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A multiperspectival approach to the process of representing

imagination in work with children: Glimpsing the future to study a playworld

“... what cold prosaic reasoning could not achieve, this tale accomplishes through its imagistic and emotional language...

This is why Pushkin is correct when he says that poetry can impact the heart with mysterious power and why, in another poem, he says of the reality of an emotional experience evoked by fiction: “Fiction makes people weep.””

-- L. S. Vygotsky, concerning a tale taken from Pushkin (2004, p.18)

Introduction

A golem is a clay giant that is brought to life by inserting a piece of written text into its mouth. When it is turned back into clay, when its soul is taken from it, it becomes not only inert but also weightless. We can accept that “we murder to dissect,” but when we murder imagination we may find that we have created, not a corpse for study, but, instead, an emptiness.^{1 2}

In the study of imagination in this paper we, four adult researchers, entered the depth of a play space with children. But when we returned to our laboratory with our video data our experience of playing with children was nowhere to be found. We missed our experience, and we needed this experience for our study, and so, as players and also as social scientists, we set out to bring this experience back to life.

In children's play the imaginary is intertwined with the real through the investment of inanimate objects with an emotional life and with agency. In the social sciences the explicit goal is, conventionally, to disentangle the imaginary from the real by creating dead objects of study. One attempts to see that which one studies objectively, meaning, "without being influenced by personal feelings or opinions; in an impartial or detached manner" (OED). In other words, one attempts to see that which one studies in precisely the way one tries *not* to see beings who have feelings that can be hurt and the ability to act of their own accord. However, in this study we attempted to reanimate our video data using what we had learned from our play with children: we invested our video footage with an emotional life and with agency.

The way that we invested our video footage with an emotional life and with agency was by freeing it from the category of "data" by pushing it to become "film."³ Through this move we gave our video footage access to some of the rights and privileges usually reserved for art in the medium of film. Our footage gained that quality of film that Vivian Sobchack calls "lived momentum" (1992, 2005).

The experience of imagination being represented in our study, and also that quality of our ethnographic film that this paper will explore, is a fall that becomes a flight, or a flight that becomes a fall. In play children are lifted above their current potential, achieving that which they could not achieve outside of play, and briefly inhabiting what we could call their future selves.⁴ They often appear to both themselves,

and to those onlookers who are properly situated, as superheroes, leaping buildings in a single bound. Film can also allow us to glimpse a future of potential and a future self, can make a “brief flight into life, out of the fixed frames and inexorable logic of the fated narrative.” (Lupton, 2005, 93) Also, in play children push themselves to the limit, placing themselves just next to their greatest fears, and just by those demons that truly threaten their physical and emotional selves. They enter a designated space in which they are at risk because they are challenging themselves, and in which they could not challenge themselves without risk. Within the frame of film the ability to glimpse a future coexists with the whirling sensation of vertigo, as we fall into a film time which is somehow more our own than the “real” of time unmediated by film (Alter, 2006).⁵

The process of investing inanimate objects with an emotional life and with agency, this falling flight, takes place through a combination of pleasure, exhilaration, hope, pain, melancholia and nostalgia. But to see another, even another that is not human, either a stick (which will become a horse) or video data (which will become a film), as having feelings and the ability to act independent of ourselves, is a project defined by love. As such it has been best described, thus far, not through a string of printed adjectives -- the medium of the scholar -- but in the production of art and the experience of life.

It is for this reason that I ask my reader to think of your favorite love story, or love itself, as you try to make sense of the argument I make here. I, in turn, will frame my written argument with two of my favorite love stories. I will start with Helen Levitt’s

photograph of children at play in New York City (*New York City*, 1939), and end with one of the films produced in our attempt to represent imagination in work with children.



A Playworld

In this paper I discuss one aspect of a multiperspectival approach to the process of representing imagination in work with children. In addition to using video in more traditional ways (Baumer, Ferholt & Lecusay, 2005), we manipulated our video footage to create short, experimental segment tapes. I will look carefully at one of these tapes in an effort to describe its contribution to our investigation.

The adult-child joint play that we studied took place in the context of Gunilla Lindqvist's creative pedagogy of play (1995). Lindqvist interprets Vygotsky's (1934/1987, 1966/1978, 1967/2004) description of children's play as a cultural manifestation in humans that is creative. For Vygotsky, and for Lindqvist, play is imagination materialized, that is, imagination embodied in the material.

