I assume that he means > some kind of radical intersubjectivity. I assume that some > people interpret this as referring to some kind of > superaddressee like God or some such, but I assume that > you don't see it this way. So then how do you see it? What > does Hegel mean by "the Universal"? Is it the > intersubjectivity of some community? "universal" would > suggest a global community of all people, but, as an > anthropologist, that doesn't quite seem to hold muster. > > So, what does Hegel mean by "Universal"? > > Seems important to understanding the reality of the notion > but I may be on the wrong track, please feel free to > correct course if necessary. > > -greg > > > > > > On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 8:22 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > Not at all, Greg. I just appreciated that you were > turning to *read Hegel* to get your answers and I was > giving you time for that. Let me see ... > > Q: This seems core to the kind of realism that Hegel is > building up (a realism of concepts) and, I think, > remains a revolutionary conception today. The idea here > seems to be that the Notion is not a "subjective > presupposition" but is rather much more real than that. > But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can this be? > > Yes, utterly realistic. We live in a world in which > people share, more or less, a great range of beliefs > and importantly act according to those beliefs, so, > objectively, this world is one of activities, > including the artefacts incorporated in those > activities. The unit of all that activity is concepts > rather than things or acts. Each concept is implicit > in an aggregate of actions functioning as the object > of the activity. If you think that I am just making > this up to make it sound like Activity Theory, have a > look at this paper which includes an extended quote > from a Finnish Hegelian who knows nothing about > Activity Theory and hates Marxism. > https://www.academia.edu/30657582/Response_to_Heikki_Ik%C3%A4heimo_on_Normative_Essentialism_ > > - the quote begins on the first page. > > Q: There are multiple objections, but perhaps the > biggest objection comes from 20th century social > science's preoccupation with social construction. In > this tradition, concepts are things held in the head, > subjective and maybe also intersubjective, but always > mediated (and some might say "derivative"). Hegel seems > to be offering a much different take - one in which > concepts are much more primary. Am I right here? > > Yes, Hegel is sometimes called an "objective > idealist." Ideas or thought is something which exists > in the world and only as a result of that are thinkers > able to grasp. The idea of Zeitgeist is well-known and > I don't see it as problematic, and just broaden that > to Geist and you have what Hegel is talking about, > literally. > > Q: And, what is this business about the "sublation of > mediation"? > > Everything Hegel says is very general, so it's hard to > paraphrase him without degrading his idea. But think > of this. A new practice (or technical tool, or word) > is invented in response to some situation; it then > becomes part of the world, and new situations. That's > what he means. In my answer to Q1 above there is > obviously a chicken-and-egg situation: activity is > conscious, but the content of consciousness is > objective activity. Sublation of mediation responds to > that chicken-and-egg problem. > > Does that help? > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 13/05/2017 5:27 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Andy, > So does your response mean that all of my > questions in my previous post are non-starters? > -greg > > On Thu, May 11, 2017 at 9:48 AM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Concepts are first of all things which exist; > because > they exist, the mind is capable of grasping > them, in > fact, they are exactly the way the mind grasps the > world (etymologically concept = to grasp). The way > they exist is in human activity and the > artifacts we > use in that activity. Since you have made a > start on > this Greg, I have to say that I think you need > this > and also the section to follow called "The > Subjective > Notion" to get a decent picture. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 12/05/2017 1:40 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > ?Okay Andy, I've started into the Hegel > text that you > suggested (I don't think you truly > appreciate how > slow of a reader I am! BTW, the text Andy > shared can > be found here: > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlnotion.htm > > > >), > and I came across this notion of The > Notion by Hegel > in Section 1279: > > "Now although it is true that the Notion > is to be > regarded, not merely as a subjective > presupposition > but as the /absolute foundation/, yet it > can be so > only in so far as it has /made/ itself the > foundation. Abstract immediacy is no doubt > a /first/; > > yet in so far as it is abstract it is, on the > contrary mediated, and therefore if it is > to be > grasped in its truth its foundation must > first be > sought. Hence this foundation, though > indeed an > immediate, must have made itself immediate > through > the sublation of mediation."? > > This seems core to the kind of realism > that Hegel is > building up (a realism of concepts) and, I > think, > remains a revolutionary conception today. > The idea > here seems to be that the Notion is not a > "subjective > presupposition" but is rather much more > real than > that. But, I guess I'm wondering HOW can > this be? > > There are multiple objections, but perhaps the > biggest objection comes from 20th century > social > science's preoccupation with social > construction. In > this tradition, concepts are things held > in the head, > subjective and maybe also intersubjective, > but always > mediated (and some might say > "derivative"). Hegel > seems to be offering a much different take > - one in > which concepts are much more primary. Am I > right here? > > And, what is this business about the > "sublation of > mediation"? (and where does this last bit > jibe with > CHAT? Many people in CHAT speak of > mediation but I > don't recall anyone speaking of the > "sublation of > mediation"). > > Any help with this text would be appreciated. > > (and this is closely related to "the stuff > of words" > but I still felt that this needed a new > thread.). > > -greg > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat May 13 06:37:55 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 13 May 2017 06:37:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] UNICITY of acoustic and auditory Message-ID: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> David K, I do not want to interrupt the developing theme exploring the notion, the concept, and grasping. However I do want to continue the theme of developing from the natural/environmental to the iconic, indexical, and symbolic. You are exploring the sound scape of the transitions from natural sounds, through the voice tract (iconic) then the indexical, and the symbolic. Can we say you are exploring the development/ transition from the acoustic sound scape to the auditory sound scape? The acoustic sound scape that can be explored as occurring without mediation whereas exploring the vocal tract is iconic. David, it seems you are focusing upon this transition and discriminating the features that form a ?unicity? (an interactive process or trans/action) that is key for the developing personal/ity. You are developing your sensitivity to hear/discriminate these signals that indicate patterns within the developing sound scape (metaphor for place or context of situation) and the way meaning develops within this sound scape. We can put this question aside for now, but I hope we return to this exploration of transitions, unicity, and discriminating the acoustic/auditory sound scape. In the background I am holding open exploring reading (fluency) and the 3 qualities ? rate, accuracy, and prosody- As you mentioned, science lays out the *array* but teachers focus upon integrative unicity. However, teaching persons in schools now give lip service to prosody but focus on standardized measurements of (rate and accuracy). I believe your work may translate to exploring prosody as the KEY to persons acquiring reading fluency. I hope we can pick up this theme after exploring the notion of the concept Sent from my Windows 10 phone From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat May 13 16:32:48 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 14 May 2017 09:32:48 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: UNICITY of acoustic and auditory In-Reply-To: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry: I don't really believe in the slow method, or in Helena's one screen rule, or in the "one thread at a time" rule you imply here. Vygotsky liked to use the term *"*???????? ? ???????*?, *which I gather means something like "intertwined (interpersonally) and interwoven (socioculturally)," to refer to the way in which children are first entangled in family relations and then enloomed into social ones. It is interesting to me that people who are perfectly willing to tell teachers what to do and say will draw the line at trying to tell parents what to do and say with their kids. I guess a lifetime of witnessing botched attempts at language design has taught me to be sceptical of anything that tries to reduce the complexity of natural discourse in any way. It is like trying to design a spandrel, or plan a mutation. One reason why having more than one thread is an asset rather than a liability is that I myself am not particularly good at philosophy; I don't really understand the whole problem of developing from the natural/environmental to the iconic/indexical/symbolic. It seems to me that icons and indexes and symbols are all parts of nature, like physics, chemistry and biology. They are just different levels of organization. Maybe the problem arises from the terminology. Firstness, secondness, and thirdness comes from ancient Greek grammar. Buhler uses it to divide language into three functions: the expressive (first person), the co-native (first and second person) and the representational (first, second and third person). These are just ways of looking at any one piece of language. You can see it as expressing the first person's feelings, you can see it as a message in a dialogue, or you can see it as a message in a dialogue about some other object or person. In literacy, rate, accuracy and prosody are all behavioural characteristics. I don't really see how any of them can measure understanding, although if I had to choose I guess I would go for prosody. So for example last week in a seminar we were looking at two different ways of translating a Chinese commentary on an eighth century Buddhist sutra. The commentator is a member of the Southern School of Huineng, very hostile to the Northern School of Shenxiu (yes, they had partisan politics even then!) and so he says "Shenxiu never forgets himself". You can see: "Shenxiu never forgets HIMSELF" (i.e. he's a selfish guy) "Shenxiu never FORGETS himself" (i.e. he is marvellously self-possessed). But the real problem is not in the prosody--it's that the translator's wording is all wrong. If you look at the original Chinese, it means "Shenxiu never forgets about his self". The speaker, Xuanhua, is being expressive--he is expressing his loathing and hatred of Shenxiu and the Northerners. But he's also communicating--he is trying to convince his Southern brethren to agree to ostracize them. And of course he is talking to them about a third party. At no point is the language purely iconic, the way a sound stream is before it strikes the diaphragm in a microphone. To be language at all, it has to be symbolic. Sometimes, I think, the more heavily mediated lexicogrammatical road is actually the primary one, and the less heavily mediated prosodic path will only lead you astray. David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sat, May 13, 2017 at 11:37 PM, Lplarry wrote: > David K, > > I do not want to interrupt the developing theme exploring the notion, the > concept, and grasping. > However I do want to continue the theme of developing from the > natural/environmental to the iconic, indexical, and symbolic. > > You are exploring the sound scape of the transitions from natural sounds, > through the voice tract (iconic) then the indexical, and the symbolic. > > Can we say you are exploring the development/ transition from the > acoustic sound scape to the auditory sound scape? > The acoustic sound scape that can be explored as occurring without > mediation whereas exploring the vocal tract is iconic. > David, it seems you are focusing upon this transition and discriminating > the features that form a ?unicity? (an interactive process or trans/action) > that is key for the developing personal/ity. > You are developing your sensitivity to hear/discriminate these signals > that indicate patterns within the developing sound scape (metaphor for > place or context of situation) and the way meaning develops within this > sound scape. > > We can put this question aside for now, but I hope we return to this > exploration of transitions, unicity, and discriminating the > acoustic/auditory sound scape. > > In the background I am holding open exploring reading (fluency) and the 3 > qualities ? rate, accuracy, and prosody- > As you mentioned, science lays out the *array* but teachers focus upon > integrative unicity. > However, teaching persons in schools now give lip service to prosody but > focus on standardized measurements of (rate and accuracy). > > I believe your work may translate to exploring prosody as the KEY to > persons acquiring reading fluency. > > I hope we can pick up this theme after exploring the notion of the concept > > > > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon May 15 13:21:45 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 20:21:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Shpet's Inner form of the word In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> Does anyone know whether there is an English translation of Gustav Shpet?s book ?The inner form of the word?? I have a pdf of the Russian text, if anyone is looking for an interesting summer project! :) Martin From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed May 17 15:10:15 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 22:10:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two chapters on infancy: Martin From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed May 17 15:48:22 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 22:48:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co>, Message-ID: <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. I like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and cultural psychology. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two chapters on infancy: Martin From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed May 17 16:04:42 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 23:04:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <5D1EE4BD-7169-49C5-9167-994C1EFB2911@uniandes.edu.co> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, a number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. Martin On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. I like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and cultural psychology. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two chapters on infancy: Martin From mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br Wed May 17 16:10:48 2017 From: mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br (Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins) Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 20:10:48 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: B80udWer5w91CB80xdxwgH References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> B80udWer5w91CB80xdxwgH Message-ID: <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> Martin Thank you for the chapter. Maria -----Mensagem original----- De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] Em nome de Martin John Packer Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, a number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. Martin On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. I like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and cultural psychology. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two chapters on infancy: Martin From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Thu May 18 00:07:33 2017 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Thu, 18 May 2017 07:07:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Many thanks for sharing this, Martin, I look forward to reading the chapter and the book. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: 17 May 2017 23:10 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two chapters on infancy: Martin ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. 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From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu May 18 17:27:45 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 10:27:45 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> Message-ID: Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet schtick you are up to...?) Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to address the students with "You and we"). I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach anything to anybody in some honest way). You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: a) you have the age periods and b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. What do you think of this? Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: CNF: "Grandwe" One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete thinking) Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each finger. (Hard to read it, though....) -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > Martin > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > -----Mensagem original----- > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] > Em nome de Martin John Packer > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, > a > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > Martin > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. > I > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > cultural > psychology. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two > chapters on infancy: > > > > > Martin > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri May 19 08:45:42 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 15:45:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> Message-ID: <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> Hi David, Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; tell me what you think. Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and ?transition?: "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). Martin [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet schtick you are up to...?) Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to address the students with "You and we"). I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach anything to anybody in some honest way). You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: a) you have the age periods and b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. What do you think of this? Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: CNF: "Grandwe" One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete thinking) Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each finger. (Hard to read it, though....) -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: Martin Thank you for the chapter. Maria -----Mensagem original----- De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ mailman.ucsd.edu] Em nome de Martin John Packer Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, a number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. Martin On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. I like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and cultural psychology. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two chapters on infancy: Martin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: PastedGraphic-1.png Type: image/png Size: 237658 bytes Desc: PastedGraphic-1.png Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170519/608032fb/attachment.png From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri May 19 08:57:38 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 09:57:38 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> Message-ID: <84E37135-B950-48DB-AF36-D57EF142722F@gmail.com> David, I was reading through the first part of your ?The Great Globe?. Are you familiar with Wundt and does his work resonate with your focus on the simultaneous and the sequential in narrative and dialog? I don?t have time now to explain why I ask, but will be back later. I see that Martin has responded to your post with the link to ?The Great Globe?. Henry > On May 18, 2017, at 6:27 PM, David Kellogg wrote > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > schtick you are up to...?) > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to > address the students with "You and we"). > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > a) you have the age periods and > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > What do you think of this? > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > CNF: "Grandwe" > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > thinking) > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > >> Martin >> Thank you for the chapter. Maria >> >> -----Mensagem original----- >> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ >> mailman.ucsd.edu] >> Em nome de Martin John Packer >> Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 >> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural >> Perpsective >> >> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible >> except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, >> a >> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > wrote: >> >> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. >> I >> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising >> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and >> cultural >> psychology. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > >> on >> behalf of Martin John Packer >> > >> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective >> >> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: >> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the >> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. >> >> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two >> chapters on infancy: >> >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> From ablunden@mira.net Fri May 19 09:02:20 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 02:02:20 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> Like ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi David, > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; tell me what you think. > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and ?transition?: > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > Martin > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > schtick you are up to...?) > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to > address the students with "You and we"). > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > a) you have the age periods and > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > What do you think of this? > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > CNF: "Grandwe" > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > thinking) > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > Martin > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > -----Mensagem original----- > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] > Em nome de Martin John Packer > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, > a > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > Martin > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. > I > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > cultural > psychology. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two > chapters on infancy: > > > > > Martin > > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri May 19 14:34:42 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 15:34:42 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> Martin, I?m sorry, but I don?t think that diagram came through. Also I too am interested in what you think of Shpet. HJenry > On May 19, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Hi David, > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; tell me what you think. > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and ?transition?: > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > Martin > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > schtick you are up to...?) > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to > address the students with "You and we"). > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > a) you have the age periods and > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > What do you think of this? > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > CNF: "Grandwe" > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > thinking) > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > Martin > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > -----Mensagem original----- > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] > Em nome de Martin John Packer > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, > a > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > Martin > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. > I > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > cultural > psychology. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two > chapters on infancy: > > > > > Martin > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri May 19 14:51:41 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 21:51:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> Message-ID: Diagram attached, I hope. Martin > On May 19, 2017, at 4:34 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Martin, > I?m sorry, but I don?t think that diagram came through. Also I too am interested in what you think of Shpet. > HJenry > > >> On May 19, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> Hi David, >> >> Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; tell me what you think. >> >> Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World >> Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation >> Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations >> Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation >> Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are >> Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer >> Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality >> Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible >> The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? >> The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood >> >> The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and ?transition?: >> >> "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. >> >> "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? >> >> And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). >> >> Martin >> >> >> [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] >> >> On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: >> >> Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless >> too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet >> schtick you are up to...?) >> >> Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great >> We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He >> says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was >> there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to >> address the students with "You and we"). >> >> I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without >> vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach >> anything to anybody in some honest way). >> >> You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured >> that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of >> development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: >> >> a) you have the age periods and >> >> b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will >> correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. >> >> That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not >> to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der >> Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the >> age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's >> discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. >> >> What do you think of this? >> >> Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by >> intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" >> Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: >> CNF: "Grandwe" >> One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" >> Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally >> (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" >> Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" >> Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent >> ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" >> Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" >> School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually >> (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" >> Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" >> Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. >> CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete >> thinking) >> Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" >> >> You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each >> finger. (Hard to read it, though....) >> >> -- >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >> >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >> >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >> >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations >> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >> >> >> >> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < >> mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: >> >> Martin >> Thank you for the chapter. Maria >> >> -----Mensagem original----- >> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ >> mailman.ucsd.edu] >> Em nome de Martin John Packer >> Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 >> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural >> Perpsective >> >> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible >> except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, >> a >> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > wrote: >> >> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. >> I >> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising >> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and >> cultural >> psychology. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > >> on >> behalf of Martin John Packer >> > >> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective >> >> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: >> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the >> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. >> >> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two >> chapters on infancy: >> >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Stages & Crises.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 139098 bytes Desc: Stages & Crises.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170519/bef5c756/attachment-0001.pdf From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri May 19 15:05:53 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 16:05:53 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> Message-ID: <291962F8-8BC8-4617-87AF-8C27F69BB1CA@gmail.com> Got it, Martin! Thank you very much for sharing. (Sharing stage?) Just saying. Henry > On May 19, 2017, at 3:51 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Diagram attached, I hope. > > Martin > > >> On May 19, 2017, at 4:34 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> Martin, >> I?m sorry, but I don?t think that diagram came through. Also I too am interested in what you think of Shpet. >> HJenry >> >> >>> On May 19, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> Hi David, >>> >>> Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; tell me what you think. >>> >>> Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World >>> Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation >>> Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations >>> Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation >>> Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are >>> Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer >>> Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality >>> Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible >>> The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? >>> The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood >>> >>> The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and ?transition?: >>> >>> "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. >>> >>> "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? >>> >>> And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] >>> >>> On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: >>> >>> Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless >>> too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet >>> schtick you are up to...?) >>> >>> Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great >>> We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He >>> says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was >>> there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to >>> address the students with "You and we"). >>> >>> I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without >>> vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach >>> anything to anybody in some honest way). >>> >>> You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured >>> that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of >>> development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: >>> >>> a) you have the age periods and >>> >>> b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will >>> correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. >>> >>> That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not >>> to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der >>> Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the >>> age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's >>> discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. >>> >>> What do you think of this? >>> >>> Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by >>> intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" >>> Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: >>> CNF: "Grandwe" >>> One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" >>> Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally >>> (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" >>> Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" >>> Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent >>> ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" >>> Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" >>> School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually >>> (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" >>> Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" >>> Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. >>> CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete >>> thinking) >>> Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" >>> >>> You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each >>> finger. (Hard to read it, though....) >>> >>> -- >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >>> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >>> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >>> >>> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >>> >>> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >>> >>> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations >>> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >>> >>> Free E-print Downloadable at: >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < >>> mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: >>> >>> Martin >>> Thank you for the chapter. Maria >>> >>> -----Mensagem original----- >>> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ >>> mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> Em nome de Martin John Packer >>> Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 >>> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural >>> Perpsective >>> >>> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible >>> except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, >>> a >>> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>> > wrote: >>> >>> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. >>> I >>> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising >>> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and >>> cultural >>> psychology. >>> >>> Alfredo >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> > >>> on >>> behalf of Martin John Packer >>> > >>> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective >>> >>> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: >>> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the >>> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. >>> >>> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two >>> chapters on infancy: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri May 19 15:32:39 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 22:32:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co>, <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> Message-ID: <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but who still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder why these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can you clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" would be an adequate label for a reformation???) I can understand that there are different disciplines within developmental psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations that, " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" If these transitions truly are transitions for the child-caregiver-niche system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings with it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed with the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the issue of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is it about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed in and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based elementary school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a classroom, it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise my behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of listening, caring, orienting, responding). If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks in his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a means to achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, is it "age" periods what should be the focus? These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to learn from/with you all. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Like ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi David, > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; tell me what you think. > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and ?transition?: > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > Martin > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > schtick you are up to...?) > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to > address the students with "You and we"). > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > a) you have the age periods and > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > What do you think of this? > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > CNF: "Grandwe" > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > thinking) > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > Martin > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > -----Mensagem original----- > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] > Em nome de Martin John Packer > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, > a > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > Martin > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. > I > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > cultural > psychology. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two > chapters on infancy: > > > > > Martin > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri May 19 15:39:09 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 08:39:09 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> Message-ID: Thanks, Martin. I'm reading Vygotsky's lecture on "Negative Phases of the Transitional Age", i.e. adolescence. Its' a late lecture, a little under a year before he died. But in it he does argue that the central neoformation of adolescence isn't sexuality or teenage rebellion or any of the other behavioural symptoms that his colleagues were focused on. He wants something that can generalize to every other crisis as well, and he chooses what he calls "schizoticism" which is probably what we would call today "schizotypal personality disorder", except that for him it's not a disorder at all, an in fact he argues that it is the children who show only feeble schizotic symptoms or who refuse to show them who are seriously disordered. And he suggests that what generalizes to every other crisis is the notion of a house divided against itself, what he calls "??????? ? ???????????", or the concept of the differentiation, the division, the split, just as you say. Weirdly, I think that your stable periods don't link together so well. That's not just the lack of grammatical parallelism in the nomenclature ("infancy", "toddler[hood]", "early/middle childhood" "teenager[hood]"--I can see that you are trying to stay away from a nomenclature that implies schooling on the one hand and use common-sense folk categories on the other. I think it's because you are using a model of stable periods based on world-building rather than on language, and the worlds of "Greatwe", "irresistible invitations", "appearances", etc don't really seem linked the way that physical-biological-psychological differentiation are linked. Your stable periods work well for your project (yes, culture, but within that getting your students to rediscover both the strengths and weakness of Piaget). But I think they won't work so well for mine (yes, language, and within language and the "world-building" function of language, distinguishing what Halliday would call the Experiential rather than the Logical metafunction--the feeling/thought of what's happening rather than the whole question of how it all fits together.) I didn't really mean to inflict my book chapter on poor Henry--publishers are now trying to get authors to shoulder almost ALL of the sales as well as the editing work, and one of the things they do is provide all these neat links that you stick in your signature when you take part in a discussion list; my book sales have been, like two or three copies a year, so I thought I'd try it. I notice that (for all that real, unfeigned modesty and humility), Henry knows onewhole hell of a lot more about Langacker on the one hand and Wundt on the other than I do (I have read bits of both but I don't have anything like his understanding of either). But there really is something I really do share with Henry that I think explains right away how he responded to my book chapter. It's this: Vygotsky talks about "communication" and "generalization" (or "sharing" and "about that shared"); Halliday about "dialogue" and "narrative". It seems to me that by whatever name we give them, this linguistic woofing and warping are the weft that join the stable periods and the crises together. The difference is that during stable periods, the communication/sharing/dialogue threads are in front and the generalization/about-that-shared/narrative threads go in back. But during the crises, the child is trying to "turn the tables" on the environment, so that the child is source of development and the environment is site. During the crisis, we see all those loose threads, all those knots and breaks--and yet also, there is the same pattern, albeit like a photographic negative--in the back of the carpet. -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 7:51 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Diagram attached, I hope. > > Martin > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 4:34 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > Martin, > > I?m sorry, but I don?t think that diagram came through. Also I too am > interested in what you think of Shpet. > > HJenry > > > > > >> On May 19, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >> > >> Hi David, > >> > >> Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and > crises; tell me what you think. > >> > >> Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > >> Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > >> Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > >> Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > >> Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > >> Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > >> Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > >> Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > >> The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > >> The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > >> > >> The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed > to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say > about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole > chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and > ?transition?: > >> > >> "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the > form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in > the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way > of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a > new way of experiencing and understanding. > >> > >> "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > >> > >> And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > >> > >> On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >> > >> Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty > shameless > >> too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > >> schtick you are up to...?) > >> > >> Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains > "Great > >> We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot > wittier. He > >> says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" > was > >> there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes > to > >> address the students with "You and we"). > >> > >> I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > >> vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > >> anything to anybody in some honest way). > >> > >> You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky > measured > >> that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > >> development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > >> > >> a) you have the age periods and > >> > >> b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > >> correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > >> > >> That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is > not > >> to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > >> Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the > >> age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with > Vygotsky's > >> discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > >> > >> What do you think of this? > >> > >> Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > >> intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > >> Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > >> CNF: "Grandwe" > >> One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > >> Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > >> (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > >> Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: > "Pre-will" > >> Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically > dependent > >> ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > >> Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > >> School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > >> (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > >> Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > >> Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > >> CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > >> thinking) > >> Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > >> > >> You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along > each > >> finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > >> > >> -- > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > >> > >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: > >> > >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe- > and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > >> > >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > >> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > >> > >> Free E-print Downloadable at: > >> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > >> > >> > >> > >> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > >> mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > >> > >> Martin > >> Thank you for the chapter. Maria > >> > >> -----Mensagem original----- > >> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > >> mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> Em nome de Martin John Packer > >> Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > >> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > >> Perpsective > >> > >> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible > >> except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart > people, > >> a > >> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > >> > wrote: > >> > >> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks > great. > >> I > >> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, > emphasising > >> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > >> cultural > >> psychology. > >> > >> Alfredo > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> >> > >> on > >> behalf of Martin John Packer > >> > > >> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > >> > >> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child > Development: > >> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for > the > >> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > >> > >> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the > two > >> chapters on infancy: > >> > >> 43%20#preview> > >> > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri May 19 15:40:09 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 16:40:09 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <98479DAF-D4A9-4A7E-A3D3-39C77532B208@gmail.com> Grok > On May 19, 2017, at 4:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > > These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but who still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder why these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can you clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" would be an adequate label for a reformation???) > > I can understand that there are different disciplines within developmental psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations that, " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" > > If these transitions truly are transitions for the child-caregiver-niche system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings with it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed with the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the issue of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is it about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed in and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based elementary school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a classroom, it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise my behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of listening, caring, orienting, responding). > > If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks in his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a means to achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, is it "age" periods what should be the focus? > > These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to learn from/with you all. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective > > Like > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> Hi David, >> >> Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; tell me what you think. >> >> Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World >> Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation >> Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations >> Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation >> Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are >> Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer >> Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality >> Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible >> The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? >> The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood >> >> The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and ?transition?: >> >> "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. >> >> "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? >> >> And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). >> >> Martin >> >> >> [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] >> >> On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: >> >> Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless >> too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet >> schtick you are up to...?) >> >> Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great >> We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He >> says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was >> there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to >> address the students with "You and we"). >> >> I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without >> vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach >> anything to anybody in some honest way). >> >> You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured >> that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of >> development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: >> >> a) you have the age periods and >> >> b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will >> correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. >> >> That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not >> to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der >> Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the >> age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's >> discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. >> >> What do you think of this? >> >> Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by >> intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" >> Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: >> CNF: "Grandwe" >> One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" >> Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally >> (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" >> Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" >> Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent >> ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" >> Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" >> School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually >> (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" >> Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" >> Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. >> CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete >> thinking) >> Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" >> >> You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each >> finger. (Hard to read it, though....) >> >> -- >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >> >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >> >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >> >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations >> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >> >> >> >> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < >> mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: >> >> Martin >> Thank you for the chapter. Maria >> >> -----Mensagem original----- >> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ >> mailman.ucsd.edu] >> Em nome de Martin John Packer >> Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 >> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural >> Perpsective >> >> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible >> except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, >> a >> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > wrote: >> >> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. >> I >> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising >> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and >> cultural >> psychology. >> >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > >> on >> behalf of Martin John Packer >> > >> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective >> >> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: >> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the >> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. >> >> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two >> chapters on infancy: >> >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Fri May 19 15:43:31 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 22:43:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co>, <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net>, <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <1495233811813.42182@iped.uio.no> And, in anticipating the issue of concept development (for I am aware Vygotsky would note that it is the function of concept formation that marks the "end" of the stages), what are good examples of research linking changes in ideology with changes in child transitions? Thanks, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: 20 May 2017 00:32 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu; ablunden@mira.net Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but who still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder why these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can you clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" would be an adequate label for a reformation???) I can understand that there are different disciplines within developmental psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations that, " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" If these transitions truly are transitions for the child-caregiver-niche system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings with it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed with the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the issue of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is it about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed in and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based elementary school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a classroom, it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise my behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of listening, caring, orienting, responding). If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks in his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a means to achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, is it "age" periods what should be the focus? These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to learn from/with you all. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Like ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi David, > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; tell me what you think. > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and ?transition?: > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > Martin > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > schtick you are up to...?) > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to > address the students with "You and we"). > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > a) you have the age periods and > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > What do you think of this? > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > CNF: "Grandwe" > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > thinking) > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > Martin > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > -----Mensagem original----- > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] > Em nome de Martin John Packer > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, > a > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > Martin > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. > I > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > cultural > psychology. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two > chapters on infancy: > > > > > Martin > > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri May 19 16:02:22 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 17:02:22 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> Message-ID: David, Be mighty careful what you say or I?ll shamelessly show how little I know about Langacker or Wundt. But I used to swim in Langacker and Wundt was my best shot at indtroducing masters of yesteryear into the comprehensives for my doctorate in Educational Linguistics, a wonderful program co-founded at the University of New Mexico by Vera John-Steiner and the socio-linguists Bernard Spolsky back in about 1980. I have gotten out my comps and dissertation and am going to re-read them as I read and think about the latest threads on the chat, starting, I guess, with ?The stuff of words?. I guess I fancy myself a late-blooming philosopher. Like Andy, but with less ammo. I do best as a lurker. Peace on you all :) Henry > On May 19, 2017, at 4:39 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Thanks, Martin. I'm reading Vygotsky's lecture on "Negative Phases of the > Transitional Age", i.e. adolescence. Its' a late lecture, a little under a > year before he died. But in it he does argue that the central neoformation > of adolescence isn't sexuality or teenage rebellion or any of the other > behavioural symptoms that his colleagues were focused on. He wants > something that can generalize to every other crisis as well, and he chooses > what he calls "schizoticism" which is probably what we would call today > "schizotypal personality disorder", except that for him it's not a disorder > at all, an in fact he argues that it is the children who show only feeble > schizotic symptoms or who refuse to show them who are seriously disordered. > And he suggests that what generalizes to every other crisis is the notion > of a house divided against itself, what he calls "??????? ? ???????????", > or the concept of the differentiation, the division, the split, just as you > say. > > Weirdly, I think that your stable periods don't link together so well. > That's not just the lack of grammatical parallelism in the nomenclature > ("infancy", "toddler[hood]", "early/middle childhood" "teenager[hood]"--I > can see that you are trying to stay away from a nomenclature that implies > schooling on the one hand and use common-sense folk categories on the > other. I think it's because you are using a model of stable periods based > on world-building rather than on language, and the worlds of "Greatwe", > "irresistible invitations", "appearances", etc don't really seem linked the > way that physical-biological-psychological differentiation are linked. > > Your stable periods work well for your project (yes, culture, but within > that getting your students to rediscover both the strengths and weakness of > Piaget). But I think they won't work so well for mine (yes, language, and > within language and the "world-building" function of > language, distinguishing what Halliday would call the Experiential rather > than the Logical metafunction--the feeling/thought of what's happening > rather than the whole question of how it all fits together.) > > I didn't really mean to inflict my book chapter on poor Henry--publishers > are now trying to get authors to shoulder almost ALL of the sales as well > as the editing work, and one of the things they do is provide all these > neat links that you stick in your signature when you take part in a > discussion list; my book sales have been, like two or three copies a year, > so I thought I'd try it. I notice that (for all that real, unfeigned > modesty and humility), Henry knows onewhole hell of a lot more about > Langacker on the one hand and Wundt on the other than I do (I have read > bits of both but I don't have anything like his understanding of either). > > But there really is something I really do share with Henry that I think > explains right away how he responded to my book chapter. It's this: > Vygotsky talks about "communication" and "generalization" (or "sharing" and > "about that shared"); Halliday about "dialogue" and "narrative". It seems > to me that by whatever name we give them, this linguistic woofing and > warping are the weft that join the stable periods and the crises together. > > The difference is that during stable periods, the > communication/sharing/dialogue threads are in front and the > generalization/about-that-shared/narrative > threads go in back. But during the crises, the child is trying to "turn the > tables" on the environment, so that the child is source of development and > the environment is site. During the crisis, we see all those loose threads, > all those knots and breaks--and yet also, there is the same pattern, albeit > like a photographic negative--in the back of the carpet. > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 7:51 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Diagram attached, I hope. >> >> Martin >> >> >>> On May 19, 2017, at 4:34 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> >>> Martin, >>> I?m sorry, but I don?t think that diagram came through. Also I too am >> interested in what you think of Shpet. >>> HJenry >>> >>> >>>> On May 19, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi David, >>>> >>>> Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and >> crises; tell me what you think. >>>> >>>> Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World >>>> Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation >>>> Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations >>>> Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation >>>> Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are >>>> Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer >>>> Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality >>>> Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible >>>> The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? >>>> The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood >>>> >>>> The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed >> to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say >> about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole >> chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and >> ?transition?: >>>> >>>> "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the >> form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in >> the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way >> of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a >> new way of experiencing and understanding. >>>> >>>> "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A >> transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a >> dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she >> discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: >> of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child >> progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These >> transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole >> child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? >>>> >>>> And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I >> think the third should read Appearance & Reality). >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] >>>> >>>> On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: >>>> >>>> Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty >> shameless >>>> too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet >>>> schtick you are up to...?) >>>> >>>> Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains >> "Great >>>> We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot >> wittier. He >>>> says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" >> was >>>> there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes >> to >>>> address the students with "You and we"). >>>> >>>> I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without >>>> vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach >>>> anything to anybody in some honest way). >>>> >>>> You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky >> measured >>>> that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of >>>> development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: >>>> >>>> a) you have the age periods and >>>> >>>> b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will >>>> correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. >>>> >>>> That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is >> not >>>> to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der >>>> Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the >>>> age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with >> Vygotsky's >>>> discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. >>>> >>>> What do you think of this? >>>> >>>> Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by >>>> intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" >>>> Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: >>>> CNF: "Grandwe" >>>> One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" >>>> Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally >>>> (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" >>>> Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: >> "Pre-will" >>>> Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically >> dependent >>>> ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" >>>> Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" >>>> School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually >>>> (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" >>>> Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" >>>> Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. >>>> CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete >>>> thinking) >>>> Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" >>>> >>>> You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along >> each >>>> finger. (Hard to read it, though....) >>>> >>>> -- >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Macquarie University >>>> >>>> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >>>> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >>>> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >>>> >>>> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >>>> >>>> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe- >> and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >>>> >>>> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some >> Ruminations >>>> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >>>> >>>> Free E-print Downloadable at: >>>> >>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < >>>> mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> Thank you for the chapter. Maria >>>> >>>> -----Mensagem original----- >>>> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ >>>> mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> Em nome de Martin John Packer >>>> Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 >>>> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural >>>> Perpsective >>>> >>>> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible >>>> except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart >> people, >>>> a >>>> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks >> great. >>>> I >>>> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, >> emphasising >>>> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and >>>> cultural >>>> psychology. >>>> >>>> Alfredo >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>> >>>> on >>>> behalf of Martin John Packer >>>> > >>>> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural >> Perpsective >>>> >>>> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child >> Development: >>>> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for >> the >>>> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. >>>> >>>> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the >> two >>>> chapters on infancy: >>>> >>>> > 43%20#preview> >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri May 19 16:07:10 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 09:07:10 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <1495233811813.42182@iped.uio.no> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <1495233811813.42182@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Alfredo: Just two quick points, and then I shall get back to Vygotsky--we are having our weekly on-line seminar today here and in Seoul, and it's all about the Pedology of the Adolescent and "The Negative Phase of the Transitional Age". First--I don't think pre-life or any of the terms I offered are "adequate labels" for the neoformations. In fact, "neoformation" is not an adequate label either (Vygotsky takes it from geology!) In Vygotsky, the label is just a place holder, it's a kind of mnemonic, a way of remembering something that hasn't actually even been really said yet. "The word is only ready when the concept is," remember? Second--and relatedly--I don't think Vygotsky would agree that concept formation is the end of child development. Concept formation takes place in adolescence. But child development ends at eighteen, and there's a whole crisis at seventeen, to do with school leaving: the child is now intellectually independent, but entering a world where a good deal of that critical thinking that went into concept formation has to be utterly forgotten. Maybe that's the natural state of adult human beings--not a stable period, but a crisis, in which we are socio-economically independent, but ruthlessly exploited and brutally oppressed. But, as Vygotsky says, that is another form of development, not child development, and it obeys other laws. Adults are not senile children; they too have a future in mind. -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 8:43 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > And, in anticipating the issue of concept development (for I am aware > Vygotsky would note that it is the function of concept formation that marks > the "end" of the stages), what are good examples of research linking > changes in ideology with changes in child transitions? > > Thanks, > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Alfredo Jornet Gil > Sent: 20 May 2017 00:32 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu; ablunden@mira.net > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth > structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as > someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but who > still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder why > these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and > tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say > nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can you > clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" > would be an adequate label for a reformation???) > > I can understand that there are different disciplines within developmental > psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) > development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, > professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations that, > " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child but > in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" > > If these transitions truly are transitions for the child-caregiver-niche > system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings with > it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed with > the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the issue > of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is it > about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed in > and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my > participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based elementary > school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a classroom, > it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise my > behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of > listening, caring, orienting, responding). > > If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks in > his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a means to > achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, is > it "age" periods what should be the focus? > > These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to > learn from/with you all. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Like > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Hi David, > > > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and > crises; tell me what you think. > > > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to > treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about > each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter > to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and > ?transition?: > > > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the > form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in > the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way > of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a > new way of experiencing and understanding. > > > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > > > Martin > > > > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg dkellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty > shameless > > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > > schtick you are up to...?) > > > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains > "Great > > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. > He > > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" > was > > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes > to > > address the students with "You and we"). > > > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky > measured > > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > > > a) you have the age periods and > > > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is > not > > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the > > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with > Vygotsky's > > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > > > What do you think of this? > > > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > > CNF: "Grandwe" > > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" > > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent > > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > > thinking) > > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each > > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > > > -- > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > > > Martin > > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > > > -----Mensagem original----- > > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] > > Em nome de Martin John Packer > > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > Perpsective > > > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible > > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart > people, > > a > > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks > great. > > I > > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, > emphasising > > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > > cultural > > psychology. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> > > on > > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child > Development: > > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for > the > > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two > > chapters on infancy: > > > > book253543%20#preview> > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri May 19 16:18:53 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 23:18:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Hi Alfredo, I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? Martin A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to assume that the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that development is the process of the child achieving adult status. However, it should now be clear to the reader that human psychological development involves the entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to death. This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual who lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of reproduction in a community. There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see figure below), and this book has told only part of the story of the human life cycle. As young people become parents and then grandparents, or as they become teachers, coaches, or recognized community figures, their lives intersect and interact with those of children, both their own and those of other people. The stages from infant to adolescent are not separate and distinct from later stages of the lifecycle. We have seen that parents and caregivers play a crucial role in a young child?s development. Even death has an intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, albeit one that extends as a helix through time. Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence and independent authority, divide and multiply their being through relations with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire and lose the capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that the human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in many parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because nutrition and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into our genes. As a result, many infants will interact not only with parents but grandparents and even great-grandparents, as never before in human existence. This intergenerational contact and interaction creates opportunities for a variety of influences on the child, including mentorship, advice, alliances, and a richer density of social relations. On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but who still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder why these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can you clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" would be an adequate label for a reformation???) I can understand that there are different disciplines within developmental psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations that, " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" If these transitions truly are transitions for the child-caregiver-niche system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings with it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed with the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the issue of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is it about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed in and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based elementary school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a classroom, it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise my behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of listening, caring, orienting, responding). If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks in his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a means to achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, is it "age" periods what should be the focus? These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to learn from/with you all. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Like ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: Hi David, Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; tell me what you think. Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and ?transition?: "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). Martin [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet schtick you are up to...?) Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to address the students with "You and we"). I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach anything to anybody in some honest way). You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: a) you have the age periods and b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. What do you think of this? Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: CNF: "Grandwe" One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete thinking) Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each finger. (Hard to read it, though....) -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: Martin Thank you for the chapter. Maria -----Mensagem original----- De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ mailman.ucsd.edu] Em nome de Martin John Packer Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, a number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. Martin On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. I like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and cultural psychology. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two chapters on infancy: Martin From ablunden@mira.net Fri May 19 17:03:13 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 10:03:13 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <1495233811813.42182@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: "The word is almost always ready when the concept is" Yes? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/05/2017 9:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Alfredo: > > Just two quick points, and then I shall get back to Vygotsky--we are having > our weekly on-line seminar today here and in Seoul, and it's all about the > Pedology of the Adolescent and "The Negative Phase of the Transitional Age". > > First--I don't think pre-life or any of the terms I offered are "adequate > labels" for the neoformations. In fact, "neoformation" is not an adequate > label either (Vygotsky takes it from geology!) In Vygotsky, the label is > just a place holder, it's a kind of mnemonic, a way of remembering > something that hasn't actually even been really said yet. "The word is only > ready when the concept is," remember? > > ... From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat May 20 14:41:36 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 07:41:36 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <1495233811813.42182@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Yes, Vygotsky cites that passage in Tolstoy three times in Thinking and Speech (and he also cites it elsewhere, e.g. in "Thinking in School Age" in the Lectures on Pedology). But I don't want to be the fundamentalist on the list; I think it's more important to grasp the context in which he's citing this. It's always an emphasis on something Andy himself has often noted: Marx's remark that human beings set themselves only the tasks that they can solve (which is, after all, the whole basis for the zone of proximal development and the functional method of dual stimulation). It's not just that we don't perceive problems as problems until we perceive them as potentially soluble; it's also because objectively the solutions to problems evolve alongside the problems themselves. So that for example, as Ruqaiya Hasan remarks, the reason why language is able to fulfil so many of our needs is that many of those needs are created by language use. I think Vygotsky is saying the same thing about concepts; they only arise when the problems they solve have arisen in development. They do not arise simply because we teach the labels that they have, and they don't fail to arise just because we are not using the right label. In any case the idea that the word is only ready when the concept is (which I think is what Andy is objecting to, although it's hard to tell) is certainly implicit in the way Vygotsky names his own concepts: they only emerge when the content has become clear and the place in a system of concepts that have also emerged is established. Here's what Vygotsky says his report to the section on psychotechnics of the Communist Academy in November 1930: "I don't think that the adult never develops, but I think that he develops obeying other rules, and for this development the lines which characterize his development are different from those of that of the child, and it is the qualitative particularity of child development is the direct object of the pedologist. For me, to speak of a pedology of the adult is not only false from the point of view of the very name of pedology but above all from the point of view of isolating in a single unique line the process of child development and the process of adult transformation. I repeat: the same laws cannot embrace at one and the same time the internal changes in child development and the changes of later ages. It is not excluded for science, and for psychology in particular, to study those changes which are produced at ripe age or in old age, but I do not associate these two problematics and I don't think that this object belongs to the category of phenomena that pedology deals with. " (I'm taking this from a PhD thesis by Irina Leopoldoff-Martin of the University of Geneva, No 561, p. 287). On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 10:03 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > "The word is almost always ready when the concept is" Yes? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 20/05/2017 9:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Alfredo: >> >> Just two quick points, and then I shall get back to Vygotsky--we are >> having >> our weekly on-line seminar today here and in Seoul, and it's all about the >> Pedology of the Adolescent and "The Negative Phase of the Transitional >> Age". >> >> First--I don't think pre-life or any of the terms I offered are "adequate >> labels" for the neoformations. In fact, "neoformation" is not an adequate >> label either (Vygotsky takes it from geology!) In Vygotsky, the label is >> just a place holder, it's a kind of mnemonic, a way of remembering >> something that hasn't actually even been really said yet. "The word is >> only >> ready when the concept is," remember? >> >> ... >> > > -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat May 20 14:51:37 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 07:51:37 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Martin: This is from the Q&A at the Psychotechnic Conference in November 1930. Mikhaillov and Spielrein (Isaac, not Sabine) have just asked questions about the relationship of pedology to other sciences (especially lifelong education). Jerusalimcik: How does Comrade Vygotsky conceive of pedology: only as a science of the child or as a science of the development of the human being right to the end of his life? Vygotsky: Concerning the question of Comrade Jerusalimcik, is pedology the science of the child or of the development of the person right to the end of his life? I think--and, again, it seems to me that there is an objective basis for this idea--that pedology is the science of the child in development and not that of the person in development right to the end of his life. I think that those who wish to extend pedology from the cradle to the grave, those who want to put on the same plane the development of the child and the development which occurs with a child, without realizing it are making the same mistake that the old authors made when they said that the child is a small adult: that is, they deny the qualitative specificity of the process of development in the child compared to that processes and the changes that are produced in a situation that is relatively stable. On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Alfredo, > > I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? > > Martin > > > A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the > entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to assume that > the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that development > is the process of the child achieving adult status. However, it should now > be clear to the reader that human psychological development involves the > entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to death. > This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual who > lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of reproduction > in a community. > > There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see figure > below), and this book has told only part of the story of the human life > cycle. As young people become parents and then grandparents, or as they > become teachers, coaches, or recognized community figures, their lives > intersect and interact with those of children, both their own and those of > other people. The stages from infant to adolescent are not separate and > distinct from later stages of the lifecycle. We have seen that parents and > caregivers play a crucial role in a young child?s development. Even death > has an intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, albeit > one that extends as a helix through time. > > Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: > > persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence and > independent authority, divide and multiply their being through relations > with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire and lose the > capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) > > It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not > opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that the > human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in many > parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because nutrition > and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into our genes. As > a result, many infants will interact not only with parents but grandparents > and even great-grandparents, as never before in human existence. This > intergenerational contact and interaction creates opportunities for a > variety of influences on the child, including mentorship, advice, > alliances, and a richer density of social relations. > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth > structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as > someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but who > still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder why > these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and > tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say > nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can you > clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" > would be an adequate label for a reformation???) > > I can understand that there are different disciplines within developmental > psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) > development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, > professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations that, > " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child but > in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" > > If these transitions truly are transitions for the child-caregiver-niche > system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings with > it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed with > the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the issue > of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is it > about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed in > and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my > participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based elementary > school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a classroom, > it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise my > behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of > listening, caring, orienting, responding). > > If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks in > his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a means to > achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, is > it "age" periods what should be the focus? > > These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to > learn from/with you all. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu mailman.ucsd.edu> mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy Blunden ablunden@mira.net>> > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Like > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi David, > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; > tell me what you think. > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to > treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about > each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter > to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and > ?transition?: > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form > of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the > child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of > relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new > way of experiencing and understanding. > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > Martin > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > schtick you are up to...?) > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to > address the students with "You and we"). > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > a) you have the age periods and > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > What do you think of this? > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > CNF: "Grandwe" > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > thinking) > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > Martin > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > -----Mensagem original----- > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] > Em nome de Martin John Packer > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, > a > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > Martin > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. > I > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > cultural > psychology. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two > chapters on infancy: > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat May 20 15:55:58 2017 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 22:55:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <89097A69-684D-4619-9AF2-BF21A37E93A7@uniandes.edu.co> Interesting, David. I?m not sure that I agree with LSV?s answer, here, or in the passage you cite in your message to Andy. At least, if we are to equate pedology with developmental psychology, or with developmental science. For one thing, the situation of adulthood is certainly not always stable. For another, the ?line? of an adult's development may be different from that of a child, but I would have thought that Vygotsky himself would have agreed that there is no single line to the development of a child, or of children. The line of development, I think, varies from stage to stage, and from one developmental context to another. Martin On May 20, 2017, at 4:51 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: Martin: This is from the Q&A at the Psychotechnic Conference in November 1930. Mikhaillov and Spielrein (Isaac, not Sabine) have just asked questions about the relationship of pedology to other sciences (especially lifelong education). Jerusalimcik: How does Comrade Vygotsky conceive of pedology: only as a science of the child or as a science of the development of the human being right to the end of his life? Vygotsky: Concerning the question of Comrade Jerusalimcik, is pedology the science of the child or of the development of the person right to the end of his life? I think--and, again, it seems to me that there is an objective basis for this idea--that pedology is the science of the child in development and not that of the person in development right to the end of his life. I think that those who wish to extend pedology from the cradle to the grave, those who want to put on the same plane the development of the child and the development which occurs with a child, without realizing it are making the same mistake that the old authors made when they said that the child is a small adult: that is, they deny the qualitative specificity of the process of development in the child compared to that processes and the changes that are produced in a situation that is relatively stable. On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: Hi Alfredo, I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? Martin A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to assume that the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that development is the process of the child achieving adult status. However, it should now be clear to the reader that human psychological development involves the entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to death. This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual who lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of reproduction in a community. There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see figure below), and this book has told only part of the story of the human life cycle. As young people become parents and then grandparents, or as they become teachers, coaches, or recognized community figures, their lives intersect and interact with those of children, both their own and those of other people. The stages from infant to adolescent are not separate and distinct from later stages of the lifecycle. We have seen that parents and caregivers play a crucial role in a young child?s development. Even death has an intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, albeit one that extends as a helix through time. Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence and independent authority, divide and multiply their being through relations with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire and lose the capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that the human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in many parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because nutrition and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into our genes. As a result, many infants will interact not only with parents but grandparents and even great-grandparents, as never before in human existence. This intergenerational contact and interaction creates opportunities for a variety of influences on the child, including mentorship, advice, alliances, and a richer density of social relations. On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but who still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder why these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can you clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" would be an adequate label for a reformation???) I can understand that there are different disciplines within developmental psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations that, " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" If these transitions truly are transitions for the child-caregiver-niche system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings with it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed with the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the issue of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is it about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed in and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based elementary school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a classroom, it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise my behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of listening, caring, orienting, responding). If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks in his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a means to achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, is it "age" periods what should be the focus? These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to learn from/with you all. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> >> on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Like ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: Hi David, Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; tell me what you think. Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and ?transition?: "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). Martin [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet schtick you are up to...?) Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to address the students with "You and we"). I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach anything to anybody in some honest way). You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: a) you have the age periods and b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. What do you think of this? Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: CNF: "Grandwe" One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete thinking) Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each finger. (Hard to read it, though....) -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: Martin Thank you for the chapter. Maria -----Mensagem original----- De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ mailman.ucsd.edu] Em nome de Martin John Packer Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, a number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. Martin On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. I like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and cultural psychology. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two chapters on infancy: Martin -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat May 20 16:29:52 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 16:29:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> Message-ID: David- I stumbled into this conversation tardily but hope one day to get more deeply into the topics raised around the Vygtosky texts. In trying to follow the argument, i would be helped enormously if it were possible to site the sources of the texts in a way that is readily accessible. If I want to read "Negative Phases of the Transitional Age", ?for example, is there a web site or an English language where one can go to read larger segments of the text? Access to the texts would help enormously in getting us, more or less, on the same page, both metaphorically and digitally at the same time. If this is complicated, perhaps Alfredo could organize a simple way to allow people rapid access to the texts. The time appears ripe to consider the question of the bio-social-cultural nature of human development again. Your careful work with the pedagogical essays appears to be a key text in figuring out Vygotsky's views and our own. At present i am trying to think my way through this terrain in order to put together a talk at the Piaget Society meetings in early June. Roy Pea and I are giving a talk there?. The conference theme is "technology and development." Quite naturally there is a great deal of overlap between that topic and this conversation. Being able to explore that overlap more closely would certainly be useful, personally speaking. mike On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 3:39 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Thanks, Martin. I'm reading Vygotsky's lecture on "Negative Phases of the > Transitional Age", i.e. adolescence. Its' a late lecture, a little under a > year before he died. But in it he does argue that the central neoformation > of adolescence isn't sexuality or teenage rebellion or any of the other > behavioural symptoms that his colleagues were focused on. He wants > something that can generalize to every other crisis as well, and he chooses > what he calls "schizoticism" which is probably what we would call today > "schizotypal personality disorder", except that for him it's not a disorder > at all, an in fact he argues that it is the children who show only feeble > schizotic symptoms or who refuse to show them who are seriously disordered. > And he suggests that what generalizes to every other crisis is the notion > of a house divided against itself, what he calls "??????? ? ???????????", > or the concept of the differentiation, the division, the split, just as you > say. > > Weirdly, I think that your stable periods don't link together so well. > That's not just the lack of grammatical parallelism in the nomenclature > ("infancy", "toddler[hood]", "early/middle childhood" "teenager[hood]"--I > can see that you are trying to stay away from a nomenclature that implies > schooling on the one hand and use common-sense folk categories on the > other. I think it's because you are using a model of stable periods based > on world-building rather than on language, and the worlds of "Greatwe", > "irresistible invitations", "appearances", etc don't really seem linked the > way that physical-biological-psychological differentiation are linked. > > Your stable periods work well for your project (yes, culture, but within > that getting your students to rediscover both the strengths and weakness of > Piaget). But I think they won't work so well for mine (yes, language, and > within language and the "world-building" function of > language, distinguishing what Halliday would call the Experiential rather > than the Logical metafunction--the feeling/thought of what's happening > rather than the whole question of how it all fits together.) > > I didn't really mean to inflict my book chapter on poor Henry--publishers > are now trying to get authors to shoulder almost ALL of the sales as well > as the editing work, and one of the things they do is provide all these > neat links that you stick in your signature when you take part in a > discussion list; my book sales have been, like two or three copies a year, > so I thought I'd try it. I notice that (for all that real, unfeigned > modesty and humility), Henry knows onewhole hell of a lot more about > Langacker on the one hand and Wundt on the other than I do (I have read > bits of both but I don't have anything like his understanding of either). > > But there really is something I really do share with Henry that I think > explains right away how he responded to my book chapter. It's this: > Vygotsky talks about "communication" and "generalization" (or "sharing" and > "about that shared"); Halliday about "dialogue" and "narrative". It seems > to me that by whatever name we give them, this linguistic woofing and > warping are the weft that join the stable periods and the crises together. > > The difference is that during stable periods, the > communication/sharing/dialogue threads are in front and the > generalization/about-that-shared/narrative > threads go in back. But during the crises, the child is trying to "turn the > tables" on the environment, so that the child is source of development and > the environment is site. During the crisis, we see all those loose threads, > all those knots and breaks--and yet also, there is the same pattern, albeit > like a photographic negative--in the back of the carpet. > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 7:51 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > wrote: > > > Diagram attached, I hope. > > > > Martin > > > > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 4:34 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > > Martin, > > > I?m sorry, but I don?t think that diagram came through. Also I too am > > interested in what you think of Shpet. > > > HJenry > > > > > > > > >> On May 19, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > >> > > >> Hi David, > > >> > > >> Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and > > crises; tell me what you think. > > >> > > >> Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > > >> Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > > >> Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > > >> Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > > >> Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > > >> Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > > >> Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > > >> Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > > >> The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > > >> The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > >> > > >> The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed > > to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say > > about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole > > chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and > > ?transition?: > > >> > > >> "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the > > form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also > in > > the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way > > of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a > > new way of experiencing and understanding. > > >> > > >> "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a > > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of > herself: > > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the > child > > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > >> > > >> And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence > (I > > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> > > >> [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > >> > > >> On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > >> > > >> Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty > > shameless > > >> too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > > >> schtick you are up to...?) > > >> > > >> Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains > > "Great > > >> We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot > > wittier. He > > >> says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" > > was > > >> there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky > likes > > to > > >> address the students with "You and we"). > > >> > > >> I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > > >> vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > > >> anything to anybody in some honest way). > > >> > > >> You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky > > measured > > >> that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > > >> development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > >> > > >> a) you have the age periods and > > >> > > >> b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > > >> correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > >> > > >> That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is > > not > > >> to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van > der > > >> Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take > the > > >> age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with > > Vygotsky's > > >> discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > >> > > >> What do you think of this? > > >> > > >> Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > > >> intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > > >> Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > > >> CNF: "Grandwe" > > >> One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > > >> Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > > >> (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > > >> Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: > > "Pre-will" > > >> Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically > > dependent > > >> ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > > >> Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: > "Pre-me" > > >> School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > > >> (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > > >> Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: > "Pre-concepts" > > >> Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically > dependent. > > >> CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > > >> thinking) > > >> Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > >> > > >> You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along > > each > > >> finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > >> > > >> -- > > >> David Kellogg > > >> Macquarie University > > >> > > >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > >> > > >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > >> > > >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe- > > and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > >> > > >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > Ruminations > > >> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > >> > > >> Free E-print Downloadable at: > > >> > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > > >> mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > >> > > >> -----Mensagem original----- > > >> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > >> mailman.ucsd.edu] > > >> Em nome de Martin John Packer > > >> Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > > >> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > >> Perpsective > > >> > > >> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been > possible > > >> except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart > > people, > > >> a > > >> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > >> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks > > great. > > >> I > > >> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, > > emphasising > > >> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > > >> cultural > > >> psychology. > > >> > > >> Alfredo > > >> ________________________________________ > > >> From: > > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu mailman.ucsd.edu> > > >> mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> > > >> on > > >> behalf of Martin John Packer > > >> > > > >> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > Perpsective > > >> > > >> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child > > Development: > > >> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 > for > > the > > >> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > >> > > >> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the > > two > > >> chapters on infancy: > > >> > > >> > 43%20#preview> > > >> > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat May 20 16:44:40 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 16:44:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> Message-ID: Ah, once in this tread I see how relevant it is. For now, I repeat the epigraph in the chapter on development in adulthood in the early versions of the cole & cole book on development. *?We are born one time only, we can never start a new life equipped with the experience we've gained from the previous one. We leave childhood without knowing what youth is, we marry without knowing what it is to be married, and even when we enter old age, we don't know what it is we're heading for: the old are innocent children innocent of their old age. In that sense, man's world is the planet of inexperience?-* Milan Kundera, The art of the novel. This passage fits my experience and may or may not resonate with yours. I think there are some pretty good theoretical reasons to think that it may bespeak an important continuity in development. Maybe ontogeny can usefully be thought of as a functional system for the reproduction of the human society. Gives grandma and grandpa something to worry about as they wile away their days. :-) mike On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 4:29 PM, mike cole wrote: > David- I stumbled into this conversation tardily but hope one day to get > more deeply into the topics raised around the Vygtosky texts. In trying to > follow the argument, i would be helped enormously if it were possible to > site the sources of the texts in a way that is readily accessible. If I > want to read "Negative Phases of the > Transitional Age", > ?for example, is there a web site or an English language where one can go > to read larger segments of the text? > > Access to the texts would help enormously in getting us, more or less, on > the same page, both metaphorically and digitally at the same time. > > If this is complicated, perhaps Alfredo could organize a simple way to > allow people rapid access to the texts. > > The time appears ripe to consider the question of the bio-social-cultural > nature of human development again. > Your careful work with the pedagogical essays appears to be a key text in > figuring out Vygotsky's views and our own. > > At present i am trying to think my way through this terrain in order to > put together a talk at the Piaget Society meetings in early June. Roy Pea > and I are giving a talk there?. The conference theme is "technology and > development." > > Quite naturally there is a great deal of overlap between that topic and > this conversation. Being able to explore that overlap more closely would > certainly be useful, personally speaking. > > mike > > On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 3:39 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >> Thanks, Martin. I'm reading Vygotsky's lecture on "Negative Phases of the >> Transitional Age", i.e. adolescence. Its' a late lecture, a little under a >> year before he died. But in it he does argue that the central neoformation >> of adolescence isn't sexuality or teenage rebellion or any of the other >> behavioural symptoms that his colleagues were focused on. He wants >> something that can generalize to every other crisis as well, and he >> chooses >> what he calls "schizoticism" which is probably what we would call today >> "schizotypal personality disorder", except that for him it's not a >> disorder >> at all, an in fact he argues that it is the children who show only feeble >> schizotic symptoms or who refuse to show them who are seriously >> disordered. >> And he suggests that what generalizes to every other crisis is the notion >> of a house divided against itself, what he calls "??????? ? ???????????", >> or the concept of the differentiation, the division, the split, just as >> you >> say. >> >> Weirdly, I think that your stable periods don't link together so well. >> That's not just the lack of grammatical parallelism in the nomenclature >> ("infancy", "toddler[hood]", "early/middle childhood" "teenager[hood]"--I >> can see that you are trying to stay away from a nomenclature that implies >> schooling on the one hand and use common-sense folk categories on the >> other. I think it's because you are using a model of stable periods based >> on world-building rather than on language, and the worlds of "Greatwe", >> "irresistible invitations", "appearances", etc don't really seem linked >> the >> way that physical-biological-psychological differentiation are linked. >> >> Your stable periods work well for your project (yes, culture, but within >> that getting your students to rediscover both the strengths and weakness >> of >> Piaget). But I think they won't work so well for mine (yes, language, and >> within language and the "world-building" function of >> language, distinguishing what Halliday would call the Experiential rather >> than the Logical metafunction--the feeling/thought of what's happening >> rather than the whole question of how it all fits together.) >> >> I didn't really mean to inflict my book chapter on poor Henry--publishers >> are now trying to get authors to shoulder almost ALL of the sales as well >> as the editing work, and one of the things they do is provide all these >> neat links that you stick in your signature when you take part in a >> discussion list; my book sales have been, like two or three copies a year, >> so I thought I'd try it. I notice that (for all that real, unfeigned >> modesty and humility), Henry knows onewhole hell of a lot more about >> Langacker on the one hand and Wundt on the other than I do (I have read >> bits of both but I don't have anything like his understanding of either). >> >> But there really is something I really do share with Henry that I think >> explains right away how he responded to my book chapter. It's this: >> Vygotsky talks about "communication" and "generalization" (or "sharing" >> and >> "about that shared"); Halliday about "dialogue" and "narrative". It seems >> to me that by whatever name we give them, this linguistic woofing and >> warping are the weft that join the stable periods and the crises together. >> >> The difference is that during stable periods, the >> communication/sharing/dialogue threads are in front and the >> generalization/about-that-shared/narrative >> threads go in back. But during the crises, the child is trying to "turn >> the >> tables" on the environment, so that the child is source of development and >> the environment is site. During the crisis, we see all those loose >> threads, >> all those knots and breaks--and yet also, there is the same pattern, >> albeit >> like a photographic negative--in the back of the carpet. >> -- >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >> >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >> >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- >> globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >> >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations >> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >> On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 7:51 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >> > wrote: >> >> > Diagram attached, I hope. >> > >> > Martin >> > >> > >> > > On May 19, 2017, at 4:34 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >> > > >> > > Martin, >> > > I?m sorry, but I don?t think that diagram came through. Also I too am >> > interested in what you think of Shpet. >> > > HJenry >> > > >> > > >> > >> On May 19, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Martin John Packer < >> > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >> > >> >> > >> Hi David, >> > >> >> > >> Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and >> > crises; tell me what you think. >> > >> >> > >> Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World >> > >> Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation >> > >> Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations >> > >> Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation >> > >> Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are >> > >> Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer >> > >> Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality >> > >> Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible >> > >> The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? >> > >> The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood >> > >> >> > >> The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed >> > to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say >> > about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole >> > chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? >> and >> > ?transition?: >> > >> >> > >> "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the >> > form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also >> in >> > the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific >> way >> > of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a >> > new way of experiencing and understanding. >> > >> >> > >> "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A >> > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is >> a >> > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she >> > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of >> herself: >> > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the >> child >> > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These >> > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole >> > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? >> > >> >> > >> And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence >> (I >> > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). >> > >> >> > >> Martin >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] >> > >> >> > >> On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > > > wrote: >> > >> >> > >> Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty >> > shameless >> > >> too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet >> > >> schtick you are up to...?) >> > >> >> > >> Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains >> > "Great >> > >> We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot >> > wittier. He >> > >> says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the >> "we" >> > was >> > >> there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky >> likes >> > to >> > >> address the students with "You and we"). >> > >> >> > >> I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without >> > >> vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to >> teach >> > >> anything to anybody in some honest way). >> > >> >> > >> You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky >> > measured >> > >> that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of >> > >> development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: >> > >> >> > >> a) you have the age periods and >> > >> >> > >> b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will >> > >> correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. >> > >> >> > >> That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies >> is >> > not >> > >> to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van >> der >> > >> Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take >> the >> > >> age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with >> > Vygotsky's >> > >> discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. >> > >> >> > >> What do you think of this? >> > >> >> > >> Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by >> > >> intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" >> > >> Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: >> > >> CNF: "Grandwe" >> > >> One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" >> > >> Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally >> > >> (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" >> > >> Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: >> > "Pre-will" >> > >> Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically >> > dependent >> > >> ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" >> > >> Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: >> "Pre-me" >> > >> School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually >> > >> (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" >> > >> Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: >> "Pre-concepts" >> > >> Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically >> dependent. >> > >> CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete >> > >> thinking) >> > >> Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" >> > >> >> > >> You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along >> > each >> > >> finger. (Hard to read it, though....) >> > >> >> > >> -- >> > >> David Kellogg >> > >> Macquarie University >> > >> >> > >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >> > >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >> > >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >> > >> >> > >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >> > >> >> > >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe- >> > and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >> > >> >> > >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some >> > Ruminations >> > >> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >> > >> >> > >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> > >> >> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < >> > >> mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: >> > >> >> > >> Martin >> > >> Thank you for the chapter. Maria >> > >> >> > >> -----Mensagem original----- >> > >> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ >> > >> mailman.ucsd.edu] >> > >> Em nome de Martin John Packer >> > >> Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 >> > >> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > >> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural >> > >> Perpsective >> > >> >> > >> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been >> possible >> > >> except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart >> > people, >> > >> a >> > >> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. >> > >> >> > >> Martin >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > >> > wrote: >> > >> >> > >> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks >> > great. >> > >> I >> > >> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, >> > emphasising >> > >> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and >> > >> cultural >> > >> psychology. >> > >> >> > >> Alfredo >> > >> ________________________________________ >> > >> From: >> > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> n.ucsd.edu> >> > >> > an.ucsd.edu >> > >> >> > >> on >> > >> behalf of Martin John Packer >> > >> > >> > >> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 >> > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural >> > Perpsective >> > >> >> > >> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child >> > Development: >> > >> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 >> for >> > the >> > >> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. >> > >> >> > >> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the >> > two >> > >> chapters on infancy: >> > >> >> > >> > > 43%20#preview> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> Martin >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Sat May 20 16:48:11 2017 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 19:48:11 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <89097A69-684D-4619-9AF2-BF21A37E93A7@uniandes.edu.co> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <89097A69-684D-4619-9AF2-BF21A37E93A7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <004c01d2d1c3$8b306c00$a1914400$@att.net> A tad tangential, but maybe interesting nevertheless: "4-Year-Olds Don?t Act Like Donald Trump By ALISON GOPNIK Comparing our president to a child is inaccurate and unfair to children." Etc. at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/opinion/sunday/4-year-olds-children-trump-gopnik.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col-top-region®ion=opinion-c-col-top-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-top-region Peg -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Saturday, May 20, 2017 6:56 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Interesting, David. I?m not sure that I agree with LSV?s answer, here, or in the passage you cite in your message to Andy. At least, if we are to equate pedology with developmental psychology, or with developmental science. For one thing, the situation of adulthood is certainly not always stable. For another, the ?line? of an adult's development may be different from that of a child, but I would have thought that Vygotsky himself would have agreed that there is no single line to the development of a child, or of children. The line of development, I think, varies from stage to stage, and from one developmental context to another. Martin On May 20, 2017, at 4:51 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: Martin: This is from the Q&A at the Psychotechnic Conference in November 1930. Mikhaillov and Spielrein (Isaac, not Sabine) have just asked questions about the relationship of pedology to other sciences (especially lifelong education). Jerusalimcik: How does Comrade Vygotsky conceive of pedology: only as a science of the child or as a science of the development of the human being right to the end of his life? Vygotsky: Concerning the question of Comrade Jerusalimcik, is pedology the science of the child or of the development of the person right to the end of his life? I think--and, again, it seems to me that there is an objective basis for this idea--that pedology is the science of the child in development and not that of the person in development right to the end of his life. I think that those who wish to extend pedology from the cradle to the grave, those who want to put on the same plane the development of the child and the development which occurs with a child, without realizing it are making the same mistake that the old authors made when they said that the child is a small adult: that is, they deny the qualitative specificity of the process of development in the child compared to that processes and the changes that are produced in a situation that is relatively stable. On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: Hi Alfredo, I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? Martin A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to assume that the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that development is the process of the child achieving adult status. However, it should now be clear to the reader that human psychological development involves the entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to death. This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual who lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of reproduction in a community. There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see figure below), and this book has told only part of the story of the human life cycle. As young people become parents and then grandparents, or as they become teachers, coaches, or recognized community figures, their lives intersect and interact with those of children, both their own and those of other people. The stages from infant to adolescent are not separate and distinct from later stages of the lifecycle. We have seen that parents and caregivers play a crucial role in a young child?s development. Even death has an intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, albeit one that extends as a helix through time. Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence and independent authority, divide and multiply their being through relations with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire and lose the capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that the human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in many parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because nutrition and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into our genes. As a result, many infants will interact not only with parents but grandparents and even great-grandparents, as never before in human existence. This intergenerational contact and interaction creates opportunities for a variety of influences on the child, including mentorship, advice, alliances, and a richer density of social relations. On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but who still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder why these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can you clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" would be an adequate label for a reformation???) I can understand that there are different disciplines within developmental psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations that, " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" If these transitions truly are transitions for the child-caregiver-niche system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings with it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed with the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the issue of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is it about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed in and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based elementary school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a classroom, it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise my behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of listening, caring, orienting, responding). If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks in his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a means to achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, is it "age" periods what should be the focus? These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to learn from/with you all. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> >> on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Like ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: Hi David, Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; tell me what you think. Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and ?transition?: "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). Martin [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet schtick you are up to...?) Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to address the students with "You and we"). I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach anything to anybody in some honest way). You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: a) you have the age periods and b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. What do you think of this? Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: CNF: "Grandwe" One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete thinking) Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each finger. (Hard to read it, though....) -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: Martin Thank you for the chapter. Maria -----Mensagem original----- De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ mailman.ucsd.edu] Em nome de Martin John Packer Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, a number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. Martin On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. I like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and cultural psychology. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two chapters on infancy: Martin -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat May 20 17:06:39 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 17:06:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <004c01d2d1c3$8b306c00$a1914400$@att.net> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <89097A69-684D-4619-9AF2-BF21A37E93A7@uniandes.edu.co> <004c01d2d1c3$8b306c00$a1914400$@att.net> Message-ID: :-) Lets hear it for children's rights, Peg! mike On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 4:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > A tad tangential, but maybe interesting nevertheless: > "4-Year-Olds Don?t Act Like Donald Trump By ALISON GOPNIK Comparing our > president to a child is inaccurate and unfair to children." > Etc. at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/opinion/sunday/4-year- > olds-children-trump-gopnik.html?action=click&pgtype= > Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col- > top-region®ion=opinion-c-col-top-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-top-region > > Peg > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Saturday, May 20, 2017 6:56 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Interesting, David. I?m not sure that I agree with LSV?s answer, here, or > in the passage you cite in your message to Andy. At least, if we are to > equate pedology with developmental psychology, or with developmental > science. For one thing, the situation of adulthood is certainly not always > stable. For another, the ?line? of an adult's development may be different > from that of a child, but I would have thought that Vygotsky himself would > have agreed that there is no single line to the development of a child, or > of children. The line of development, I think, varies from stage to stage, > and from one developmental context to another. > > Martin > > > > > On May 20, 2017, at 4:51 PM, David Kellogg kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Martin: > > This is from the Q&A at the Psychotechnic Conference in November 1930. > Mikhaillov and Spielrein (Isaac, not Sabine) have just asked questions > about the relationship of pedology to other sciences (especially lifelong > education). > > Jerusalimcik: How does Comrade Vygotsky conceive of pedology: only as a > science of the child or as a science of the development of the human being > right to the end of his life? > > Vygotsky: Concerning the question of Comrade Jerusalimcik, is pedology the > science of the child or of the development of the person right to the end > of his life? I think--and, again, it seems to me that there is an objective > basis for this idea--that pedology is the science of the child in > development and not that of the person in development right to the end of > his life. I think that those who wish to extend pedology from the cradle to > the grave, those who want to put on the same plane the development of the > child and the development which occurs with a child, without realizing it > are making the same mistake that the old authors made when they said that > the child is a small adult: that is, they deny the qualitative specificity > of the process of development in the child compared to that processes and > the changes that are produced in a situation that is relatively stable. > > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > wrote: > > Hi Alfredo, > > I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? > > Martin > > > A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the > entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to assume that > the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that development > is the process of the child achieving adult status. However, it should now > be clear to the reader that human psychological development involves the > entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to death. > This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual who > lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of reproduction > in a community. > > There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see figure > below), and this book has told only part of the story of the human life > cycle. As young people become parents and then grandparents, or as they > become teachers, coaches, or recognized community figures, their lives > intersect and interact with those of children, both their own and those of > other people. The stages from infant to adolescent are not separate and > distinct from later stages of the lifecycle. We have seen that parents and > caregivers play a crucial role in a young child?s development. Even death > has an intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, albeit > one that extends as a helix through time. > > Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: > > persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence and > independent authority, divide and multiply their being through relations > with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire and lose the > capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) > > It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not > opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that the > human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in many > parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because nutrition > and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into our genes. As > a result, many infants will interact not only with parents but grandparents > and even great-grandparents, as never before in human existence. This > intergenerational contact and interaction creates opportunities for a > variety of influences on the child, including mentorship, advice, > alliances, and a richer density of social relations. > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth > structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as > someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but who > still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder why > these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and > tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say > nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can you > clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" > would be an adequate label for a reformation???) > > I can understand that there are different disciplines within developmental > psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) > development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, > professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations that, > " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child but > in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" > > If these transitions truly are transitions for the child-caregiver-niche > system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings with > it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed with > the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the issue > of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is it > about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed in > and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my > participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based elementary > school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a classroom, > it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise my > behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of > listening, caring, orienting, responding). > > If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks in > his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a means to > achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, is > it "age" periods what should be the focus? > > These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to > learn from/with you all. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu mailman.ucsd.edu> mailman.ucsd.edu> edu mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net ablunden@mira.net>> > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Like > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi David, > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; > tell me what you think. > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World Infancy - Towards > Biological Differentiation Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible > Invitations Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation Early > Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are Early Childhood - Towards > Inner and Outer Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible The Teenage Years - > Adolescent, or Adult? > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to > treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about > each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter > to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and > ?transition?: > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form > of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the > child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of > relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new > way of experiencing and understanding. > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > Martin > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > schtick you are up to...?) > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to > address the students with "You and we"). > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > a) you have the age periods and > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > What do you think of this? > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > CNF: "Grandwe" > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > thinking) > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and > Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > Martin > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > -----Mensagem original----- > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] Em nome de Martin John Packer Enviada em: quarta-feira, > 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, > a number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > Martin > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. > I > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > cultural psychology. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for > the paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two > chapters on infancy: > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and > Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Sat May 20 17:14:17 2017 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Sat, 20 May 2017 20:14:17 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <89097A69-684D-4619-9AF2-BF21A37E93A7@uniandes.edu.co> <004c01d2d1c3$8b306c00$a1914400$@att.net> Message-ID: <005701d2d1c7$30855ff0$91901fd0$@att.net> We're all learning about proper dealing with members of frontline communities in different intersections of resistance... Peg -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Saturday, May 20, 2017 8:07 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective :-) Lets hear it for children's rights, Peg! mike On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 4:48 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > A tad tangential, but maybe interesting nevertheless: > "4-Year-Olds Don?t Act Like Donald Trump By ALISON GOPNIK Comparing > our president to a child is inaccurate and unfair to children." > Etc. at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/opinion/sunday/4-year- > olds-children-trump-gopnik.html?action=click&pgtype= > Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col- > top-region®ion=opinion-c-col-top-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-top-re > gion > > Peg > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Saturday, May 20, 2017 6:56 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a > Cultural Perpsective > > Interesting, David. I?m not sure that I agree with LSV?s answer, here, > or in the passage you cite in your message to Andy. At least, if we > are to equate pedology with developmental psychology, or with > developmental science. For one thing, the situation of adulthood is > certainly not always stable. For another, the ?line? of an adult's > development may be different from that of a child, but I would have > thought that Vygotsky himself would have agreed that there is no > single line to the development of a child, or of children. The line of > development, I think, varies from stage to stage, and from one developmental context to another. > > Martin > > > > > On May 20, 2017, at 4:51 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > Martin: > > This is from the Q&A at the Psychotechnic Conference in November 1930. > Mikhaillov and Spielrein (Isaac, not Sabine) have just asked questions > about the relationship of pedology to other sciences (especially > lifelong education). > > Jerusalimcik: How does Comrade Vygotsky conceive of pedology: only as > a science of the child or as a science of the development of the human > being right to the end of his life? > > Vygotsky: Concerning the question of Comrade Jerusalimcik, is pedology > the science of the child or of the development of the person right to > the end of his life? I think--and, again, it seems to me that there is > an objective basis for this idea--that pedology is the science of the > child in development and not that of the person in development right > to the end of his life. I think that those who wish to extend pedology > from the cradle to the grave, those who want to put on the same plane > the development of the child and the development which occurs with a > child, without realizing it are making the same mistake that the old > authors made when they said that the child is a small adult: that is, > they deny the qualitative specificity of the process of development in > the child compared to that processes and the changes that are produced in a situation that is relatively stable. > > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > wrote: > > Hi Alfredo, > > I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? > > Martin > > > A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the > entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to assume > that the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that > development is the process of the child achieving adult status. > However, it should now be clear to the reader that human psychological > development involves the entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to death. > This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual > who lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of > reproduction in a community. > > There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see > figure below), and this book has told only part of the story of the > human life cycle. As young people become parents and then > grandparents, or as they become teachers, coaches, or recognized > community figures, their lives intersect and interact with those of > children, both their own and those of other people. The stages from > infant to adolescent are not separate and distinct from later stages > of the lifecycle. We have seen that parents and caregivers play a > crucial role in a young child?s development. Even death has an > intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, albeit one that extends as a helix through time. > > Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: > > persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence and > independent authority, divide and multiply their being through > relations with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire > and lose the capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) > > It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not > opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that the > human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in > many parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because > nutrition and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into > our genes. As a result, many infants will interact not only with > parents but grandparents and even great-grandparents, as never before > in human existence. This intergenerational contact and interaction > creates opportunities for a variety of influences on the child, > including mentorship, advice, alliances, and a richer density of social relations. > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth > structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, > as someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, > but who still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I > always wonder why these characterisations often refer to > characteristics of the child and tend to end in *adulthood*, as in > Martin's sequence, but tend to say nothing about adult change in that > relation. (By the way, David, can you clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" > would be an adequate label for a reformation???) > > I can understand that there are different disciplines within > developmental psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and > not adult) development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult > development, professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's > own quotations that, " transitions [across periods] are truly changes > not only in the child but in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" > > If these transitions truly are transitions for the > child-caregiver-niche system, then the issue of age periods also and > at the same time brings with it not only the issue of niche periods > (which I see can be addressed with the notion of Social Situation of > Development and ZPD), but also the issue of adult development as part > of that system. Does not it? But then, is it about "age"? I certainly > feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed in and through > educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my > participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based > elementary school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis > in a classroom, it could be said that many of the primary functions > that characterise my behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of listening, caring, orienting, responding). > > If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks > in his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a > means to achieve the same higher psychological function, namely > decision making, is it "age" periods what should be the focus? > > These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to > learn from/with you all. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu mailman.ucsd.edu> mailman.ucsd.edu> edu mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy Blunden > < > ablunden@mira.net ablunden@mira.net>> > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a > Cultural Perpsective > > Like > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi David, > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and > crises; tell me what you think. > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World Infancy - Towards > Biological Differentiation Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible > Invitations Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation Early > Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are Early Childhood - > Towards Inner and Outer Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional > Reality Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible The > Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed > to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say > about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a > whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of > ?stage? and > ?transition?: > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the > form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but > also in the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a > specific way of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a > result of this a new way of experiencing and understanding. > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there > is a dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that > she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the > child progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence > (I think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > Martin > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty > shameless too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for > the Shpet schtick you are up to...?) > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains > "Great We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot > wittier. He says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that > is, the "we" was there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's > eye. (Vygotsky likes to address the students with "You and we"). > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky > measured that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" > zone of development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > a) you have the age periods and > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is > not to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and > van der > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take > the age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with > Vygotsky's discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > What do you think of this? > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > CNF: "Grandwe" > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically > dependent ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > thinking) > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along > each finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and > Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > Martin > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > -----Mensagem original----- > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] Em nome de Martin John Packer Enviada em: > quarta-feira, > 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been > possible except for what I have learned over the years from some very > smart people, a number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > Martin > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > wrote: > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. > I > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, > emphasising common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field > theory, and cultural psychology. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > u>> > on > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 > for the paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the > two chapters on infancy: > > iew> > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and > Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sat May 20 18:30:35 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 11:30:35 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <1495233811813.42182@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <039bb47b-0fae-77ab-abf3-3b3817aa2a93@mira.net> My interest, David, was (1) that you had inverted the claim with which I am familiar, and (2) I have always been curious as to the basis for the confidence Vygotsky has for his claim. Of course the point you make about the concept arising as part of the perception of the problem (Marx says "Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present *or at least in the course of formation*.") is correct. But my point is that Vygotsky is making a point about the place of the *word* in concept-formation in this excerpt, not the social/technical context or the problem/solution issues. Ad (1). "The word is almost always ready when the concept is" (neglecting the important "almost always") means word first, then concept. "The word is only ready when the concept is," (with the important "only") means concept first then word. So you've completely inverted Vygotsky's claim. Ad (2) - you may be right David, I know you read the Russian as well, or Master Lev may be mixed up. I don't think it's cut and dry like this. But the inversion was my point of interest. It would get to long-winded to go into the question itself, as I see it. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 21/05/2017 7:41 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Yes, Vygotsky cites that passage in Tolstoy three times in > Thinking and Speech (and he also cites it elsewhere, e.g. > in "Thinking in School Age" in the Lectures on Pedology). > But I don't want to be the fundamentalist on the list; I > think it's more important to grasp the context in which > he's citing this. It's always an emphasis on something > Andy himself has often noted: Marx's remark that human > beings set themselves only the tasks that they can solve > (which is, after all, the whole basis for the zone of > proximal development and the functional method of dual > stimulation). > > It's not just that we don't perceive problems as > problems until we perceive them as potentially soluble; > it's also because objectively the solutions to problems > evolve alongside the problems themselves. So that for > example, as Ruqaiya Hasan remarks, the reason why language > is able to fulfil so many of our needs is that many of > those needs are created by language use. > > I think Vygotsky is saying the same thing about concepts; > they only arise when the problems they solve have arisen > in development. They do not arise simply because we teach > the labels that they have, and they don't fail to arise > just because we are not using the right label. In any case > the idea that the word is only ready when the concept is > (which I think is what Andy is objecting to, although it's > hard to tell) is certainly implicit in the way Vygotsky > names his own concepts: they only emerge when the content > has become clear and the place in a system of concepts > that have also emerged is established. > > Here's what Vygotsky says his report to the section on > psychotechnics of the Communist Academy in November 1930: > > "I don't think that the adult never develops, but I think > that he develops obeying other rules, and for this > development the lines which characterize his development > are different from those of that of the child, and it is > the qualitative particularity of child development is the > direct object of the pedologist. For me, to speak of a > pedology of the adult is not only false from the point of > view of the very name of pedology but above all from the > point of view of isolating in a single unique line the > process of child development and the process of adult > transformation. I repeat: the same laws cannot embrace at > one and the same time the internal changes in child > development and the changes of later ages. It is not > excluded for science, and for psychology in particular, to > study those changes which are produced at ripe age or in > old age, but I do not associate these two problematics and > I don't think that this object belongs to the category of > phenomena that pedology deals with. " > > (I'm taking this from a PhD thesis by Irina > Leopoldoff-Martin of the University of Geneva, No 561, p. > 287). > > > > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 10:03 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > "The word is almost always ready when the concept is" Yes? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > On 20/05/2017 9:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Alfredo: > > Just two quick points, and then I shall get back > to Vygotsky--we are having > our weekly on-line seminar today here and in > Seoul, and it's all about the > Pedology of the Adolescent and "The Negative Phase > of the Transitional Age". > > First--I don't think pre-life or any of the terms > I offered are "adequate > labels" for the neoformations. In fact, > "neoformation" is not an adequate > label either (Vygotsky takes it from geology!) In > Vygotsky, the label is > just a place holder, it's a kind of mnemonic, a > way of remembering > something that hasn't actually even been really > said yet. "The word is only > ready when the concept is," remember? > > ... > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and > Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean > Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sun May 21 00:17:49 2017 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 07:17:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> Message-ID: I am so glad you posted this, Mike! I have been lurking around the edges of this discussion (not enough time to engage fully) and was trying to recall where I had come across the idea that we continue to be 'children' or novices in every new stage of our lives. I am now facing early retirement (like many UK universities we are having to cut costs!) and I am conscious of how much I have to learn about how this will work. I think the big difference between the way a young child experiences a new way of being in the world and the way this is experienced by an adult is that adults have gained some experience of deaing with change so have a variety of existing ways of thinking about what they are now facing. So our ability to develop (as cultures as well as as individuals) develops as we do more developing. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: 21 May 2017 00:45 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Ah, once in this tread I see how relevant it is. For now, I repeat the epigraph in the chapter on development in adulthood in the early versions of the cole & cole book on development. *?We are born one time only, we can never start a new life equipped with the experience we've gained from the previous one. We leave childhood without knowing what youth is, we marry without knowing what it is to be married, and even when we enter old age, we don't know what it is we're heading for: the old are innocent children innocent of their old age. In that sense, man's world is the planet of inexperience?-* Milan Kundera, The art of the novel. This passage fits my experience and may or may not resonate with yours. I think there are some pretty good theoretical reasons to think that it may bespeak an important continuity in development. Maybe ontogeny can usefully be thought of as a functional system for the reproduction of the human society. Gives grandma and grandpa something to worry about as they wile away their days. :-) mike On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 4:29 PM, mike cole wrote: > David- I stumbled into this conversation tardily but hope one day to > get more deeply into the topics raised around the Vygtosky texts. In > trying to follow the argument, i would be helped enormously if it were > possible to site the sources of the texts in a way that is readily > accessible. If I want to read "Negative Phases of the Transitional > Age", ?for example, is there a web site or an English language where > one can go to read larger segments of the text? > > Access to the texts would help enormously in getting us, more or less, > on the same page, both metaphorically and digitally at the same time. > > If this is complicated, perhaps Alfredo could organize a simple way to > allow people rapid access to the texts. > > The time appears ripe to consider the question of the > bio-social-cultural nature of human development again. > Your careful work with the pedagogical essays appears to be a key text > in figuring out Vygotsky's views and our own. > > At present i am trying to think my way through this terrain in order > to put together a talk at the Piaget Society meetings in early June. > Roy Pea and I are giving a talk there?. The conference theme is > "technology and development." > > Quite naturally there is a great deal of overlap between that topic > and this conversation. Being able to explore that overlap more closely > would certainly be useful, personally speaking. > > mike > > On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 3:39 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >> Thanks, Martin. I'm reading Vygotsky's lecture on "Negative Phases of >> the Transitional Age", i.e. adolescence. Its' a late lecture, a >> little under a year before he died. But in it he does argue that the >> central neoformation of adolescence isn't sexuality or teenage >> rebellion or any of the other behavioural symptoms that his >> colleagues were focused on. He wants something that can generalize to >> every other crisis as well, and he chooses what he calls >> "schizoticism" which is probably what we would call today >> "schizotypal personality disorder", except that for him it's not a >> disorder at all, an in fact he argues that it is the children who >> show only feeble schizotic symptoms or who refuse to show them who >> are seriously disordered. >> And he suggests that what generalizes to every other crisis is the >> notion of a house divided against itself, what he calls "??????? ? >> ???????????", or the concept of the differentiation, the division, >> the split, just as you say. >> >> Weirdly, I think that your stable periods don't link together so well. >> That's not just the lack of grammatical parallelism in the >> nomenclature ("infancy", "toddler[hood]", "early/middle childhood" >> "teenager[hood]"--I can see that you are trying to stay away from a >> nomenclature that implies schooling on the one hand and use >> common-sense folk categories on the other. I think it's because you >> are using a model of stable periods based on world-building rather >> than on language, and the worlds of "Greatwe", "irresistible >> invitations", "appearances", etc don't really seem linked the way >> that physical-biological-psychological differentiation are linked. >> >> Your stable periods work well for your project (yes, culture, but >> within that getting your students to rediscover both the strengths >> and weakness of Piaget). But I think they won't work so well for mine >> (yes, language, and within language and the "world-building" function >> of language, distinguishing what Halliday would call the Experiential >> rather than the Logical metafunction--the feeling/thought of what's >> happening rather than the whole question of how it all fits >> together.) >> >> I didn't really mean to inflict my book chapter on poor >> Henry--publishers are now trying to get authors to shoulder almost >> ALL of the sales as well as the editing work, and one of the things >> they do is provide all these neat links that you stick in your >> signature when you take part in a discussion list; my book sales have >> been, like two or three copies a year, so I thought I'd try it. I >> notice that (for all that real, unfeigned modesty and humility), >> Henry knows onewhole hell of a lot more about Langacker on the one >> hand and Wundt on the other than I do (I have read bits of both but I don't have anything like his understanding of either). >> >> But there really is something I really do share with Henry that I >> think explains right away how he responded to my book chapter. It's this: >> Vygotsky talks about "communication" and "generalization" (or "sharing" >> and >> "about that shared"); Halliday about "dialogue" and "narrative". It >> seems to me that by whatever name we give them, this linguistic >> woofing and warping are the weft that join the stable periods and the crises together. >> >> The difference is that during stable periods, the >> communication/sharing/dialogue threads are in front and the >> generalization/about-that-shared/narrative >> threads go in back. But during the crises, the child is trying to >> "turn the tables" on the environment, so that the child is source of >> development and the environment is site. During the crisis, we see >> all those loose threads, all those knots and breaks--and yet also, >> there is the same pattern, albeit like a photographic negative--in >> the back of the carpet. >> -- >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and >> Shakespeare" >> >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >> >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- >> globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >> >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some >> Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >> On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 7:51 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >> > wrote: >> >> > Diagram attached, I hope. >> > >> > Martin >> > >> > >> > > On May 19, 2017, at 4:34 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >> > > >> > > Martin, >> > > I?m sorry, but I don?t think that diagram came through. Also I >> > > too am >> > interested in what you think of Shpet. >> > > HJenry >> > > >> > > >> > >> On May 19, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Martin John Packer < >> > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >> > >> >> > >> Hi David, >> > >> >> > >> Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages >> > >> and >> > crises; tell me what you think. >> > >> >> > >> Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World Infancy - >> > >> Towards Biological Differentiation Toddlerhood - A World of >> > >> Irresistible Invitations Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological >> > >> Differentiation Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How >> > >> They Are Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer Middle >> > >> Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality Middle Childhood >> > >> - Towards the Actual and the Possible The Teenage Years - >> > >> Adolescent, or Adult? >> > >> The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood >> > >> >> > >> The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I >> > >> needed >> > to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to >> > say about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate >> > a whole chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? >> and >> > ?transition?: >> > >> >> > >> "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in >> > >> the >> > form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but >> > also >> in >> > the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a >> > specific >> way >> > of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of >> > this a new way of experiencing and understanding. >> > >> >> > >> "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. >> > >> A >> > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition >> > there is >> a >> > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that >> > she discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense >> > of >> herself: >> > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, >> > the >> child >> > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These >> > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the >> > whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? >> > >> >> > >> And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the >> > >> sequence >> (I >> > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). >> > >> >> > >> Martin >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] >> > >> >> > >> On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > > > wrote: >> > >> >> > >> Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty >> > shameless >> > >> too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the >> > >> Shpet schtick you are up to...?) >> > >> >> > >> Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky >> > >> explains >> > "Great >> > >> We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot >> > wittier. He >> > >> says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, >> > >> the >> "we" >> > was >> > >> there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. >> > >> (Vygotsky >> likes >> > to >> > >> address the students with "You and we"). >> > >> >> > >> I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without >> > >> vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to >> teach >> > >> anything to anybody in some honest way). >> > >> >> > >> You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that >> > >> Vygotsky >> > measured >> > >> that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone >> > >> of development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: >> > >> >> > >> a) you have the age periods and >> > >> >> > >> b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that >> > >> will correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. >> > >> >> > >> That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky >> > >> studies >> is >> > not >> > >> to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and >> > >> van >> der >> > >> Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to >> > >> take >> the >> > >> age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with >> > Vygotsky's >> > >> discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. >> > >> >> > >> What do you think of this? >> > >> >> > >> Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by >> > >> intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" >> > >> Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: >> > >> CNF: "Grandwe" >> > >> One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" >> > >> Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but >> > >> interpersonally >> > >> (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" >> > >> Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: >> > "Pre-will" >> > >> Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically >> > dependent >> > >> ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" >> > >> Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: >> "Pre-me" >> > >> School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually >> > >> (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" >> > >> Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: >> "Pre-concepts" >> > >> Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically >> dependent. >> > >> CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with >> > >> concrete >> > >> thinking) >> > >> Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" >> > >> >> > >> You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods >> > >> along >> > each >> > >> finger. (Hard to read it, though....) >> > >> >> > >> -- >> > >> David Kellogg >> > >> Macquarie University >> > >> >> > >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >> > >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, >> > >> and Shakespeare" >> > >> >> > >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >> > >> >> > >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe- >> > and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >> > >> >> > >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some >> > Ruminations >> > >> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >> > >> >> > >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> > >> >> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa >> > >> Lins < mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: >> > >> >> > >> Martin >> > >> Thank you for the chapter. Maria >> > >> >> > >> -----Mensagem original----- >> > >> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ >> > >> mailman.ucsd.edu] Em nome de Martin John Packer Enviada em: >> > >> quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 >> > >> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > >> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a >> > >> Cultural Perpsective >> > >> >> > >> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been >> possible >> > >> except for what I have learned over the years from some very >> > >> smart >> > people, >> > >> a >> > >> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. >> > >> >> > >> Martin >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >> > >> > wrote: >> > >> >> > >> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter >> > >> looks >> > great. >> > >> I >> > >> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, >> > emphasising >> > >> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, >> > >> and cultural psychology. >> > >> >> > >> Alfredo >> > >> ________________________________________ >> > >> From: >> > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> n.ucsd.edu> >> > >> > an.ucsd.edu >> > >> >> > >> on >> > >> behalf of Martin John Packer >> > >> > >> > >> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 >> > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural >> > Perpsective >> > >> >> > >> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child >> > Development: >> > >> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only >> > >> $46 >> for >> > the >> > >> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. >> > >> >> > >> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one >> > >> of the >> > two >> > >> chapters on infancy: >> > >> >> > >> > > 43%20#preview> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> Martin >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. 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From smago@uga.edu Sun May 21 07:59:30 2017 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 14:59:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] 2017 GRADNASFLA Symposium Call for Papers: Demystifying Systemic Functional Linguistics Message-ID: Dear Wonderful Colleagues, I am so happy to share the first GRADNASFLA Symposium that will be held at our university this fall. Please share with your graduate students and other scholars who are working on new papers; this is will be great space for brainstorming, looking at data and fostering cutting edge research collectives across universities. Discussion will also focus on the Graduate Poster Session and collaborative round tables to be held at ISFGC. Please encourage your students and other colleagues to take part. They will be well taken care of. Please see a link also to supporting the conference on the poster if you feel inclined to support the conference and the work of two amazing doctoral students, Khanh Bui and Kelly Dugan, who organized this by themselves. They invited me to be their keynote to indicate to students and scholars alike that there will also be faculty at the conference, mixing in and collaborating too. Ruth, Khanh and Kelly Ruth Harman, Associate Professor Program Chair TESOL and World Language Education Language and Literacy Department Linguistics Program Affiliated Qualitative Program Member President of National Systemic Functional Linguistics Association (NASFLA) Professor on Special Assignment with PDSD (UGA and Clarke School District) 309 Aderhold Hall University of Georgia, Athens GA 30602 Email: rharman@uga.edu Website: http://www.ruthharman.com/ Blog: http://www.rharman.wordpress.com/ Video on YPAR: https://vimeo.com/183258965 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 2017_GRADNASFLA Symposium_Call for Papers.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 379961 bytes Desc: 2017_GRADNASFLA Symposium_Call for Papers.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170521/cd3f20ff/attachment.pdf From feine@duq.edu Sun May 21 09:59:53 2017 From: feine@duq.edu (Elizabeth Fein) Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 12:59:53 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Society for Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology Annual Conference Message-ID: Dear colleagues, If you are a New Yorker or plan to be in NYC this week, check out the annual conference of the *Society **for Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology*, a subdivision of the American Psychological Association's Division 5, happening this Wednesday and Thursday *May 24th and 25th* at Fordham University's Lincoln Center campus. We've got an exciting program planned, including keynote addresses from *Kim Hopper*, who does ethnographic work on cross-cultural variations in the course and prognosis of schizophrenia and also on homelessness, and the *Bronx African-American History Project*, a collaborative oral history project that has informed a number of community projects in NYC. We'll also have themed paper sessions and symposia, posters, and a plenary address on validity in psychology from SQIP founding members *Ruthellen Josselson, Ken Gergen and Mark Freeman, along with Scott **Churchill.* I've attached the conference program here along with some information about the conference and a letter from our President, Fred Wertz; you can also find out more information at our website, qualpsy.org. Best, Elizabeth Fein, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Duquesne University -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 2017 SQIP Program Final.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1153162 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170521/1de51c51/attachment-0004.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: SQIP 2017 Flyer Info.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 154130 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170521/1de51c51/attachment-0005.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: SQIP 2017 Flyer Photo.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 302507 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170521/1de51c51/attachment-0006.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Fred Wertz Cover Letter SQIP Conference.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 57746 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170521/1de51c51/attachment-0007.pdf From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun May 21 14:16:51 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 07:16:51 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <89097A69-684D-4619-9AF2-BF21A37E93A7@uniandes.edu.co> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <89097A69-684D-4619-9AF2-BF21A37E93A7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I think context is at least half all, Martin. In context, LSV's text is just as true as it is brave. But I also think it has a truth that can be generalized to our own time, to wit: a) Child development is sui generis, in that adult development does not (as Mike's quote and Rod's example make all too clear) have a "complete form" in the environment which guides it. Language is, as always, the central example here: even from the crude, purely quantitative point of view of word counting, we can see that language develops until roughly age seventeen (vocabulary learning) but it is only learned, and at a rate that is barely above attrition, after that. The only way to keep language development going is to emigrate. b) The social situation of development in childhood is BOTH constant AND ever-changing, BOTH single and unbroken AND singular and sui generis. So are the lines of development and the neoformations. But once again in order to really see this you need to look at language. If we take the social situation of development as the "relationship with the environment" this is both constant (in the sense that the language system is constant) and constantly changing (in the sense that discourse and text are constantly changing). If we take the lines of development as diverse forms of "communication" (in Russian, "sharing", "making common") on the one hand and various forms of "generalization" on the other (but this is intellectualistic, it's really "about-sharing", or "about-making-common") we can see that the lines of development are unbroken too but they are constantly shape shifting, and that in critical periods the "generalization" is in the first plane and communication takes the second plane, while in stable periods it's the other way around. The neoformations are even more obviously like this: critical neoformations are always the child's proto-version, and they persist only as subordinate moments of the complete version provided in the environment (hence "pre-we", "grandwe", "pre-will", "grandwill", "pre-me", "grandme", etc.) c) The life of the adult is not at all stable. But the variation of adult life is no part of ontogenesis. It is what forms the link between ontogenesis and sociogenesis; that is, the point were we have to stop just understanding the world and start to actually change it. That's the only thing that can excuse my somewhat flowery language about senile children and having futures in mind. But look at the context. The year is 1930. Russia has begun to "realize the first five year plan in four years". The famine is underway in the Ukraine, and Vygotsky is writing, about children, that although their weight and height doubles in the first year, it hardly changes throughout the whole of school age (!). Vygotsky, Blonsky, and Krupskaya are under siege (Vygotsky had dabbled in artistic milieux sympathetic to Trotskyism, Blonsky had a past in the ancient Greek classics, Krupskaya had been a member of the Leningrad Opposition to Stalin). Bukharin was...and for all they know still is...the major party theorist, and Bukharin's line is that there is absolutely no need for "separate laws" to describe development at different levels: everything is simply caused, reflexively, by adaptation to the environment. Vygotsky dutifully refers to Bukharin in Pedology of the Adolescent, Chapter One: ?????????? ????????????? ???????????? ????? ??? ????? ???????????????? ????????????? ??????? ?? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ? ????????? ???????? ????????, ?? ????????? ????????, ? ????????? ???????? ???????, ??????? ??????????? ?? ?????? ???? ???? ? ????? ?????? ???????????? ???????: ? ????? ???????, ?????? ????????, ?????????? ? ?. ?., ? ?????? ???????, ?????? ????????????? ????????. ?? ????? ????, ???? ???? ?????????? ???????, ???? ? ?? ?? ??????? ??????????????? ? ?????? ????? ???????. 'The simplistic representation of these two series of facts (biological and sociological--dk) as existing more or less independently in the human organism relative to each other leads, according to Bukharin, to an ?absurd redundancy of laws, which occurs at every step even in the best Marxist works.? On the one hand, the laws of biology, physiology, and so on, and on the other the laws of social development. In fact, one is the ?alter ego? of the other, one and the same phenomenon seen from different points of view.' What a perfect example of the thinking of the bureaucrat-philosopher! All development is exactly the same--just put enough pressure on the developing entity--and it will develop. Who needs genetic laws? There is only one law for the whole of development: adapt to your environment or die. Or, like Bukharin, do both. -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 8:55 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Interesting, David. I?m not sure that I agree with LSV?s answer, here, or > in the passage you cite in your message to Andy. At least, if we are to > equate pedology with developmental psychology, or with developmental > science. For one thing, the situation of adulthood is certainly not always > stable. For another, the ?line? of an adult's development may be different > from that of a child, but I would have thought that Vygotsky himself would > have agreed that there is no single line to the development of a child, or > of children. The line of development, I think, varies from stage to stage, > and from one developmental context to another. > > Martin > > > > > On May 20, 2017, at 4:51 PM, David Kellogg kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Martin: > > This is from the Q&A at the Psychotechnic Conference in November 1930. > Mikhaillov and Spielrein (Isaac, not Sabine) have just asked questions > about the relationship of pedology to other sciences (especially lifelong > education). > > Jerusalimcik: How does Comrade Vygotsky conceive of pedology: only as a > science of the child or as a science of the development of the human being > right to the end of his life? > > Vygotsky: Concerning the question of Comrade Jerusalimcik, is pedology the > science of the child or of the development of the person right to the end > of his life? I think--and, again, it seems to me that there is an objective > basis for this idea--that pedology is the science of the child in > development and not that of the person in development right to the end of > his life. I think that those who wish to extend pedology from the cradle to > the grave, those who want to put on the same plane the development of the > child and the development which occurs with a child, without realizing it > are making the same mistake that the old authors made when they said that > the child is a small adult: that is, they deny the qualitative specificity > of the process of development in the child compared to that processes and > the changes that are produced in a situation that is relatively stable. > > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > wrote: > > Hi Alfredo, > > I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? > > Martin > > > A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the > entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to assume that > the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that development > is the process of the child achieving adult status. However, it should now > be clear to the reader that human psychological development involves the > entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to death. > This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual who > lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of reproduction > in a community. > > There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see figure > below), and this book has told only part of the story of the human life > cycle. As young people become parents and then grandparents, or as they > become teachers, coaches, or recognized community figures, their lives > intersect and interact with those of children, both their own and those of > other people. The stages from infant to adolescent are not separate and > distinct from later stages of the lifecycle. We have seen that parents and > caregivers play a crucial role in a young child?s development. Even death > has an intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, albeit > one that extends as a helix through time. > > Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: > > persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence and > independent authority, divide and multiply their being through relations > with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire and lose the > capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) > > It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not > opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that the > human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in many > parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because nutrition > and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into our genes. As > a result, many infants will interact not only with parents but grandparents > and even great-grandparents, as never before in human existence. This > intergenerational contact and interaction creates opportunities for a > variety of influences on the child, including mentorship, advice, > alliances, and a richer density of social relations. > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth > structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as > someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but who > still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder why > these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and > tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say > nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can you > clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" > would be an adequate label for a reformation???) > > I can understand that there are different disciplines within developmental > psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) > development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, > professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations that, > " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child but > in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" > > If these transitions truly are transitions for the child-caregiver-niche > system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings with > it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed with > the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the issue > of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is it > about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed in > and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my > participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based elementary > school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a classroom, > it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise my > behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of > listening, caring, orienting, responding). > > If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks in > his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a means to > achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, is > it "age" periods what should be the focus? > > These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to > learn from/with you all. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu mailman.ucsd.edu> mailman.ucsd.edu> edu mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net ablunden@mira.net>> > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Like > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi David, > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and crises; > tell me what you think. > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to > treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about > each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter > to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and > ?transition?: > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form > of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the > child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of > relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new > way of experiencing and understanding. > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of herself: > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the child > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > Martin > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty shameless > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > schtick you are up to...?) > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains "Great > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. He > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" was > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes to > address the students with "You and we"). > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky measured > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > a) you have the age periods and > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is not > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with Vygotsky's > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > What do you think of this? > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > CNF: "Grandwe" > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > thinking) > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > Martin > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > -----Mensagem original----- > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > mailman.ucsd.edu] > Em nome de Martin John Packer > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart people, > a > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > Martin > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > wrote: > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks great. > I > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, emphasising > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > cultural > psychology. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child Development: > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for the > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two > chapters on infancy: > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun May 21 14:27:52 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 07:27:52 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> Message-ID: I really wish you WOULD have a look at it, Mike. It's giving me a lot of trouble. It's in this: https://www.marxists.org/russkij/vygotsky/pedologia/lektsii-po-pedologii.pdf (starts on p. 233) The main trouble I'm having is with the words "schizotomy", "mesotomy", "isotomy", and "topo-human", which as far as I can tell do not exist in either Russian or English. I'm also having trouble with names: the stenographer uses "kelt" for "Volkelt" and I think that "Bleder" is really Bleuler (although that may be a mistake of the transcriber and not the stenographer). But who the devil is this Osburgen? Could it be Asperger? He WAS working on "schizoid" children at that time (he hadn't actually started exterminating them as part of the Nazi T4 programme). But he hadn't really started publishing, I don't think. If you wait a week or so, I'll have a first draft of an English translation I can show the list. I'm about half done. But it turns out that they actually want you to write thesis when you do a Ph.D.! -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 9:29 AM, mike cole wrote: > David- I stumbled into this conversation tardily but hope one day to get > more deeply into the topics raised around the Vygtosky texts. In trying to > follow the argument, i would be helped enormously if it were possible to > site the sources of the texts in a way that is readily accessible. If I > want to read "Negative Phases of the > Transitional Age", > ?for example, is there a web site or an English language where one can go > to read larger segments of the text? > > Access to the texts would help enormously in getting us, more or less, on > the same page, both metaphorically and digitally at the same time. > > If this is complicated, perhaps Alfredo could organize a simple way to > allow people rapid access to the texts. > > The time appears ripe to consider the question of the bio-social-cultural > nature of human development again. > Your careful work with the pedagogical essays appears to be a key text in > figuring out Vygotsky's views and our own. > > At present i am trying to think my way through this terrain in order to put > together a talk at the Piaget Society meetings in early June. Roy Pea and I > are giving a talk there?. The conference theme is "technology and > development." > > Quite naturally there is a great deal of overlap between that topic and > this conversation. Being able to explore that overlap more closely would > certainly be useful, personally speaking. > > mike > > On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 3:39 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Thanks, Martin. I'm reading Vygotsky's lecture on "Negative Phases of the > > Transitional Age", i.e. adolescence. Its' a late lecture, a little under > a > > year before he died. But in it he does argue that the central > neoformation > > of adolescence isn't sexuality or teenage rebellion or any of the other > > behavioural symptoms that his colleagues were focused on. He wants > > something that can generalize to every other crisis as well, and he > chooses > > what he calls "schizoticism" which is probably what we would call today > > "schizotypal personality disorder", except that for him it's not a > disorder > > at all, an in fact he argues that it is the children who show only feeble > > schizotic symptoms or who refuse to show them who are seriously > disordered. > > And he suggests that what generalizes to every other crisis is the notion > > of a house divided against itself, what he calls "??????? ? ???????????", > > or the concept of the differentiation, the division, the split, just as > you > > say. > > > > Weirdly, I think that your stable periods don't link together so well. > > That's not just the lack of grammatical parallelism in the nomenclature > > ("infancy", "toddler[hood]", "early/middle childhood" "teenager[hood]"--I > > can see that you are trying to stay away from a nomenclature that implies > > schooling on the one hand and use common-sense folk categories on the > > other. I think it's because you are using a model of stable periods based > > on world-building rather than on language, and the worlds of "Greatwe", > > "irresistible invitations", "appearances", etc don't really seem linked > the > > way that physical-biological-psychological differentiation are linked. > > > > Your stable periods work well for your project (yes, culture, but within > > that getting your students to rediscover both the strengths and weakness > of > > Piaget). But I think they won't work so well for mine (yes, language, and > > within language and the "world-building" function of > > language, distinguishing what Halliday would call the Experiential rather > > than the Logical metafunction--the feeling/thought of what's happening > > rather than the whole question of how it all fits together.) > > > > I didn't really mean to inflict my book chapter on poor Henry--publishers > > are now trying to get authors to shoulder almost ALL of the sales as well > > as the editing work, and one of the things they do is provide all these > > neat links that you stick in your signature when you take part in a > > discussion list; my book sales have been, like two or three copies a > year, > > so I thought I'd try it. I notice that (for all that real, unfeigned > > modesty and humility), Henry knows onewhole hell of a lot more about > > Langacker on the one hand and Wundt on the other than I do (I have read > > bits of both but I don't have anything like his understanding of either). > > > > But there really is something I really do share with Henry that I think > > explains right away how he responded to my book chapter. It's this: > > Vygotsky talks about "communication" and "generalization" (or "sharing" > and > > "about that shared"); Halliday about "dialogue" and "narrative". It seems > > to me that by whatever name we give them, this linguistic woofing and > > warping are the weft that join the stable periods and the crises > together. > > > > The difference is that during stable periods, the > > communication/sharing/dialogue threads are in front and the > > generalization/about-that-shared/narrative > > threads go in back. But during the crises, the child is trying to "turn > the > > tables" on the environment, so that the child is source of development > and > > the environment is site. During the crisis, we see all those loose > threads, > > all those knots and breaks--and yet also, there is the same pattern, > albeit > > like a photographic negative--in the back of the carpet. > > -- > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 7:51 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > > wrote: > > > > > Diagram attached, I hope. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 4:34 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > > > > > > Martin, > > > > I?m sorry, but I don?t think that diagram came through. Also I too am > > > interested in what you think of Shpet. > > > > HJenry > > > > > > > > > > > >> On May 19, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Hi David, > > > >> > > > >> Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and > > > crises; tell me what you think. > > > >> > > > >> Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > > > >> Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > > > >> Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > > > >> Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > > > >> Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > > > >> Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > > > >> Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > > > >> Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > > > >> The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > > > >> The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > > >> > > > >> The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I > needed > > > to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say > > > about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole > > > chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? > and > > > ?transition?: > > > >> > > > >> "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the > > > form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also > > in > > > the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific > way > > > of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this > a > > > new way of experiencing and understanding. > > > >> > > > >> "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > > > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there > is a > > > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > > > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of > > herself: > > > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the > > child > > > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > > > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > > > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > > >> > > > >> And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence > > (I > > > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > > >> > > > >> On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty > > > shameless > > > >> too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > > > >> schtick you are up to...?) > > > >> > > > >> Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains > > > "Great > > > >> We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot > > > wittier. He > > > >> says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the > "we" > > > was > > > >> there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky > > likes > > > to > > > >> address the students with "You and we"). > > > >> > > > >> I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > > > >> vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to > teach > > > >> anything to anybody in some honest way). > > > >> > > > >> You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky > > > measured > > > >> that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > > > >> development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > > >> > > > >> a) you have the age periods and > > > >> > > > >> b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > > > >> correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > > >> > > > >> That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies > is > > > not > > > >> to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van > > der > > > >> Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take > > the > > > >> age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with > > > Vygotsky's > > > >> discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > > >> > > > >> What do you think of this? > > > >> > > > >> Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > > > >> intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > > > >> Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically > dependent: > > > >> CNF: "Grandwe" > > > >> One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: > "Pre-speech" > > > >> Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > > > >> (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > > > >> Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: > > > "Pre-will" > > > >> Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically > > > dependent > > > >> ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > > > >> Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: > > "Pre-me" > > > >> School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > > > >> (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > > > >> Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: > > "Pre-concepts" > > > >> Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically > > dependent. > > > >> CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > > > >> thinking) > > > >> Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > > >> > > > >> You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along > > > each > > > >> finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> David Kellogg > > > >> Macquarie University > > > >> > > > >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > >> > > > >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > >> > > > >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe- > > > and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > >> > > > >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > > Ruminations > > > >> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > >> > > > >> Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > >> > > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > > > >> mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > > >> > > > >> -----Mensagem original----- > > > >> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > >> mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > >> Em nome de Martin John Packer > > > >> Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > > > >> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > > >> Perpsective > > > >> > > > >> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been > > possible > > > >> except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart > > > people, > > > >> a > > > >> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > >> > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks > > > great. > > > >> I > > > >> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, > > > emphasising > > > >> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > > > >> cultural > > > >> psychology. > > > >> > > > >> Alfredo > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > >> From: > > > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > >> > mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> > > > >> on > > > >> behalf of Martin John Packer > > > >> > > > > >> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > > Perpsective > > > >> > > > >> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child > > > Development: > > > >> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 > > for > > > the > > > >> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > > >> > > > >> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of > the > > > two > > > >> chapters on infancy: > > > >> > > > >> > > 43%20#preview> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun May 21 14:52:41 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 07:52:41 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <039bb47b-0fae-77ab-abf3-3b3817aa2a93@mira.net> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <1495233811813.42182@iped.uio.no> <039bb47b-0fae-77ab-abf3-3b3817aa2a93@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes, I gathered that, from your "Yes?". A very interesting demonstration of how important it is to actually meet people and get use to their intonation. I still regret not having a pint with Huw in London, because I sometimes find his comments a little too condensed. The Russian is not Vygotsky: it's Tolstoy. It's this: '????? ????? ?????? ??????, ????? ?????? ???????.' (Word nearly always ready when ready concept.) It seems to me that to say that the word is ready when the concept is ready doesn't imply either word first or concept first. To a linguist, the relationship is not causal or temporal: we don't say that a concept "causes" a word, or that a word "causes" a concept, because they are different orders of matter. We don't say "meaning first" or "word first" because we have to model language parsimoniously, so that it is neutral to whether we are taking the point of view of the speaker or the hearer. The relationship is simply that of realization: that is, the word is the realization of the meaning, and the meaning is an activation (as Vygotsky says, "volitilization") of the word. But I was making a different point having to do with what Alfredo called my "labelling". My terminology wasn't supposed to be a label on a jar of concept. Concepts don't live in jars; they live in families and societies, just like the people who make them. So I was trying to choose names like "pre-we", "pre-speech", "pre-will" on the one hand and "grandwe", "grandspeech", and "grandwill" on the other to show how the critical neoformations were BOTH individuals AND related to other critical neoformations, and BOTH distinct from and linked to stable neoformations. These two points were exactly the points that came up in Martin's post. Actually, we've been here before. If you think of language as a kind of sandwich: meaning wording sounding You can see that the relationship between the three strata is realization. But the names, or if you like the labels, are chosen accordingly: the "~ing" is there to show that they are linked because they are all processes and the roots "mean~", "word~", and "sound~" are there to show that they are distinct because they are different orders of matter. I guess I was trying to design my "labels" the same way. It's a good thing I don't work in a marketing department; I'd get canned. -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 11:30 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > My interest, David, was (1) that you had inverted the claim with which I > am familiar, and (2) I have always been curious as to the basis for the > confidence Vygotsky has for his claim. Of course the point you make about > the concept arising as part of the perception of the problem (Marx says > "Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to > solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself > arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already > present *or at least in the course of formation*.") is correct. But my > point is that Vygotsky is making a point about the place of the *word* in > concept-formation in this excerpt, not the social/technical context or the > problem/solution issues. > > Ad (1). "The word is almost always ready when the concept is" (neglecting > the important "almost always") means word first, then concept. "The word is > only ready when the concept is," (with the important "only") means concept > first then word. So you've completely inverted Vygotsky's claim. Ad (2) - > you may be right David, I know you read the Russian as well, or Master Lev > may be mixed up. I don't think it's cut and dry like this. But the > inversion was my point of interest. It would get to long-winded to go into > the question itself, as I see it. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 21/05/2017 7:41 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Yes, Vygotsky cites that passage in Tolstoy three times in Thinking and >> Speech (and he also cites it elsewhere, e.g. in "Thinking in School Age" in >> the Lectures on Pedology). But I don't want to be the fundamentalist on the >> list; I think it's more important to grasp the context in which he's citing >> this. It's always an emphasis on something Andy himself has often noted: >> Marx's remark that human beings set themselves only the tasks that they can >> solve (which is, after all, the whole basis for the zone of proximal >> development and the functional method of dual stimulation). >> >> It's not just that we don't perceive problems as problems until we >> perceive them as potentially soluble; it's also because objectively the >> solutions to problems evolve alongside the problems themselves. So that for >> example, as Ruqaiya Hasan remarks, the reason why language is able to >> fulfil so many of our needs is that many of those needs are created by >> language use. >> >> I think Vygotsky is saying the same thing about concepts; they only arise >> when the problems they solve have arisen in development. They do not arise >> simply because we teach the labels that they have, and they don't fail to >> arise just because we are not using the right label. In any case the idea >> that the word is only ready when the concept is (which I think is what Andy >> is objecting to, although it's hard to tell) is certainly implicit in the >> way Vygotsky names his own concepts: they only emerge when the content has >> become clear and the place in a system of concepts that have also emerged >> is established. >> >> Here's what Vygotsky says his report to the section on psychotechnics of >> the Communist Academy in November 1930: >> >> "I don't think that the adult never develops, but I think that he >> develops obeying other rules, and for this development the lines which >> characterize his development are different from those of that of the child, >> and it is the qualitative particularity of child development is the direct >> object of the pedologist. For me, to speak of a pedology of the adult is >> not only false from the point of view of the very name of pedology but >> above all from the point of view of isolating in a single unique line the >> process of child development and the process of adult transformation. I >> repeat: the same laws cannot embrace at one and the same time the internal >> changes in child development and the changes of later ages. It is not >> excluded for science, and for psychology in particular, to study those >> changes which are produced at ripe age or in old age, but I do not >> associate these two problematics and I don't think that this object belongs >> to the category of phenomena that pedology deals with. " >> >> (I'm taking this from a PhD thesis by Irina Leopoldoff-Martin of the >> University of Geneva, No 561, p. 287). >> >> >> >> On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 10:03 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> "The word is almost always ready when the concept is" Yes? >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making> >> >> On 20/05/2017 9:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Alfredo: >> >> Just two quick points, and then I shall get back >> to Vygotsky--we are having >> our weekly on-line seminar today here and in >> Seoul, and it's all about the >> Pedology of the Adolescent and "The Negative Phase >> of the Transitional Age". >> >> First--I don't think pre-life or any of the terms >> I offered are "adequate >> labels" for the neoformations. In fact, >> "neoformation" is not an adequate >> label either (Vygotsky takes it from geology!) In >> Vygotsky, the label is >> just a place holder, it's a kind of mnemonic, a >> way of remembering >> something that hasn't actually even been really >> said yet. "The word is only >> ready when the concept is," remember? >> >> ... >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >> >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >> >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe- >> and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >> >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some >> Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >> > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun May 21 15:31:43 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 15:31:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <89097A69-684D-4619-9AF2-BF21A37E93A7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Happy to wait for your translation, David and thanks for reminding me that version of this exists already. But given your care with translation, waiting seems best - especially with my own thesis deadline fast approaching. I do not envy you the task of figuring out who is being referred to among the non-Russian names. You seem to be doing a great sleuthing job. Asperger and all. Did Kundera really write that development up to age 18-20 is sui generis? The steady demise of my intellectual capacities induced me to get his remarks exactly backwards it seems. (I thought there was a grandwe awaiting me in the old folks home, should I make it that far!) mike On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 2:16 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > I think context is at least half all, Martin. In context, LSV's text is > just as true as it is brave. But I also think it has a truth that can be > generalized to our own time, to wit: > > a) Child development is sui generis, in that adult development does not (as > Mike's quote and Rod's example make all too clear) have a "complete form" > in the environment which guides it. Language is, as always, the central > example here: even from the crude, purely quantitative point of view of > word counting, we can see that language develops until roughly age > seventeen (vocabulary learning) but it is only learned, and at a rate that > is barely above attrition, after that. The only way to keep language > development going is to emigrate. > > b) The social situation of development in childhood is BOTH constant AND > ever-changing, BOTH single and unbroken AND singular and sui generis. > So are the lines of development and the neoformations. But once again in > order to really see this you need to look at language. If we take the > social situation of development as the "relationship with the environment" > this is both constant (in the sense that the language system is constant) > and constantly changing (in the sense that discourse and text are > constantly changing). If we take the lines of development as diverse forms > of "communication" (in Russian, "sharing", "making common") on the one hand > and various forms of "generalization" on the other (but this is > intellectualistic, it's really "about-sharing", or "about-making-common") > we can see that the lines of development are unbroken too but they are > constantly shape shifting, and that in critical periods the > "generalization" is in the first plane and communication takes the second > plane, while in stable periods it's the other way around. The neoformations > are even more obviously like this: critical neoformations are always the > child's proto-version, and they persist only as subordinate moments of the > complete version provided in the environment (hence "pre-we", "grandwe", > "pre-will", "grandwill", "pre-me", "grandme", etc.) > > c) The life of the adult is not at all stable. But the variation of adult > life is no part of ontogenesis. It is what forms the link between > ontogenesis and sociogenesis; that is, the point were we have to stop just > understanding the world and start to actually change it. That's the only > thing that can excuse my somewhat flowery language about senile children > and having futures in mind. > > But look at the context. The year is 1930. Russia has begun to "realize the > first five year plan in four years". The famine is underway in the Ukraine, > and Vygotsky is writing, about children, that although their weight and > height doubles in the first year, it hardly changes throughout the whole of > school age (!). > > Vygotsky, Blonsky, and Krupskaya are under siege (Vygotsky had dabbled in > artistic milieux sympathetic to Trotskyism, Blonsky had a past in the > ancient Greek classics, Krupskaya had been a member of the Leningrad > Opposition to Stalin). Bukharin was...and for all they know still is...the > major party theorist, and Bukharin's line is that there is absolutely no > need for "separate laws" to describe development at different levels: > everything is simply caused, reflexively, by adaptation to the environment. > Vygotsky dutifully refers to Bukharin in Pedology of the Adolescent, > Chapter One: > > ?????????? ????????????? ???????????? ????? ??? ????? ???????????????? > ????????????? ??????? ?? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ? ????????? ???????? > ????????, ?? ????????? ????????, ? ????????? ???????? ???????, ??????? > ??????????? ?? ?????? ???? ???? ? ????? ?????? ???????????? ???????: ? > ????? > ???????, ?????? ????????, ?????????? ? ?. ?., ? ?????? ???????, ?????? > ????????????? ????????. ?? ????? ????, ???? ???? ?????????? ???????, ???? ? > ?? ?? ??????? ??????????????? ? ?????? ????? ???????. 'The simplistic > representation of these two series of facts (biological and > sociological--dk) as existing more or less independently in the human > organism relative to each other leads, according to Bukharin, to an ?absurd > redundancy of laws, which occurs at every step even in the best Marxist > works.? On the one hand, the laws of biology, physiology, and so on, and on > the other the laws of social development. In fact, one is the ?alter ego? > of the other, one and the same phenomenon seen from different points of > view.' > > What a perfect example of the thinking of the bureaucrat-philosopher! All > development is exactly the same--just put enough pressure on the developing > entity--and it will develop. Who needs genetic laws? There is only one law > for the whole of development: adapt to your environment or die. Or, like > Bukharin, do both. > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 8:55 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > wrote: > > > Interesting, David. I?m not sure that I agree with LSV?s answer, here, or > > in the passage you cite in your message to Andy. At least, if we are to > > equate pedology with developmental psychology, or with developmental > > science. For one thing, the situation of adulthood is certainly not > always > > stable. For another, the ?line? of an adult's development may be > different > > from that of a child, but I would have thought that Vygotsky himself > would > > have agreed that there is no single line to the development of a child, > or > > of children. The line of development, I think, varies from stage to > stage, > > and from one developmental context to another. > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > On May 20, 2017, at 4:51 PM, David Kellogg d > > kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > Martin: > > > > This is from the Q&A at the Psychotechnic Conference in November 1930. > > Mikhaillov and Spielrein (Isaac, not Sabine) have just asked questions > > about the relationship of pedology to other sciences (especially lifelong > > education). > > > > Jerusalimcik: How does Comrade Vygotsky conceive of pedology: only as a > > science of the child or as a science of the development of the human > being > > right to the end of his life? > > > > Vygotsky: Concerning the question of Comrade Jerusalimcik, is pedology > the > > science of the child or of the development of the person right to the end > > of his life? I think--and, again, it seems to me that there is an > objective > > basis for this idea--that pedology is the science of the child in > > development and not that of the person in development right to the end of > > his life. I think that those who wish to extend pedology from the cradle > to > > the grave, those who want to put on the same plane the development of the > > child and the development which occurs with a child, without realizing it > > are making the same mistake that the old authors made when they said that > > the child is a small adult: that is, they deny the qualitative > specificity > > of the process of development in the child compared to that processes and > > the changes that are produced in a situation that is relatively stable. > > > > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > wrote: > > > > Hi Alfredo, > > > > I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? > > > > Martin > > > > > > A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the > > entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to assume > that > > the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that > development > > is the process of the child achieving adult status. However, it should > now > > be clear to the reader that human psychological development involves the > > entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to death. > > This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual who > > lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of reproduction > > in a community. > > > > There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see figure > > below), and this book has told only part of the story of the human life > > cycle. As young people become parents and then grandparents, or as they > > become teachers, coaches, or recognized community figures, their lives > > intersect and interact with those of children, both their own and those > of > > other people. The stages from infant to adolescent are not separate and > > distinct from later stages of the lifecycle. We have seen that parents > and > > caregivers play a crucial role in a young child?s development. Even death > > has an intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, albeit > > one that extends as a helix through time. > > > > Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: > > > > persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence and > > independent authority, divide and multiply their being through relations > > with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire and lose the > > capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) > > > > It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not > > opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that the > > human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in > many > > parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because nutrition > > and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into our genes. > As > > a result, many infants will interact not only with parents but > grandparents > > and even great-grandparents, as never before in human existence. This > > intergenerational contact and interaction creates opportunities for a > > variety of influences on the child, including mentorship, advice, > > alliances, and a richer density of social relations. > > > > > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > wrote: > > > > These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth > > structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as > > someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but who > > still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder > why > > these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and > > tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say > > nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can you > > clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" > > would be an adequate label for a reformation???) > > > > I can understand that there are different disciplines within > developmental > > psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) > > development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, > > professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations > that, > > " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child > but > > in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" > > > > If these transitions truly are transitions for the child-caregiver-niche > > system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings > with > > it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed with > > the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the > issue > > of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is it > > about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply changed > in > > and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my > > participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based > elementary > > school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a classroom, > > it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise my > > behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of > > listening, caring, orienting, responding). > > > > If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks in > > his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a means > to > > achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, > is > > it "age" periods what should be the focus? > > > > These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to > > learn from/with you all. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > mailman.ucsd.edu> > mailman.ucsd.edu> > > edu > mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy Blunden < > > ablunden@mira.net > ablunden@mira.net>> > > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a > Cultural > > Perpsective > > > > Like > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Hi David, > > > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and > crises; > > tell me what you think. > > > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed to > > treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say about > > each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole chapter > > to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and > > ?transition?: > > > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the form > > of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in the > > child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way of > > relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a new > > way of experiencing and understanding. > > > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there is a > > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of > herself: > > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the > child > > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I > > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > > > Martin > > > > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg d > > kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty > shameless > > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > > schtick you are up to...?) > > > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains > "Great > > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot wittier. > He > > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" > was > > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes > to > > address the students with "You and we"). > > > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky > measured > > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > > > a) you have the age periods and > > > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is > not > > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take the > > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with > Vygotsky's > > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > > > What do you think of this? > > > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > > CNF: "Grandwe" > > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: "Pre-will" > > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically dependent > > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: "Pre-me" > > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: "Pre-concepts" > > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically dependent. > > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > > thinking) > > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along each > > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > > > -- > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > > > Martin > > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > > > -----Mensagem original----- > > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > mailman.ucsd.edu] > > Em nome de Martin John Packer > > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > Perpsective > > > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been possible > > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart > people, > > a > > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > wrote: > > > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks > great. > > I > > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, > emphasising > > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > > cultural > > psychology. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> > > on > > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > Perpsective > > > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child > Development: > > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for > the > > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the two > > chapters on infancy: > > > > book253543%20#preview> > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun May 21 15:43:16 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 08:43:16 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <89097A69-684D-4619-9AF2-BF21A37E93A7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Not what I said, Mike! I said that Mike's quote from Kundera makes it clear that there isn't a "final" or "complete" or "ideal" form in the adult environment to guide adult learning the way that there is with mothers and teachers. That's why Kundera says that there is no way for the previous life to help us in our inexperiences. With children, there is a way. (I can't believe they are actually going to put Rod out to pasture. Can't they read? No wonder Korea is filling up with unemployed British academics these days....) dk On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 8:31 AM, mike cole wrote: > Happy to wait for your translation, David and thanks for reminding me that > version of this exists already. But given your care with translation, > waiting seems best - especially with my own thesis deadline fast > approaching. I do not envy you the task of figuring out who is being > referred to among the non-Russian names. You seem to be doing a great > sleuthing job. Asperger and all. > > Did Kundera really write that development up to age 18-20 is sui generis? > The steady demise of my intellectual capacities induced me to get his > remarks exactly backwards it seems. (I thought there was a grandwe awaiting > me in the old folks home, should I make it that far!) > > mike > > > > > > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 2:16 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > I think context is at least half all, Martin. In context, LSV's text is > > just as true as it is brave. But I also think it has a truth that can be > > generalized to our own time, to wit: > > > > a) Child development is sui generis, in that adult development does not > (as > > Mike's quote and Rod's example make all too clear) have a "complete form" > > in the environment which guides it. Language is, as always, the central > > example here: even from the crude, purely quantitative point of view of > > word counting, we can see that language develops until roughly age > > seventeen (vocabulary learning) but it is only learned, and at a rate > that > > is barely above attrition, after that. The only way to keep language > > development going is to emigrate. > > > > b) The social situation of development in childhood is BOTH constant AND > > ever-changing, BOTH single and unbroken AND singular and sui generis. > > So are the lines of development and the neoformations. But once again in > > order to really see this you need to look at language. If we take the > > social situation of development as the "relationship with the > environment" > > this is both constant (in the sense that the language system is constant) > > and constantly changing (in the sense that discourse and text are > > constantly changing). If we take the lines of development as diverse > forms > > of "communication" (in Russian, "sharing", "making common") on the one > hand > > and various forms of "generalization" on the other (but this is > > intellectualistic, it's really "about-sharing", or "about-making-common") > > we can see that the lines of development are unbroken too but they are > > constantly shape shifting, and that in critical periods the > > "generalization" is in the first plane and communication takes the second > > plane, while in stable periods it's the other way around. The > neoformations > > are even more obviously like this: critical neoformations are always the > > child's proto-version, and they persist only as subordinate moments of > the > > complete version provided in the environment (hence "pre-we", "grandwe", > > "pre-will", "grandwill", "pre-me", "grandme", etc.) > > > > c) The life of the adult is not at all stable. But the variation of adult > > life is no part of ontogenesis. It is what forms the link between > > ontogenesis and sociogenesis; that is, the point were we have to stop > just > > understanding the world and start to actually change it. That's the only > > thing that can excuse my somewhat flowery language about senile children > > and having futures in mind. > > > > But look at the context. The year is 1930. Russia has begun to "realize > the > > first five year plan in four years". The famine is underway in the > Ukraine, > > and Vygotsky is writing, about children, that although their weight and > > height doubles in the first year, it hardly changes throughout the whole > of > > school age (!). > > > > Vygotsky, Blonsky, and Krupskaya are under siege (Vygotsky had dabbled in > > artistic milieux sympathetic to Trotskyism, Blonsky had a past in the > > ancient Greek classics, Krupskaya had been a member of the Leningrad > > Opposition to Stalin). Bukharin was...and for all they know still > is...the > > major party theorist, and Bukharin's line is that there is absolutely no > > need for "separate laws" to describe development at different levels: > > everything is simply caused, reflexively, by adaptation to the > environment. > > Vygotsky dutifully refers to Bukharin in Pedology of the Adolescent, > > Chapter One: > > > > ?????????? ????????????? ???????????? ????? ??? ????? ???????????????? > > ????????????? ??????? ?? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ? ????????? ???????? > > ????????, ?? ????????? ????????, ? ????????? ???????? ???????, ??????? > > ??????????? ?? ?????? ???? ???? ? ????? ?????? ???????????? ???????: ? > > ????? > > ???????, ?????? ????????, ?????????? ? ?. ?., ? ?????? ???????, ?????? > > ????????????? ????????. ?? ????? ????, ???? ???? ?????????? ???????, > ???? ? > > ?? ?? ??????? ??????????????? ? ?????? ????? ???????. 'The simplistic > > representation of these two series of facts (biological and > > sociological--dk) as existing more or less independently in the human > > organism relative to each other leads, according to Bukharin, to an > ?absurd > > redundancy of laws, which occurs at every step even in the best Marxist > > works.? On the one hand, the laws of biology, physiology, and so on, and > on > > the other the laws of social development. In fact, one is the ?alter ego? > > of the other, one and the same phenomenon seen from different points of > > view.' > > > > What a perfect example of the thinking of the bureaucrat-philosopher! All > > development is exactly the same--just put enough pressure on the > developing > > entity--and it will develop. Who needs genetic laws? There is only one > law > > for the whole of development: adapt to your environment or die. Or, like > > Bukharin, do both. > > > > > > > > -- > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 8:55 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > > wrote: > > > > > Interesting, David. I?m not sure that I agree with LSV?s answer, here, > or > > > in the passage you cite in your message to Andy. At least, if we are to > > > equate pedology with developmental psychology, or with developmental > > > science. For one thing, the situation of adulthood is certainly not > > always > > > stable. For another, the ?line? of an adult's development may be > > different > > > from that of a child, but I would have thought that Vygotsky himself > > would > > > have agreed that there is no single line to the development of a child, > > or > > > of children. The line of development, I think, varies from stage to > > stage, > > > and from one developmental context to another. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 20, 2017, at 4:51 PM, David Kellogg > d > > > kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > > > Martin: > > > > > > This is from the Q&A at the Psychotechnic Conference in November 1930. > > > Mikhaillov and Spielrein (Isaac, not Sabine) have just asked questions > > > about the relationship of pedology to other sciences (especially > lifelong > > > education). > > > > > > Jerusalimcik: How does Comrade Vygotsky conceive of pedology: only as a > > > science of the child or as a science of the development of the human > > being > > > right to the end of his life? > > > > > > Vygotsky: Concerning the question of Comrade Jerusalimcik, is pedology > > the > > > science of the child or of the development of the person right to the > end > > > of his life? I think--and, again, it seems to me that there is an > > objective > > > basis for this idea--that pedology is the science of the child in > > > development and not that of the person in development right to the end > of > > > his life. I think that those who wish to extend pedology from the > cradle > > to > > > the grave, those who want to put on the same plane the development of > the > > > child and the development which occurs with a child, without realizing > it > > > are making the same mistake that the old authors made when they said > that > > > the child is a small adult: that is, they deny the qualitative > > specificity > > > of the process of development in the child compared to that processes > and > > > the changes that are produced in a situation that is relatively stable. > > > > > > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > > wrote: > > > > > > Hi Alfredo, > > > > > > I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the > > > entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to assume > > that > > > the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that > > development > > > is the process of the child achieving adult status. However, it should > > now > > > be clear to the reader that human psychological development involves > the > > > entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to > death. > > > This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual > who > > > lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of > reproduction > > > in a community. > > > > > > There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see figure > > > below), and this book has told only part of the story of the human life > > > cycle. As young people become parents and then grandparents, or as they > > > become teachers, coaches, or recognized community figures, their lives > > > intersect and interact with those of children, both their own and those > > of > > > other people. The stages from infant to adolescent are not separate and > > > distinct from later stages of the lifecycle. We have seen that parents > > and > > > caregivers play a crucial role in a young child?s development. Even > death > > > has an intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, > albeit > > > one that extends as a helix through time. > > > > > > Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: > > > > > > persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence and > > > independent authority, divide and multiply their being through > relations > > > with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire and lose > the > > > capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) > > > > > > It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not > > > opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that the > > > human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in > > many > > > parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because > nutrition > > > and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into our genes. > > As > > > a result, many infants will interact not only with parents but > > grandparents > > > and even great-grandparents, as never before in human existence. This > > > intergenerational contact and interaction creates opportunities for a > > > variety of influences on the child, including mentorship, advice, > > > alliances, and a richer density of social relations. > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth > > > structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, as > > > someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but > who > > > still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always wonder > > why > > > these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child and > > > tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say > > > nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can > you > > > clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why "pre-life" > > > would be an adequate label for a reformation???) > > > > > > I can understand that there are different disciplines within > > developmental > > > psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) > > > development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult development, > > > professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations > > that, > > > " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the child > > but > > > in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component" > > > > > > If these transitions truly are transitions for the > child-caregiver-niche > > > system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time brings > > with > > > it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed > with > > > the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the > > issue > > > of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, is > it > > > about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply > changed > > in > > > and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun my > > > participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based > > elementary > > > school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a > classroom, > > > it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise > my > > > behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of > > > listening, caring, orienting, responding). > > > > > > If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky speaks > in > > > his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a > means > > to > > > achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision making, > > is > > > it "age" periods what should be the focus? > > > > > > These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to > > > learn from/with you all. > > > > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > mailman.ucsd.edu> > > mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > edu > > mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy > Blunden < > > > ablunden@mira.net > > ablunden@mira.net>> > > > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a > > Cultural > > > Perpsective > > > > > > Like > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Andy Blunden > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > > > > > On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > Hi David, > > > > > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and > > crises; > > > tell me what you think. > > > > > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > > > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > > > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > > > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > > > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > > > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > > > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > > > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > > > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > > > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > > > > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed > to > > > treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say > about > > > each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole > chapter > > > to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and > > > ?transition?: > > > > > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the > form > > > of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in > the > > > child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way > of > > > relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a > new > > > way of experiencing and understanding. > > > > > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > > > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there > is a > > > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > > > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of > > herself: > > > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the > > child > > > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > > > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > > > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > > > > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence (I > > > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > > > > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > d > > > kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty > > shameless > > > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > > > schtick you are up to...?) > > > > > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains > > "Great > > > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot > wittier. > > He > > > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the "we" > > was > > > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky likes > > to > > > address the students with "You and we"). > > > > > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > > > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to teach > > > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > > > > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky > > measured > > > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > > > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > > > > > a) you have the age periods and > > > > > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > > > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > > > > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies is > > not > > > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van der > > > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take > the > > > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with > > Vygotsky's > > > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > > > > > What do you think of this? > > > > > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > > > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > > > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > > > CNF: "Grandwe" > > > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > > > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > > > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > > > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: > "Pre-will" > > > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically > dependent > > > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > > > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: > "Pre-me" > > > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > > > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > > > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: > "Pre-concepts" > > > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically > dependent. > > > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > > > thinking) > > > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > > > > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along > each > > > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > > > > > -- > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > Ruminations > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > > > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > > > > > Martin > > > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > > > > > -----Mensagem original----- > > > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > Em nome de Martin John Packer > > > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > > > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > > Perpsective > > > > > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been > possible > > > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart > > people, > > > a > > > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > wrote: > > > > > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks > > great. > > > I > > > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, > > emphasising > > > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > > > cultural > > > psychology. > > > > > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> > > > on > > > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > > > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > Perpsective > > > > > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child > > Development: > > > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 for > > the > > > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > > > > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the > two > > > chapters on infancy: > > > > > > > book253543%20#preview> > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > Ruminations > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun May 21 16:11:21 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 17:11:21 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Society for Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology Annual Conference In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Elizabeth, It occurred to me the other day that crowd-sourced qualitative inquiry could connect qualitative with quantitative, analog with digital. Does this thinking possibly resonate with the SQIP Conference? Henry > On May 21, 2017, at 10:59 AM, Elizabeth Fein wrote: > > Dear colleagues, > > If you are a New Yorker or plan to be in NYC this week, check out the > annual conference of the *Society **for Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology*, > a subdivision of the American Psychological Association's Division 5, > happening this > Wednesday and Thursday *May 24th and 25th* at Fordham University's Lincoln > Center campus. We've got an exciting program planned, including keynote > addresses from *Kim Hopper*, who does ethnographic work on > cross-cultural variations in the course and prognosis of schizophrenia and > also on homelessness, and the *Bronx African-American History Project*, a > collaborative oral history project that has informed a number of community > projects in NYC. We'll also have themed paper sessions and symposia, > posters, and a plenary address on validity in psychology from SQIP founding > members *Ruthellen Josselson, Ken Gergen and Mark Freeman, along with > Scott **Churchill.* > > I've attached the conference program here along with some information about > the conference and a letter from our President, Fred Wertz; you can also > find out more information at our website, qualpsy.org. > > Best, > > Elizabeth Fein, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Psychology > Duquesne University > <2017 SQIP Program Final.pdf> From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun May 21 17:00:09 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 17:00:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <89097A69-684D-4619-9AF2-BF21A37E93A7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: For discussion, David. Vis a vis the uniqueness of early ontogeny : That there is functional reorganization associated with physical decline and cultural accumulation seems like a point of potential agreement as an abstract starting point. A great many adults in this world appear to believe that there IS a '"final or complete or ideal" that guides their behavior. Vis a vis mandatory retirement: Hopefully Rod will not be economically crippled by being "let out to pasture." If he has the means to keep body and soul together, he now has a great deal of time to devote to issues he cares a lot about. And he will be more productive in academic fora such as XMCA. Its a great luxury. And presumably the people migrating to South Korea to teach in order to keep body and soul together are sharing the fate of their working class kin. :-( Hang in here Rod! :-) mike On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 3:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Not what I said, Mike! I said that Mike's quote from Kundera makes it clear > that there isn't a "final" or "complete" or "ideal" form in the adult > environment to guide adult learning the way that there is with mothers and > teachers. That's why Kundera says that there is no way for the previous > life to help us in our inexperiences. With children, there is a way. > > (I can't believe they are actually going to put Rod out to pasture. Can't > they read? No wonder Korea is filling up with unemployed British academics > these days....) > > dk > > > On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 8:31 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > Happy to wait for your translation, David and thanks for reminding me > that > > version of this exists already. But given your care with translation, > > waiting seems best - especially with my own thesis deadline fast > > approaching. I do not envy you the task of figuring out who is being > > referred to among the non-Russian names. You seem to be doing a great > > sleuthing job. Asperger and all. > > > > Did Kundera really write that development up to age 18-20 is sui generis? > > The steady demise of my intellectual capacities induced me to get his > > remarks exactly backwards it seems. (I thought there was a grandwe > awaiting > > me in the old folks home, should I make it that far!) > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 2:16 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > I think context is at least half all, Martin. In context, LSV's text is > > > just as true as it is brave. But I also think it has a truth that can > be > > > generalized to our own time, to wit: > > > > > > a) Child development is sui generis, in that adult development does not > > (as > > > Mike's quote and Rod's example make all too clear) have a "complete > form" > > > in the environment which guides it. Language is, as always, the central > > > example here: even from the crude, purely quantitative point of view of > > > word counting, we can see that language develops until roughly age > > > seventeen (vocabulary learning) but it is only learned, and at a rate > > that > > > is barely above attrition, after that. The only way to keep language > > > development going is to emigrate. > > > > > > b) The social situation of development in childhood is BOTH constant > AND > > > ever-changing, BOTH single and unbroken AND singular and sui generis. > > > So are the lines of development and the neoformations. But once again > in > > > order to really see this you need to look at language. If we take the > > > social situation of development as the "relationship with the > > environment" > > > this is both constant (in the sense that the language system is > constant) > > > and constantly changing (in the sense that discourse and text are > > > constantly changing). If we take the lines of development as diverse > > forms > > > of "communication" (in Russian, "sharing", "making common") on the one > > hand > > > and various forms of "generalization" on the other (but this is > > > intellectualistic, it's really "about-sharing", or > "about-making-common") > > > we can see that the lines of development are unbroken too but they are > > > constantly shape shifting, and that in critical periods the > > > "generalization" is in the first plane and communication takes the > second > > > plane, while in stable periods it's the other way around. The > > neoformations > > > are even more obviously like this: critical neoformations are always > the > > > child's proto-version, and they persist only as subordinate moments of > > the > > > complete version provided in the environment (hence "pre-we", > "grandwe", > > > "pre-will", "grandwill", "pre-me", "grandme", etc.) > > > > > > c) The life of the adult is not at all stable. But the variation of > adult > > > life is no part of ontogenesis. It is what forms the link between > > > ontogenesis and sociogenesis; that is, the point were we have to stop > > just > > > understanding the world and start to actually change it. That's the > only > > > thing that can excuse my somewhat flowery language about senile > children > > > and having futures in mind. > > > > > > But look at the context. The year is 1930. Russia has begun to "realize > > the > > > first five year plan in four years". The famine is underway in the > > Ukraine, > > > and Vygotsky is writing, about children, that although their weight and > > > height doubles in the first year, it hardly changes throughout the > whole > > of > > > school age (!). > > > > > > Vygotsky, Blonsky, and Krupskaya are under siege (Vygotsky had dabbled > in > > > artistic milieux sympathetic to Trotskyism, Blonsky had a past in the > > > ancient Greek classics, Krupskaya had been a member of the Leningrad > > > Opposition to Stalin). Bukharin was...and for all they know still > > is...the > > > major party theorist, and Bukharin's line is that there is absolutely > no > > > need for "separate laws" to describe development at different levels: > > > everything is simply caused, reflexively, by adaptation to the > > environment. > > > Vygotsky dutifully refers to Bukharin in Pedology of the Adolescent, > > > Chapter One: > > > > > > ?????????? ????????????? ???????????? ????? ??? ????? ???????????????? > > > ????????????? ??????? ?? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ? ????????? ???????? > > > ????????, ?? ????????? ????????, ? ????????? ???????? ???????, ??????? > > > ??????????? ?? ?????? ???? ???? ? ????? ?????? ???????????? ???????: ? > > > ????? > > > ???????, ?????? ????????, ?????????? ? ?. ?., ? ?????? ???????, ?????? > > > ????????????? ????????. ?? ????? ????, ???? ???? ?????????? ???????, > > ???? ? > > > ?? ?? ??????? ??????????????? ? ?????? ????? ???????. 'The simplistic > > > representation of these two series of facts (biological and > > > sociological--dk) as existing more or less independently in the human > > > organism relative to each other leads, according to Bukharin, to an > > ?absurd > > > redundancy of laws, which occurs at every step even in the best Marxist > > > works.? On the one hand, the laws of biology, physiology, and so on, > and > > on > > > the other the laws of social development. In fact, one is the ?alter > ego? > > > of the other, one and the same phenomenon seen from different points of > > > view.' > > > > > > What a perfect example of the thinking of the bureaucrat-philosopher! > All > > > development is exactly the same--just put enough pressure on the > > developing > > > entity--and it will develop. Who needs genetic laws? There is only one > > law > > > for the whole of development: adapt to your environment or die. Or, > like > > > Bukharin, do both. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > Ruminations > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 8:55 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Interesting, David. I?m not sure that I agree with LSV?s answer, > here, > > or > > > > in the passage you cite in your message to Andy. At least, if we are > to > > > > equate pedology with developmental psychology, or with developmental > > > > science. For one thing, the situation of adulthood is certainly not > > > always > > > > stable. For another, the ?line? of an adult's development may be > > > different > > > > from that of a child, but I would have thought that Vygotsky himself > > > would > > > > have agreed that there is no single line to the development of a > child, > > > or > > > > of children. The line of development, I think, varies from stage to > > > stage, > > > > and from one developmental context to another. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 20, 2017, at 4:51 PM, David Kellogg > > > d > > > > kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > > > > > Martin: > > > > > > > > This is from the Q&A at the Psychotechnic Conference in November > 1930. > > > > Mikhaillov and Spielrein (Isaac, not Sabine) have just asked > questions > > > > about the relationship of pedology to other sciences (especially > > lifelong > > > > education). > > > > > > > > Jerusalimcik: How does Comrade Vygotsky conceive of pedology: only > as a > > > > science of the child or as a science of the development of the human > > > being > > > > right to the end of his life? > > > > > > > > Vygotsky: Concerning the question of Comrade Jerusalimcik, is > pedology > > > the > > > > science of the child or of the development of the person right to the > > end > > > > of his life? I think--and, again, it seems to me that there is an > > > objective > > > > basis for this idea--that pedology is the science of the child in > > > > development and not that of the person in development right to the > end > > of > > > > his life. I think that those who wish to extend pedology from the > > cradle > > > to > > > > the grave, those who want to put on the same plane the development of > > the > > > > child and the development which occurs with a child, without > realizing > > it > > > > are making the same mistake that the old authors made when they said > > that > > > > the child is a small adult: that is, they deny the qualitative > > > specificity > > > > of the process of development in the child compared to that processes > > and > > > > the changes that are produced in a situation that is relatively > stable. > > > > > > > > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Hi Alfredo, > > > > > > > > I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the > > > > entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to > assume > > > that > > > > the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that > > > development > > > > is the process of the child achieving adult status. However, it > should > > > now > > > > be clear to the reader that human psychological development involves > > the > > > > entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to > > death. > > > > This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual > > who > > > > lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of > > reproduction > > > > in a community. > > > > > > > > There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see > figure > > > > below), and this book has told only part of the story of the human > life > > > > cycle. As young people become parents and then grandparents, or as > they > > > > become teachers, coaches, or recognized community figures, their > lives > > > > intersect and interact with those of children, both their own and > those > > > of > > > > other people. The stages from infant to adolescent are not separate > and > > > > distinct from later stages of the lifecycle. We have seen that > parents > > > and > > > > caregivers play a crucial role in a young child?s development. Even > > death > > > > has an intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, > > albeit > > > > one that extends as a helix through time. > > > > > > > > Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: > > > > > > > > persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence > and > > > > independent authority, divide and multiply their being through > > relations > > > > with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire and lose > > the > > > > capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) > > > > > > > > It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not > > > > opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that > the > > > > human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in > > > many > > > > parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because > > nutrition > > > > and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into our > genes. > > > As > > > > a result, many infants will interact not only with parents but > > > grandparents > > > > and even great-grandparents, as never before in human existence. This > > > > intergenerational contact and interaction creates opportunities for a > > > > variety of influences on the child, including mentorship, advice, > > > > alliances, and a richer density of social relations. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth > > > > structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, > as > > > > someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but > > who > > > > still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always > wonder > > > why > > > > these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child > and > > > > tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say > > > > nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can > > you > > > > clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why > "pre-life" > > > > would be an adequate label for a reformation???) > > > > > > > > I can understand that there are different disciplines within > > > developmental > > > > psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) > > > > development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult > development, > > > > professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations > > > that, > > > > " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the > child > > > but > > > > in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a > component" > > > > > > > > If these transitions truly are transitions for the > > child-caregiver-niche > > > > system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time > brings > > > with > > > > it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed > > with > > > > the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the > > > issue > > > > of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, > is > > it > > > > about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply > > changed > > > in > > > > and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun > my > > > > participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based > > > elementary > > > > school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a > > classroom, > > > > it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise > > my > > > > behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of > > > > listening, caring, orienting, responding). > > > > > > > > If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky > speaks > > in > > > > his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a > > means > > > to > > > > achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision > making, > > > is > > > > it "age" periods what should be the focus? > > > > > > > > These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to > > > > learn from/with you all. > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > > > edu > > > mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy > > Blunden < > > > > ablunden@mira.net > > > ablunden@mira.net>> > > > > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a > > > Cultural > > > > Perpsective > > > > > > > > Like > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > > > > > > > On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > > Hi David, > > > > > > > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and > > > crises; > > > > tell me what you think. > > > > > > > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > > > > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > > > > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > > > > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > > > > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > > > > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > > > > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > > > > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > > > > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > > > > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > > > > > > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed > > to > > > > treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say > > about > > > > each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole > > chapter > > > > to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and > > > > ?transition?: > > > > > > > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the > > form > > > > of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in > > the > > > > child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way > > of > > > > relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a > > new > > > > way of experiencing and understanding. > > > > > > > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > > > > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there > > is a > > > > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > > > > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of > > > herself: > > > > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the > > > child > > > > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > > > > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > > > > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > > > > > > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence > (I > > > > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > > > > > > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > > > d > > > > kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > > > > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty > > > shameless > > > > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > > > > schtick you are up to...?) > > > > > > > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains > > > "Great > > > > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot > > wittier. > > > He > > > > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the > "we" > > > was > > > > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky > likes > > > to > > > > address the students with "You and we"). > > > > > > > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > > > > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to > teach > > > > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > > > > > > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky > > > measured > > > > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > > > > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > > > > > > > a) you have the age periods and > > > > > > > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > > > > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > > > > > > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies > is > > > not > > > > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van > der > > > > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take > > the > > > > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with > > > Vygotsky's > > > > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > > > > > > > What do you think of this? > > > > > > > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > > > > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > > > > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > > > > CNF: "Grandwe" > > > > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > > > > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > > > > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > > > > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: > > "Pre-will" > > > > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically > > dependent > > > > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > > > > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: > > "Pre-me" > > > > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > > > > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > > > > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: > > "Pre-concepts" > > > > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically > > dependent. > > > > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > > > > thinking) > > > > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > > > > > > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along > > each > > > > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > > > > > > > -- > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > > Ruminations > > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > > > > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > > > > > > > -----Mensagem original----- > > > > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > > Em nome de Martin John Packer > > > > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > > > > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > > > Perpsective > > > > > > > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been > > possible > > > > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart > > > people, > > > > a > > > > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks > > > great. > > > > I > > > > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, > > > emphasising > > > > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > > > > cultural > > > > psychology. > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> > > > > on > > > > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > > > > > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > > Perpsective > > > > > > > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child > > > Development: > > > > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 > for > > > the > > > > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > > > > > > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the > > two > > > > chapters on infancy: > > > > > > > > > > book253543%20#preview> > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > > Ruminations > > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun May 21 22:05:34 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 22:05:34 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a CulturalPerpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <89097A69-684D-4619-9AF2-BF21A37E93A7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <59227199.55a3620a.c917e.b40e@mx.google.com> Mike, Contrasting: There IS a final, or complete, or ideal... With Having a great deal of time to *devote* to issues one cares about.... This theme of devotion, commitment, and this quality leading to being more productive within academic *fora* What do we give our lives to? Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: mike cole Sent: May 21, 2017 5:02 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a CulturalPerpsective For discussion, David. Vis a vis the uniqueness of early ontogeny : That there is functional reorganization associated with physical decline and cultural accumulation seems like a point of potential agreement as an abstract starting point. A great many adults in this world appear to believe that there IS a '"final or complete or ideal" that guides their behavior. Vis a vis mandatory retirement: Hopefully Rod will not be economically crippled by being "let out to pasture." If he has the means to keep body and soul together, he now has a great deal of time to devote to issues he cares a lot about. And he will be more productive in academic fora such as XMCA. Its a great luxury. And presumably the people migrating to South Korea to teach in order to keep body and soul together are sharing the fate of their working class kin. :-( Hang in here Rod! :-) mike On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 3:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Not what I said, Mike! I said that Mike's quote from Kundera makes it clear > that there isn't a "final" or "complete" or "ideal" form in the adult > environment to guide adult learning the way that there is with mothers and > teachers. That's why Kundera says that there is no way for the previous > life to help us in our inexperiences. With children, there is a way. > > (I can't believe they are actually going to put Rod out to pasture. Can't > they read? No wonder Korea is filling up with unemployed British academics > these days....) > > dk > > > On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 8:31 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > Happy to wait for your translation, David and thanks for reminding me > that > > version of this exists already. But given your care with translation, > > waiting seems best - especially with my own thesis deadline fast > > approaching. I do not envy you the task of figuring out who is being > > referred to among the non-Russian names. You seem to be doing a great > > sleuthing job. Asperger and all. > > > > Did Kundera really write that development up to age 18-20 is sui generis? > > The steady demise of my intellectual capacities induced me to get his > > remarks exactly backwards it seems. (I thought there was a grandwe > awaiting > > me in the old folks home, should I make it that far!) > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 2:16 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > I think context is at least half all, Martin. In context, LSV's text is > > > just as true as it is brave. But I also think it has a truth that can > be > > > generalized to our own time, to wit: > > > > > > a) Child development is sui generis, in that adult development does not > > (as > > > Mike's quote and Rod's example make all too clear) have a "complete > form" > > > in the environment which guides it. Language is, as always, the central > > > example here: even from the crude, purely quantitative point of view of > > > word counting, we can see that language develops until roughly age > > > seventeen (vocabulary learning) but it is only learned, and at a rate > > that > > > is barely above attrition, after that. The only way to keep language > > > development going is to emigrate. > > > > > > b) The social situation of development in childhood is BOTH constant > AND > > > ever-changing, BOTH single and unbroken AND singular and sui generis. > > > So are the lines of development and the neoformations. But once again > in > > > order to really see this you need to look at language. If we take the > > > social situation of development as the "relationship with the > > environment" > > > this is both constant (in the sense that the language system is > constant) > > > and constantly changing (in the sense that discourse and text are > > > constantly changing). If we take the lines of development as diverse > > forms > > > of "communication" (in Russian, "sharing", "making common") on the one > > hand > > > and various forms of "generalization" on the other (but this is > > > intellectualistic, it's really "about-sharing", or > "about-making-common") > > > we can see that the lines of development are unbroken too but they are > > > constantly shape shifting, and that in critical periods the > > > "generalization" is in the first plane and communication takes the > second > > > plane, while in stable periods it's the other way around. The > > neoformations > > > are even more obviously like this: critical neoformations are always > the > > > child's proto-version, and they persist only as subordinate moments of > > the > > > complete version provided in the environment (hence "pre-we", > "grandwe", > > > "pre-will", "grandwill", "pre-me", "grandme", etc.) > > > > > > c) The life of the adult is not at all stable. But the variation of > adult > > > life is no part of ontogenesis. It is what forms the link between > > > ontogenesis and sociogenesis; that is, the point were we have to stop > > just > > > understanding the world and start to actually change it. That's the > only > > > thing that can excuse my somewhat flowery language about senile > children > > > and having futures in mind. > > > > > > But look at the context. The year is 1930. Russia has begun to "realize > > the > > > first five year plan in four years". The famine is underway in the > > Ukraine, > > > and Vygotsky is writing, about children, that although their weight and > > > height doubles in the first year, it hardly changes throughout the > whole > > of > > > school age (!). > > > > > > Vygotsky, Blonsky, and Krupskaya are under siege (Vygotsky had dabbled > in > > > artistic milieux sympathetic to Trotskyism, Blonsky had a past in the > > > ancient Greek classics, Krupskaya had been a member of the Leningrad > > > Opposition to Stalin). Bukharin was...and for all they know still > > is...the > > > major party theorist, and Bukharin's line is that there is absolutely > no > > > need for "separate laws" to describe development at different levels: > > > everything is simply caused, reflexively, by adaptation to the > > environment. > > > Vygotsky dutifully refers to Bukharin in Pedology of the Adolescent, > > > Chapter One: > > > > > > ?????????? ????????????? ???????????? ????? ??? ????? ???????????????? > > > ????????????? ??????? ?? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ? ????????? ???????? > > > ????????, ?? ????????? ????????, ? ????????? ???????? ???????, ??????? > > > ??????????? ?? ?????? ???? ???? ? ????? ?????? ???????????? ???????: ? > > > ????? > > > ???????, ?????? ????????, ?????????? ? ?. ?., ? ?????? ???????, ?????? > > > ????????????? ????????. ?? ????? ????, ???? ???? ?????????? ???????, > > ???? ? > > > ?? ?? ??????? ??????????????? ? ?????? ????? ???????. 'The simplistic > > > representation of these two series of facts (biological and > > > sociological--dk) as existing more or less independently in the human > > > organism relative to each other leads, according to Bukharin, to an > > ?absurd > > > redundancy of laws, which occurs at every step even in the best Marxist > > > works.? On the one hand, the laws of biology, physiology, and so on, > and > > on > > > the other the laws of social development. In fact, one is the ?alter > ego? > > > of the other, one and the same phenomenon seen from different points of > > > view.' > > > > > > What a perfect example of the thinking of the bureaucrat-philosopher! > All > > > development is exactly the same--just put enough pressure on the > > developing > > > entity--and it will develop. Who needs genetic laws? There is only one > > law > > > for the whole of development: adapt to your environment or die. Or, > like > > > Bukharin, do both. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > Ruminations > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 8:55 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Interesting, David. I?m not sure that I agree with LSV?s answer, > here, > > or > > > > in the passage you cite in your message to Andy. At least, if we are > to > > > > equate pedology with developmental psychology, or with developmental > > > > science. For one thing, the situation of adulthood is certainly not > > > always > > > > stable. For another, the ?line? of an adult's development may be > > > different > > > > from that of a child, but I would have thought that Vygotsky himself > > > would > > > > have agreed that there is no single line to the development of a > child, > > > or > > > > of children. The line of development, I think, varies from stage to > > > stage, > > > > and from one developmental context to another. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 20, 2017, at 4:51 PM, David Kellogg > > > d > > > > kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > > > > > Martin: > > > > > > > > This is from the Q&A at the Psychotechnic Conference in November > 1930. > > > > Mikhaillov and Spielrein (Isaac, not Sabine) have just asked > questions > > > > about the relationship of pedology to other sciences (especially > > lifelong > > > > education). > > > > > > > > Jerusalimcik: How does Comrade Vygotsky conceive of pedology: only > as a > > > > science of the child or as a science of the development of the human > > > being > > > > right to the end of his life? > > > > > > > > Vygotsky: Concerning the question of Comrade Jerusalimcik, is > pedology > > > the > > > > science of the child or of the development of the person right to the > > end > > > > of his life? I think--and, again, it seems to me that there is an > > > objective > > > > basis for this idea--that pedology is the science of the child in > > > > development and not that of the person in development right to the > end > > of > > > > his life. I think that those who wish to extend pedology from the > > cradle > > > to > > > > the grave, those who want to put on the same plane the development of > > the > > > > child and the development which occurs with a child, without > realizing > > it > > > > are making the same mistake that the old authors made when they said > > that > > > > the child is a small adult: that is, they deny the qualitative > > > specificity > > > > of the process of development in the child compared to that processes > > and > > > > the changes that are produced in a situation that is relatively > stable. > > > > > > > > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Hi Alfredo, > > > > > > > > I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the > > > > entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to > assume > > > that > > > > the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that > > > development > > > > is the process of the child achieving adult status. However, it > should > > > now > > > > be clear to the reader that human psychological development involves > > the > > > > entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to > > death. > > > > This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual > > who > > > > lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of > > reproduction > > > > in a community. > > > > > > > > There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see > figure > > > > below), and this book has told only part of the story of the human > life > > > > cycle. As young people become parents and then grandparents, or as > they > > > > become teachers, coaches, or recognized community figures, their > lives > > > > intersect and interact with those of children, both their own and > those > > > of > > > > other people. The stages from infant to adolescent are not separate > and > > > > distinct from later stages of the lifecycle. We have seen that > parents > > > and > > > > caregivers play a crucial role in a young child?s development. Even > > death > > > > has an intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, > > albeit > > > > one that extends as a helix through time. > > > > > > > > Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: > > > > > > > > persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence > and > > > > independent authority, divide and multiply their being through > > relations > > > > with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire and lose > > the > > > > capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) > > > > > > > > It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not > > > > opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that > the > > > > human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in > > > many > > > > parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because > > nutrition > > > > and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into our > genes. > > > As > > > > a result, many infants will interact not only with parents but > > > grandparents > > > > and even great-grandparents, as never before in human existence. This > > > > intergenerational contact and interaction creates opportunities for a > > > > variety of influences on the child, including mentorship, advice, > > > > alliances, and a richer density of social relations. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth > > > > structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, > as > > > > someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but > > who > > > > still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always > wonder > > > why > > > > these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child > and > > > > tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say > > > > nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can > > you > > > > clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why > "pre-life" > > > > would be an adequate label for a reformation???) > > > > > > > > I can understand that there are different disciplines within > > > developmental > > > > psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) > > > > development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult > development, > > > > professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations > > > that, > > > > " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the > child > > > but > > > > in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a > component" > > > > > > > > If these transitions truly are transitions for the > > child-caregiver-niche > > > > system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time > brings > > > with > > > > it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed > > with > > > > the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the > > > issue > > > > of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, > is > > it > > > > about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply > > changed > > > in > > > > and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun > my > > > > participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based > > > elementary > > > > school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a > > classroom, > > > > it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise > > my > > > > behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of > > > > listening, caring, orienting, responding). > > > > > > > > If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky > speaks > > in > > > > his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a > > means > > > to > > > > achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision > making, > > > is > > > > it "age" periods what should be the focus? > > > > > > > > These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to > > > > learn from/with you all. > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > > > edu > > > mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy > > Blunden < > > > > ablunden@mira.net > > > ablunden@mira.net>> > > > > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a > > > Cultural > > > > Perpsective > > > > > > > > Like > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > > > > > > > On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > > Hi David, > > > > > > > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and > > > crises; > > > > tell me what you think. > > > > > > > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > > > > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > > > > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > > > > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > > > > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > > > > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > > > > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > > > > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > > > > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > > > > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > > > > > > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed > > to > > > > treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say > > about > > > > each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole > > chapter > > > > to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and > > > > ?transition?: > > > > > > > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the > > form > > > > of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in > > the > > > > child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way > > of > > > > relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a > > new > > > > way of experiencing and understanding. > > > > > > > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > > > > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there > > is a > > > > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > > > > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of > > > herself: > > > > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the > > > child > > > > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > > > > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > > > > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > > > > > > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence > (I > > > > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > > > > > > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > > > d > > > > kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > > > > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty > > > shameless > > > > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > > > > schtick you are up to...?) > > > > > > > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains > > > "Great > > > > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot > > wittier. > > > He > > > > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the > "we" > > > was > > > > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky > likes > > > to > > > > address the students with "You and we"). > > > > > > > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > > > > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to > teach > > > > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > > > > > > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky > > > measured > > > > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > > > > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > > > > > > > a) you have the age periods and > > > > > > > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > > > > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > > > > > > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies > is > > > not > > > > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van > der > > > > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take > > the > > > > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with > > > Vygotsky's > > > > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > > > > > > > What do you think of this? > > > > > > > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > > > > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > > > > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > > > > CNF: "Grandwe" > > > > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > > > > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > > > > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > > > > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: > > "Pre-will" > > > > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically > > dependent > > > > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > > > > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: > > "Pre-me" > > > > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > > > > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > > > > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: > > "Pre-concepts" > > > > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically > > dependent. > > > > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > > > > thinking) > > > > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > > > > > > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along > > each > > > > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > > > > > > > -- > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > > Ruminations > > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > > > > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > > > > > > > -----Mensagem original----- > > > > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > > Em nome de Martin John Packer > > > > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > > > > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > > > Perpsective > > > > > > > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been > > possible > > > > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart > > > people, > > > > a > > > > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks > > > great. > > > > I > > > > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, > > > emphasising > > > > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > > > > cultural > > > > psychology. > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> > > > > on > > > > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > > > > > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > > Perpsective > > > > > > > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child > > > Development: > > > > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 > for > > > the > > > > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > > > > > > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the > > two > > > > chapters on infancy: > > > > > > > > > > book253543%20#preview> > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > > Ruminations > > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sun May 21 22:36:40 2017 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 05:36:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Message-ID: Many thanks David and Mike, Yes, I am certainly looking forward to having time to keep up with the XMCA conversation and I will be continuing in my role as co-editor of 'Early Years'. And I will have an adequate pension! I am also looking forward to meeting some XMCA contributors at the ISCAR conference in Quebec. It will be good to be able to see the people behind the ideas. All the best, Rod On 22 May 2017 1:01 am, mike cole wrote: For discussion, David. Vis a vis the uniqueness of early ontogeny : That there is functional reorganization associated with physical decline and cultural accumulation seems like a point of potential agreement as an abstract starting point. A great many adults in this world appear to believe that there IS a '"final or complete or ideal" that guides their behavior. Vis a vis mandatory retirement: Hopefully Rod will not be economically crippled by being "let out to pasture." If he has the means to keep body and soul together, he now has a great deal of time to devote to issues he cares a lot about. And he will be more productive in academic fora such as XMCA. Its a great luxury. And presumably the people migrating to South Korea to teach in order to keep body and soul together are sharing the fate of their working class kin. :-( Hang in here Rod! :-) mike On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 3:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Not what I said, Mike! I said that Mike's quote from Kundera makes it clear > that there isn't a "final" or "complete" or "ideal" form in the adult > environment to guide adult learning the way that there is with mothers and > teachers. That's why Kundera says that there is no way for the previous > life to help us in our inexperiences. With children, there is a way. > > (I can't believe they are actually going to put Rod out to pasture. Can't > they read? No wonder Korea is filling up with unemployed British academics > these days....) > > dk > > > On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 8:31 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > Happy to wait for your translation, David and thanks for reminding me > that > > version of this exists already. But given your care with translation, > > waiting seems best - especially with my own thesis deadline fast > > approaching. I do not envy you the task of figuring out who is being > > referred to among the non-Russian names. You seem to be doing a great > > sleuthing job. Asperger and all. > > > > Did Kundera really write that development up to age 18-20 is sui generis? > > The steady demise of my intellectual capacities induced me to get his > > remarks exactly backwards it seems. (I thought there was a grandwe > awaiting > > me in the old folks home, should I make it that far!) > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 2:16 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > I think context is at least half all, Martin. In context, LSV's text is > > > just as true as it is brave. But I also think it has a truth that can > be > > > generalized to our own time, to wit: > > > > > > a) Child development is sui generis, in that adult development does not > > (as > > > Mike's quote and Rod's example make all too clear) have a "complete > form" > > > in the environment which guides it. Language is, as always, the central > > > example here: even from the crude, purely quantitative point of view of > > > word counting, we can see that language develops until roughly age > > > seventeen (vocabulary learning) but it is only learned, and at a rate > > that > > > is barely above attrition, after that. The only way to keep language > > > development going is to emigrate. > > > > > > b) The social situation of development in childhood is BOTH constant > AND > > > ever-changing, BOTH single and unbroken AND singular and sui generis. > > > So are the lines of development and the neoformations. But once again > in > > > order to really see this you need to look at language. If we take the > > > social situation of development as the "relationship with the > > environment" > > > this is both constant (in the sense that the language system is > constant) > > > and constantly changing (in the sense that discourse and text are > > > constantly changing). If we take the lines of development as diverse > > forms > > > of "communication" (in Russian, "sharing", "making common") on the one > > hand > > > and various forms of "generalization" on the other (but this is > > > intellectualistic, it's really "about-sharing", or > "about-making-common") > > > we can see that the lines of development are unbroken too but they are > > > constantly shape shifting, and that in critical periods the > > > "generalization" is in the first plane and communication takes the > second > > > plane, while in stable periods it's the other way around. The > > neoformations > > > are even more obviously like this: critical neoformations are always > the > > > child's proto-version, and they persist only as subordinate moments of > > the > > > complete version provided in the environment (hence "pre-we", > "grandwe", > > > "pre-will", "grandwill", "pre-me", "grandme", etc.) > > > > > > c) The life of the adult is not at all stable. But the variation of > adult > > > life is no part of ontogenesis. It is what forms the link between > > > ontogenesis and sociogenesis; that is, the point were we have to stop > > just > > > understanding the world and start to actually change it. That's the > only > > > thing that can excuse my somewhat flowery language about senile > children > > > and having futures in mind. > > > > > > But look at the context. The year is 1930. Russia has begun to "realize > > the > > > first five year plan in four years". The famine is underway in the > > Ukraine, > > > and Vygotsky is writing, about children, that although their weight and > > > height doubles in the first year, it hardly changes throughout the > whole > > of > > > school age (!). > > > > > > Vygotsky, Blonsky, and Krupskaya are under siege (Vygotsky had dabbled > in > > > artistic milieux sympathetic to Trotskyism, Blonsky had a past in the > > > ancient Greek classics, Krupskaya had been a member of the Leningrad > > > Opposition to Stalin). Bukharin was...and for all they know still > > is...the > > > major party theorist, and Bukharin's line is that there is absolutely > no > > > need for "separate laws" to describe development at different levels: > > > everything is simply caused, reflexively, by adaptation to the > > environment. > > > Vygotsky dutifully refers to Bukharin in Pedology of the Adolescent, > > > Chapter One: > > > > > > ?????????? ????????????? ???????????? ????? ??? ????? ???????????????? > > > ????????????? ??????? ?? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ? ????????? ???????? > > > ????????, ?? ????????? ????????, ? ????????? ???????? ???????, ??????? > > > ??????????? ?? ?????? ???? ???? ? ????? ?????? ???????????? ???????: ? > > > ????? > > > ???????, ?????? ????????, ?????????? ? ?. ?., ? ?????? ???????, ?????? > > > ????????????? ????????. ?? ????? ????, ???? ???? ?????????? ???????, > > ???? ? > > > ?? ?? ??????? ??????????????? ? ?????? ????? ???????. 'The simplistic > > > representation of these two series of facts (biological and > > > sociological--dk) as existing more or less independently in the human > > > organism relative to each other leads, according to Bukharin, to an > > ?absurd > > > redundancy of laws, which occurs at every step even in the best Marxist > > > works.? On the one hand, the laws of biology, physiology, and so on, > and > > on > > > the other the laws of social development. In fact, one is the ?alter > ego? > > > of the other, one and the same phenomenon seen from different points of > > > view.' > > > > > > What a perfect example of the thinking of the bureaucrat-philosopher! > All > > > development is exactly the same--just put enough pressure on the > > developing > > > entity--and it will develop. Who needs genetic laws? There is only one > > law > > > for the whole of development: adapt to your environment or die. Or, > like > > > Bukharin, do both. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > Ruminations > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 8:55 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Interesting, David. I?m not sure that I agree with LSV?s answer, > here, > > or > > > > in the passage you cite in your message to Andy. At least, if we are > to > > > > equate pedology with developmental psychology, or with developmental > > > > science. For one thing, the situation of adulthood is certainly not > > > always > > > > stable. For another, the ?line? of an adult's development may be > > > different > > > > from that of a child, but I would have thought that Vygotsky himself > > > would > > > > have agreed that there is no single line to the development of a > child, > > > or > > > > of children. The line of development, I think, varies from stage to > > > stage, > > > > and from one developmental context to another. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 20, 2017, at 4:51 PM, David Kellogg > > > d > > > > kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > > > > > Martin: > > > > > > > > This is from the Q&A at the Psychotechnic Conference in November > 1930. > > > > Mikhaillov and Spielrein (Isaac, not Sabine) have just asked > questions > > > > about the relationship of pedology to other sciences (especially > > lifelong > > > > education). > > > > > > > > Jerusalimcik: How does Comrade Vygotsky conceive of pedology: only > as a > > > > science of the child or as a science of the development of the human > > > being > > > > right to the end of his life? > > > > > > > > Vygotsky: Concerning the question of Comrade Jerusalimcik, is > pedology > > > the > > > > science of the child or of the development of the person right to the > > end > > > > of his life? I think--and, again, it seems to me that there is an > > > objective > > > > basis for this idea--that pedology is the science of the child in > > > > development and not that of the person in development right to the > end > > of > > > > his life. I think that those who wish to extend pedology from the > > cradle > > > to > > > > the grave, those who want to put on the same plane the development of > > the > > > > child and the development which occurs with a child, without > realizing > > it > > > > are making the same mistake that the old authors made when they said > > that > > > > the child is a small adult: that is, they deny the qualitative > > > specificity > > > > of the process of development in the child compared to that processes > > and > > > > the changes that are produced in a situation that is relatively > stable. > > > > > > > > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Hi Alfredo, > > > > > > > > I completely agree with you. If you?ll allow me to cite myself again? > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > A strong case could be made that this book should have considered the > > > > entire human lifespan. Developmental researchers have tended to > assume > > > that > > > > the endpoint of development is the start of adulthood, and that > > > development > > > > is the process of the child achieving adult status. However, it > should > > > now > > > > be clear to the reader that human psychological development involves > > the > > > > entire span of human life, the cycle of ontogenesis from birth to > > death. > > > > This cycle should be understood not solely in terms of the individual > > who > > > > lives and dies, but also in terms of the social relations of > > reproduction > > > > in a community. > > > > > > > > There has been an unprecedented increase in life expectancy (see > figure > > > > below), and this book has told only part of the story of the human > life > > > > cycle. As young people become parents and then grandparents, or as > they > > > > become teachers, coaches, or recognized community figures, their > lives > > > > intersect and interact with those of children, both their own and > those > > > of > > > > other people. The stages from infant to adolescent are not separate > and > > > > distinct from later stages of the lifecycle. We have seen that > parents > > > and > > > > caregivers play a crucial role in a young child?s development. Even > > death > > > > has an intimate connection to birth: human life truly is a cycle, > > albeit > > > > one that extends as a helix through time. > > > > > > > > Viewed this way, the human life cycle is a process in which: > > > > > > > > persons are formed and dissolved, move between dependent impotence > and > > > > independent authority, divide and multiply their being through > > relations > > > > with others, know more and less about the world, and acquire and lose > > the > > > > capacity to change it. (Robertson 1996, p. 591) > > > > > > > > It is worth emphasizing one more time that nature and culture are not > > > > opposed but operate together, and we can see this in the fact that > the > > > > human lifespan is longer today than at many times in the past, and in > > > many > > > > parts of the world it is growing even longer, probably because > > nutrition > > > > and healthcare are postponing the senescence programmed into our > genes. > > > As > > > > a result, many infants will interact not only with parents but > > > grandparents > > > > and even great-grandparents, as never before in human existence. This > > > > intergenerational contact and interaction creates opportunities for a > > > > variety of influences on the child, including mentorship, advice, > > > > alliances, and a richer density of social relations. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 5:32 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > These seem very interesting contributions in that they bring forth > > > > structural aspects necessary for a *developmental* explanation. But, > as > > > > someone educated in general psychology and the learning sciences, but > > who > > > > still has much to learn from developmental psychology, I always > wonder > > > why > > > > these characterisations often refer to characteristics of the child > and > > > > tend to end in *adulthood*, as in Martin's sequence, but tend to say > > > > nothing about adult change in that relation. (By the way, David, can > > you > > > > clarify or refer us where we could get a better grasp of why > "pre-life" > > > > would be an adequate label for a reformation???) > > > > > > > > I can understand that there are different disciplines within > > > developmental > > > > psychology, one of which is concerned with child (and not adult) > > > > development, just as other disciplines may deal with adult > development, > > > > professional development, etc. But we read in Martin's own quotations > > > that, > > > > " transitions [across periods] are truly changes not only in the > child > > > but > > > > in the whole child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a > component" > > > > > > > > If these transitions truly are transitions for the > > child-caregiver-niche > > > > system, then the issue of age periods also and at the same time > brings > > > with > > > > it not only the issue of niche periods (which I see can be addressed > > with > > > > the notion of Social Situation of Development and ZPD), but also the > > > issue > > > > of adult development as part of that system. Does not it? But then, > is > > it > > > > about "age"? I certainly feel and can recognise that I am deeply > > changed > > > in > > > > and through educating. I am not the same person I was before I begun > my > > > > participant ethnography as an assistant teacher at an arts-based > > > elementary > > > > school. Certainly with regard to how I organise my praxis in a > > classroom, > > > > it could be said that many of the primary functions that characterise > > my > > > > behavior have been re-organised leading to new formations (e.g., of > > > > listening, caring, orienting, responding). > > > > > > > > If the "primitive" but also adult "Kaffir" about which Vygotsky > speaks > > in > > > > his writings may possibly shift from "dreaming" to "thinking" as a > > means > > > to > > > > achieve the same higher psychological function, namely decision > making, > > > is > > > > it "age" periods what should be the focus? > > > > > > > > These are not rhetorical but genuine questions from someone hoping to > > > > learn from/with you all. > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > > > edu > > > mailman.ucsd.edu>> on behalf of Andy > > Blunden < > > > > ablunden@mira.net > > > ablunden@mira.net>> > > > > Sent: 19 May 2017 18:02 > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a > > > Cultural > > > > Perpsective > > > > > > > > Like > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > Andy Blunden > > > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > > > > > > > > On 20/05/2017 1:45 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > > Hi David, > > > > > > > > Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and > > > crises; > > > > tell me what you think. > > > > > > > > Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > > > > Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > > > > Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > > > > Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > > > > Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > > > > Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > > > > Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > > > > Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > > > > The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > > > > The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > > > > > > > The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I needed > > to > > > > treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say > > about > > > > each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole > > chapter > > > > to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? and > > > > ?transition?: > > > > > > > > "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the > > form > > > > of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also in > > the > > > > child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific way > > of > > > > relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this a > > new > > > > way of experiencing and understanding. > > > > > > > > "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > > > > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there > > is a > > > > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > > > > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of > > > herself: > > > > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the > > > child > > > > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > > > > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > > > > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > > > > > > > And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence > (I > > > > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > > > > > > > On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > > > d > > > > kellogg60@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > > > > > Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty > > > shameless > > > > too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > > > > schtick you are up to...?) > > > > > > > > Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains > > > "Great > > > > We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot > > wittier. > > > He > > > > says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the > "we" > > > was > > > > there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky > likes > > > to > > > > address the students with "You and we"). > > > > > > > > I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > > > > vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to > teach > > > > anything to anybody in some honest way). > > > > > > > > You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky > > > measured > > > > that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > > > > development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > > > > > > > a) you have the age periods and > > > > > > > > b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > > > > correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > > > > > > > That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies > is > > > not > > > > to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van > der > > > > Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take > > the > > > > age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with > > > Vygotsky's > > > > discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > > > > > > > What do you think of this? > > > > > > > > Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > > > > intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > > > > Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically dependent: > > > > CNF: "Grandwe" > > > > One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: "Pre-speech" > > > > Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > > > > (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > > > > Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: > > "Pre-will" > > > > Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically > > dependent > > > > ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > > > > Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: > > "Pre-me" > > > > School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > > > > (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > > > > Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: > > "Pre-concepts" > > > > Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically > > dependent. > > > > CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > > > > thinking) > > > > Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > > > > > > > You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along > > each > > > > finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > > > > > > > -- > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > > Ruminations > > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > > > > mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > > > > > > > -----Mensagem original----- > > > > De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > > Em nome de Martin John Packer > > > > Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > > > > Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > > > Perpsective > > > > > > > > Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been > > possible > > > > except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart > > > people, > > > > a > > > > number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks > > > great. > > > > I > > > > like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, > > > emphasising > > > > common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > > > > cultural > > > > psychology. > > > > > > > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> > > > > on > > > > behalf of Martin John Packer > > > > > > > > > Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > > Perpsective > > > > > > > > A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child > > > Development: > > > > Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 > for > > > the > > > > paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > > > > > > > There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of the > > two > > > > chapters on infancy: > > > > > > > > > > book253543%20#preview> > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > > Ruminations > > > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. 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From feine@duq.edu Mon May 22 05:04:43 2017 From: feine@duq.edu (Elizabeth Fein) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 08:04:43 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Society for Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology Annual Conference In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hello Henry - There are certainly people there talking and thinking about a lot of topics relevant to your idea, including how to bridge some of the divides you mentioned, and how to include a broader range of participants in qualitative inquiry. The question of how to "crowd-source" (what crowd? how sourced?) and then how to go about analyzing the resultant big (very big!) data set are tricky, interesting ones. Best, Elizabeth On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 7:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Elizabeth, > It occurred to me the other day that crowd-sourced qualitative inquiry > could connect qualitative with quantitative, analog with digital. Does this > thinking possibly resonate with the SQIP Conference? > Henry > > > > On May 21, 2017, at 10:59 AM, Elizabeth Fein wrote: > > > > Dear colleagues, > > > > If you are a New Yorker or plan to be in NYC this week, check out the > > annual conference of the *Society **for Qualitative Inquiry in > Psychology*, > > a subdivision of the American Psychological Association's Division 5, > > happening this > > Wednesday and Thursday *May 24th and 25th* at Fordham University's > Lincoln > > Center campus. We've got an exciting program planned, including keynote > > addresses from *Kim Hopper*, who does ethnographic work on > > cross-cultural variations in the course and prognosis of schizophrenia > and > > also on homelessness, and the *Bronx African-American History Project*, a > > collaborative oral history project that has informed a number of > community > > projects in NYC. We'll also have themed paper sessions and symposia, > > posters, and a plenary address on validity in psychology from SQIP > founding > > members *Ruthellen Josselson, Ken Gergen and Mark Freeman, along with > > Scott **Churchill.* > > > > I've attached the conference program here along with some information > about > > the conference and a letter from our President, Fred Wertz; you can also > > find out more information at our website, qualpsy.org. > > > > Best, > > > > Elizabeth Fein, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Psychology > > Duquesne University > > <2017 SQIP Program Final.pdf> Photo.pdf> > > > -- Elizabeth Fein, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Duquesne University From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon May 22 06:23:30 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 13:23:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> , Message-ID: <1495459412072.29442@iped.uio.no> Thanks David for sharing the link to the original text, and for sharing the English translation later. With regard to Mike's note, it seems Marxists.org already does a wonderful service as archive. I can always help contributors to do the extra work if another source needs to be shared. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: 21 May 2017 23:27 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective I really wish you WOULD have a look at it, Mike. It's giving me a lot of trouble. It's in this: https://www.marxists.org/russkij/vygotsky/pedologia/lektsii-po-pedologii.pdf (starts on p. 233) The main trouble I'm having is with the words "schizotomy", "mesotomy", "isotomy", and "topo-human", which as far as I can tell do not exist in either Russian or English. I'm also having trouble with names: the stenographer uses "kelt" for "Volkelt" and I think that "Bleder" is really Bleuler (although that may be a mistake of the transcriber and not the stenographer). But who the devil is this Osburgen? Could it be Asperger? He WAS working on "schizoid" children at that time (he hadn't actually started exterminating them as part of the Nazi T4 programme). But he hadn't really started publishing, I don't think. If you wait a week or so, I'll have a first draft of an English translation I can show the list. I'm about half done. But it turns out that they actually want you to write thesis when you do a Ph.D.! -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 9:29 AM, mike cole wrote: > David- I stumbled into this conversation tardily but hope one day to get > more deeply into the topics raised around the Vygtosky texts. In trying to > follow the argument, i would be helped enormously if it were possible to > site the sources of the texts in a way that is readily accessible. If I > want to read "Negative Phases of the > Transitional Age", > ?for example, is there a web site or an English language where one can go > to read larger segments of the text? > > Access to the texts would help enormously in getting us, more or less, on > the same page, both metaphorically and digitally at the same time. > > If this is complicated, perhaps Alfredo could organize a simple way to > allow people rapid access to the texts. > > The time appears ripe to consider the question of the bio-social-cultural > nature of human development again. > Your careful work with the pedagogical essays appears to be a key text in > figuring out Vygotsky's views and our own. > > At present i am trying to think my way through this terrain in order to put > together a talk at the Piaget Society meetings in early June. Roy Pea and I > are giving a talk there?. The conference theme is "technology and > development." > > Quite naturally there is a great deal of overlap between that topic and > this conversation. Being able to explore that overlap more closely would > certainly be useful, personally speaking. > > mike > > On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 3:39 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Thanks, Martin. I'm reading Vygotsky's lecture on "Negative Phases of the > > Transitional Age", i.e. adolescence. Its' a late lecture, a little under > a > > year before he died. But in it he does argue that the central > neoformation > > of adolescence isn't sexuality or teenage rebellion or any of the other > > behavioural symptoms that his colleagues were focused on. He wants > > something that can generalize to every other crisis as well, and he > chooses > > what he calls "schizoticism" which is probably what we would call today > > "schizotypal personality disorder", except that for him it's not a > disorder > > at all, an in fact he argues that it is the children who show only feeble > > schizotic symptoms or who refuse to show them who are seriously > disordered. > > And he suggests that what generalizes to every other crisis is the notion > > of a house divided against itself, what he calls "??????? ? ???????????", > > or the concept of the differentiation, the division, the split, just as > you > > say. > > > > Weirdly, I think that your stable periods don't link together so well. > > That's not just the lack of grammatical parallelism in the nomenclature > > ("infancy", "toddler[hood]", "early/middle childhood" "teenager[hood]"--I > > can see that you are trying to stay away from a nomenclature that implies > > schooling on the one hand and use common-sense folk categories on the > > other. I think it's because you are using a model of stable periods based > > on world-building rather than on language, and the worlds of "Greatwe", > > "irresistible invitations", "appearances", etc don't really seem linked > the > > way that physical-biological-psychological differentiation are linked. > > > > Your stable periods work well for your project (yes, culture, but within > > that getting your students to rediscover both the strengths and weakness > of > > Piaget). But I think they won't work so well for mine (yes, language, and > > within language and the "world-building" function of > > language, distinguishing what Halliday would call the Experiential rather > > than the Logical metafunction--the feeling/thought of what's happening > > rather than the whole question of how it all fits together.) > > > > I didn't really mean to inflict my book chapter on poor Henry--publishers > > are now trying to get authors to shoulder almost ALL of the sales as well > > as the editing work, and one of the things they do is provide all these > > neat links that you stick in your signature when you take part in a > > discussion list; my book sales have been, like two or three copies a > year, > > so I thought I'd try it. I notice that (for all that real, unfeigned > > modesty and humility), Henry knows onewhole hell of a lot more about > > Langacker on the one hand and Wundt on the other than I do (I have read > > bits of both but I don't have anything like his understanding of either). > > > > But there really is something I really do share with Henry that I think > > explains right away how he responded to my book chapter. It's this: > > Vygotsky talks about "communication" and "generalization" (or "sharing" > and > > "about that shared"); Halliday about "dialogue" and "narrative". It seems > > to me that by whatever name we give them, this linguistic woofing and > > warping are the weft that join the stable periods and the crises > together. > > > > The difference is that during stable periods, the > > communication/sharing/dialogue threads are in front and the > > generalization/about-that-shared/narrative > > threads go in back. But during the crises, the child is trying to "turn > the > > tables" on the environment, so that the child is source of development > and > > the environment is site. During the crisis, we see all those loose > threads, > > all those knots and breaks--and yet also, there is the same pattern, > albeit > > like a photographic negative--in the back of the carpet. > > -- > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > Ruminations > > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 7:51 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > > wrote: > > > > > Diagram attached, I hope. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > On May 19, 2017, at 4:34 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > > > > > > Martin, > > > > I?m sorry, but I don?t think that diagram came through. Also I too am > > > interested in what you think of Shpet. > > > > HJenry > > > > > > > > > > > >> On May 19, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Hi David, > > > >> > > > >> Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and > > > crises; tell me what you think. > > > >> > > > >> Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World > > > >> Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation > > > >> Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations > > > >> Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation > > > >> Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are > > > >> Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer > > > >> Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality > > > >> Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible > > > >> The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? > > > >> The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood > > > >> > > > >> The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I > needed > > > to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say > > > about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole > > > chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? > and > > > ?transition?: > > > >> > > > >> "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the > > > form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also > > in > > > the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific > way > > > of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this > a > > > new way of experiencing and understanding. > > > >> > > > >> "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A > > > transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there > is a > > > dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she > > > discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of > > herself: > > > of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the > > child > > > progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These > > > transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole > > > child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? > > > >> > > > >> And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence > > (I > > > think the third should read Appearance & Reality). > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] > > > >> > > > >> On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty > > > shameless > > > >> too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet > > > >> schtick you are up to...?) > > > >> > > > >> Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains > > > "Great > > > >> We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot > > > wittier. He > > > >> says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the > "we" > > > was > > > >> there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky > > likes > > > to > > > >> address the students with "You and we"). > > > >> > > > >> I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without > > > >> vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to > teach > > > >> anything to anybody in some honest way). > > > >> > > > >> You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky > > > measured > > > >> that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of > > > >> development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: > > > >> > > > >> a) you have the age periods and > > > >> > > > >> b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will > > > >> correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. > > > >> > > > >> That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies > is > > > not > > > >> to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van > > der > > > >> Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take > > the > > > >> age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with > > > Vygotsky's > > > >> discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. > > > >> > > > >> What do you think of this? > > > >> > > > >> Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by > > > >> intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" > > > >> Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically > dependent: > > > >> CNF: "Grandwe" > > > >> One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: > "Pre-speech" > > > >> Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally > > > >> (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" > > > >> Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: > > > "Pre-will" > > > >> Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically > > > dependent > > > >> ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" > > > >> Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: > > "Pre-me" > > > >> School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually > > > >> (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" > > > >> Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: > > "Pre-concepts" > > > >> Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically > > dependent. > > > >> CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete > > > >> thinking) > > > >> Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" > > > >> > > > >> You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along > > > each > > > >> finger. (Hard to read it, though....) > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> David Kellogg > > > >> Macquarie University > > > >> > > > >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > > > >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > > > >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > > >> > > > >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > > >> > > > >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe- > > > and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > > >> > > > >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > > > Ruminations > > > >> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > > >> > > > >> Free E-print Downloadable at: > > > >> > > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < > > > >> mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> Thank you for the chapter. Maria > > > >> > > > >> -----Mensagem original----- > > > >> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ > > > >> mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > >> Em nome de Martin John Packer > > > >> Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 > > > >> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > > >> Perpsective > > > >> > > > >> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been > > possible > > > >> except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart > > > people, > > > >> a > > > >> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil > > > >> > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks > > > great. > > > >> I > > > >> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, > > > emphasising > > > >> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and > > > >> cultural > > > >> psychology. > > > >> > > > >> Alfredo > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > >> From: > > > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > >> > mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> > > > >> on > > > >> behalf of Martin John Packer > > > >> > > > > >> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural > > > Perpsective > > > >> > > > >> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child > > > Development: > > > >> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 > > for > > > the > > > >> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. > > > >> > > > >> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of > the > > > two > > > >> chapters on infancy: > > > >> > > > >> > > 43%20#preview> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon May 22 06:36:29 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 23:36:29 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <1495459412072.29442@iped.uio.no> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <30BA01C7-58DF-4206-A470-10CBED68E21E@gmail.com> <1495459412072.29442@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Any time that David wishes to share the electronic texts of his new translations, provided he is confident of their reliability, marxists.org will be delighted to publish them. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 22/05/2017 11:23 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks David for sharing the link to the original text, and for sharing the English translation later. With regard to Mike's note, it seems Marxists.org already does a wonderful service as archive. I can always help contributors to do the extra work if another source needs to be shared. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: 21 May 2017 23:27 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective > > I really wish you WOULD have a look at it, Mike. It's giving me a lot of > trouble. It's in this: > > https://www.marxists.org/russkij/vygotsky/pedologia/lektsii-po-pedologii.pdf > > (starts on p. 233) > > The main trouble I'm having is with the words "schizotomy", "mesotomy", > "isotomy", and "topo-human", which as far as I can tell do not exist in > either Russian or English. > > I'm also having trouble with names: the stenographer uses "kelt" for > "Volkelt" and I think that "Bleder" is really Bleuler (although that may be > a mistake of the transcriber and not the stenographer). But who the devil > is this Osburgen? Could it be Asperger? He WAS working on "schizoid" > children at that time (he hadn't actually started exterminating them as > part of the Nazi T4 programme). But he hadn't really started publishing, I > don't think. > > If you wait a week or so, I'll have a first draft of an English > translation I can show the list. I'm about half done. But it turns out that > they actually want you to write thesis when you do a Ph.D.! > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 9:29 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> David- I stumbled into this conversation tardily but hope one day to get >> more deeply into the topics raised around the Vygtosky texts. In trying to >> follow the argument, i would be helped enormously if it were possible to >> site the sources of the texts in a way that is readily accessible. If I >> want to read "Negative Phases of the >> Transitional Age", >> ?for example, is there a web site or an English language where one can go >> to read larger segments of the text? >> >> Access to the texts would help enormously in getting us, more or less, on >> the same page, both metaphorically and digitally at the same time. >> >> If this is complicated, perhaps Alfredo could organize a simple way to >> allow people rapid access to the texts. >> >> The time appears ripe to consider the question of the bio-social-cultural >> nature of human development again. >> Your careful work with the pedagogical essays appears to be a key text in >> figuring out Vygotsky's views and our own. >> >> At present i am trying to think my way through this terrain in order to put >> together a talk at the Piaget Society meetings in early June. Roy Pea and I >> are giving a talk there?. The conference theme is "technology and >> development." >> >> Quite naturally there is a great deal of overlap between that topic and >> this conversation. Being able to explore that overlap more closely would >> certainly be useful, personally speaking. >> >> mike >> >> On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 3:39 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >>> Thanks, Martin. I'm reading Vygotsky's lecture on "Negative Phases of the >>> Transitional Age", i.e. adolescence. Its' a late lecture, a little under >> a >>> year before he died. But in it he does argue that the central >> neoformation >>> of adolescence isn't sexuality or teenage rebellion or any of the other >>> behavioural symptoms that his colleagues were focused on. He wants >>> something that can generalize to every other crisis as well, and he >> chooses >>> what he calls "schizoticism" which is probably what we would call today >>> "schizotypal personality disorder", except that for him it's not a >> disorder >>> at all, an in fact he argues that it is the children who show only feeble >>> schizotic symptoms or who refuse to show them who are seriously >> disordered. >>> And he suggests that what generalizes to every other crisis is the notion >>> of a house divided against itself, what he calls "??????? ? ???????????", >>> or the concept of the differentiation, the division, the split, just as >> you >>> say. >>> >>> Weirdly, I think that your stable periods don't link together so well. >>> That's not just the lack of grammatical parallelism in the nomenclature >>> ("infancy", "toddler[hood]", "early/middle childhood" "teenager[hood]"--I >>> can see that you are trying to stay away from a nomenclature that implies >>> schooling on the one hand and use common-sense folk categories on the >>> other. I think it's because you are using a model of stable periods based >>> on world-building rather than on language, and the worlds of "Greatwe", >>> "irresistible invitations", "appearances", etc don't really seem linked >> the >>> way that physical-biological-psychological differentiation are linked. >>> >>> Your stable periods work well for your project (yes, culture, but within >>> that getting your students to rediscover both the strengths and weakness >> of >>> Piaget). But I think they won't work so well for mine (yes, language, and >>> within language and the "world-building" function of >>> language, distinguishing what Halliday would call the Experiential rather >>> than the Logical metafunction--the feeling/thought of what's happening >>> rather than the whole question of how it all fits together.) >>> >>> I didn't really mean to inflict my book chapter on poor Henry--publishers >>> are now trying to get authors to shoulder almost ALL of the sales as well >>> as the editing work, and one of the things they do is provide all these >>> neat links that you stick in your signature when you take part in a >>> discussion list; my book sales have been, like two or three copies a >> year, >>> so I thought I'd try it. I notice that (for all that real, unfeigned >>> modesty and humility), Henry knows onewhole hell of a lot more about >>> Langacker on the one hand and Wundt on the other than I do (I have read >>> bits of both but I don't have anything like his understanding of either). >>> >>> But there really is something I really do share with Henry that I think >>> explains right away how he responded to my book chapter. It's this: >>> Vygotsky talks about "communication" and "generalization" (or "sharing" >> and >>> "about that shared"); Halliday about "dialogue" and "narrative". It seems >>> to me that by whatever name we give them, this linguistic woofing and >>> warping are the weft that join the stable periods and the crises >> together. >>> The difference is that during stable periods, the >>> communication/sharing/dialogue threads are in front and the >>> generalization/about-that-shared/narrative >>> threads go in back. But during the crises, the child is trying to "turn >> the >>> tables" on the environment, so that the child is source of development >> and >>> the environment is site. During the crisis, we see all those loose >> threads, >>> all those knots and breaks--and yet also, there is the same pattern, >> albeit >>> like a photographic negative--in the back of the carpet. >>> -- >>> David Kellogg >>> Macquarie University >>> >>> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >>> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >>> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >>> >>> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >>> >>> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- >>> globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >>> >>> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some >> Ruminations >>> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >>> >>> Free E-print Downloadable at: >>> >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >>> On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 7:51 AM, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>> wrote: >>>> Diagram attached, I hope. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>>> On May 19, 2017, at 4:34 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>>>> Martin, >>>>> I?m sorry, but I don?t think that diagram came through. Also I too am >>>> interested in what you think of Shpet. >>>>> HJenry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On May 19, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Martin John Packer < >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>> Hi David, >>>>>> >>>>>> Here?s how I handled the matter of the age periods: the stages and >>>> crises; tell me what you think. >>>>>> Infancy - A Practical Understanding of the World >>>>>> Infancy - Towards Biological Differentiation >>>>>> Toddlerhood - A World of Irresistible Invitations >>>>>> Toddlerhood - Towards Psychological Differentiation >>>>>> Early Childhood - How Things Appear, And How They Are >>>>>> Early Childhood - Towards Inner and Outer >>>>>> Middle Childhood - Understanding Institutional Reality >>>>>> Middle Childhood - Towards the Actual and the Possible >>>>>> The Teenage Years - Adolescent, or Adult? >>>>>> The Teenage Years - Towards Adulthood >>>>>> >>>>>> The ?Towards? in these chapter titles reflects the fact that I >> needed >>>> to treat each stage in two chapters, and there was usually less to say >>>> about each crisis than about each stage, so I couldn?t dedicate a whole >>>> chapter to each crisis. Here?s how I described the notions of ?stage? >> and >>>> ?transition?: >>>>>> "Stages are qualitatively distinct from one another, not only in the >>>> form of intelligence that the child employs (as Piaget noted), but also >>> in >>>> the child?s way of being in the world. Each stage involves a specific >> way >>>> of relating to the world and relating to self, and as a result of this >> a >>>> new way of experiencing and understanding. >>>>>> "Transitions are those times when new properties rapidly emerge. A >>>> transition is a point of inflection, a crisis. In a transition there >> is a >>>> dramatic change in the child?s way of being in the world, so that she >>>> discovers new possibilities in that world and gains a new sense of >>> herself: >>>> of her abilities, her capacities. During the stage that follows, the >>> child >>>> progressively masters this new way of living in the world. These >>>> transitions are truly changes not only in the child but in the whole >>>> child-caregiver-niche system of which she is a component.? >>>>>> And the diagram below (if it comes through) illustrates the sequence >>> (I >>>> think the third should read Appearance & Reality). >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> [cid:FAACC3A0-B984-4539-B8E7-05391373CD7F] >>>>>> >>>>>> On May 18, 2017, at 7:27 PM, David Kellogg >>> > wrote: >>>>>> Martin, I think if I'd written something like that I'd be pretty >>>> shameless >>>>>> too. (A propos--or by the bye--do you have a publisher for the Shpet >>>>>> schtick you are up to...?) >>>>>> >>>>>> Here's something for the revised edition. The way Vygotsky explains >>>> "Great >>>>>> We" in the Pedological Lectures is a little different and a lot >>>> wittier. He >>>>>> says it is a "Grandwe" in the sense of your Grandpa--that is, the >> "we" >>>> was >>>>>> there before you were even a gleam in your Daddy's eye. (Vygotsky >>> likes >>>> to >>>>>> address the students with "You and we"). >>>>>> >>>>>> I have been thinking how to "popularize" the age periods without >>>>>> vulgarizing them (you know, what Bruner says about being able to >> teach >>>>>> anything to anybody in some honest way). >>>>>> >>>>>> You and we (our little Grandwe) know perfectly well that Vygotsky >>>> measured >>>>>> that zone of proximal development in years (it's a "next" zone of >>>>>> development, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about it unless: >>>>>> >>>>>> a) you have the age periods and >>>>>> >>>>>> b) you have some set of problems--not the Binet problems!--that will >>>>>> correlate in some non-arbitrary way to the next age period. >>>>>> >>>>>> That means that the "next zone of development" for Vygotsky studies >> is >>>> not >>>>>> to try to turn him into a failed Gestaltist (pace Yasnitsky and van >>> der >>>>>> Veer) but rather to try to figure out some way to get people to take >>> the >>>>>> age periods seriously no matter how busy and how impatient with >>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>> discursive and apparently indecisive formulations they are. >>>>>> >>>>>> What do you think of this? >>>>>> >>>>>> Birth--Social Situation of Development: Instinct confronted by >>>>>> intersubjectivity. Central Neoformation: "Pre-we" >>>>>> Infancy--SSD: Physiologically independent but biologically >> dependent: >>>>>> CNF: "Grandwe" >>>>>> One--SSD: Proto-speech confronted by proper speech. CNF: >> "Pre-speech" >>>>>> Early Childhood--SSD: Biologically independent but interpersonally >>>>>> (interactionally) dependent. CNF: "Grandspeech" >>>>>> Three--SSD: Affect confronted by the 'antipode' of will. CNF: >>>> "Pre-will" >>>>>> Preschool--SSD: Interpersonally independent but psychologically >>>> dependent >>>>>> ('reactive' learning). CNF: "Grandwill" >>>>>> Seven--SSD: Inner personality confronted by outer persona. CNF: >>> "Pre-me" >>>>>> School Age: Psychologically independent but intellectually >>>>>> (academically) dependent. CNF: "Grandme" >>>>>> Thirteen: Original thinking confronted by imitation. CNF: >>> "Pre-concepts" >>>>>> Adolescence: Intellectually independent but socioeconomically >>> dependent. >>>>>> CNF: "Grandconcepts" (nontheoretical concepts, tinged with concrete >>>>>> thinking) >>>>>> Seventeen SSD: In the USSR, school leaving. CNF: "Pre-Life" >>>>>> >>>>>> You could write the Crises on your palm and the Stable Periods along >>>> each >>>>>> finger. (Hard to read it, though....) >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Macquarie University >>>>>> >>>>>> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >>>>>> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >>>>>> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >>>>>> >>>>>> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe- >>>> and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >>>>>> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some >>>> Ruminations >>>>>> on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >>>>>> >>>>>> Free E-print Downloadable at: >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Maria Judith Sucupira Costa Lins < >>>>>> mariasucupiralins@terra.com.br> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> Thank you for the chapter. Maria >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Mensagem original----- >>>>>> De: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ >>>>>> mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>> Em nome de Martin John Packer >>>>>> Enviada em: quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2017 20:05 >>>>>> Para: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Assunto: [Xmca-l] Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural >>>>>> Perpsective >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks Alfredo. It was fun to write, and it would not have been >>> possible >>>>>> except for what I have learned over the years from some very smart >>>> people, >>>>>> a >>>>>> number of whom hang out on this very discussion group. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On May 17, 2017, at 5:48 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks for shamelessly sharing your work, Martin. The chapter looks >>>> great. >>>>>> I >>>>>> like the way it draws connections throughout diverse theories, >>>> emphasising >>>>>> common ground across dual systems theory, dynamic field theory, and >>>>>> cultural >>>>>> psychology. >>>>>> >>>>>> Alfredo >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>> mailman.ucsd.edu> >>>>>> >> mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> on >>>>>> behalf of Martin John Packer >>>>>> > >>>>>> Sent: 18 May 2017 00:10 >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Child Development: Understanding a Cultural >>>> Perpsective >>>>>> A few months ago I shamelessly promoted my new textbook, Child >>>> Development: >>>>>> Understanding a Cultural Perspective, published by Sage at only $46 >>> for >>>> the >>>>>> paperback edition, $33 or less for the various electronic editions. >>>>>> >>>>>> There is now a sample chapter available online: Chapter 5, one of >> the >>>> two >>>>>> chapters on infancy: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> 43%20#preview> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon May 22 06:54:04 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 13:54:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <1495233811813.42182@iped.uio.no> <039bb47b-0fae-77ab-abf3-3b3817aa2a93@mira.net>, Message-ID: <1495461243188.77372@iped.uio.no> David, your point that concepts live in families or societies makes good sense to me. But would not you also say the same of words? Your system makes sense in all the cases you mention in this last post (pre-we, etc), but the one on "pre-life" is harder to digest by the very logic of the system you are presenting to us. On the one hand, it seems to suggest continuity of development with adulthood. On the other hand, if something like "grand-life" was to be the neo-formation related to "pre-life", it seems as if the whole of adulthood was dumped together in one long period (not to mention the unfortunate sense that before life there was something, but not life). Words are only "labels" in very limited cases (like in some of Vygotsky's experiments in which invented words are given as stimuli), and so they also relate to each other as members of families or "groups". But then, using one or the other (like the compound "pre-life" in a sequence of periods) matters for how well a typology system works. More so than to the problematic use of a label, I wanted to call attention to the term "pre-life" in order to raise the issue that the borderline between childhood and adulthood, and dis/continuities thereof, appears to be an unresolved issue. I see Vygotsky has a point in defending the object of study of the particular field of pedology. But I do also agree with Martin's remarks that Vygotsky also was defending the *qualitative* leap that separates different age periods within child development itself, which nonetheless did not lead him to establish a different discipline for each period. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: 21 May 2017 23:52 To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective Yes, I gathered that, from your "Yes?". A very interesting demonstration of how important it is to actually meet people and get use to their intonation. I still regret not having a pint with Huw in London, because I sometimes find his comments a little too condensed. The Russian is not Vygotsky: it's Tolstoy. It's this: '????? ????? ?????? ??????, ????? ?????? ???????.' (Word nearly always ready when ready concept.) It seems to me that to say that the word is ready when the concept is ready doesn't imply either word first or concept first. To a linguist, the relationship is not causal or temporal: we don't say that a concept "causes" a word, or that a word "causes" a concept, because they are different orders of matter. We don't say "meaning first" or "word first" because we have to model language parsimoniously, so that it is neutral to whether we are taking the point of view of the speaker or the hearer. The relationship is simply that of realization: that is, the word is the realization of the meaning, and the meaning is an activation (as Vygotsky says, "volitilization") of the word. But I was making a different point having to do with what Alfredo called my "labelling". My terminology wasn't supposed to be a label on a jar of concept. Concepts don't live in jars; they live in families and societies, just like the people who make them. So I was trying to choose names like "pre-we", "pre-speech", "pre-will" on the one hand and "grandwe", "grandspeech", and "grandwill" on the other to show how the critical neoformations were BOTH individuals AND related to other critical neoformations, and BOTH distinct from and linked to stable neoformations. These two points were exactly the points that came up in Martin's post. Actually, we've been here before. If you think of language as a kind of sandwich: meaning wording sounding You can see that the relationship between the three strata is realization. But the names, or if you like the labels, are chosen accordingly: the "~ing" is there to show that they are linked because they are all processes and the roots "mean~", "word~", and "sound~" are there to show that they are distinct because they are different orders of matter. I guess I was trying to design my "labels" the same way. It's a good thing I don't work in a marketing department; I'd get canned. -- David Kellogg Macquarie University "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" Free Chapters Downloadable at: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children Free E-print Downloadable at: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 11:30 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > My interest, David, was (1) that you had inverted the claim with which I > am familiar, and (2) I have always been curious as to the basis for the > confidence Vygotsky has for his claim. Of course the point you make about > the concept arising as part of the perception of the problem (Marx says > "Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to > solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself > arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already > present *or at least in the course of formation*.") is correct. But my > point is that Vygotsky is making a point about the place of the *word* in > concept-formation in this excerpt, not the social/technical context or the > problem/solution issues. > > Ad (1). "The word is almost always ready when the concept is" (neglecting > the important "almost always") means word first, then concept. "The word is > only ready when the concept is," (with the important "only") means concept > first then word. So you've completely inverted Vygotsky's claim. Ad (2) - > you may be right David, I know you read the Russian as well, or Master Lev > may be mixed up. I don't think it's cut and dry like this. But the > inversion was my point of interest. It would get to long-winded to go into > the question itself, as I see it. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > On 21/05/2017 7:41 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Yes, Vygotsky cites that passage in Tolstoy three times in Thinking and >> Speech (and he also cites it elsewhere, e.g. in "Thinking in School Age" in >> the Lectures on Pedology). But I don't want to be the fundamentalist on the >> list; I think it's more important to grasp the context in which he's citing >> this. It's always an emphasis on something Andy himself has often noted: >> Marx's remark that human beings set themselves only the tasks that they can >> solve (which is, after all, the whole basis for the zone of proximal >> development and the functional method of dual stimulation). >> >> It's not just that we don't perceive problems as problems until we >> perceive them as potentially soluble; it's also because objectively the >> solutions to problems evolve alongside the problems themselves. So that for >> example, as Ruqaiya Hasan remarks, the reason why language is able to >> fulfil so many of our needs is that many of those needs are created by >> language use. >> >> I think Vygotsky is saying the same thing about concepts; they only arise >> when the problems they solve have arisen in development. They do not arise >> simply because we teach the labels that they have, and they don't fail to >> arise just because we are not using the right label. In any case the idea >> that the word is only ready when the concept is (which I think is what Andy >> is objecting to, although it's hard to tell) is certainly implicit in the >> way Vygotsky names his own concepts: they only emerge when the content has >> become clear and the place in a system of concepts that have also emerged >> is established. >> >> Here's what Vygotsky says his report to the section on psychotechnics of >> the Communist Academy in November 1930: >> >> "I don't think that the adult never develops, but I think that he >> develops obeying other rules, and for this development the lines which >> characterize his development are different from those of that of the child, >> and it is the qualitative particularity of child development is the direct >> object of the pedologist. For me, to speak of a pedology of the adult is >> not only false from the point of view of the very name of pedology but >> above all from the point of view of isolating in a single unique line the >> process of child development and the process of adult transformation. I >> repeat: the same laws cannot embrace at one and the same time the internal >> changes in child development and the changes of later ages. It is not >> excluded for science, and for psychology in particular, to study those >> changes which are produced at ripe age or in old age, but I do not >> associate these two problematics and I don't think that this object belongs >> to the category of phenomena that pedology deals with. " >> >> (I'm taking this from a PhD thesis by Irina Leopoldoff-Martin of the >> University of Geneva, No 561, p. 287). >> >> >> >> On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 10:03 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> "The word is almost always ready when the concept is" Yes? >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> > decision-making> >> >> On 20/05/2017 9:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Alfredo: >> >> Just two quick points, and then I shall get back >> to Vygotsky--we are having >> our weekly on-line seminar today here and in >> Seoul, and it's all about the >> Pedology of the Adolescent and "The Negative Phase >> of the Transitional Age". >> >> First--I don't think pre-life or any of the terms >> I offered are "adequate >> labels" for the neoformations. In fact, >> "neoformation" is not an adequate >> label either (Vygotsky takes it from geology!) In >> Vygotsky, the label is >> just a place holder, it's a kind of mnemonic, a >> way of remembering >> something that hasn't actually even been really >> said yet. "The word is only >> ready when the concept is," remember? >> >> ... >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" >> >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: >> >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe- >> and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf >> >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some >> Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children >> >> Free E-print Downloadable at: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full >> > > From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Mon May 22 11:43:27 2017 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 18:43:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] ISCAR Newsletter Message-ID: Dear XMCA Folks, I just received the ISCAR Newsletter for May, 2017; it is attached below. It includes loads of information regarding the 5th International Congress, held in Quebec City from August 28th to September 1st, 2017. More information here: http://www.iscar17.ulaval.ca. Hope you see you there!! Best, Jen -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Newsletter_May 2017_Issue_1.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 690601 bytes Desc: Newsletter_May 2017_Issue_1.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170522/b7a2afb0/attachment-0001.pdf From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon May 22 14:45:28 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 23 May 2017 07:45:28 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a Cultural Perpsective In-Reply-To: <1495461243188.77372@iped.uio.no> References: <59170c52.ca99620a.9102c.996a@mx.google.com> <06597170-1E35-4405-A449-C8ED5A2F0591@uniandes.edu.co> <1495061300732.40094@iped.uio.no> <000201d2cf62$d41c8830$7c559890$@terra.com.br> <65CC4460-7196-4778-A362-4185F29E9593@uniandes.edu.co> <467cac91-ce5a-d990-b240-bebc0504408a@mira.net> <1495233159088.73293@iped.uio.no> <1495233811813.42182@iped.uio.no> <039bb47b-0fae-77ab-abf3-3b3817aa2a93@mira.net> <1495461243188.77372@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Yes, I think that "pre-adulthood" might be better, but I was trying to keep everything to single syllables. Marketing again. As Andy says, the problem is really one of reliability, and I'm not doing very well on that just now. Ultimately I think that reliability can only be guaranteed by having a native speaker of Russian go over them. But even that is not enough: there has to be a LOT of contextual information, and the further away we get from Vygotsky's life and work the more that has to be provided. In Korea, we found the only way of doing this was having "boxes" after almost every other paragraph. With the text on the "Negative Phase of the Transitional Age" that's going to be even more important. For example, the title is not Vygotsky's. It's from the work of Charlotte Buhler, and Vygotsky is actually arguing AGAINST the idea that there is a negative phase of the transitional age. He wants to use "the transitional age" to refer to a stable period from 13-14 to 17 or 18; what we call adolescence. It's stable because the neoformations--gender identity, aesthetic judgement, academic concepts--are permanent in nature. "Phase" is the term Vygotsky uses for the distinction between an early stable and a late one. What Buhler is calling the "negative phase" is really not a negative phase of a stable period. It's the Crisis at Thirteen. But crises are also age periods. That is, they have a social situation of development, central and peripheral lines of development, and neoformations. They are different from stable periods in three ways: a) A stable period is empirically marked by increased capabilities while a crisis is typically marked by decreased ones. b) A stable period has well defined borders (the crises) but no well defined peak. The crisis is the other way around; with a well defined peak but no clear boundaries. c) A stable period creates stable neoformations which last; the neoformations of the crises are "sublated" and set aside, appearing only as subordinate moments of a stable neoformation (e.g. phatic speech, paralyzed will, manneristic behaviour). There also seems to be a fourth difference Vygotsky is less explicit about that has to do with the balance of power on the axis between the personality and the environment. It's as if in the crises the chid is trying to "turn the tables" on the environment, becoming the source of development rather than simply the site of development. So for example in proto-speech the child is trying to "be" language, and in proto-will the child is trying to "will" itself on the world. It's almost like the child is trying to establish its own little USSR, in defiance of the capitalist world outside. Because I'm a linguist I tend to think of this as the relationship between figure and ground, putting "sharing" or "dialogue" (communication) as figure and "about-sharing" or "narrative" (generalization) as ground in the stable periods and putting "sharing" as ground and "about-sharing" as figure in the crises. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 11:54 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > David, your point that concepts live in families or societies makes good > sense to me. But would not you also say the same of words? Your system > makes sense in all the cases you mention in this last post (pre-we, etc), > but the one on "pre-life" is harder to digest by the very logic of the > system you are presenting to us. On the one hand, it seems to suggest > continuity of development with adulthood. On the other hand, if something > like "grand-life" was to be the neo-formation related to "pre-life", it > seems as if the whole of adulthood was dumped together in one long period > (not to mention the unfortunate sense that before life there was something, > but not life). Words are only "labels" in very limited cases (like in some > of Vygotsky's experiments in which invented words are given as stimuli), > and so they also relate to each other as members of families or "groups". > But then, using one or the other (like the compound "pre-life" in a > sequence of periods) matters for how well a typology system works. > > More so than to the problematic use of a label, I wanted to call attention > to the term "pre-life" in order to raise the issue that the borderline > between childhood and adulthood, and dis/continuities thereof, appears to > be an unresolved issue. I see Vygotsky has a point in defending the object > of study of the particular field of pedology. But I do also agree with > Martin's remarks that Vygotsky also was defending the *qualitative* leap > that separates different age periods within child development itself, which > nonetheless did not lead him to establish a different discipline for each > period. > > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: 21 May 2017 23:52 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: RES: Re: Child Development: Understanding a > Cultural Perpsective > > Yes, I gathered that, from your "Yes?". A very interesting demonstration of > how important it is to actually meet people and get use to their > intonation. I still regret not having a pint with Huw in London, because I > sometimes find his comments a little too condensed. > > The Russian is not Vygotsky: it's Tolstoy. It's this: > > '????? ????? ?????? ??????, ????? ?????? ???????.' > > (Word nearly always ready when ready concept.) > > It seems to me that to say that the word is ready when the concept is ready > doesn't imply either word first or concept first. To a linguist, the > relationship is not causal or temporal: we don't say that a concept > "causes" a word, or that a word "causes" a concept, because they are > different orders of matter. We don't say "meaning first" or "word first" > because we have to model language parsimoniously, so that it is neutral to > whether we are taking the point of view of the speaker or the hearer. The > relationship is simply that of realization: that is, the word is the > realization of the meaning, and the meaning is an activation (as Vygotsky > says, "volitilization") of the word. > > But I was making a different point having to do with what Alfredo called my > "labelling". My terminology wasn't supposed to be a label on a jar of > concept. Concepts don't live in jars; they live in families and societies, > just like the people who make them. So I was trying to choose names like > "pre-we", "pre-speech", "pre-will" on the one hand and "grandwe", > "grandspeech", and "grandwill" on the other to show how the critical > neoformations were BOTH individuals AND related to other critical > neoformations, and BOTH distinct from and linked to stable neoformations. > These two points were exactly the points that came up in Martin's post. > > Actually, we've been here before. If you think of language as a kind of > sandwich: > > meaning > wording > sounding > > You can see that the relationship between the three strata is realization. > But the names, or if you like the labels, are chosen accordingly: the > "~ing" is there to show that they are linked because they are all processes > and the roots "mean~", "word~", and "sound~" are there to show that they > are distinct because they are different orders of matter. I guess I was > trying to design my "labels" the same way. It's a good thing I don't work > in a marketing department; I'd get canned. > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > > Free Chapters Downloadable at: > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great- > globe-and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > > Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some Ruminations > on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > > Free E-print Downloadable at: > > http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 11:30 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > My interest, David, was (1) that you had inverted the claim with which I > > am familiar, and (2) I have always been curious as to the basis for the > > confidence Vygotsky has for his claim. Of course the point you make about > > the concept arising as part of the perception of the problem (Marx says > > "Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to > > solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself > > arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already > > present *or at least in the course of formation*.") is correct. But my > > point is that Vygotsky is making a point about the place of the *word* in > > concept-formation in this excerpt, not the social/technical context or > the > > problem/solution issues. > > > > Ad (1). "The word is almost always ready when the concept is" (neglecting > > the important "almost always") means word first, then concept. "The word > is > > only ready when the concept is," (with the important "only") means > concept > > first then word. So you've completely inverted Vygotsky's claim. Ad (2) - > > you may be right David, I know you read the Russian as well, or Master > Lev > > may be mixed up. I don't think it's cut and dry like this. But the > > inversion was my point of interest. It would get to long-winded to go > into > > the question itself, as I see it. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Andy Blunden > > http://home.mira.net/~andy > > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 21/05/2017 7:41 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > >> Yes, Vygotsky cites that passage in Tolstoy three times in Thinking and > >> Speech (and he also cites it elsewhere, e.g. in "Thinking in School > Age" in > >> the Lectures on Pedology). But I don't want to be the fundamentalist on > the > >> list; I think it's more important to grasp the context in which he's > citing > >> this. It's always an emphasis on something Andy himself has often noted: > >> Marx's remark that human beings set themselves only the tasks that they > can > >> solve (which is, after all, the whole basis for the zone of proximal > >> development and the functional method of dual stimulation). > >> > >> It's not just that we don't perceive problems as problems until we > >> perceive them as potentially soluble; it's also because objectively the > >> solutions to problems evolve alongside the problems themselves. So that > for > >> example, as Ruqaiya Hasan remarks, the reason why language is able to > >> fulfil so many of our needs is that many of those needs are created by > >> language use. > >> > >> I think Vygotsky is saying the same thing about concepts; they only > arise > >> when the problems they solve have arisen in development. They do not > arise > >> simply because we teach the labels that they have, and they don't fail > to > >> arise just because we are not using the right label. In any case the > idea > >> that the word is only ready when the concept is (which I think is what > Andy > >> is objecting to, although it's hard to tell) is certainly implicit in > the > >> way Vygotsky names his own concepts: they only emerge when the content > has > >> become clear and the place in a system of concepts that have also > emerged > >> is established. > >> > >> Here's what Vygotsky says his report to the section on psychotechnics of > >> the Communist Academy in November 1930: > >> > >> "I don't think that the adult never develops, but I think that he > >> develops obeying other rules, and for this development the lines which > >> characterize his development are different from those of that of the > child, > >> and it is the qualitative particularity of child development is the > direct > >> object of the pedologist. For me, to speak of a pedology of the adult is > >> not only false from the point of view of the very name of pedology but > >> above all from the point of view of isolating in a single unique line > the > >> process of child development and the process of adult transformation. I > >> repeat: the same laws cannot embrace at one and the same time the > internal > >> changes in child development and the changes of later ages. It is not > >> excluded for science, and for psychology in particular, to study those > >> changes which are produced at ripe age or in old age, but I do not > >> associate these two problematics and I don't think that this object > belongs > >> to the category of phenomena that pedology deals with. " > >> > >> (I'm taking this from a PhD thesis by Irina Leopoldoff-Martin of the > >> University of Geneva, No 561, p. 287). > >> > >> > >> > >> On Sat, May 20, 2017 at 10:03 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: > >> > >> "The word is almost always ready when the concept is" Yes? > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> Andy Blunden > >> http://home.mira.net/~andy > >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective- > decision-making > >> >> decision-making> > >> > >> On 20/05/2017 9:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >> Alfredo: > >> > >> Just two quick points, and then I shall get back > >> to Vygotsky--we are having > >> our weekly on-line seminar today here and in > >> Seoul, and it's all about the > >> Pedology of the Adolescent and "The Negative Phase > >> of the Transitional Age". > >> > >> First--I don't think pre-life or any of the terms > >> I offered are "adequate > >> labels" for the neoformations. In fact, > >> "neoformation" is not an adequate > >> label either (Vygotsky takes it from geology!) In > >> Vygotsky, the label is > >> just a place holder, it's a kind of mnemonic, a > >> way of remembering > >> something that hasn't actually even been really > >> said yet. "The word is only > >> ready when the concept is," remember? > >> > >> ... > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> David Kellogg > >> Macquarie University > >> > >> "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit: > >> Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with > >> Vygotsky, Halliday, and Shakespeare" > >> > >> Free Chapters Downloadable at: > >> > >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/2096-the-great-globe- > >> and-all-who-it-inherit.pdf > >> > >> Recent Article: Thinking of feeling: Hasan, Vygotsky, and Some > >> Ruminations on the Development of Narrative in Korean Children > >> > >> Free E-print Downloadable at: > >> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8Vaq4HpJMi55DzsAyFCf/full > >> > > > > > From anamshane@gmail.com Mon May 22 15:12:56 2017 From: anamshane@gmail.com (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 22:12:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ISCAR Newsletter In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Jen and all, Thanks! I also received the ISCAR Newsletter! And I am so sad to not be able to come to the Congress, in spite having a n accepted presentation and a symposium. However, the timing is absolutely impossible for me. My classes start in that week, and there is no way I can miss the first week of classes! I will miss all of you! Ana On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 2:45 PM Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: > Dear XMCA Folks, I just received the ISCAR Newsletter for May, 2017; it is > attached below. It includes loads of information regarding the 5th > International Congress, held in Quebec City from August 28th to September > 1st, 2017. More information here: http://www.iscar17.ulaval.ca. Hope you > see you there!! Best, Jen > > -- *Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Ph.D.* Chestnut Hill College, Associate Professor of Education Dialogic Pedagogy Journal, deputy Editor-in-Chief (dpj.pitt.edu) e-mails: shaneam@chc.edu anamshane@gmail.com Phone: +1 267-334-2905 From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon May 22 17:14:00 2017 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 18:14:00 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Society for Qualitative Inquiry in Psychology Annual Conference In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3EC23C1F-4543-4E3E-8D5B-88434753FFFB@gmail.com> Elizabeth, Thank you for your response! What brought me to ask you the question was listening to a Sam Harris (Waking Up) podcast, an interview of Gary Taubes, who is famous for attributing to sugar the epidemic of obesity and diabetes. Taubes claimed that only very expensive random-assignment-to- treatment experiments could settle questions of causality in nutrition. I was wondering if the internet doesn?t offer alternatives that don?t cost so much. Henry > On May 22, 2017, at 6:04 AM, Elizabeth Fein wrote: > > Hello Henry - > There are certainly people there talking and thinking about a lot of topics > relevant to your idea, including how to bridge some of the divides you > mentioned, and how to include a broader range of participants in > qualitative inquiry. The question of how to "crowd-source" (what crowd? how > sourced?) and then how to go about analyzing the resultant big (very big!) > data set are tricky, interesting ones. > Best, > Elizabeth > > On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 7:11 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Elizabeth, >> It occurred to me the other day that crowd-sourced qualitative inquiry >> could connect qualitative with quantitative, analog with digital. Does this >> thinking possibly resonate with the SQIP Conference? >> Henry >> >> >>> On May 21, 2017, at 10:59 AM, Elizabeth Fein wrote: >>> >>> Dear colleagues, >>> >>> If you are a New Yorker or plan to be in NYC this week, check out the >>> annual conference of the *Society **for Qualitative Inquiry in >> Psychology*, >>> a subdivision of the American Psychological Association's Division 5, >>> happening this >>> Wednesday and Thursday *May 24th and 25th* at Fordham University's >> Lincoln >>> Center campus. We've got an exciting program planned, including keynote >>> addresses from *Kim Hopper*, who does ethnographic work on >>> cross-cultural variations in the course and prognosis of schizophrenia >> and >>> also on homelessness, and the *Bronx African-American History Project*, a >>> collaborative oral history project that has informed a number of >> community >>> projects in NYC. We'll also have themed paper sessions and symposia, >>> posters, and a plenary address on validity in psychology from SQIP >> founding >>> members *Ruthellen Josselson, Ken Gergen and Mark Freeman, along with >>> Scott **Churchill.* >>> >>> I've attached the conference program here along with some information >> about >>> the conference and a letter from our President, Fred Wertz; you can also >>> find out more information at our website, qualpsy.org. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Elizabeth Fein, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Psychology >>> Duquesne University >>> <2017 SQIP Program Final.pdf>> Photo.pdf> >> >> >> > > > -- > Elizabeth Fein, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Psychology > Duquesne University From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Tue May 23 10:10:54 2017 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Tue, 23 May 2017 17:10:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ISCAR Newsletter In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7C3EE223-C191-4D2F-8471-91B5EC314756@mail.ubc.ca> I'll be thinking of you, Ana, and have a wonderful beginning to the school year! jen On 2017-05-22, at 3:12 PM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane wrote: > Dear Jen and all, > > Thanks! I also received the ISCAR Newsletter! And I am so sad to not be > able to come to the Congress, in spite having a n accepted presentation and > a symposium. However, the timing is absolutely impossible for me. My > classes start in that week, and there is no way I can miss the first week > of classes! > > I will miss all of you! > > Ana > > On Mon, May 22, 2017 at 2:45 PM Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer < > j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca> wrote: > >> Dear XMCA Folks, I just received the ISCAR Newsletter for May, 2017; it is >> attached below. It includes loads of information regarding the 5th >> International Congress, held in Quebec City from August 28th to September >> 1st, 2017. More information here: http://www.iscar17.ulaval.ca. Hope you >> see you there!! Best, Jen >> >> -- > *Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Ph.D.* > Chestnut Hill College, Associate Professor of Education > Dialogic Pedagogy Journal, deputy Editor-in-Chief (dpj.pitt.edu) > e-mails: shaneam@chc.edu > anamshane@gmail.com > Phone: +1 267-334-2905 From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed May 24 12:14:17 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 19:14:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] 2017 Issue 2 Discussion: Weavers Agency Message-ID: <1495653256561.66962@iped.uio.no> Dear all, MCA's Issue 2 has been out for a couple of weeks now and it is time to bring it up for discussion here at xmca. The issue is a tribute to Naoki Ueno, a long time contributor to the MCA and CHAT communities who sadly and suddenly passed away two years ago. The issue is a symposium including three original articles, one of which is co-authored by Ueno. The issue also includes four commentaries by American colleagues who, as Mike describes in his editorial, came to know and appreciate Ueno over many decades. For the purpose of discussion here at XMCA, we have chosen the original article written by Yasuko Kawatoko, Ueno's close collaborator ?whose scholarship represents well ?his intellectual heritage at the same time that offers an interesting empirical case. The article, titled "Forming and Transforming Weavers' Agency: Agency in Sociotechnical Arrangements" (attached) presents a case study of a women weavers' group in Central Japan, the Yuzuru Party, whose goal is to preserve and share traditional hand-weaving skills. The study draws on actor-network theory notions that also populated Ueno's work. It examines the ways in which the weaving group develops "agency" as "sociotechnical arrangements" are reconfigured due to changes associated to the place of Matsusaka cotton in the city's cultural and political context. The paper covers a range of issues important to the MCA community, perhaps most centrally those related to the notion of agency, and is relevant to recent discussions held here at xmca dealing with the central question of the role of "artifacts" in human development. The author, Yasuko Kawatoko, who also has written an introduction to the special issue, has kindly agreed to join us in the discussion and will introduce herself soon. I am making other contributors to the special issue aware of the discussion in case they wished to join us too. I hope many of you engage and I look forward to a very productive discussion.? Alfredo -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Kawatoko 2017 Weavers agency.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1210955 bytes Desc: Kawatoko 2017 Weavers agency.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170524/c689d8b7/attachment-0001.pdf From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed May 24 23:10:15 2017 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 16:10:15 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Negative Phase of the Transitional Age Message-ID: Mike--this is a rough draft. As Andy says, I need help with reliability: back in Korea I could just use y Russian professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, but here everybody is too busy. So I included all the Russian as well, for anyone on the list who can help me. There is a kind of "executive summary" at the end. I do this mostly for my own comprehension, but we started including it in our books because our readers find it useful as a kind of study guide. And now we are translating the "Pedology of the Adolescent", which is Vygotsky's correspondence course for teachers in remote areas, and the first homework Vygotsky always assigns is...doing an executive summary! Enjoy the pictures! I bet very few people on the list have ever seen a photo of Bluma Zeigarnik learning how to dance with Kurt Lewin. -- David Kellogg Macquarie University -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Negative Phase of the Transitional Age.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 920759 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170525/48c0f809/attachment-0001.bin From smago@uga.edu Thu May 25 02:56:40 2017 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 09:56:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: WRITING AND FORMAL OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY AMONG THE VAI1 - Academia.edu In-Reply-To: <0100015c3db7607c-2c21eefe-91b2-4827-9d5f-93c47e3e5d0c-000000@email.amazonses.com> References: <0100015c3db7607c-2c21eefe-91b2-4827-9d5f-93c47e3e5d0c-000000@email.amazonses.com> Message-ID: Hi all, Mike?s been spending his copious leisure time uploading his career to academia.edu. Help yourselves to this treasure chest of scholarship. p From: Academia.edu Weekly Digest [mailto:noreply@academia-mail.com] Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2017 11:47 PM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: WRITING AND FORMAL OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY AMONG THE VAI1 - Academia.edu [Academia.edu] TOP PAPERS FROM YOUR NEWSFEED [Mike Cole] Mike Cole University of California, San Diego, Communication, Emeritus WRITING AND FORMAL OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY AMONG THE VAI1 This paper describes the corpus of writing-related activities by a Vai village elder living in a small, remote village in rural Liberia. The range of activities from record keeping both for personal use and as a part of village life provide a window into long standing questions about the role of literacy in personal and social development. Download Bookmark [Ruth Harman] Ruth Harman Bookmarked by Lindy Johnson Critical Inquiry in Language Studies Critical SFL Praxis With Bilingual Youth: Disciplinary Instruction in a Third Space Download Bookmark [Martin Ebner] Martin Ebner Graz University of Technology, Educational Technology, Faculty Member Does Gamification in MOOC Discussion Forums Work? Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) are a new form of learning environment aimed towards accessibility and openness using contemporary technologies. One of the MOOC's key features is the social interaction which usually takes place in discussion forums. This article focuses on reworking and analyzing the existing iMooX forum by enriching the new design with gamifi-cation elements. The intended objectives aim at refreshing the current style and improving its handling and usability. This article provides our experience of this implementation as well as examining whether or not the... Download Bookmark [Sibilla Destefani] Sibilla Destefani University of Zurich, Switzerland, Romanisches Seminar, Faculty Member L'anticivilt?. Il naufragio dell'Occidente nelle narrazioni della Shoah Auschwitz ? il luogo, simbolico e materiale, in cui si compie l'ultimo atto della modernit? europea. Auschwitz, in questo senso, divide la storia in un "prima" e un "dopo" tra cui non c'? pi? nessuna comunicazione, dando vita a una vera e propria frattura che mette fine ai miti e alle illusioni di quella stessa modernit?. Ad Auschwitz la parabola gloriosa inaugurata dall'Uomo vitruviano di Leonardo collassa, sostituita dal suo doppio speculare e negativo: quel Muselman in cui Primo Levi identifica l'emblema di "tutto il male del nostro tempo" e che abita l'anticivilt? del genocidio. Le... Download Bookmark [http://a.academia-assets.com/images/s65_no_pic.png] joelle zask Aix-Marseille University, Philosophy, Faculty Member Education, exp?rience et d?mocratie chez J. Dewey, Pr?face (2011) Bien que plus de vingt ans s?parent D?mocratie et ?ducation de Exp?rience et ?ducation, les pr?occupations de Dewey restent les m?mes : qu?est ce qu?une ?ducation ? d?mocratique ? ? Cette question, directement pos?e dans les deux textes, n?a aucune signification partisane. La d?mocratie, explique Dewey, par exemple dans Le public et ses probl?mes, n'est pas une alternative ? d'autres principes de vie en association. Elle est l'id?e de la communaut? elle-m?me. ? Entendons par l? : la seule forme d?association qui assure le d?veloppement des ?tres sp?cifiquement humains, ni b?tes, ni dieux,... Download Bookmark [David Henderson] David Henderson Middlesex University, Centre for Psychoanalysis, Faculty Member Holism: possibilities and problems - 8-10 September, 2017 This international, interdisciplinary conference will explore the possibilities and problems to which the concept of holism gives rise, both academically and in practice. Across many areas of contemporary culture we hear the concept of holism being invoked, as in holistic sciences, holistic spirituality, holistic healthcare, and holistic education. While there are different varieties of holism, each case implies a perspective in which the whole of a system is considered to be more important than the sum of its parts. Download Bookmark [Jos? Henrique dos Santos] Jos? Henrique dos Santos Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, DEPARTAMENTO DE EDUCA??O F?SICA E ESPORTES, Faculty Member Representa??es sociais sobre a defici?ncia: perspectivas de alunos de Educa??o F?sica Escolar As representa??es sociais sobre a defici?ncia podem ter amplo impacto no processo de inclus?o nas aulas de Educa??o F?sica. O objetivo deste estudo foi investigar as representa??es sociais sobre a defici?ncia na perspectiva de alunos de Educa??o F?sica Escolar e avaliar as repercuss?es destas na efetiva participa??o do aluno com defici?ncia nas atividades pedag?gicas propostas. O estudo descritivo, qualitativo e explorat?rio contou com a participa??o de 29 estudantes da rede Estadual de Ensino dos munic?pios de Itagua? e Serop?dica, de ambos os sexos, com idade m?dia de 19,55 anos... Download Bookmark [Barry Mauer] Barry Mauer University of Central Florida, English, Faculty Member The New Age of Eliminationism in America: A Conversation with David Neiwert and Barry Mauer On April 18, 2017, David Neiwert presented a talk to the University of Central Florida titled ?The New Age of Eliminationism in America: How the Internet Feeds Radicalization and Dehumanization.? The next day, he sat down for a discussion with Dr. Barry Mauer, Interim Director of the Texts and Technology Doctoral Program and a codirector of the Citizen Curator Project, which is sponsoring exhibitions about Eliminationism and resilience on the anniversary of the Pulse Nightclub shooting. Neiwert summarized his April 18th talk as follows: The politics of elimination ? embodied in nativism,... Download Bookmark [Rui Bordalo] Rui Bordalo Universidade de ?vora, HERCULES Center, Post-Doc The Effect of Excimer Laser Irradiation on Selected Pigments used in the 19th Century The potential of laser cleaning for paintings as an alternative to traditional cleaning methods has been recognized, and studies using industrial laser equipment have shown some potential. Irradiation at a wavelength of 248 nm has shown to be the most promising for natural resin varnish and overpaint removal, because it is strongly absorbed by triterpenoid varnish functional groups and associated degradation products (Georgiou 1998). However, it has been suggested that a minimal varnish thickness should remain intact to prevent any radiation from being absorbed by the underlying layers.... Download Bookmark [ELISEU RISCAROLLI] ELISEU RISCAROLLI Universidade Federal do Tocantins, Educa?ao, Faculty Member INF?NCIA E EDUCA??O NA PERSPECTIVA GRAMSCIANA : UMA LEITURA DAS CARTAS DO C?RCERE O pol?tico italiano Antonio Gramsci2 foi, sem d?vida, um homem ? frente de seu tempo. Formado em literatura e obstinado na educa??o do povo por meio da escrita em jornal, panfletos, cartas, manifestos do partido, adotou desde sempre uma postura pela liberdade de pensamento e a favor do racioc?nio filos?fico-politico. De modo geral, Gramsci n?o ? um autor muito estudado na ?rea da educa??o, a nosso ver equivocadamente, pois ele fornece elementos fundamentais para compreender essa atividade humana como forma de construir historicamente o homem, n?o ao gosto do tempo, mas com dire??o, em que a... Download Bookmark Academia, 251 Kearny St., Suite 520, San Francisco, CA, 94108 Unsubscribe Privacy Policy Terms of Service ? 2017 Academia From Anne-Nelly.Perret-Clermont@unine.ch Thu May 25 03:04:38 2017 From: Anne-Nelly.Perret-Clermont@unine.ch (PERRET-CLERMONT Anne-Nelly) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 10:04:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Michael Cole has uploaded on Academia.edu Message-ID: Thanks Peter for making us aware of this ! Here is the link: https://ucsd.academia.edu/MikeCole Best greetings, Anne-Nelly Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont Prof. hon. Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont Institut de psychologie et ?ducation Facult? des lettres et sciences humaines Universit? de Neuch?tel Espace L. Agassiz 1, CH- 2000 Neuch?tel (Switzerland) http://www2.unine.ch/ipe/publications/anne_nelly_perret_clermont -----Message d'origine----- De : on behalf of Peter Smagorinsky R?pondre ? : "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Date : jeudi, 25 mai 2017 11:56 ? : "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Objet : [Xmca-l] FW: WRITING AND FORMAL OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY AMONG THE VAI1 - Academia.edu Hi all, Mike?s been spending his copious leisure time uploading his career to academia.edu. Help yourselves to this treasure chest of scholarship. p From: Academia.edu Weekly Digest [mailto:noreply@academia-mail.com] Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2017 11:47 PM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: WRITING AND FORMAL OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY AMONG THE VAI1 - Academia.edu [Academia.edu] TOP PAPERS FROM YOUR NEWSFEED [Mike Cole] Mike Cole University of California, San Diego, Communication, Emeritus WRITING AND FORMAL OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY AMONG THE VAI1 This paper describes the corpus of writing-related activities by a Vai village elder living in a small, remote village in rural Liberia. The range of activities from record keeping both for personal use and as a part of village life provide a window into long standing questions about the role of literacy in personal and social development. Download Bookmark [Ruth Harman] Ruth Harman Bookmarked by Lindy Johnson Critical Inquiry in Language Studies Critical SFL Praxis With Bilingual Youth: Disciplinary Instruction in a Third Space Download Bookmark [Martin Ebner] Martin Ebner Graz University of Technology, Educational Technology, Faculty Member Does Gamification in MOOC Discussion Forums Work? Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) are a new form of learning environment aimed towards accessibility and openness using contemporary technologies. One of the MOOC's key features is the social interaction which usually takes place in discussion forums. This article focuses on reworking and analyzing the existing iMooX forum by enriching the new design with gamifi-cation elements. The intended objectives aim at refreshing the current style and improving its handling and usability. This article provides our experience of this implementation as well as examining whether or not the... Download Bookmark [Sibilla Destefani] Sibilla Destefani University of Zurich, Switzerland, Romanisches Seminar, Faculty Member L'anticivilt?. Il naufragio dell'Occidente nelle narrazioni della Shoah Auschwitz ? il luogo, simbolico e materiale, in cui si compie l'ultimo atto della modernit? europea. Auschwitz, in questo senso, divide la storia in un "prima" e un "dopo" tra cui non c'? pi? nessuna comunicazione, dando vita a una vera e propria frattura che mette fine ai miti e alle illusioni di quella stessa modernit?. Ad Auschwitz la parabola gloriosa inaugurata dall'Uomo vitruviano di Leonardo collassa, sostituita dal suo doppio speculare e negativo: quel Muselman in cui Primo Levi identifica l'emblema di "tutto il male del nostro tempo" e che abita l'anticivilt? del genocidio. Le... Download Bookmark [http://a.academia-assets.com/images/s65_no_pic.png] joelle zask Aix-Marseille University, Philosophy, Faculty Member Education, exp?rience et d?mocratie chez J. Dewey, Pr?face (2011) Bien que plus de vingt ans s?parent D?mocratie et ?ducation de Exp?rience et ?ducation, les pr?occupations de Dewey restent les m?mes : qu?est ce qu?une ?ducation ? d?mocratique ? ? Cette question, directement pos?e dans les deux textes, n?a aucune signification partisane. La d?mocratie, explique Dewey, par exemple dans Le public et ses probl?mes, n'est pas une alternative ? d'autres principes de vie en association. Elle est l'id?e de la communaut? elle-m?me. ? Entendons par l? : la seule forme d?association qui assure le d?veloppement des ?tres sp?cifiquement humains, ni b?tes, ni dieux,... Download Bookmark [David Henderson] David Henderson Middlesex University, Centre for Psychoanalysis, Faculty Member Holism: possibilities and problems - 8-10 September, 2017 This international, interdisciplinary conference will explore the possibilities and problems to which the concept of holism gives rise, both academically and in practice. Across many areas of contemporary culture we hear the concept of holism being invoked, as in holistic sciences, holistic spirituality, holistic healthcare, and holistic education. While there are different varieties of holism, each case implies a perspective in which the whole of a system is considered to be more important than the sum of its parts. Download Bookmark [Jos? Henrique dos Santos] Jos? Henrique dos Santos Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, DEPARTAMENTO DE EDUCA??O F?SICA E ESPORTES, Faculty Member Representa??es sociais sobre a defici?ncia: perspectivas de alunos de Educa??o F?sica Escolar As representa??es sociais sobre a defici?ncia podem ter amplo impacto no processo de inclus?o nas aulas de Educa??o F?sica. O objetivo deste estudo foi investigar as representa??es sociais sobre a defici?ncia na perspectiva de alunos de Educa??o F?sica Escolar e avaliar as repercuss?es destas na efetiva participa??o do aluno com defici?ncia nas atividades pedag?gicas propostas. O estudo descritivo, qualitativo e explorat?rio contou com a participa??o de 29 estudantes da rede Estadual de Ensino dos munic?pios de Itagua? e Serop?dica, de ambos os sexos, com idade m?dia de 19,55 anos... Download Bookmark [Barry Mauer] Barry Mauer University of Central Florida, English, Faculty Member The New Age of Eliminationism in America: A Conversation with David Neiwert and Barry Mauer On April 18, 2017, David Neiwert presented a talk to the University of Central Florida titled ?The New Age of Eliminationism in America: How the Internet Feeds Radicalization and Dehumanization.? The next day, he sat down for a discussion with Dr. Barry Mauer, Interim Director of the Texts and Technology Doctoral Program and a codirector of the Citizen Curator Project, which is sponsoring exhibitions about Eliminationism and resilience on the anniversary of the Pulse Nightclub shooting. Neiwert summarized his April 18th talk as follows: The politics of elimination ? embodied in nativism,... Download Bookmark [Rui Bordalo] Rui Bordalo Universidade de ?vora, HERCULES Center, Post-Doc The Effect of Excimer Laser Irradiation on Selected Pigments used in the 19th Century The potential of laser cleaning for paintings as an alternative to traditional cleaning methods has been recognized, and studies using industrial laser equipment have shown some potential. Irradiation at a wavelength of 248 nm has shown to be the most promising for natural resin varnish and overpaint removal, because it is strongly absorbed by triterpenoid varnish functional groups and associated degradation products (Georgiou 1998). However, it has been suggested that a minimal varnish thickness should remain intact to prevent any radiation from being absorbed by the underlying layers.... Download Bookmark [ELISEU RISCAROLLI] ELISEU RISCAROLLI Universidade Federal do Tocantins, Educa?ao, Faculty Member INF?NCIA E EDUCA??O NA PERSPECTIVA GRAMSCIANA : UMA LEITURA DAS CARTAS DO C?RCERE O pol?tico italiano Antonio Gramsci2 foi, sem d?vida, um homem ? frente de seu tempo. Formado em literatura e obstinado na educa??o do povo por meio da escrita em jornal, panfletos, cartas, manifestos do partido, adotou desde sempre uma postura pela liberdade de pensamento e a favor do racioc?nio filos?fico-politico. De modo geral, Gramsci n?o ? um autor muito estudado na ?rea da educa??o, a nosso ver equivocadamente, pois ele fornece elementos fundamentais para compreender essa atividade humana como forma de construir historicamente o homem, n?o ao gosto do tempo, mas com dire??o, em que a... Download Bookmark Academia, 251 Kearny St., Suite 520, San Francisco, CA, 94108 Unsubscribe Privacy Policy Terms of Service ? 