In Lindqvist's creative pedagogy of play the development of adult-child joint play is made possible through the creation of a common fiction, a space in which both children and adults are creatively engaged, which she calls a "playworld" (1995). Adults and children work together "to bring (a piece of) literature to life" (1995) through drama. Together adults and children transform a classroom into a world inspired by a book (and, in the process, the book they are working from into a world inspired by a classroom).

Over the course of one year we worked with 20 kindergarteners and first graders and their teacher, in a public school classroom on a military base, to move the world of C.S. Lewis's *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* into the classroom and the world of the classroom into Lewis's novel. On the first day of school the children found a locked

wardrobe in their classroom, whose origin no one appeared to know. A few months later their teacher, Mr. Tiger, was not able to read the next chapter of *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* aloud because, as he told the children, “The words in the book have disappeared!” To the sound of rain, the researchers came into the classroom playing the child heroes of the book: Susan, Peter, Edwina and Lucas.

Every Friday we researchers came to the classroom from our university and performed another scene from Lewis’s novel. Every Monday the children found a few of the words from the book, words concerning the imaginary world of Narnia, on the floor of their classroom – ‘trees’, ‘cave’, ‘beaver dam’, ‘castle’, ‘table’, ‘sewing machine,’ ‘cage’ -- and created this set piece or prop out of cardboard and paint over the course of the week. As the weeks went by the classroom became covered in the colorful, delicately-wrought trappings of the world of Narnia, until, eventually, the teacher stopped moving the cardboard structures for his literacy and math groups, and, instead, moved the literacy and math groups into Narnia. (The children appeared to be more fluent readers when they were sitting in the wardrobe.)

As the Friday session came and went the back came off the wardrobe. The ice in Narnia was real, and really cold on bare feet, just as the eggs and tea we all shared at cave of the faun, Mr. Tumnus, were really filling. And the often asked question, “Who is the White Witch?” was answered when the children’s teacher entered the play in a white fur coat and long white gloves. Then the children became visible to the adult actors and entered the story as story designers. The children began to stay in from recess and after

school to sit in the White Witch's castle and recount the dreams they'd had the night before about Narnia and their classroom, or to draw pictures in which they saved members of their family who had died, or were deployed in Iraq, from the White Witch, or simply to spend a few extra minutes sitting on the floor of the wardrobe amongst the soft fur coats. And, finally, Mr. Tumnus was saved from the White Witch, breathed on until he turned from stone back to living faun, the children's boisterous chanting: "Party! Party! Party!" filled the room, and we all joined the inhabitants of Narnia for a giant feast.

When our playworld was completed the children we had worked with needed to represent the playworld to their families in such a way that they would be able to take these school experiences home with them for the summer. Like the researchers in the project, returning to the laboratory at the university, the children were faced with the task of representing the playworld both to themselves and to outsiders. All participants, adults and children, needed to contain their experience of the playworld for transport, to carry these experiences to a new time and place, and then to revive these experiences in such a way that they would be comprehensible to a new audience, and, also, despite the passage of time and process of translation from medium to medium, still recognizable to themselves.

In order to make their experiences of the playworld comprehensible to their families, and hence to their future selves, the children came up with the wonderful plan of staging a play *about* the playworld for their families. In an effort to stay true to their

memories, not to reenter the playworld but to revive its form with a temporary ‘breath of life’, the children designed, after much debate, a production that was avant-garde and unexpected, and that succeeded in maintaining and conveying the creative integrity of the playworld. In the children’s play about the playworld a wooden prop was reproduced in cardboard, and this replica was erected next to its wooden counterpart for use in the play, while other props from the playworld were used to represent themselves in the play. Some of the carefully and lovingly created costumes from the playworld were replaced by paper symbols of these costumes, while others were used as costumes in the play. Some of the lines in the play were taken from the playworld, while others were new creations. Some of the children played themselves, and others played characters that had been played, in the playworld, by adults. Some of the children stayed in one character for the whole play, and others played a new character every scene -- meaning that in most scenes there were multiple actors playing each of the characters.

At one point in the creation of this innovative and impressive production, when a disagreement concerning the design of the play arose, it appeared that an impasse had been reached. A group of children sat on one side of the room, insisting that only characters from the playworld should be included in the play about the playworld, and another group of children sat on the other side of the room and insisted that characters from their favorite books and movies should also be included in the play about the playworld. Every child refused to be persuaded by the opposing camp to change his or her view, or even to compromise.