2017 Academia From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu May 25 08:20:28 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 08:20:28 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 2017 Issue 2 Discussion: Weavers Agency In-Reply-To: <1495653256561.66962@iped.uio.no> References: <1495653256561.66962@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <5926f660.083f630a.39f1b.516f@mx.google.com> I am reading this tribute to Naoki Ueno, a longtime participant in the chat and MCA communities. The article is in 3sections, and my comment will focus on section 1 page 131, paragraph two. This paragraph contrasts ANT (Pickering) with CHAT (Kaptelinin and Nardi). The discussion explicitly focuses upon the theme of (symmetry and asymmetry) between human agency and material technical agency. The focus of ANT approaches human agency as a hybridization of (humans and nonhumans) as they are: Inseparably related to each other. ANT originates from the removal of the division (the fold) between humans and nonhumans, the fold between subject and object, the fold between individual and social. The explicit intent is to volitionally (bridge) the gap and move (beyond) this boundary marking/fold. What VANISHES with this move is the key focus upon symmetry and asymmetry. By assuming humans and nonhumans act Equitably (with equality) the boundary fold VANISHES. CHAT puts in question this vanishing act Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: May 24, 2017 12:16 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] 2017 Issue 2 Discussion: Weavers Agency Dear all, MCA's Issue 2 has been out for a couple of weeks now and it is time to bring it up for discussion here at xmca. The issue is a tribute to Naoki Ueno, a long time contributor to the MCA and CHAT communities who sadly and suddenly passed away two years ago. The issue is a symposium including three original articles, one of which is co-authored by Ueno. The issue also includes four commentaries by American colleagues who, as Mike describes in his editorial, came to know and appreciate Ueno over many decades. For the purpose of discussion here at XMCA, we have chosen the original article written by Yasuko Kawatoko, Ueno's close collaborator ?whose scholarship represents well ?his intellectual heritage at the same time that offers an interesting empirical case. The article, titled "Forming and Transforming Weavers' Agency: Agency in Sociotechnical Arrangements" (attached) presents a case study of a women weavers' group in Central Japan, the Yuzuru Party, whose goal is to preserve and share traditional hand-weaving skills. The study draws on actor-network theory notions that also populated Ueno's work. It examines the ways in which the weaving group develops "agency" as "sociotechnical arrangements" are reconfigured due to changes associated to the place of Matsusaka cotton in the city's cultural and political context. The paper covers a range of issues important to the MCA community, perhaps most centrally those related to the notion of agency, and is relevant to recent discussions held here at xmca dealing with the central question of the role of "artifacts" in human development. The author, Yasuko Kawatoko, who also has written an introduction to the special issue, has kindly agreed to join us in the discussion and will introduce herself soon. I am making other contributors to the special issue aware of the discussion in case they wished to join us too. I hope many of you engage and I look forward to a very productive discussion.? Alfredo From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu May 25 08:51:12 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 15:51:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: WRITING AND FORMAL OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY AMONG THE VAI1 - Academia.edu In-Reply-To: References: <0100015c3db7607c-2c21eefe-91b2-4827-9d5f-93c47e3e5d0c-000000@email.amazonses.com>, Message-ID: <1495727474099.83147@iped.uio.no> A treasure indeed! Thanks for sharing, A ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Peter Smagorinsky Sent: 25 May 2017 11:56 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: WRITING AND FORMAL OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY AMONG THE VAI1 - Academia.edu Hi all, Mike?s been spending his copious leisure time uploading his career to academia.edu. Help yourselves to this treasure chest of scholarship. p From: Academia.edu Weekly Digest [mailto:noreply@academia-mail.com] Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2017 11:47 PM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: WRITING AND FORMAL OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY AMONG THE VAI1 - Academia.edu [Academia.edu] TOP PAPERS FROM YOUR NEWSFEED [Mike Cole] Mike Cole University of California, San Diego, Communication, Emeritus WRITING AND FORMAL OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY AMONG THE VAI1 This paper describes the corpus of writing-related activities by a Vai village elder living in a small, remote village in rural Liberia. The range of activities from record keeping both for personal use and as a part of village life provide a window into long standing questions about the role of literacy in personal and social development. Download Bookmark [Ruth Harman] Ruth Harman Bookmarked by Lindy Johnson Critical Inquiry in Language Studies Critical SFL Praxis With Bilingual Youth: Disciplinary Instruction in a Third Space Download Bookmark [Martin Ebner] Martin Ebner Graz University of Technology, Educational Technology, Faculty Member Does Gamification in MOOC Discussion Forums Work? Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) are a new form of learning environment aimed towards accessibility and openness using contemporary technologies. One of the MOOC's key features is the social interaction which usually takes place in discussion forums. This article focuses on reworking and analyzing the existing iMooX forum by enriching the new design with gamifi-cation elements. The intended objectives aim at refreshing the current style and improving its handling and usability. This article provides our experience of this implementation as well as examining whether or not the... Download Bookmark [Sibilla Destefani] Sibilla Destefani University of Zurich, Switzerland, Romanisches Seminar, Faculty Member L'anticivilt?. Il naufragio dell'Occidente nelle narrazioni della Shoah Auschwitz ? il luogo, simbolico e materiale, in cui si compie l'ultimo atto della modernit? europea. Auschwitz, in questo senso, divide la storia in un "prima" e un "dopo" tra cui non c'? pi? nessuna comunicazione, dando vita a una vera e propria frattura che mette fine ai miti e alle illusioni di quella stessa modernit?. Ad Auschwitz la parabola gloriosa inaugurata dall'Uomo vitruviano di Leonardo collassa, sostituita dal suo doppio speculare e negativo: quel Muselman in cui Primo Levi identifica l'emblema di "tutto il male del nostro tempo" e che abita l'anticivilt? del genocidio. Le... Download Bookmark [http://a.academia-assets.com/images/s65_no_pic.png] joelle zask Aix-Marseille University, Philosophy, Faculty Member Education, exp?rience et d?mocratie chez J. Dewey, Pr?face (2011) Bien que plus de vingt ans s?parent D?mocratie et ?ducation de Exp?rience et ?ducation, les pr?occupations de Dewey restent les m?mes : qu?est ce qu?une ?ducation ? d?mocratique ? ? Cette question, directement pos?e dans les deux textes, n?a aucune signification partisane. La d?mocratie, explique Dewey, par exemple dans Le public et ses probl?mes, n'est pas une alternative ? d'autres principes de vie en association. Elle est l'id?e de la communaut? elle-m?me. ? Entendons par l? : la seule forme d?association qui assure le d?veloppement des ?tres sp?cifiquement humains, ni b?tes, ni dieux,... Download Bookmark [David Henderson] David Henderson Middlesex University, Centre for Psychoanalysis, Faculty Member Holism: possibilities and problems - 8-10 September, 2017 This international, interdisciplinary conference will explore the possibilities and problems to which the concept of holism gives rise, both academically and in practice. Across many areas of contemporary culture we hear the concept of holism being invoked, as in holistic sciences, holistic spirituality, holistic healthcare, and holistic education. While there are different varieties of holism, each case implies a perspective in which the whole of a system is considered to be more important than the sum of its parts. Download Bookmark [Jos? Henrique dos Santos] Jos? Henrique dos Santos Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, DEPARTAMENTO DE EDUCA??O F?SICA E ESPORTES, Faculty Member Representa??es sociais sobre a defici?ncia: perspectivas de alunos de Educa??o F?sica Escolar As representa??es sociais sobre a defici?ncia podem ter amplo impacto no processo de inclus?o nas aulas de Educa??o F?sica. O objetivo deste estudo foi investigar as representa??es sociais sobre a defici?ncia na perspectiva de alunos de Educa??o F?sica Escolar e avaliar as repercuss?es destas na efetiva participa??o do aluno com defici?ncia nas atividades pedag?gicas propostas. O estudo descritivo, qualitativo e explorat?rio contou com a participa??o de 29 estudantes da rede Estadual de Ensino dos munic?pios de Itagua? e Serop?dica, de ambos os sexos, com idade m?dia de 19,55 anos... Download Bookmark [Barry Mauer] Barry Mauer University of Central Florida, English, Faculty Member The New Age of Eliminationism in America: A Conversation with David Neiwert and Barry Mauer On April 18, 2017, David Neiwert presented a talk to the University of Central Florida titled ?The New Age of Eliminationism in America: How the Internet Feeds Radicalization and Dehumanization.? The next day, he sat down for a discussion with Dr. Barry Mauer, Interim Director of the Texts and Technology Doctoral Program and a codirector of the Citizen Curator Project, which is sponsoring exhibitions about Eliminationism and resilience on the anniversary of the Pulse Nightclub shooting. Neiwert summarized his April 18th talk as follows: The politics of elimination ? embodied in nativism,... Download Bookmark [Rui Bordalo] Rui Bordalo Universidade de ?vora, HERCULES Center, Post-Doc The Effect of Excimer Laser Irradiation on Selected Pigments used in the 19th Century The potential of laser cleaning for paintings as an alternative to traditional cleaning methods has been recognized, and studies using industrial laser equipment have shown some potential. Irradiation at a wavelength of 248 nm has shown to be the most promising for natural resin varnish and overpaint removal, because it is strongly absorbed by triterpenoid varnish functional groups and associated degradation products (Georgiou 1998). However, it has been suggested that a minimal varnish thickness should remain intact to prevent any radiation from being absorbed by the underlying layers.... Download Bookmark [ELISEU RISCAROLLI] ELISEU RISCAROLLI Universidade Federal do Tocantins, Educa?ao, Faculty Member INF?NCIA E EDUCA??O NA PERSPECTIVA GRAMSCIANA : UMA LEITURA DAS CARTAS DO C?RCERE O pol?tico italiano Antonio Gramsci2 foi, sem d?vida, um homem ? frente de seu tempo. Formado em literatura e obstinado na educa??o do povo por meio da escrita em jornal, panfletos, cartas, manifestos do partido, adotou desde sempre uma postura pela liberdade de pensamento e a favor do racioc?nio filos?fico-politico. De modo geral, Gramsci n?o ? um autor muito estudado na ?rea da educa??o, a nosso ver equivocadamente, pois ele fornece elementos fundamentais para compreender essa atividade humana como forma de construir historicamente o homem, n?o ao gosto do tempo, mas com dire??o, em que a... Download Bookmark Academia, 251 Kearny St., Suite 520, San Francisco, CA, 94108 Unsubscribe Privacy Policy Terms of Service ? 2017 Academia From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu May 25 09:55:36 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 09:55:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 2017 Issue 2 Discussion: Weavers Agency In-Reply-To: <5926f660.083f630a.39f1b.516f@mx.google.com> References: <1495653256561.66962@iped.uio.no> <5926f660.083f630a.39f1b.516f@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <59270cac.4777630a.130df.08ab@mx.google.com> This sentence on page 132 paragraph 2 seems pivotal: .... As artifacts participate fully in constructing the farmers actions, cognitions, and agency As... Partners of humans rather than instruments in their hands. This distinction seems relevant to this approach to agency Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Lplarry Sent: May 25, 2017 8:21 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] 2017 Issue 2 Discussion: Weavers Agency I am reading this tribute to Naoki Ueno, a longtime participant in the chat and MCA communities. The article is in 3sections, and my comment will focus on section 1 page 131, paragraph two. This paragraph contrasts ANT (Pickering) with CHAT (Kaptelinin and Nardi). The discussion explicitly focuses upon the theme of (symmetry and asymmetry) between human agency and material technical agency. The focus of ANT approaches human agency as a hybridization of (humans and nonhumans) as they are: Inseparably related to each other. ANT originates from the removal of the division (the fold) between humans and nonhumans, the fold between subject and object, the fold between individual and social. The explicit intent is to volitionally (bridge) the gap and move (beyond) this boundary marking/fold. What VANISHES with this move is the key focus upon symmetry and asymmetry. By assuming humans and nonhumans act Equitably (with equality) the boundary fold VANISHES. CHAT puts in question this vanishing act Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: May 24, 2017 12:16 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] 2017 Issue 2 Discussion: Weavers Agency Dear all, MCA's Issue 2 has been out for a couple of weeks now and it is time to bring it up for discussion here at xmca. The issue is a tribute to Naoki Ueno, a long time contributor to the MCA and CHAT communities who sadly and suddenly passed away two years ago. The issue is a symposium including three original articles, one of which is co-authored by Ueno. The issue also includes four commentaries by American colleagues who, as Mike describes in his editorial, came to know and appreciate Ueno over many decades. For the purpose of discussion here at XMCA, we have chosen the original article written by Yasuko Kawatoko, Ueno's close collaborator ?whose scholarship represents well ?his intellectual heritage at the same time that offers an interesting empirical case. The article, titled "Forming and Transforming Weavers' Agency: Agency in Sociotechnical Arrangements" (attached) presents a case study of a women weavers' group in Central Japan, the Yuzuru Party, whose goal is to preserve and share traditional hand-weaving skills. The study draws on actor-network theory notions that also populated Ueno's work. It examines the ways in which the weaving group develops "agency" as "sociotechnical arrangements" are reconfigured due to changes associated to the place of Matsusaka cotton in the city's cultural and political context. The paper covers a range of issues important to the MCA community, perhaps most centrally those related to the notion of agency, and is relevant to recent discussions held here at xmca dealing with the central question of the role of "artifacts" in human development. The author, Yasuko Kawatoko, who also has written an introduction to the special issue, has kindly agreed to join us in the discussion and will introduce herself soon. I am making other contributors to the special issue aware of the discussion in case they wished to join us too. I hope many of you engage and I look forward to a very productive discussion.? Alfredo From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Thu May 25 12:36:40 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 22:36:40 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Eisenstein-Vygotsky-Luria Message-ID: https://marxismocritico.com/2014/09/26/eisenstein-vygotsky-lurias-project/ I knew already from Autobiography the friendship between the three. It is really incredibly nice that they knew each other, they discussed, they projected... It is really fantastic as if you bring them and make them live in the same decades. It is also very interesting that Vygotsky was the one who tried to persuade Eisenstein not to reject art. In such instances, I feel myself frozen in the face of such wonderful facts. This occurs when I am face to face with intellectual, artistic, scientific figures, human beings who, like revolutions, make live humanity such leaps that can never occur in "normal" times. And moreover, it is such a pity that these giants, after their physical disappearences, are handled by other people during years and years sometimes so vulgarly and in such a mediocr manner that these giants are made dwarfs consciously or unconsciously. One such case is about Nazim Hikmet and Lenin. Why people who are sincere followers of these giants are so incapable of continuing on the same path consistently and in fidelity? Why they misinterpret and/or are complete incapable of interpreting them creatively? It is understandable why some some insist not to see in Nazim Hikmet the class determination, October Revolution, Lenin, Leninism and bolshevism, anti imperialism and in Lenin determination for a socialist revolution but why some others are so few to see the original content in their work in fidelity? This is what is condemning humanity's thinking to a regression. I think that Nazim Hikmet and Lenin are so badly read universally and another instance is that in one of our communications Bella told me that people restrict themselves to mention only to people of the last 15 years but do not extend until examples like Luria. I firmly believe the essential, fundamental reason in all of them is the following: that the mechanisms of capitalism do not allow or restrain people to think in a revolutionary way, in poetry, in neuropsychology, in cinema, in art theory and in politics. Because I believe that great leaps come with great social revolutions. Then, after the waters calm down, people move on more ordinary paths. "In later recalling his plans to work with Vygotsky, Eisenstein wrote that he had had a strong affection for ?this wonderful man with the strangely cropped hair. It seemed to have grown out permanently, as after typhus or another illness when the head is shaved. Gazing out at the world from under this strange array of hair were the eyes, clear and transparent as the sky, of one of the most brilliant psychologists of our time? (The Grundproblem, note 1) Vir?s bulunmuyor. www.avg.com <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: The Grundproblem in the Theory of Art.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 206192 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170525/bf66b358/attachment.pdf From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Thu May 25 12:42:02 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 22:42:02 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eisenstein-Vygotsky-Luria In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I think Vassilieva's work is wonderful, exceptional. Vir?s bulunmuyor. www.avg.com <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> On 25 May 2017 at 22:36, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > https://marxismocritico.com/2014/09/26/eisenstein-vygotsky-lurias-project/ > > I knew already from Autobiography the friendship between the three. > > It is really incredibly nice that they knew each other, they discussed, > they projected... > > It is really fantastic as if you bring them and make them live in the same > decades. > > It is also very interesting that Vygotsky was the one who tried to > persuade Eisenstein not to reject art. > > In such instances, I feel myself frozen in the face of such wonderful > facts. > > This occurs when I am face to face with intellectual, artistic, scientific > figures, human beings who, like revolutions, make live humanity such leaps > that can never occur in "normal" times. > > And moreover, it is such a pity that these giants, after their physical > disappearences, are handled by other people during years and years > sometimes so vulgarly and in such a mediocr manner that these giants are > made dwarfs consciously or unconsciously. > > One such case is about Nazim Hikmet and Lenin. > > Why people who are sincere followers of these giants are so incapable of > continuing on the same path consistently and in fidelity? > > Why they misinterpret and/or are complete incapable of interpreting them > creatively? > > It is understandable why some some insist not to see in Nazim Hikmet the > class determination, October Revolution, Lenin, Leninism and bolshevism, > anti imperialism and in Lenin determination for a socialist revolution but > why > some others are so few to see the original content in their work in > fidelity? > > This is what is condemning humanity's thinking to a regression. > > I think that Nazim Hikmet and Lenin are so badly read universally and > another instance is that in one of our communications Bella told me that > people restrict themselves to mention only to people of the last 15 years > but do not extend until examples like Luria. > > I firmly believe the essential, fundamental reason in all of them is the > following: that the mechanisms of capitalism do not allow or restrain > people to think in a revolutionary way, in poetry, in neuropsychology, in > cinema, in art theory and in politics. > > Because I believe that great leaps come with great social revolutions. > Then, after the waters calm down, people move on more ordinary paths. > > "In later recalling his plans to work with Vygotsky, Eisenstein wrote > that he had had a strong affection for ?this wonderful man with the > strangely > cropped hair. It seemed to have grown out permanently, as after typhus or > another illness when the head is shaved. Gazing out at the world from under > this strange array of hair were the eyes, clear and transparent as the > sky, of > one of the most brilliant psychologists of our time? (The Grundproblem, > note 1) > > > > Vir?s > bulunmuyor. www.avg.com > > <#m_-6634144830770013484_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu May 25 16:18:18 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 16:18:18 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eisenstein-Vygotsky-Luria In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you very much for pointing out the existence of this article, Ulvi. It is great to see an archive-based account of this collaboration. The LSV-Eisenshtein connection has come up before and may be mysterious for people. This article provides a lot of background to why the collaboration. mike On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > https://marxismocritico.com/2014/09/26/eisenstein-vygotsky-lurias-project/ > > I knew already from Autobiography the friendship between the three. > > It is really incredibly nice that they knew each other, they discussed, > they projected... > > It is really fantastic as if you bring them and make them live in the same > decades. > > It is also very interesting that Vygotsky was the one who tried to persuade > Eisenstein not to reject art. > > In such instances, I feel myself frozen in the face of such wonderful > facts. > > This occurs when I am face to face with intellectual, artistic, scientific > figures, human beings who, like revolutions, make live humanity such leaps > that can never occur in "normal" times. > > And moreover, it is such a pity that these giants, after their physical > disappearences, are handled by other people during years and years > sometimes so vulgarly and in such a mediocr manner that these giants are > made dwarfs consciously or unconsciously. > > One such case is about Nazim Hikmet and Lenin. > > Why people who are sincere followers of these giants are so incapable of > continuing on the same path consistently and in fidelity? > > Why they misinterpret and/or are complete incapable of interpreting them > creatively? > > It is understandable why some some insist not to see in Nazim Hikmet the > class determination, October Revolution, Lenin, Leninism and bolshevism, > anti imperialism and in Lenin determination for a socialist revolution but > why > some others are so few to see the original content in their work in > fidelity? > > This is what is condemning humanity's thinking to a regression. > > I think that Nazim Hikmet and Lenin are so badly read universally and > another instance is that in one of our communications Bella told me that > people restrict themselves to mention only to people of the last 15 years > but do not extend until examples like Luria. > > I firmly believe the essential, fundamental reason in all of them is the > following: that the mechanisms of capitalism do not allow or restrain > people to think in a revolutionary way, in poetry, in neuropsychology, in > cinema, in art theory and in politics. > > Because I believe that great leaps come with great social revolutions. > Then, after the waters calm down, people move on more ordinary paths. > > "In later recalling his plans to work with Vygotsky, Eisenstein wrote > that he had had a strong affection for ?this wonderful man with the > strangely > cropped hair. It seemed to have grown out permanently, as after typhus or > another illness when the head is shaved. Gazing out at the world from under > this strange array of hair were the eyes, clear and transparent as the sky, > of > one of the most brilliant psychologists of our time? (The Grundproblem, > note 1) > > > utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > Vir?s > bulunmuyor. www.avg.com > utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu May 25 16:47:20 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 16:47:20 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Negative Phase of the Transitional Age In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Many thanks for sending this text, David. Scanning the list of lecture topics from the Russian language link to lectures on pedology you sent earlier it is clear how many of articles of recent concern/discussion in the past couple of years coincided closely in time. Its so difficult to keep any systematic track of the timing of the different threads of the corpus of essays. For discussion once we have paused to read Yasuko's article about Ueno's work. mike On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 11:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Mike--this is a rough draft. As Andy says, I need help with reliability: > back in Korea I could just use y Russian professor at Hankuk University of > Foreign Studies, but here everybody is too busy. So I included all the > Russian as well, for anyone on the list who can help me. > > There is a kind of "executive summary" at the end. I do this mostly for my > own comprehension, but we started including it in our books because our > readers find it useful as a kind of study guide. And now we are translating > the "Pedology of the Adolescent", which is Vygotsky's correspondence course > for teachers in remote areas, and the first homework Vygotsky always > assigns is...doing an executive summary! > > Enjoy the pictures! I bet very few people on the list have ever seen a > photo of Bluma Zeigarnik learning how to dance with Kurt Lewin. > > -- > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu May 25 17:00:06 2017 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 25 May 2017 17:00:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Negative Phase of the Transitional Age In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: PS-- David - Fascinating to see a picture of Bluma Volfovna! I knew her as an elderly lady, about the age that I am now I suppose. Thin, and somewhat bent over. But always present for important lectures at the old Institute of Psychology. How do you know she was just learning to dance? In the woods! :-) mike On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 4:47 PM, mike cole wrote: > Many thanks for sending this text, David. > > Scanning the list of lecture topics from the Russian language link to > lectures on pedology you sent earlier it is clear how many of articles of > recent concern/discussion in the past couple of years coincided closely in > time. Its so difficult to keep any systematic track of the timing of the > different threads of the corpus of essays. > > For discussion once we have paused to read Yasuko's article about Ueno's > work. > > mike > > > On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 11:10 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >> Mike--this is a rough draft. As Andy says, I need help with reliability: >> back in Korea I could just use y Russian professor at Hankuk University of >> Foreign Studies, but here everybody is too busy. So I included all the >> Russian as well, for anyone on the list who can help me. >> >> There is a kind of "executive summary" at the end. I do this mostly for my >> own comprehension, but we started including it in our books because our >> readers find it useful as a kind of study guide. And now we are >> translating >> the "Pedology of the Adolescent", which is Vygotsky's correspondence >> course >> for teachers in remote areas, and the first homework Vygotsky always >> assigns is...doing an executive summary! >> >> Enjoy the pictures! I bet very few people on the list have ever seen a >> photo of Bluma Zeigarnik learning how to dance with Kurt Lewin. >> >> -- >> David Kellogg >> Macquarie University >> > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Thu May 25 18:12:50 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 01:12:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eisenstein-Vygotsky-Luria In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1495761169637.90464@iped.uio.no> Hi, yes Ulvi, thanks so much. As Mike points out the connection is not known at all and, to me, this link has meant the beginning of an inquiry for more of that, so thanks so much. A ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: 26 May 2017 01:18 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eisenstein-Vygotsky-Luria Thank you very much for pointing out the existence of this article, Ulvi. It is great to see an archive-based account of this collaboration. The LSV-Eisenshtein connection has come up before and may be mysterious for people. This article provides a lot of background to why the collaboration. mike On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > https://marxismocritico.com/2014/09/26/eisenstein-vygotsky-lurias-project/ > > I knew already from Autobiography the friendship between the three. > > It is really incredibly nice that they knew each other, they discussed, > they projected... > > It is really fantastic as if you bring them and make them live in the same > decades. > > It is also very interesting that Vygotsky was the one who tried to persuade > Eisenstein not to reject art. > > In such instances, I feel myself frozen in the face of such wonderful > facts. > > This occurs when I am face to face with intellectual, artistic, scientific > figures, human beings who, like revolutions, make live humanity such leaps > that can never occur in "normal" times. > > And moreover, it is such a pity that these giants, after their physical > disappearences, are handled by other people during years and years > sometimes so vulgarly and in such a mediocr manner that these giants are > made dwarfs consciously or unconsciously. > > One such case is about Nazim Hikmet and Lenin. > > Why people who are sincere followers of these giants are so incapable of > continuing on the same path consistently and in fidelity? > > Why they misinterpret and/or are complete incapable of interpreting them > creatively? > > It is understandable why some some insist not to see in Nazim Hikmet the > class determination, October Revolution, Lenin, Leninism and bolshevism, > anti imperialism and in Lenin determination for a socialist revolution but > why > some others are so few to see the original content in their work in > fidelity? > > This is what is condemning humanity's thinking to a regression. > > I think that Nazim Hikmet and Lenin are so badly read universally and > another instance is that in one of our communications Bella told me that > people restrict themselves to mention only to people of the last 15 years > but do not extend until examples like Luria. > > I firmly believe the essential, fundamental reason in all of them is the > following: that the mechanisms of capitalism do not allow or restrain > people to think in a revolutionary way, in poetry, in neuropsychology, in > cinema, in art theory and in politics. > > Because I believe that great leaps come with great social revolutions. > Then, after the waters calm down, people move on more ordinary paths. > > "In later recalling his plans to work with Vygotsky, Eisenstein wrote > that he had had a strong affection for ?this wonderful man with the > strangely > cropped hair. It seemed to have grown out permanently, as after typhus or > another illness when the head is shaved. Gazing out at the world from under > this strange array of hair were the eyes, clear and transparent as the sky, > of > one of the most brilliant psychologists of our time? (The Grundproblem, > note 1) > > > utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > Vir?s > bulunmuyor. www.avg.com > utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Fri May 26 07:54:20 2017 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 17:54:20 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eisenstein-Vygotsky-Luria In-Reply-To: <1495761169637.90464@iped.uio.no> References: <1495761169637.90464@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: It's a pleasure and a great one, especially when the three together. 26 May 2017 04:14 tarihinde "Alfredo Jornet Gil" yazd?: > Hi, yes Ulvi, thanks so much. As Mike points out the connection is not > known at all and, to me, this link has meant the beginning of an inquiry > for more of that, so thanks so much. > A > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: 26 May 2017 01:18 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eisenstein-Vygotsky-Luria > > Thank you very much for pointing out the existence of this article, Ulvi. > It is great to see an archive-based account of this collaboration. The > LSV-Eisenshtein connection has come up before and may be mysterious for > people. This article provides a lot of background to why the collaboration. > > mike > > On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > https://marxismocritico.com/2014/09/26/eisenstein- > vygotsky-lurias-project/ > > > > I knew already from Autobiography the friendship between the three. > > > > It is really incredibly nice that they knew each other, they discussed, > > they projected... > > > > It is really fantastic as if you bring them and make them live in the > same > > decades. > > > > It is also very interesting that Vygotsky was the one who tried to > persuade > > Eisenstein not to reject art. > > > > In such instances, I feel myself frozen in the face of such wonderful > > facts. > > > > This occurs when I am face to face with intellectual, artistic, > scientific > > figures, human beings who, like revolutions, make live humanity such > leaps > > that can never occur in "normal" times. > > > > And moreover, it is such a pity that these giants, after their physical > > disappearences, are handled by other people during years and years > > sometimes so vulgarly and in such a mediocr manner that these giants are > > made dwarfs consciously or unconsciously. > > > > One such case is about Nazim Hikmet and Lenin. > > > > Why people who are sincere followers of these giants are so incapable of > > continuing on the same path consistently and in fidelity? > > > > Why they misinterpret and/or are complete incapable of interpreting them > > creatively? > > > > It is understandable why some some insist not to see in Nazim Hikmet the > > class determination, October Revolution, Lenin, Leninism and bolshevism, > > anti imperialism and in Lenin determination for a socialist revolution > but > > why > > some others are so few to see the original content in their work in > > fidelity? > > > > This is what is condemning humanity's thinking to a regression. > > > > I think that Nazim Hikmet and Lenin are so badly read universally and > > another instance is that in one of our communications Bella told me that > > people restrict themselves to mention only to people of the last 15 years > > but do not extend until examples like Luria. > > > > I firmly believe the essential, fundamental reason in all of them is the > > following: that the mechanisms of capitalism do not allow or restrain > > people to think in a revolutionary way, in poetry, in neuropsychology, in > > cinema, in art theory and in politics. > > > > Because I believe that great leaps come with great social revolutions. > > Then, after the waters calm down, people move on more ordinary paths. > > > > "In later recalling his plans to work with Vygotsky, Eisenstein wrote > > that he had had a strong affection for ?this wonderful man with the > > strangely > > cropped hair. It seemed to have grown out permanently, as after typhus or > > another illness when the head is shaved. Gazing out at the world from > under > > this strange array of hair were the eyes, clear and transparent as the > sky, > > of > > one of the most brilliant psychologists of our time? (The Grundproblem, > > note 1) > > > > > > > utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > Vir?s > > bulunmuyor. www.avg.com > > > utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > > <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri May 26 09:03:48 2017 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 10:03:48 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Nice language development distraction Message-ID: Sorry for the distraction, but the following document of a child's first words over time is kinda cool: https://www.good.is/articles/first-words-spreadsheet?utm_ content=buffer41934&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign= buffer -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From kawatoko@r-aquaparks.com Sat May 27 00:29:47 2017 From: kawatoko@r-aquaparks.com (=?utf-8?B?5bed5bqK6Z2W5a2Q?=) Date: Sat, 27 May 2017 16:29:47 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started Message-ID: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> Dear xmca members, Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. Let me introduce my research career briefly. Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. Yasuko Kawatoko From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat May 27 07:03:22 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 27 May 2017 07:03:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> Message-ID: <5929871a.8698620a.c020a.f973@mx.google.com> Yasuko, I will be responding through CHAT but want to personally send an article approaching your themes within an alternative tradition. This article also explores material *agency* but from within a radically different tradition. The (benches) have (eyes) expressing a particular relation of material/ human focus. What I refer to as vari-focality (a type of hybridization) Just ignore if this is going outside the scope of your interests. I do share our mutual your pleasure in walking around here and there in search of human collective activities. Your focus on (traditions) OF Matsubara cotton *creating/constructing* agency opens up a deep curiosity to keep walking. Thank you for inviting us into your ways of walking Larry Purss Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: ???? Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.eduope of the Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started Dear xmca members, Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. Let me introduce my research career briefly. Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. Yasuko Kawatoko -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: WYLIE JOHN MAY 25 2017 Lndscape, absence, and the Geographies of Love.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 342645 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20170527/d8b1166f/attachment.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat May 27 08:22:01 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 27 May 2017 08:22:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> Message-ID: <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com> Yasuko, Thank you for your personal narrative, introducing your ways of walking through *tactile* places. I will open my response through revivifying Ueno?s sense of spirit in our walking alongside Ueno and listening: ?Participation in a community is realized through the process of making the community *visible* to the participants.? Participants create *boundaries* between communities and make them *visible* each time they discuss codes or categories, and in doing so, they are able to constitute their own participation in the community. Yasuko, you are applying this approach (way of tactile walking) in your approach to the *subject of* (not object of) The Yuzuru Party. (distributing agency) Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: ???? Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started Dear xmca members, Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. Let me introduce my research career briefly. Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. Yasuko Kawatoko From kawatoko@r-aquaparks.com Sun May 28 00:57:17 2017 From: kawatoko@r-aquaparks.com (=?utf-8?B?5bed5bqK6Z2W5a2Q?=) Date: Sun, 28 May 2017 16:57:17 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com> References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> Dear Larry Purss, Thank you very much for John Wylie?s article, ?Landscape, absence and the geographies of love.? It beautifully describes what we experience in our mind when we face and view (magnificent) landscape. I like the following phrase: Our ?stories of life and love weave together landscape and memory.? In this sense, absence and presence are mutually constituted. In the same way, past and present, participation and non-participation, culture and sub-culture, everything is mutually constituted in a series of context of interactions among human, non-human, and machinery, in other words, under the sociotechnical and historical arrangements. I am for the author?s way of exploring things; that is, ?bringing to light things previously hidden or lost, unearthing memory, making the invisible visible.? In my cases, ?talking? is important to make invisible visible. Talking is part of practice. What and how individuals talk about artifacts they use, fellow members working together, personal and public stories regarding the place become important resources to make the invisible visible for the researcher, while simultaneously the individuals? talks give the individuals opportunities to make their own practice visible and to constitute their own participation in the (work) place. Larry, yes, I am applying this approach to the subject of the Yuzuru Party. > 2017/05/28 ??0:22?Larry Purss ????? > > Yasuko, > Thank you for your personal narrative, introducing your ways of walking through *tactile* places. > > I will open my response through revivifying Ueno?s sense of spirit in our walking alongside Ueno and listening: > > > ?Participation in a community is realized through the process of making the community *visible* to the participants.? > > Participants create *boundaries* between communities and make them *visible* each time they discuss codes or categories, and in doing so, they are able to constitute their own participation in the community. > > Yasuko, you are applying this approach (way of tactile walking) in your approach to the *subject of* (not object of) > The Yuzuru Party. (distributing agency) > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: ???? > Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started > > Dear xmca members, > > Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. > > Let me introduce my research career briefly. > > Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. > > After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). > > I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. > > I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. > > Yasuko Kawatoko > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Sun May 28 23:53:56 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Mon, 29 May 2017 06:53:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com>, <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> Message-ID: <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no> I am glad to see you find common ground, although I would say that Yasuko's article is very different: while Wylie's analysis seems to be concerned with a seeing of a landscape, and seems to operate from within that seeing or gaze, Yasuko's framework and analyses seem to promise something else: to talk about the possibility of that seeing in concrete terms. So I see Wylie's paper as addressing something like this: what is a possible seeing of this landscape from where I stand (e.g., as a reader of Derrida)? Whereas I hear Yasuko's article as being more about the historical and material premises that position Wylie as that particular looker who sees a landscape in that way, an account that then would have to include the reading and citing of Derrida not as something given or somehow 'natural', but as yet another aspect of a multitude of aspects forming the arrangement that supports that particular seeing. The two approaches seem very different to me, among other things, because the latter can explain the possibility of the former but not the other way around. Not that you cannot learn from both, of course, which you can! An aspect that is sharply distinctive in Y. Kawatoko's article, at least with regard to the one that Larry has shared, is a concern on *development*, on growth and change, rather than on self and experience. Kawatoko's article describes a trajectory involving an intertwining between enhanced awareness and re-configured contexts or 'arrangements'. In this regard, Kawatoko's article seems to be much closer to the CHAT tradition that characterises much of the MCA readership. In fact, Kawatoko's article, which analyses a history of weaving, also seems to describe a weaving within the weaving: the one that tangles together history and weaving hands. As socio-historical arrangements develop, so too develop the weaving skills, which is to the cloth what the gaze is to the landscape in Wylie's paper. In this regard, the paper seems to touch upon, though not thematise, the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices. In CHAT circles, this issue is very much discussed and the Vygotskian legacy seems to offer possible venues for further inquiry. But I am curious about the possibilities that stem from ANT (or the version your article draws from). In which way does this framework help you characterise this affective dimension (Yasuko and anyone else), and how does it address the issue of growth, of development? Thanks for engagement, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ???? Sent: 28 May 2017 09:57 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started Dear Larry Purss, Thank you very much for John Wylie?s article, ?Landscape, absence and the geographies of love.? It beautifully describes what we experience in our mind when we face and view (magnificent) landscape. I like the following phrase: Our ?stories of life and love weave together landscape and memory.? In this sense, absence and presence are mutually constituted. In the same way, past and present, participation and non-participation, culture and sub-culture, everything is mutually constituted in a series of context of interactions among human, non-human, and machinery, in other words, under the sociotechnical and historical arrangements. I am for the author?s way of exploring things; that is, ?bringing to light things previously hidden or lost, unearthing memory, making the invisible visible.? In my cases, ?talking? is important to make invisible visible. Talking is part of practice. What and how individuals talk about artifacts they use, fellow members working together, personal and public stories regarding the place become important resources to make the invisible visible for the researcher, while simultaneously the individuals? talks give the individuals opportunities to make their own practice visible and to constitute their own participation in the (work) place. Larry, yes, I am applying this approach to the subject of the Yuzuru Party. > 2017/05/28 ??0:22?Larry Purss ????? > > Yasuko, > Thank you for your personal narrative, introducing your ways of walking through *tactile* places. > > I will open my response through revivifying Ueno?s sense of spirit in our walking alongside Ueno and listening: > > > ?Participation in a community is realized through the process of making the community *visible* to the participants.? > > Participants create *boundaries* between communities and make them *visible* each time they discuss codes or categories, and in doing so, they are able to constitute their own participation in the community. > > Yasuko, you are applying this approach (way of tactile walking) in your approach to the *subject of* (not object of) > The Yuzuru Party. (distributing agency) > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: ???? > Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started > > Dear xmca members, > > Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. > > Let me introduce my research career briefly. > > Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. > > After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). > > I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. > > I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. > > Yasuko Kawatoko > > > From kawatoko@r-aquaparks.com Mon May 29 06:20:47 2017 From: kawatoko@r-aquaparks.com (=?utf-8?B?5bed5bqK6Z2W5a2Q?=) Date: Mon, 29 May 2017 22:20:47 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no> References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com> <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: To tell you the truth, I am not much familiar with CHAT and Vygotskian legacy. I appreciate it if you could explain what has been discussed about ?the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices? in CHAT circles and Vygotskian legacy. As for ANT, the idea that attracts me the most is its disposal of dichotomy. For example, you said, ?In which way does this framework help you characterize this affective dimension?? The word ?affective? is bothering me because I feel some sign of dichotomy such as affective/cognitive, emotional/reasonable and so on. The concept of ?agency? in ANT connotes all human volitional actions including learning, feeling, conceiving, gazing, etc. Thanks for discussion, Yasuko Kawatoko > 2017/05/29 ??3:53?Alfredo Jornet Gil ????? > > I am glad to see you find common ground, although I would say that Yasuko's article is very different: while Wylie's analysis seems to be concerned with a seeing of a landscape, and seems to operate from within that seeing or gaze, Yasuko's framework and analyses seem to promise something else: to talk about the possibility of that seeing in concrete terms. So I see Wylie's paper as addressing something like this: what is a possible seeing of this landscape from where I stand (e.g., as a reader of Derrida)? Whereas I hear Yasuko's article as being more about the historical and material premises that position Wylie as that particular looker who sees a landscape in that way, an account that then would have to include the reading and citing of Derrida not as something given or somehow 'natural', but as yet another aspect of a multitude of aspects forming the arrangement that supports that particular seeing. The two approaches seem very different to me, among other things, because the latter can explain the possibility of the former but not the other way around. Not that you cannot learn from both, of course, which you can! > > An aspect that is sharply distinctive in Y. Kawatoko's article, at least with regard to the one that Larry has shared, is a concern on *development*, on growth and change, rather than on self and experience. Kawatoko's article describes a trajectory involving an intertwining between enhanced awareness and re-configured contexts or 'arrangements'. In this regard, Kawatoko's article seems to be much closer to the CHAT tradition that characterises much of the MCA readership. > > In fact, Kawatoko's article, which analyses a history of weaving, also seems to describe a weaving within the weaving: the one that tangles together history and weaving hands. As socio-historical arrangements develop, so too develop the weaving skills, which is to the cloth what the gaze is to the landscape in Wylie's paper. In this regard, the paper seems to touch upon, though not thematise, the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices. In CHAT circles, this issue is very much discussed and the Vygotskian legacy seems to offer possible venues for further inquiry. But I am curious about the possibilities that stem from ANT (or the version your article draws from). In which way does this framework help you characterise this affective dimension (Yasuko and anyone else), and how does it address the issue of growth, of development? > > Thanks for engagement, > Alfredo > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ???? > Sent: 28 May 2017 09:57 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started > > Dear Larry Purss, > > Thank you very much for John Wylie?s article, ?Landscape, absence and the geographies of love.? It beautifully describes what we experience in our mind when we face and view (magnificent) landscape. I like the following phrase: Our ?stories of life and love weave together landscape and memory.? In this sense, absence and presence are mutually constituted. > > > In the same way, past and present, participation and non-participation, culture and sub-culture, everything is mutually constituted in a series of context of interactions among human, non-human, and machinery, in other words, under the sociotechnical and historical arrangements. > > I am for the author?s way of exploring things; that is, ?bringing to light things previously hidden or lost, unearthing memory, making the invisible visible.? In my cases, ?talking? is important to make invisible visible. Talking is part of practice. What and how individuals talk about artifacts they use, fellow members working together, personal and public stories regarding the place become important resources to make the invisible visible for the researcher, while simultaneously the individuals? talks give the individuals opportunities to make their own practice visible and to constitute their own participation in the (work) place. > > > Larry, yes, I am applying this approach to the subject of the Yuzuru Party. > > > >> 2017/05/28 ??0:22?Larry Purss ????? >> >> Yasuko, >> Thank you for your personal narrative, introducing your ways of walking through *tactile* places. >> >> I will open my response through revivifying Ueno?s sense of spirit in our walking alongside Ueno and listening: >> >> >> ?Participation in a community is realized through the process of making the community *visible* to the participants.? >> >> Participants create *boundaries* between communities and make them *visible* each time they discuss codes or categories, and in doing so, they are able to constitute their own participation in the community. >> >> Yasuko, you are applying this approach (way of tactile walking) in your approach to the *subject of* (not object of) >> The Yuzuru Party. (distributing agency) >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >> From: ???? >> Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started >> >> Dear xmca members, >> >> Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. >> >> Let me introduce my research career briefly. >> >> Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. >> >> After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). >> >> I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. >> >> I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. >> >> Yasuko Kawatoko >> >> >> From ablunden@mira.net Mon May 29 06:27:56 2017 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 29 May 2017 23:27:56 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com> <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <6cdd59e0-b1b8-737d-a68b-f90222b5c564@mira.net> Yasuko, affect/cognition is an analytical distinction but it does not form a dichotomy, as you say. At the level of activity this distinction is not present, likewise in the case of agency, personality, experience, etc. To make an analytical distinction is not necessarily to posit a dichotomy. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 29/05/2017 11:20 PM, ???? wrote: > To tell you the truth, I am not much familiar with CHAT and Vygotskian legacy. > > I appreciate it if you could explain what has been discussed about ?the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices? in CHAT circles and Vygotskian legacy. > > As for ANT, the idea that attracts me the most is its disposal of dichotomy. For example, you said, ?In which way does this framework help you characterize this affective dimension?? The word ?affective? is bothering me because I feel some sign of dichotomy such as affective/cognitive, emotional/reasonable and so on. The concept of ?agency? in ANT connotes all human volitional actions including learning, feeling, conceiving, gazing, etc. > > Thanks for discussion, > > Yasuko Kawatoko > > >> 2017/05/29 ??3:53?Alfredo Jornet Gil ????? >> >> I am glad to see you find common ground, although I would say that Yasuko's article is very different: while Wylie's analysis seems to be concerned with a seeing of a landscape, and seems to operate from within that seeing or gaze, Yasuko's framework and analyses seem to promise something else: to talk about the possibility of that seeing in concrete terms. So I see Wylie's paper as addressing something like this: what is a possible seeing of this landscape from where I stand (e.g., as a reader of Derrida)? Whereas I hear Yasuko's article as being more about the historical and material premises that position Wylie as that particular looker who sees a landscape in that way, an account that then would have to include the reading and citing of Derrida not as something given or somehow 'natural', but as yet another aspect of a multitude of aspects forming the arrangement that supports that particular seeing. The two approaches seem very different to me, among other things, because the latter can explain the possibility of the former but not the other way around. Not that you cannot learn from both, of course, which you can! >> >> An aspect that is sharply distinctive in Y. Kawatoko's article, at least with regard to the one that Larry has shared, is a concern on *development*, on growth and change, rather than on self and experience. Kawatoko's article describes a trajectory involving an intertwining between enhanced awareness and re-configured contexts or 'arrangements'. In this regard, Kawatoko's article seems to be much closer to the CHAT tradition that characterises much of the MCA readership. >> >> In fact, Kawatoko's article, which analyses a history of weaving, also seems to describe a weaving within the weaving: the one that tangles together history and weaving hands. As socio-historical arrangements develop, so too develop the weaving skills, which is to the cloth what the gaze is to the landscape in Wylie's paper. In this regard, the paper seems to touch upon, though not thematise, the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices. In CHAT circles, this issue is very much discussed and the Vygotskian legacy seems to offer possible venues for further inquiry. But I am curious about the possibilities that stem from ANT (or the version your article draws from). In which way does this framework help you characterise this affective dimension (Yasuko and anyone else), and how does it address the issue of growth, of development? >> >> Thanks for engagement, >> Alfredo >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ???? >> Sent: 28 May 2017 09:57 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started >> >> Dear Larry Purss, >> >> Thank you very much for John Wylie?s article, ?Landscape, absence and the geographies of love.? It beautifully describes what we experience in our mind when we face and view (magnificent) landscape. I like the following phrase: Our ?stories of life and love weave together landscape and memory.? In this sense, absence and presence are mutually constituted. >> >> >> In the same way, past and present, participation and non-participation, culture and sub-culture, everything is mutually constituted in a series of context of interactions among human, non-human, and machinery, in other words, under the sociotechnical and historical arrangements. >> >> I am for the author?s way of exploring things; that is, ?bringing to light things previously hidden or lost, unearthing memory, making the invisible visible.? In my cases, ?talking? is important to make invisible visible. Talking is part of practice. What and how individuals talk about artifacts they use, fellow members working together, personal and public stories regarding the place become important resources to make the invisible visible for the researcher, while simultaneously the individuals? talks give the individuals opportunities to make their own practice visible and to constitute their own participation in the (work) place. >> >> >> Larry, yes, I am applying this approach to the subject of the Yuzuru Party. >> >> >> >>> 2017/05/28 ??0:22?Larry Purss ????? >>> >>> Yasuko, >>> Thank you for your personal narrative, introducing your ways of walking through *tactile* places. >>> >>> I will open my response through revivifying Ueno?s sense of spirit in our walking alongside Ueno and listening: >>> >>> >>> ?Participation in a community is realized through the process of making the community *visible* to the participants.? >>> >>> Participants create *boundaries* between communities and make them *visible* each time they discuss codes or categories, and in doing so, they are able to constitute their own participation in the community. >>> >>> Yasuko, you are applying this approach (way of tactile walking) in your approach to the *subject of* (not object of) >>> The Yuzuru Party. (distributing agency) >>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>> >>> From: ???? >>> Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started >>> >>> Dear xmca members, >>> >>> Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. >>> >>> Let me introduce my research career briefly. >>> >>> Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. >>> >>> After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). >>> >>> I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. >>> >>> I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. >>> >>> Yasuko Kawatoko >>> >>> >>> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon May 29 10:18:06 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 29 May 2017 10:18:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no> References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com>, <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <592c57ce.479b620a.97977.770b@mx.google.com> Alfredo, Your referencing and regarding Yasuko?s framework and analysis as talking about the possibility of *seeing* in concrete terms opens up our weaving ability. This framework may have a relation to *a* framework that Kenneth Liberman is exploring having to do with ethnomethods. He indicates that there is a phrase [in and as of] that is central to that approach to *seeing*in concrete terms; Hear Liberman?s approach: 1 The phrase ??in and as of?? intends to retain the actual state of affairs of a social practice. Instead of conceiving of a metaphysical object, ??science,?? which ??has?? certain practices, a science consists of its practices. It does not exist apart from them; in fact, the task of any inquiry into the lebenswelt origins of sciences takes its departure from this recognition. A science is nothing more than, and nothing less than, the activities of its practitioners. The phrase promises to retain the important insight, which is consistent with Husserl?s own phenomenological discoveries, that a science does not merely exist in its practices, it exists as its practices. The perspective is vital to an anti-essentialist inquiry, and the phrase is employed frequently in ethnomethodology (cf. Gar?nkel, 2002, p. 92, 99, 138, 207, 211, 246, 247; Gar?nkel and Wieder, 1992, p. 175). Is this particular phrase [in and as of] that Kenneth Lieberman makes explicit helpful in our current exploring as weaving? For example, ? in and as of Matsusaka cotton? Intending to retain the actual *seeing* of a social practice. In other words making visible what was invisible. Matsusaka cotton does NOT exist apart from *a* particular social practice as if a metaphysical object. Lived practice [lebenswelt] takes the origin of Matsusaka cotton from this recognition, from this departure. Matsusaka cotton is nothing more than and nothing less than Matsukaka cotton?s activities of its This activity of these particular practitioners. The phrase [in and as of] retains this important way of *seeing* or *gazing* or *watching*. Matsusaka cotton does not merely exist *in* Matsukaka cotton?s practices [agency] but Matsusaka cotton exists *as* Matsusaka cotton practices. This [in and as of] phrase expressing a particular approach towards *seeing* or *gazing* or *watching* may possibly be employed here/hear in Yasuko?s composition. This lens of perception also seems to line up with Andy?s notion of social facts as actually existing facts that are not merely ideal. Alfredo, this is all as background in which to engage with your weaving in your commentary that Yasuko is promising something else, while also noticing that both Wylie and Yasuko are exploring artifactual *agency*. Wylie sees benches as ways of *seeing* which implies the bench?s possessing their own agency. This notion of artifactual agency overlaps Yasuko?s ways of seeing. I acknowledge that hear we are recognizing different traditions, in and as of particular concrete actual reconfiguring contexts [arrangements]. However, there also is implied an imaginal aspect in both Wylie?s and Yasuko?s frameworks. For example, Yasuko says: ?recognition of the interrelations between humans and artifacts does NOT discount the distinctions that may be found between them.? This reminds me of the phrase [intra-inter subjectivity] which I read as the human aspect being *intra* and the artifactual aspect being *inter* relations/actions/knowings within the basic irreducibility of these human-artifactual *inter* relations. Note that Yasuko points out that ANT is a symbolic theoretical proposition that humans & artifacts act [symmetrically] imply [equally]. This, Yasuko emphasizes is *only* a theoretical assumption put forward in order to break through the unproductive *diversions* of traditional social science studies. .... Further, Yasuko adds: During the configuration of *a* particular concrete networks [ [not *the*abstracted metaphysical network] NCLUDING what humans want, think, feel, in terms of human agency [such as seeing and gazing and watching] depends on *a* concrete particular configuration [arrangement] of the sociotechnical environment/niche within which our wanting, thinking, and feeling, exist. I do question the term [social object] in contrast to [social subject] such as the phrase ?reconstructing Matsusaka striped cotton *as* a social object that becomes actual and concrete? Is it not alternatively possible to say: ?reconstructing Matusaka striped cotton *as* a social subject that becomes actual and concrete? Thereby arriving at the *intra-inter-actions* of human/artifactual irreducibility. In summary, and returning to my opening comment, does the phrase [in and as of] have any relevance to our weaving this particular commentary exploring the actuality of Matsusaka cotton in its concrete reality? Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: May 28, 2017 11:55 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started I am glad to see you find common ground, although I would say that Yasuko's article is very different: while Wylie's analysis seems to be concerned with a seeing of a landscape, and seems to operate from within that seeing or gaze, Yasuko's framework and analyses seem to promise something else: to talk about the possibility of that seeing in concrete terms. So I see Wylie's paper as addressing something like this: what is a possible seeing of this landscape from where I stand (e.g., as a reader of Derrida)? Whereas I hear Yasuko's article as being more about the historical and material premises that position Wylie as that particular looker who sees a landscape in that way, an account that then would have to include the reading and citing of Derrida not as something given or somehow 'natural', but as yet another aspect of a multitude of aspects forming the arrangement that supports that particular seeing. The two approaches seem very different to me, among other things, because the latter can explain the possibility of the former but not the other way around. Not that you cannot learn from both, of course, which you can! An aspect that is sharply distinctive in Y. Kawatoko's article, at least with regard to the one that Larry has shared, is a concern on *development*, on growth and change, rather than on self and experience. Kawatoko's article describes a trajectory involving an intertwining between enhanced awareness and re-configured contexts or 'arrangements'. In this regard, Kawatoko's article seems to be much closer to the CHAT tradition that characterises much of the MCA readership. In fact, Kawatoko's article, which analyses a history of weaving, also seems to describe a weaving within the weaving: the one that tangles together history and weaving hands. As socio-historical arrangements develop, so too develop the weaving skills, which is to the cloth what the gaze is to the landscape in Wylie's paper. In this regard, the paper seems to touch upon, though not thematise, the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices. In CHAT circles, this issue is very much discussed and the Vygotskian legacy seems to offer possible venues for further inquiry. But I am curious about the possibilities that stem from ANT (or the version your article draws from). In which way does this framework help you characterise this affective dimension (Yasuko and anyone else), and how does it address the issue of growth, of development? Thanks for engagement, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ???? Sent: 28 May 2017 09:57 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started Dear Larry Purss, Thank you very much for John Wylie?s article, ?Landscape, absence and the geographies of love.? It beautifully describes what we experience in our mind when we face and view (magnificent) landscape. I like the following phrase: Our ?stories of life and love weave together landscape and memory.? In this sense, absence and presence are mutually constituted. In the same way, past and present, participation and non-participation, culture and sub-culture, everything is mutually constituted in a series of context of interactions among human, non-human, and machinery, in other words, under the sociotechnical and historical arrangements. I am for the author?s way of exploring things; that is, ?bringing to light things previously hidden or lost, unearthing memory, making the invisible visible.? In my cases, ?talking? is important to make invisible visible. Talking is part of practice. What and how individuals talk about artifacts they use, fellow members working together, personal and public stories regarding the place become important resources to make the invisible visible for the researcher, while simultaneously the individuals? talks give the individuals opportunities to make their own practice visible and to constitute their own participation in the (work) place. Larry, yes, I am applying this approach to the subject of the Yuzuru Party. > 2017/05/28 ??0:22?Larry Purss ????? > > Yasuko, > Thank you for your personal narrative, introducing your ways of walking through *tactile* places. > > I will open my response through revivifying Ueno?s sense of spirit in our walking alongside Ueno and listening: > > > ?Participation in a community is realized through the process of making the community *visible* to the participants.? > > Participants create *boundaries* between communities and make them *visible* each time they discuss codes or categories, and in doing so, they are able to constitute their own participation in the community. > > Yasuko, you are applying this approach (way of tactile walking) in your approach to the *subject of* (not object of) > The Yuzuru Party. (distributing agency) > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: ???? > Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started > > Dear xmca members, > > Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. > > Let me introduce my research career briefly. > > Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. > > After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). > > I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. > > I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. > > Yasuko Kawatoko > > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Mon May 29 23:44:24 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 30 May 2017 06:44:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: <6cdd59e0-b1b8-737d-a68b-f90222b5c564@mira.net> References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com> <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no> , <6cdd59e0-b1b8-737d-a68b-f90222b5c564@mira.net> Message-ID: <1496126664245.85005@iped.uio.no> Yes, as Andy suggests, in CHAT, talking about affect does not imply a dichotomy. In fact, just before his premature death, Vygotsky had taken on the task to develop a theory of emotions that was to be based precisely on a firm commitment to overcome cartesian dualism. I think that no summary will do justice to all there is to say about CHAT and the study of emotions. But if I had to make it short, I would say that Vygotsky was striving towards a materialist account of emotions in particular, and of the psyche more generally, that would not take the form of a 'mechanistic' explanation. He hoped to explain the psyche as a material phenomenon without giving up the concept of psyche, or mind, as the proper subject. He aimed to achieve this by postulating and investigating a genetic relation between emotions as they emerge historically as social wholes (that is, as much more than emotions: as a dinner, a farewell party, a romantic rupture...), and the way they manifest as individual feelings. This may be akin to studying the socio-technical arrangements of emotions, to put it in terms closer to your text. Although Vygotsky's was a project for psychology, which is not ANT's interest, I asked you about emotions because I felt that the empirical case that you describe in your article brings to relieve a story of transforming affects as these belong to a history of socio-historical development or, as you describe it, of a reconfiguration of a socio-technical arrangement. I am referring to the fragments in which, as you describe in your text, "There was tension in the meeting because the person from the MCPA expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the textiles that the members had woven." (p. 138). You also point out "The discontent felt by some Yuzuru members in terms of the direction of the Party?s activities was expressed in discussions." (p. 139). Yet, you warn readers: "Caution must be exercised in interpreting this, as discontent that was felt by Yuzuru members." I was thinking that this note of caution might be a fruitful arena for discussing at the interface of CHAT and ANT. I did empathise with Yuzuru Party members' feelings as I was reading the narrative and excerpts. Thanks for that! Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: 29 May 2017 15:27 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started Yasuko, affect/cognition is an analytical distinction but it does not form a dichotomy, as you say. At the level of activity this distinction is not present, likewise in the case of agency, personality, experience, etc. To make an analytical distinction is not necessarily to posit a dichotomy. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making On 29/05/2017 11:20 PM, ???? wrote: > To tell you the truth, I am not much familiar with CHAT and Vygotskian legacy. > > I appreciate it if you could explain what has been discussed about ?the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices? in CHAT circles and Vygotskian legacy. > > As for ANT, the idea that attracts me the most is its disposal of dichotomy. For example, you said, ?In which way does this framework help you characterize this affective dimension?? The word ?affective? is bothering me because I feel some sign of dichotomy such as affective/cognitive, emotional/reasonable and so on. The concept of ?agency? in ANT connotes all human volitional actions including learning, feeling, conceiving, gazing, etc. > > Thanks for discussion, > > Yasuko Kawatoko > > >> 2017/05/29 ??3:53?Alfredo Jornet Gil ????? >> >> I am glad to see you find common ground, although I would say that Yasuko's article is very different: while Wylie's analysis seems to be concerned with a seeing of a landscape, and seems to operate from within that seeing or gaze, Yasuko's framework and analyses seem to promise something else: to talk about the possibility of that seeing in concrete terms. So I see Wylie's paper as addressing something like this: what is a possible seeing of this landscape from where I stand (e.g., as a reader of Derrida)? Whereas I hear Yasuko's article as being more about the historical and material premises that position Wylie as that particular looker who sees a landscape in that way, an account that then would have to include the reading and citing of Derrida not as something given or somehow 'natural', but as yet another aspect of a multitude of aspects forming the arrangement that supports that particular seeing. The two approaches seem very different to me, among other things, because the latter can explain the possibility of the former but not the other way around. Not that you cannot learn from both, of course, which you can! >> >> An aspect that is sharply distinctive in Y. Kawatoko's article, at least with regard to the one that Larry has shared, is a concern on *development*, on growth and change, rather than on self and experience. Kawatoko's article describes a trajectory involving an intertwining between enhanced awareness and re-configured contexts or 'arrangements'. In this regard, Kawatoko's article seems to be much closer to the CHAT tradition that characterises much of the MCA readership. >> >> In fact, Kawatoko's article, which analyses a history of weaving, also seems to describe a weaving within the weaving: the one that tangles together history and weaving hands. As socio-historical arrangements develop, so too develop the weaving skills, which is to the cloth what the gaze is to the landscape in Wylie's paper. In this regard, the paper seems to touch upon, though not thematise, the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices. In CHAT circles, this issue is very much discussed and the Vygotskian legacy seems to offer possible venues for further inquiry. But I am curious about the possibilities that stem from ANT (or the version your article draws from). In which way does this framework help you characterise this affective dimension (Yasuko and anyone else), and how does it address the issue of growth, of development? >> >> Thanks for engagement, >> Alfredo >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ???? >> Sent: 28 May 2017 09:57 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started >> >> Dear Larry Purss, >> >> Thank you very much for John Wylie?s article, ?Landscape, absence and the geographies of love.? It beautifully describes what we experience in our mind when we face and view (magnificent) landscape. I like the following phrase: Our ?stories of life and love weave together landscape and memory.? In this sense, absence and presence are mutually constituted. >> >> >> In the same way, past and present, participation and non-participation, culture and sub-culture, everything is mutually constituted in a series of context of interactions among human, non-human, and machinery, in other words, under the sociotechnical and historical arrangements. >> >> I am for the author?s way of exploring things; that is, ?bringing to light things previously hidden or lost, unearthing memory, making the invisible visible.? In my cases, ?talking? is important to make invisible visible. Talking is part of practice. What and how individuals talk about artifacts they use, fellow members working together, personal and public stories regarding the place become important resources to make the invisible visible for the researcher, while simultaneously the individuals? talks give the individuals opportunities to make their own practice visible and to constitute their own participation in the (work) place. >> >> >> Larry, yes, I am applying this approach to the subject of the Yuzuru Party. >> >> >> >>> 2017/05/28 ??0:22?Larry Purss ????? >>> >>> Yasuko, >>> Thank you for your personal narrative, introducing your ways of walking through *tactile* places. >>> >>> I will open my response through revivifying Ueno?s sense of spirit in our walking alongside Ueno and listening: >>> >>> >>> ?Participation in a community is realized through the process of making the community *visible* to the participants.? >>> >>> Participants create *boundaries* between communities and make them *visible* each time they discuss codes or categories, and in doing so, they are able to constitute their own participation in the community. >>> >>> Yasuko, you are applying this approach (way of tactile walking) in your approach to the *subject of* (not object of) >>> The Yuzuru Party. (distributing agency) >>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>> >>> From: ???? >>> Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started >>> >>> Dear xmca members, >>> >>> Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. >>> >>> Let me introduce my research career briefly. >>> >>> Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. >>> >>> After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). >>> >>> I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. >>> >>> I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. >>> >>> Yasuko Kawatoko >>> >>> >>> > > From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Tue May 30 00:11:48 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Tue, 30 May 2017 07:11:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: <592c57ce.479b620a.97977.770b@mx.google.com> References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com>, <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no>, <592c57ce.479b620a.97977.770b@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1496128307229.57426@iped.uio.no> Larry, yes, I think that the phrase has a first relevance in that, as long as my limited understanding goes, ANT historically built upon ethnomethodology (sure many in this list know much more about this connection than me). "That a science does not merely exist in its practices, it exists as its practices" makes sense to me too. But I am particularly interested in how to get to understand how people, like the members of the Yuzuru Party, change and develop as part of changing and developing practice. I wonder how questions of development are addressed from the ANT perspectives. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: 29 May 2017 19:18 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started Alfredo, Your referencing and regarding Yasuko?s framework and analysis as talking about the possibility of *seeing* in concrete terms opens up our weaving ability. This framework may have a relation to *a* framework that Kenneth Liberman is exploring having to do with ethnomethods. He indicates that there is a phrase [in and as of] that is central to that approach to *seeing*in concrete terms; Hear Liberman?s approach: 1 The phrase ??in and as of?? intends to retain the actual state of affairs of a social practice. Instead of conceiving of a metaphysical object, ??science,?? which ??has?? certain practices, a science consists of its practices. It does not exist apart from them; in fact, the task of any inquiry into the lebenswelt origins of sciences takes its departure from this recognition. A science is nothing more than, and nothing less than, the activities of its practitioners. The phrase promises to retain the important insight, which is consistent with Husserl?s own phenomenological discoveries, that a science does not merely exist in its practices, it exists as its practices. The perspective is vital to an anti-essentialist inquiry, and the phrase is employed frequently in ethnomethodology (cf. Gar?nkel, 2002, p. 92, 99, 138, 207, 211, 246, 247; Gar?nkel and Wieder, 1992, p. 175). Is this particular phrase [in and as of] that Kenneth Lieberman makes explicit helpful in our current exploring as weaving? For example, ? in and as of Matsusaka cotton? Intending to retain the actual *seeing* of a social practice. In other words making visible what was invisible. Matsusaka cotton does NOT exist apart from *a* particular social practice as if a metaphysical object. Lived practice [lebenswelt] takes the origin of Matsusaka cotton from this recognition, from this departure. Matsusaka cotton is nothing more than and nothing less than Matsukaka cotton?s activities of its This activity of these particular practitioners. The phrase [in and as of] retains this important way of *seeing* or *gazing* or *watching*. Matsusaka cotton does not merely exist *in* Matsukaka cotton?s practices [agency] but Matsusaka cotton exists *as* Matsusaka cotton practices. This [in and as of] phrase expressing a particular approach towards *seeing* or *gazing* or *watching* may possibly be employed here/hear in Yasuko?s composition. This lens of perception also seems to line up with Andy?s notion of social facts as actually existing facts that are not merely ideal. Alfredo, this is all as background in which to engage with your weaving in your commentary that Yasuko is promising something else, while also noticing that both Wylie and Yasuko are exploring artifactual *agency*. Wylie sees benches as ways of *seeing* which implies the bench?s possessing their own agency. This notion of artifactual agency overlaps Yasuko?s ways of seeing. I acknowledge that hear we are recognizing different traditions, in and as of particular concrete actual reconfiguring contexts [arrangements]. However, there also is implied an imaginal aspect in both Wylie?s and Yasuko?s frameworks. For example, Yasuko says: ?recognition of the interrelations between humans and artifacts does NOT discount the distinctions that may be found between them.? This reminds me of the phrase [intra-inter subjectivity] which I read as the human aspect being *intra* and the artifactual aspect being *inter* relations/actions/knowings within the basic irreducibility of these human-artifactual *inter* relations. Note that Yasuko points out that ANT is a symbolic theoretical proposition that humans & artifacts act [symmetrically] imply [equally]. This, Yasuko emphasizes is *only* a theoretical assumption put forward in order to break through the unproductive *diversions* of traditional social science studies. .... Further, Yasuko adds: During the configuration of *a* particular concrete networks [ [not *the*abstracted metaphysical network] NCLUDING what humans want, think, feel, in terms of human agency [such as seeing and gazing and watching] depends on *a* concrete particular configuration [arrangement] of the sociotechnical environment/niche within which our wanting, thinking, and feeling, exist. I do question the term [social object] in contrast to [social subject] such as the phrase ?reconstructing Matsusaka striped cotton *as* a social object that becomes actual and concrete? Is it not alternatively possible to say: ?reconstructing Matusaka striped cotton *as* a social subject that becomes actual and concrete? Thereby arriving at the *intra-inter-actions* of human/artifactual irreducibility. In summary, and returning to my opening comment, does the phrase [in and as of] have any relevance to our weaving this particular commentary exploring the actuality of Matsusaka cotton in its concrete reality? Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Alfredo Jornet Gil Sent: May 28, 2017 11:55 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started I am glad to see you find common ground, although I would say that Yasuko's article is very different: while Wylie's analysis seems to be concerned with a seeing of a landscape, and seems to operate from within that seeing or gaze, Yasuko's framework and analyses seem to promise something else: to talk about the possibility of that seeing in concrete terms. So I see Wylie's paper as addressing something like this: what is a possible seeing of this landscape from where I stand (e.g., as a reader of Derrida)? Whereas I hear Yasuko's article as being more about the historical and material premises that position Wylie as that particular looker who sees a landscape in that way, an account that then would have to include the reading and citing of Derrida not as something given or somehow 'natural', but as yet another aspect of a multitude of aspects forming the arrangement that supports that particular seeing. The two approaches seem very different to me, among other things, because the latter can explain the possibility of the former but not the other way around. Not that you cannot learn from both, of course, which you can! An aspect that is sharply distinctive in Y. Kawatoko's article, at least with regard to the one that Larry has shared, is a concern on *development*, on growth and change, rather than on self and experience. Kawatoko's article describes a trajectory involving an intertwining between enhanced awareness and re-configured contexts or 'arrangements'. In this regard, Kawatoko's article seems to be much closer to the CHAT tradition that characterises much of the MCA readership. In fact, Kawatoko's article, which analyses a history of weaving, also seems to describe a weaving within the weaving: the one that tangles together history and weaving hands. As socio-historical arrangements develop, so too develop the weaving skills, which is to the cloth what the gaze is to the landscape in Wylie's paper. In this regard, the paper seems to touch upon, though not thematise, the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices. In CHAT circles, this issue is very much discussed and the Vygotskian legacy seems to offer possible venues for further inquiry. But I am curious about the possibilities that stem from ANT (or the version your article draws from). In which way does this framework help you characterise this affective dimension (Yasuko and anyone else), and how does it address the issue of growth, of development? Thanks for engagement, Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ???? Sent: 28 May 2017 09:57 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started Dear Larry Purss, Thank you very much for John Wylie?s article, ?Landscape, absence and the geographies of love.? It beautifully describes what we experience in our mind when we face and view (magnificent) landscape. I like the following phrase: Our ?stories of life and love weave together landscape and memory.? In this sense, absence and presence are mutually constituted. In the same way, past and present, participation and non-participation, culture and sub-culture, everything is mutually constituted in a series of context of interactions among human, non-human, and machinery, in other words, under the sociotechnical and historical arrangements. I am for the author?s way of exploring things; that is, ?bringing to light things previously hidden or lost, unearthing memory, making the invisible visible.? In my cases, ?talking? is important to make invisible visible. Talking is part of practice. What and how individuals talk about artifacts they use, fellow members working together, personal and public stories regarding the place become important resources to make the invisible visible for the researcher, while simultaneously the individuals? talks give the individuals opportunities to make their own practice visible and to constitute their own participation in the (work) place. Larry, yes, I am applying this approach to the subject of the Yuzuru Party. > 2017/05/28 ??0:22?Larry Purss ????? > > Yasuko, > Thank you for your personal narrative, introducing your ways of walking through *tactile* places. > > I will open my response through revivifying Ueno?s sense of spirit in our walking alongside Ueno and listening: > > > ?Participation in a community is realized through the process of making the community *visible* to the participants.? > > Participants create *boundaries* between communities and make them *visible* each time they discuss codes or categories, and in doing so, they are able to constitute their own participation in the community. > > Yasuko, you are applying this approach (way of tactile walking) in your approach to the *subject of* (not object of) > The Yuzuru Party. (distributing agency) > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > From: ???? > Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started > > Dear xmca members, > > Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. > > Let me introduce my research career briefly. > > Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. > > After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). > > I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. > > I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. > > Yasuko Kawatoko > > > From kawatoko@r-aquaparks.com Wed May 31 04:36:06 2017 From: kawatoko@r-aquaparks.com (=?iso-2022-jp?B?GyRCQG4+Mkx3O1IbKEI=?=) Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 20:36:06 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: <1496126664245.85005@iped.uio.no> References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com> <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no> <6cdd59e0-b1b8-737d-a68b-f90222b5c564@mira.net> <1496126664245.85005@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <0CF5EF91-D509-4A50-A061-673E6C5A7B94@r-aquaparks.com> Alfredo, I apologize that I only give you a simple answer as before. I see the discontent (emotion) expressed by some Yuzuru members in the context of their reshaping agency. Their reshaping agency grows out of the transformation of the socio-technical arrangement surrounding Yuzuru members. In CHAT, do they see the discontent as the emergence of conflict between members? Yasuko Kawatoko > 2017/05/30 ??3:44?Alfredo Jornet Gil ????? > > Yes, as Andy suggests, in CHAT, talking about affect does not imply a dichotomy. In fact, just before his premature death, Vygotsky had taken on the task to develop a theory of emotions that was to be based precisely on a firm commitment to overcome cartesian dualism. > > I think that no summary will do justice to all there is to say about CHAT and the study of emotions. But if I had to make it short, I would say that Vygotsky was striving towards a materialist account of emotions in particular, and of the psyche more generally, that would not take the form of a 'mechanistic' explanation. He hoped to explain the psyche as a material phenomenon without giving up the concept of psyche, or mind, as the proper subject. He aimed to achieve this by postulating and investigating a genetic relation between emotions as they emerge historically as social wholes (that is, as much more than emotions: as a dinner, a farewell party, a romantic rupture...), and the way they manifest as individual feelings. This may be akin to studying the socio-technical arrangements of emotions, to put it in terms closer to your text. > > Although Vygotsky's was a project for psychology, which is not ANT's interest, I asked you about emotions because I felt that the empirical case that you describe in your article brings to relieve a story of transforming affects as these belong to a history of socio-historical development or, as you describe it, of a reconfiguration of a socio-technical arrangement. I am referring to the fragments in which, as you describe in your text, > > "There was tension in the meeting because the person from the MCPA expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the textiles that the members had woven." (p. 138). > > You also point out "The discontent felt by some Yuzuru members in terms of the direction of the Party?s activities was expressed in discussions." (p. 139). Yet, you warn readers: "Caution must be exercised in interpreting this, as discontent that was felt by Yuzuru members." I was thinking that this note of caution might be a fruitful arena for discussing at the interface of CHAT and ANT. I did empathise with Yuzuru Party members' feelings as I was reading the narrative and excerpts. Thanks for that! > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 29 May 2017 15:27 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started > > Yasuko, affect/cognition is an analytical distinction but it > does not form a dichotomy, as you say. At the level of > activity this distinction is not present, likewise in the > case of agency, personality, experience, etc. To make an > analytical distinction is not necessarily to posit a dichotomy. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 29/05/2017 11:20 PM, ???? wrote: >> To tell you the truth, I am not much familiar with CHAT and Vygotskian legacy. >> >> I appreciate it if you could explain what has been discussed about ?the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices? in CHAT circles and Vygotskian legacy. >> >> As for ANT, the idea that attracts me the most is its disposal of dichotomy. For example, you said, ?In which way does this framework help you characterize this affective dimension?? The word ?affective? is bothering me because I feel some sign of dichotomy such as affective/cognitive, emotional/reasonable and so on. The concept of ?agency? in ANT connotes all human volitional actions including learning, feeling, conceiving, gazing, etc. >> >> Thanks for discussion, >> >> Yasuko Kawatoko >> >> >>> 2017/05/29 ??3:53?Alfredo Jornet Gil ????? >>> >>> I am glad to see you find common ground, although I would say that Yasuko's article is very different: while Wylie's analysis seems to be concerned with a seeing of a landscape, and seems to operate from within that seeing or gaze, Yasuko's framework and analyses seem to promise something else: to talk about the possibility of that seeing in concrete terms. So I see Wylie's paper as addressing something like this: what is a possible seeing of this landscape from where I stand (e.g., as a reader of Derrida)? Whereas I hear Yasuko's article as being more about the historical and material premises that position Wylie as that particular looker who sees a landscape in that way, an account that then would have to include the reading and citing of Derrida not as something given or somehow 'natural', but as yet another aspect of a multitude of aspects forming the arrangement that supports that particular seeing. The two approaches seem very different to me, among other things, because the latter can explain the possibility of the former but not the other way around. Not that you cannot learn from both, of course, which you can! >>> >>> An aspect that is sharply distinctive in Y. Kawatoko's article, at least with regard to the one that Larry has shared, is a concern on *development*, on growth and change, rather than on self and experience. Kawatoko's article describes a trajectory involving an intertwining between enhanced awareness and re-configured contexts or 'arrangements'. In this regard, Kawatoko's article seems to be much closer to the CHAT tradition that characterises much of the MCA readership. >>> >>> In fact, Kawatoko's article, which analyses a history of weaving, also seems to describe a weaving within the weaving: the one that tangles together history and weaving hands. As socio-historical arrangements develop, so too develop the weaving skills, which is to the cloth what the gaze is to the landscape in Wylie's paper. In this regard, the paper seems to touch upon, though not thematise, the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices. In CHAT circles, this issue is very much discussed and the Vygotskian legacy seems to offer possible venues for further inquiry. But I am curious about the possibilities that stem from ANT (or the version your article draws from). In which way does this framework help you characterise this affective dimension (Yasuko and anyone else), and how does it address the issue of growth, of development? >>> >>> Thanks for engagement, >>> Alfredo >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ???? >>> Sent: 28 May 2017 09:57 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started >>> >>> Dear Larry Purss, >>> >>> Thank you very much for John Wylie?s article, ?Landscape, absence and the geographies of love.? It beautifully describes what we experience in our mind when we face and view (magnificent) landscape. I like the following phrase: Our ?stories of life and love weave together landscape and memory.? In this sense, absence and presence are mutually constituted. >>> >>> >>> In the same way, past and present, participation and non-participation, culture and sub-culture, everything is mutually constituted in a series of context of interactions among human, non-human, and machinery, in other words, under the sociotechnical and historical arrangements. >>> >>> I am for the author?s way of exploring things; that is, ?bringing to light things previously hidden or lost, unearthing memory, making the invisible visible.? In my cases, ?talking? is important to make invisible visible. Talking is part of practice. What and how individuals talk about artifacts they use, fellow members working together, personal and public stories regarding the place become important resources to make the invisible visible for the researcher, while simultaneously the individuals? talks give the individuals opportunities to make their own practice visible and to constitute their own participation in the (work) place. >>> >>> >>> Larry, yes, I am applying this approach to the subject of the Yuzuru Party. >>> >>> >>> >>>> 2017/05/28 ??0:22?Larry Purss ????? >>>> >>>> Yasuko, >>>> Thank you for your personal narrative, introducing your ways of walking through *tactile* places. >>>> >>>> I will open my response through revivifying Ueno?s sense of spirit in our walking alongside Ueno and listening: >>>> >>>> >>>> ?Participation in a community is realized through the process of making the community *visible* to the participants.? >>>> >>>> Participants create *boundaries* between communities and make them *visible* each time they discuss codes or categories, and in doing so, they are able to constitute their own participation in the community. >>>> >>>> Yasuko, you are applying this approach (way of tactile walking) in your approach to the *subject of* (not object of) >>>> The Yuzuru Party. (distributing agency) >>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>> >>>> From: ???? >>>> Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started >>>> >>>> Dear xmca members, >>>> >>>> Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. >>>> >>>> Let me introduce my research career briefly. >>>> >>>> Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. >>>> >>>> After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). >>>> >>>> I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. >>>> >>>> I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. >>>> >>>> Yasuko Kawatoko >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed May 31 08:19:34 2017 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 08:19:34 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: <0CF5EF91-D509-4A50-A061-673E6C5A7B94@r-aquaparks.com> References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com> <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no> <6cdd59e0-b1b8-737d-a68b-f90222b5c564@mira.net> <1496126664245.85005@iped.uio.no> <0CF5EF91-D509-4A50-A061-673E6C5A7B94@r-aquaparks.com> Message-ID: <592edf2d.53c6620a.67d0c.2ce4@mx.google.com> I hear in Yazuru Party members addressing each other that in the transition to finding or locating new (solutions) there is also inevitably dissolution and loss. The museum contextual situation (social arrangement) expressed a passion for historical memory. This included the memory of and the continuing presence of traders who opened up markets in what has become Tokyo. Now, when the emblem is introduced as a symbol of standards, and (professional) marketable quality comes to the fore, the question I hear is what is being lost or becoming absent? Is the passion of the museum arrangement transforming? The transformation from museum to mark/ability AS standards (emblematic in the emblem) seems an imposition on a previous passion for memorialization of traditions. This also occurs as transformation in practices that is generating loss of felt experience generated from the heart. Transforming the qualities of cotton to becoming an emphasize on (a) commodity looses this felt sense of the museum arrangements operating within mutual recognition of their traditional heritage. Developing a skill with cotton was a particular and specific way of honouring their shared heritage through developing this mutually shared skill. To shift or transition to differing arrangements through commodity exchanges transforms (and dissolves) the felt sense of their original museum social arrangements. Some call this alienation. I (felt) this transition occurring in how I read through this article. Artifacts create agency but may also be dissolving agency. Museum arrangements that nurture our hearts through social fabric may be lost when transforming and orienting towards commodity arrangements (symbolized by the artifact of the (emblem). This may be one aspect of shifting presences and perceptions of the subject matter under discussion. A shift in our felt social arrangements. Sent from my Windows 10 phone From: ???? Sent: May 31, 2017 4:38 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Hans Christian Arnseth Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started Alfredo, I apologize that I only give you a simple answer as before. I see the discontent (emotion) expressed by some Yuzuru members in the context of their reshaping agency. Their reshaping agency grows out of the transformation of the socio-technical arrangement surrounding Yuzuru members. In CHAT, do they see the discontent as the emergence of conflict between members? Yasuko Kawatoko > 2017/05/30 ??3:44?Alfredo Jornet Gil ????? > > Yes, as Andy suggests, in CHAT, talking about affect does not imply a dichotomy. In fact, just before his premature death, Vygotsky had taken on the task to develop a theory of emotions that was to be based precisely on a firm commitment to overcome cartesian dualism. > > I think that no summary will do justice to all there is to say about CHAT and the study of emotions. But if I had to make it short, I would say that Vygotsky was striving towards a materialist account of emotions in particular, and of the psyche more generally, that would not take the form of a 'mechanistic' explanation. He hoped to explain the psyche as a material phenomenon without giving up the concept of psyche, or mind, as the proper subject. He aimed to achieve this by postulating and investigating a genetic relation between emotions as they emerge historically as social wholes (that is, as much more than emotions: as a dinner, a farewell party, a romantic rupture...), and the way they manifest as individual feelings. This may be akin to studying the socio-technical arrangements of emotions, to put it in terms closer to your text. > > Although Vygotsky's was a project for psychology, which is not ANT's interest, I asked you about emotions because I felt that the empirical case that you describe in your article brings to relieve a story of transforming affects as these belong to a history of socio-historical development or, as you describe it, of a reconfiguration of a socio-technical arrangement. I am referring to the fragments in which, as you describe in your text, > > "There was tension in the meeting because the person from the MCPA expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the textiles that the members had woven." (p. 138). > > You also point out "The discontent felt by some Yuzuru members in terms of the direction of the Party?s activities was expressed in discussions." (p. 139). Yet, you warn readers: "Caution must be exercised in interpreting this, as discontent that was felt by Yuzuru members." I was thinking that this note of caution might be a fruitful arena for discussing at the interface of CHAT and ANT. I did empathise with Yuzuru Party members' feelings as I was reading the narrative and excerpts. Thanks for that! > > Alfredo > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: 29 May 2017 15:27 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started > > Yasuko, affect/cognition is an analytical distinction but it > does not form a dichotomy, as you say. At the level of > activity this distinction is not present, likewise in the > case of agency, personality, experience, etc. To make an > analytical distinction is not necessarily to posit a dichotomy. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > Andy Blunden > http://home.mira.net/~andy > http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making > > On 29/05/2017 11:20 PM, ???? wrote: >> To tell you the truth, I am not much familiar with CHAT and Vygotskian legacy. >> >> I appreciate it if you could explain what has been discussed about ?the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices? in CHAT circles and Vygotskian legacy. >> >> As for ANT, the idea that attracts me the most is its disposal of dichotomy. For example, you said, ?In which way does this framework help you characterize this affective dimension?? The word ?affective? is bothering me because I feel some sign of dichotomy such as affective/cognitive, emotional/reasonable and so on. The concept of ?agency? in ANT connotes all human volitional actions including learning, feeling, conceiving, gazing, etc. >> >> Thanks for discussion, >> >> Yasuko Kawatoko >> >> >>> 2017/05/29 ??3:53?Alfredo Jornet Gil ????? >>> >>> I am glad to see you find common ground, although I would say that Yasuko's article is very different: while Wylie's analysis seems to be concerned with a seeing of a landscape, and seems to operate from within that seeing or gaze, Yasuko's framework and analyses seem to promise something else: to talk about the possibility of that seeing in concrete terms. So I see Wylie's paper as addressing something like this: what is a possible seeing of this landscape from where I stand (e.g., as a reader of Derrida)? Whereas I hear Yasuko's article as being more about the historical and material premises that position Wylie as that particular looker who sees a landscape in that way, an account that then would have to include the reading and citing of Derrida not as something given or somehow 'natural', but as yet another aspect of a multitude of aspects forming the arrangement that supports that particular seeing. The two approaches seem very different to me, among other things, because the latter can explain the possibility of the former but not the other way around. Not that you cannot learn from both, of course, which you can! >>> >>> An aspect that is sharply distinctive in Y. Kawatoko's article, at least with regard to the one that Larry has shared, is a concern on *development*, on growth and change, rather than on self and experience. Kawatoko's article describes a trajectory involving an intertwining between enhanced awareness and re-configured contexts or 'arrangements'. In this regard, Kawatoko's article seems to be much closer to the CHAT tradition that characterises much of the MCA readership. >>> >>> In fact, Kawatoko's article, which analyses a history of weaving, also seems to describe a weaving within the weaving: the one that tangles together history and weaving hands. As socio-historical arrangements develop, so too develop the weaving skills, which is to the cloth what the gaze is to the landscape in Wylie's paper. In this regard, the paper seems to touch upon, though not thematise, the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices. In CHAT circles, this issue is very much discussed and the Vygotskian legacy seems to offer possible venues for further inquiry. But I am curious about the possibilities that stem from ANT (or the version your article draws from). In which way does this framework help you characterise this affective dimension (Yasuko and anyone else), and how does it address the issue of growth, of development? >>> >>> Thanks for engagement, >>> Alfredo >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ???? >>> Sent: 28 May 2017 09:57 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started >>> >>> Dear Larry Purss, >>> >>> Thank you very much for John Wylie?s article, ?Landscape, absence and the geographies of love.? It beautifully describes what we experience in our mind when we face and view (magnificent) landscape. I like the following phrase: Our ?stories of life and love weave together landscape and memory.? In this sense, absence and presence are mutually constituted. >>> >>> >>> In the same way, past and present, participation and non-participation, culture and sub-culture, everything is mutually constituted in a series of context of interactions among human, non-human, and machinery, in other words, under the sociotechnical and historical arrangements. >>> >>> I am for the author?s way of exploring things; that is, ?bringing to light things previously hidden or lost, unearthing memory, making the invisible visible.? In my cases, ?talking? is important to make invisible visible. Talking is part of practice. What and how individuals talk about artifacts they use, fellow members working together, personal and public stories regarding the place become important resources to make the invisible visible for the researcher, while simultaneously the individuals? talks give the individuals opportunities to make their own practice visible and to constitute their own participation in the (work) place. >>> >>> >>> Larry, yes, I am applying this approach to the subject of the Yuzuru Party. >>> >>> >>> >>>> 2017/05/28 ??0:22?Larry Purss ????? >>>> >>>> Yasuko, >>>> Thank you for your personal narrative, introducing your ways of walking through *tactile* places. >>>> >>>> I will open my response through revivifying Ueno?s sense of spirit in our walking alongside Ueno and listening: >>>> >>>> >>>> ?Participation in a community is realized through the process of making the community *visible* to the participants.? >>>> >>>> Participants create *boundaries* between communities and make them *visible* each time they discuss codes or categories, and in doing so, they are able to constitute their own participation in the community. >>>> >>>> Yasuko, you are applying this approach (way of tactile walking) in your approach to the *subject of* (not object of) >>>> The Yuzuru Party. (distributing agency) >>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>> >>>> From: ???? >>>> Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started >>>> >>>> Dear xmca members, >>>> >>>> Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. >>>> >>>> Let me introduce my research career briefly. >>>> >>>> Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. >>>> >>>> After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). >>>> >>>> I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. >>>> >>>> I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. >>>> >>>> Yasuko Kawatoko >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> > From goncu@uic.edu Wed May 31 08:38:59 2017 From: goncu@uic.edu (Goncu, Artin) Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 10:38:59 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! Message-ID: <99abb73b1e2d052e7e9dec05c4b6fc46.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Dear Colleagues, I am writing to let you know that my colleague, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book, "Vygotsky and the promise of public education," has just been published. The proper reference for the book is Vadeboncoeur, J. A. (2017). Vygotsky and the promise of public education. Peter Lang, N. Y. The book is a comprehensive source that addresses significant issues regarding teaching and learning in a diverse society and expands the theory in many important ways. I am recommending this book with great enthusiasm to developmental and cultural psychologists, educators, teacher educators, policy makers, and caregivers. Here's extending best wishes to Jen and all, Artin Goncu, Ph.D http://www.artingoncu.com/ Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Education M/C 147 1040 W. Harrison St. Chicago, IL 60607 From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Wed May 31 09:10:11 2017 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 12:10:11 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! In-Reply-To: <99abb73b1e2d052e7e9dec05c4b6fc46.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> References: <99abb73b1e2d052e7e9dec05c4b6fc46.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Message-ID: Contratulations Jen! I saw this book at the Peter Lang booth during the AERA meeting and was hoping you would have a book signing but apparently there wasn't one. On Wed, May 31, 2017 at 11:38 AM, Goncu, Artin wrote: > > Dear Colleagues, > > I am writing to let you know that my colleague, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's > book, "Vygotsky and the promise of public education," has just been > published. The proper reference for the book is > > Vadeboncoeur, J. A. (2017). Vygotsky and the promise of public education. > Peter Lang, N. Y. > > The book is a comprehensive source that addresses significant issues > regarding teaching and learning in a diverse society and expands the > theory in many important ways. I am recommending this book with great > enthusiasm to developmental and cultural psychologists, educators, teacher > educators, policy makers, and caregivers. > > Here's extending best wishes to Jen and all, > > > Artin Goncu, Ph.D > http://www.artingoncu.com/ > Professor Emeritus, > University of Illinois at Chicago > College of Education M/C 147 > 1040 W. Harrison St. > Chicago, IL 60607 > > > -- Robert Lake Ed.D. Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University P. O. Box 8144, Statesboro, GA 30460 Amazon Author Page: https://www.amazon.com/Robert-Lake/e/B00E6BTUDM/ref=dp_byline_cont_book_1 Webpage: https://georgiasouthern.academia.edu/RobertLake*Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its midwife.* John Dewey-*Democracy and Education*,1916, p. 139 From a.j.gil@iped.uio.no Wed May 31 09:21:09 2017 From: a.j.gil@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Jornet Gil) Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 16:21:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! In-Reply-To: <99abb73b1e2d052e7e9dec05c4b6fc46.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> References: <99abb73b1e2d052e7e9dec05c4b6fc46.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Message-ID: <1496247672024.85647@iped.uio.no> Thanks for sharing, and congratulations to Jen! Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Goncu, Artin Sent: 31 May 2017 17:38 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! Dear Colleagues, I am writing to let you know that my colleague, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book, "Vygotsky and the promise of public education," has just been published. The proper reference for the book is Vadeboncoeur, J. A. (2017). Vygotsky and the promise of public education. Peter Lang, N. Y. The book is a comprehensive source that addresses significant issues regarding teaching and learning in a diverse society and expands the theory in many important ways. I am recommending this book with great enthusiasm to developmental and cultural psychologists, educators, teacher educators, policy makers, and caregivers. Here's extending best wishes to Jen and all, Artin Goncu, Ph.D http://www.artingoncu.com/ Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Education M/C 147 1040 W. Harrison St. Chicago, IL 60607 From anamshane@gmail.com Wed May 31 10:33:15 2017 From: anamshane@gmail.com (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 17:33:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! In-Reply-To: <1496247672024.85647@iped.uio.no> References: <99abb73b1e2d052e7e9dec05c4b6fc46.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <1496247672024.85647@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: Dear Jen, Congratulations!! Bravo! Ana On Wed, May 31, 2017 at 12:23 PM Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks for sharing, and congratulations to Jen! > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Goncu, Artin > Sent: 31 May 2017 17:38 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! > > Dear Colleagues, > > I am writing to let you know that my colleague, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's > book, "Vygotsky and the promise of public education," has just been > published. The proper reference for the book is > > Vadeboncoeur, J. A. (2017). Vygotsky and the promise of public education. > Peter Lang, N. Y. > > The book is a comprehensive source that addresses significant issues > regarding teaching and learning in a diverse society and expands the > theory in many important ways. I am recommending this book with great > enthusiasm to developmental and cultural psychologists, educators, teacher > educators, policy makers, and caregivers. > > Here's extending best wishes to Jen and all, > > > Artin Goncu, Ph.D > http://www.artingoncu.com/ > Professor Emeritus, > University of Illinois at Chicago > College of Education M/C 147 > 1040 W. Harrison St. > Chicago, IL 60607 > > > > -- *Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Ph.D.* Chestnut Hill College, Associate Professor of Education Dialogic Pedagogy Journal, deputy Editor-in-Chief (dpj.pitt.edu) e-mails: shaneam@chc.edu anamshane@gmail.com Phone: +1 267-334-2905 From nataliag@sfu.ca Wed May 31 13:12:39 2017 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 13:12:39 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! In-Reply-To: References: <99abb73b1e2d052e7e9dec05c4b6fc46.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <1496247672024.85647@iped.uio.no> Message-ID: <14559605.762193.1496261559739.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Hear, hear! Congratulations to Jennifer! I've read the book and it is an excellent one! Highly recommended! Will use it in my Vygotsky's seminars for sure. Cheers, Natalia. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ana Marjanovic-Shane" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2017 10:33:15 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! Dear Jen, Congratulations!! Bravo! Ana On Wed, May 31, 2017 at 12:23 PM Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote: > Thanks for sharing, and congratulations to Jen! > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Goncu, Artin > Sent: 31 May 2017 17:38 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! > > Dear Colleagues, > > I am writing to let you know that my colleague, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's > book, "Vygotsky and the promise of public education," has just been > published. The proper reference for the book is > > Vadeboncoeur, J. A. (2017). Vygotsky and the promise of public education. > Peter Lang, N. Y. > > The book is a comprehensive source that addresses significant issues > regarding teaching and learning in a diverse society and expands the > theory in many important ways. I am recommending this book with great > enthusiasm to developmental and cultural psychologists, educators, teacher > educators, policy makers, and caregivers. > > Here's extending best wishes to Jen and all, > > > Artin Goncu, Ph.D > http://www.artingoncu.com/ > Professor Emeritus, > University of Illinois at Chicago > College of Education M/C 147 > 1040 W. Harrison St. > Chicago, IL 60607 > > > > -- *Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Ph.D.* Chestnut Hill College, Associate Professor of Education Dialogic Pedagogy Journal, deputy Editor-in-Chief (dpj.pitt.edu) e-mails: shaneam@chc.edu anamshane@gmail.com Phone: +1 267-334-2905 From kbrown@csusm.edu Wed May 31 13:19:14 2017 From: kbrown@csusm.edu (Katherine Brown) Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 20:19:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! Message-ID: Congratulations Jennifer, well done!I am Excited to read it. KB On 5/31/17 1:12 PM, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Natalia Gajdamaschko" wrote: >Hear, hear! Congratulations to Jennifer! I've read the book and it is an >excellent one! Highly recommended! >Will use it in my Vygotsky's seminars for sure. >Cheers, >Natalia. >----- Original Message ----- >From: "Ana Marjanovic-Shane" >To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2017 10:33:15 AM >Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! > >Dear Jen, > >Congratulations!! Bravo! > >Ana > >On Wed, May 31, 2017 at 12:23 PM Alfredo Jornet Gil >wrote: > >> Thanks for sharing, and congratulations to Jen! >> Alfredo >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Goncu, Artin >> Sent: 31 May 2017 17:38 >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! >> >> Dear Colleagues, >> >> I am writing to let you know that my colleague, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's >> book, "Vygotsky and the promise of public education," has just been >> published. The proper reference for the book is >> >> Vadeboncoeur, J. A. (2017). Vygotsky and the promise of public >>education. >> Peter Lang, N. Y. >> >> The book is a comprehensive source that addresses significant issues >> regarding teaching and learning in a diverse society and expands the >> theory in many important ways. I am recommending this book with great >> enthusiasm to developmental and cultural psychologists, educators, >>teacher >> educators, policy makers, and caregivers. >> >> Here's extending best wishes to Jen and all, >> >> >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >> http://www.artingoncu.com/ >> Professor Emeritus, >> University of Illinois at Chicago >> College of Education M/C 147 >> 1040 W. Harrison St. >> Chicago, IL 60607 >> >> >> >> -- >*Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Ph.D.* >Chestnut Hill College, Associate Professor of Education >Dialogic Pedagogy Journal, deputy Editor-in-Chief (dpj.pitt.edu) >e-mails: shaneam@chc.edu > anamshane@gmail.com >Phone: +1 267-334-2905 From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Wed May 31 14:55:00 2017 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 21:55:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's book! In-Reply-To: <99abb73b1e2d052e7e9dec05c4b6fc46.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> References: <99abb73b1e2d052e7e9dec05c4b6fc46.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Message-ID: Dear Folks, I was in one of those meetings that inspire participants to think about all the things they would rather be doing and arrived to my email to find this note! Special thanks, Artin, for letting people know, and for writing the beautiful foreword. Thanks to Alfredo, Ana, Natalia, Katherine, and Robert for their kind wishes! At AERA there was a book launch on Saturday at 2 pm; perhaps we can meet at another AERA, Robert?! The scholarship of many people on this list was foundational to this book; my gratitude to them. For now, and though a sweet grad student has already informed me of 3 typos (!), I am still enjoying being able to hold the book in my hands. It is "crystallized imagination that has become an object" (Vygotsky, 1930/2004, p. 20). Imagine that . :) Best to all, jen On 2017-05-31, at 8:38 AM, Goncu, Artin wrote: > > Dear Colleagues, > > I am writing to let you know that my colleague, Jennifer Vadeboncoeur's > book, "Vygotsky and the promise of public education," has just been > published. The proper reference for the book is > > Vadeboncoeur, J. A. (2017). Vygotsky and the promise of public education. > Peter Lang, N. Y. > > The book is a comprehensive source that addresses significant issues > regarding teaching and learning in a diverse society and expands the > theory in many important ways. I am recommending this book with great > enthusiasm to developmental and cultural psychologists, educators, teacher > educators, policy makers, and caregivers. > > Here's extending best wishes to Jen and all, > > > Artin Goncu, Ph.D > http://www.artingoncu.com/ > Professor Emeritus, > University of Illinois at Chicago > College of Education M/C 147 > 1040 W. Harrison St. > Chicago, IL 60607 > > From kawatoko@r-aquaparks.com Wed May 31 23:55:24 2017 From: kawatoko@r-aquaparks.com (=?utf-8?B?5bed5bqK6Z2W5a2Q?=) Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2017 15:55:24 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started In-Reply-To: <592edf2d.53c6620a.67d0c.2ce4@mx.google.com> References: <32B50778-C614-4E0F-BA12-5ED75E86B32E@r-aquaparks.com> <59299988.4660630a.1b13c.ea88@mx.google.com> <536379FF-C23E-4FBB-A3C8-72501BAB29F9@r-aquaparks.com> <1496040836871.58796@iped.uio.no> <6cdd59e0-b1b8-737d-a68b-f90222b5c564@mira.net> <1496126664245.85005@iped.uio.no> <0CF5EF91-D509-4A50-A061-673E6C5A7B94@r-aquaparks.com> <592edf2d.53c6620a.67d0c.2ce4@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <85578950-5B5F-42C1-927F-B833BEC97397@r-aquaparks.com> Lplarry, Thank you very much for your comment and suggestion. I wondered for and admired your profound reading of Yuzuru party members? waver (experience of disorientation) in the midst of transition, Yuzuru party members who recognize themselves and be recognized by others as a symbol of the ?museum arrangements?. I could realize that I need some more data to be analyzed from the ?aspect of shifting presences and perceptions of the subject matter? that you suggested. Yasuko Kawatoko > 2017/06/01 ??0:19?Lplarry ????? > > I hear in Yazuru Party members addressing each other that in the transition to finding or locating new (solutions) there is also inevitably dissolution and loss. > The museum contextual situation (social arrangement) expressed a passion for historical memory. This included the memory of and the continuing presence of traders who opened up markets in what has become Tokyo. > > Now, when the emblem is introduced as a symbol of standards, and (professional) marketable quality comes to the fore, the question I hear is what is being lost or becoming absent? > Is the passion of the museum arrangement transforming? > The transformation from museum to mark/ability AS standards (emblematic in the emblem) seems an imposition on a previous passion for memorialization of traditions. > This also occurs as transformation in practices that is generating loss of felt experience generated from the heart. > > Transforming the qualities of cotton to becoming an emphasize on (a) commodity looses this felt sense of the museum arrangements operating within mutual recognition of their traditional heritage. > Developing a skill with cotton was a particular and specific way of honouring their shared heritage through developing this mutually shared skill. > To shift or transition to differing arrangements through commodity exchanges transforms (and dissolves) the felt sense of their original museum social arrangements. Some call this alienation. > > > I (felt) this transition occurring in how I read through this article. > Artifacts create agency but may also be dissolving agency. > > Museum arrangements that nurture our hearts through social fabric may be lost when transforming and orienting towards commodity arrangements (symbolized by the artifact of the (emblem). > > This may be one aspect of shifting presences and perceptions of the subject matter under discussion. > A shift in our felt social arrangements. > > Sent from my Windows 10 phone > > From: ???? > Sent: May 31, 2017 4:38 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Hans Christian Arnseth > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started > > Alfredo, > > I apologize that I only give you a simple answer as before. > > I see the discontent (emotion) expressed by some Yuzuru members in the context of their reshaping agency. Their reshaping agency grows out of the transformation of the socio-technical arrangement surrounding Yuzuru members. > In CHAT, do they see the discontent as the emergence of conflict between members? > > Yasuko Kawatoko > > >> 2017/05/30 ??3:44?Alfredo Jornet Gil ????? >> >> Yes, as Andy suggests, in CHAT, talking about affect does not imply a dichotomy. In fact, just before his premature death, Vygotsky had taken on the task to develop a theory of emotions that was to be based precisely on a firm commitment to overcome cartesian dualism. >> >> I think that no summary will do justice to all there is to say about CHAT and the study of emotions. But if I had to make it short, I would say that Vygotsky was striving towards a materialist account of emotions in particular, and of the psyche more generally, that would not take the form of a 'mechanistic' explanation. He hoped to explain the psyche as a material phenomenon without giving up the concept of psyche, or mind, as the proper subject. He aimed to achieve this by postulating and investigating a genetic relation between emotions as they emerge historically as social wholes (that is, as much more than emotions: as a dinner, a farewell party, a romantic rupture...), and the way they manifest as individual feelings. This may be akin to studying the socio-technical arrangements of emotions, to put it in terms closer to your text. >> >> Although Vygotsky's was a project for psychology, which is not ANT's interest, I asked you about emotions because I felt that the empirical case that you describe in your article brings to relieve a story of transforming affects as these belong to a history of socio-historical development or, as you describe it, of a reconfiguration of a socio-technical arrangement. I am referring to the fragments in which, as you describe in your text, >> >> "There was tension in the meeting because the person from the MCPA expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the textiles that the members had woven." (p. 138). >> >> You also point out "The discontent felt by some Yuzuru members in terms of the direction of the Party?s activities was expressed in discussions." (p. 139). Yet, you warn readers: "Caution must be exercised in interpreting this, as discontent that was felt by Yuzuru members." I was thinking that this note of caution might be a fruitful arena for discussing at the interface of CHAT and ANT. I did empathise with Yuzuru Party members' feelings as I was reading the narrative and excerpts. Thanks for that! >> >> Alfredo >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 29 May 2017 15:27 >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started >> >> Yasuko, affect/cognition is an analytical distinction but it >> does not form a dichotomy, as you say. At the level of >> activity this distinction is not present, likewise in the >> case of agency, personality, experience, etc. To make an >> analytical distinction is not necessarily to posit a dichotomy. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> Andy Blunden >> http://home.mira.net/~andy >> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making >> >> On 29/05/2017 11:20 PM, ???? wrote: >>> To tell you the truth, I am not much familiar with CHAT and Vygotskian legacy. >>> >>> I appreciate it if you could explain what has been discussed about ?the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices? in CHAT circles and Vygotskian legacy. >>> >>> As for ANT, the idea that attracts me the most is its disposal of dichotomy. For example, you said, ?In which way does this framework help you characterize this affective dimension?? The word ?affective? is bothering me because I feel some sign of dichotomy such as affective/cognitive, emotional/reasonable and so on. The concept of ?agency? in ANT connotes all human volitional actions including learning, feeling, conceiving, gazing, etc. >>> >>> Thanks for discussion, >>> >>> Yasuko Kawatoko >>> >>> >>>> 2017/05/29 ??3:53?Alfredo Jornet Gil ????? >>>> >>>> I am glad to see you find common ground, although I would say that Yasuko's article is very different: while Wylie's analysis seems to be concerned with a seeing of a landscape, and seems to operate from within that seeing or gaze, Yasuko's framework and analyses seem to promise something else: to talk about the possibility of that seeing in concrete terms. So I see Wylie's paper as addressing something like this: what is a possible seeing of this landscape from where I stand (e.g., as a reader of Derrida)? Whereas I hear Yasuko's article as being more about the historical and material premises that position Wylie as that particular looker who sees a landscape in that way, an account that then would have to include the reading and citing of Derrida not as something given or somehow 'natural', but as yet another aspect of a multitude of aspects forming the arrangement that supports that particular seeing. The two approaches seem very different to me, among other things, because the latter can explain the possibility of the former but not the other way around. Not that you cannot learn from both, of course, which you can! >>>> >>>> An aspect that is sharply distinctive in Y. Kawatoko's article, at least with regard to the one that Larry has shared, is a concern on *development*, on growth and change, rather than on self and experience. Kawatoko's article describes a trajectory involving an intertwining between enhanced awareness and re-configured contexts or 'arrangements'. In this regard, Kawatoko's article seems to be much closer to the CHAT tradition that characterises much of the MCA readership. >>>> >>>> In fact, Kawatoko's article, which analyses a history of weaving, also seems to describe a weaving within the weaving: the one that tangles together history and weaving hands. As socio-historical arrangements develop, so too develop the weaving skills, which is to the cloth what the gaze is to the landscape in Wylie's paper. In this regard, the paper seems to touch upon, though not thematise, the issue of emotions and affects and their development as part of social activities or practices. In CHAT circles, this issue is very much discussed and the Vygotskian legacy seems to offer possible venues for further inquiry. But I am curious about the possibilities that stem from ANT (or the version your article draws from). In which way does this framework help you characterise this affective dimension (Yasuko and anyone else), and how does it address the issue of growth, of development? >>>> >>>> Thanks for engagement, >>>> Alfredo >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of ???? >>>> Sent: 28 May 2017 09:57 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: xmca new discussion started >>>> >>>> Dear Larry Purss, >>>> >>>> Thank you very much for John Wylie?s article, ?Landscape, absence and the geographies of love.? It beautifully describes what we experience in our mind when we face and view (magnificent) landscape. I like the following phrase: Our ?stories of life and love weave together landscape and memory.? In this sense, absence and presence are mutually constituted. >>>> >>>> >>>> In the same way, past and present, participation and non-participation, culture and sub-culture, everything is mutually constituted in a series of context of interactions among human, non-human, and machinery, in other words, under the sociotechnical and historical arrangements. >>>> >>>> I am for the author?s way of exploring things; that is, ?bringing to light things previously hidden or lost, unearthing memory, making the invisible visible.? In my cases, ?talking? is important to make invisible visible. Talking is part of practice. What and how individuals talk about artifacts they use, fellow members working together, personal and public stories regarding the place become important resources to make the invisible visible for the researcher, while simultaneously the individuals? talks give the individuals opportunities to make their own practice visible and to constitute their own participation in the (work) place. >>>> >>>> >>>> Larry, yes, I am applying this approach to the subject of the Yuzuru Party. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> 2017/05/28 ??0:22?Larry Purss ????? >>>>> >>>>> Yasuko, >>>>> Thank you for your personal narrative, introducing your ways of walking through *tactile* places. >>>>> >>>>> I will open my response through revivifying Ueno?s sense of spirit in our walking alongside Ueno and listening: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ?Participation in a community is realized through the process of making the community *visible* to the participants.? >>>>> >>>>> Participants create *boundaries* between communities and make them *visible* each time they discuss codes or categories, and in doing so, they are able to constitute their own participation in the community. >>>>> >>>>> Yasuko, you are applying this approach (way of tactile walking) in your approach to the *subject of* (not object of) >>>>> The Yuzuru Party. (distributing agency) >>>>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>>>> >>>>> From: ???? >>>>> Sent: May 27, 2017 12:31 AM >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] xmca new discussion started >>>>> >>>>> Dear xmca members, >>>>> >>>>> Thank you very much for putting my article under discussion at xmca. >>>>> >>>>> Let me introduce my research career briefly. >>>>> >>>>> Until the 2000s, I had done some research in company?s workplaces or institutionalized systems where some ?strategy? called by Michel de Certeau (1984) could work, and investigated the ways of relations among individuals, artifacts and machineries in those spaces: the practice of repair technicians in a copy machine company, the practice of operators under the introduction of new production system (Toyota Production System) in the US manufacturing company, and the technology of a care needs assessment under the nursing-care insurance system in Japan. >>>>> >>>>> After that, I have been interested in everyday practices by ordinary people, especially women and old people who live in farm villages or small towns in Japan. In everyday practices that are ?tactical in character?, people ?make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules?, referring to Michel de Certeau (1984). I have tried to explore, and described vividly ordinary people?s tactics, more specifically, the procedures, bases, effects, and possibilities of those collective activities. For example, the practice of old women who were engaged in a ?happa (leaf) business? in a mountain village, and the practice of women weavers group with the objective of developing traditional hand-weaving skills and sharing Matsusaka cotton with the next generation (current issue). >>>>> >>>>> I think I am a type of researcher who takes pleasure in walking around here and there in search of interesting humans collective activities. The important thing for me is how vividly I can describe interactions among people, artifacts, and machinery that I find interesting in the places. For the sake of cultivating more fruitful viewpoints in the field, I might need some more theoretical bases that I lack unfortunately. >>>>> >>>>> I hope I have your many productive suggestions to our works. >>>>> >>>>> Yasuko Kawatoko >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >> > > >