Finally the children's teacher said that he understood the dilemma. It was, he said, the problem of wanting to open a gift to see what was inside, but also wanting to open the gift later, so as to savor the anticipation of the opening longer. The children had found themselves in an unsolvable dilemma, and the only solution he could think of was to split the class in two, so that each person could perform in the play as they desired.

Here the children mutinied. These were very difficult concepts for six and seven year olds, and the discussion was taking hours. The floor was littered with the bodies of the younger children, heads in arms, picking at noses and shoelaces. But one child, Beverly, sat on a table and said that she did not like her teacher's solution. She said, "Everyone in this class is my best friend."

At this pronouncement many of the children on the other side of the room, children who had not budged all afternoon, stood up and walked over to Beverly's side of the room. One of these children, Aslyn⁶, rested her head on Beverly's knee. Beverly suggested performing the entire play, all together, in as many versions as were desired, and everyone agreed that this was the solution they'd all been looking for. The children's teacher took them outside, then, for a run. Some of the children sprinted, some ran backwards, and some ran slowly, looping side to side, their arms outstretched. One little girl, Sarah, said that she felt like she was flying.

From this play about the playworld, the children's representation of the playworld, and the process through which it came into being, I relearned, and came to

better understand, the value of a multiperspectival approach to the process of representation. Why have one play about the playworld when you can have many? I relearned that many perspectives must work together, side-by-side, in a representation that is both analysis and art, if an internal logic is to be maintained. What mattered most in this representation of the playworld was that the integrity of the playworld -- the solidarity the children expressed so well with their final deafening and seemingly endless chanting: "Party! Party! Party!" at the end of the playworld -- should not be destroyed. Or, more accurately, that the initial loss we all experienced at the end of the playworld should be repeated through the play with a rush of *communitas*⁷ that mirrored our rush of *communitas* when we breathed on the stone statue of Mr. Tumnus with our breath of life, led him from his cage, and then hugged his furry self until he could barely stand.

Through the children's play about the playworld I also saw more clearly than ever before that it is in wild juxtapositions that this allegiance to the integrity of the 'unreal' world, an integrity of that which appears to be outside the scope of consideration, is upheld. In children's play, embodiment of imagination does not depend upon set forms, but upon a truthfulness to an essence of the imaginary. And this truthfulness is found in the irresolvable contradictions which multiple perspectives reveal as they rub against each other. For instance, because a child acting like a vegetable is expected to remain stationary, to play at being an onion may, suddenly, require rolling (Harriet shows us this in Louis Fitzhugh's *Harriet the Spy* (1964)).

In the play about the playworld the flying sensation of love was best embodied in a form which did not resemble any play we adults or children had seen or heard of, but which adhered to the children's request that they not be separated in the creative act from any of all of their best friends. And in our social science, which we thought required us to categorize video footage as data, leaving some footage as data and recreating other footage as film was not the trespass we had to avoid to ensure that our Golem could be brought back to life. Rather, what we had to avoid was working on our study in our laboratory with our feet firmly on the ground, when in the field we had fallen and flown.

Glimpsing the future with film

In this paper I argue that filmic representation can be a form of play, and that this film-play can be of use to scholars. In our study of adult-child joint play our film-play did not work to show us play that was less 'real' than the play we had experience first hand. Instead, our film-play revealed qualities of the play we had experienced which we could not see without film. Specifically, the disjointed temporality of film revealed the disjointed temporality of the embodied imagination that is play.

This argument allows for the use of ethnographic film not only as a means of documenting, but also as an object of study. In this way it contributes to a discussion concerning the uses of ethnographic film in the social sciences. This contribution is the focus of this paper, but I will situate it along side two other significant interventions.

This argument also allows us to conceive of play as a process of identification. In this way it undermines the trend in contemporary play theory to treat play as a means to an end. If play is a process of identification, then play belongs in the classroom not only because it promotes child development of some adult trait or skill, but also because play is of value in and of itself and throughout the lifespan.⁸

This argument allows us to acknowledge ways that the methodology of the researcher studying play can be shaped by the play of the children she is studying, and, by extension, ways that the teaching process of the teacher promoting play in his classroom can be shaped by the play of the child he is teaching, and ways that the imagination of adults who play with children can be re-invigorated through the embodied imagination that is the play they are sharing. This acknowledgment has the potential to lead to the generation of empirical evidence for that study of inter-subjectivity that concerns itself with how we insert ourselves into the stories of others in order to gain the foresight which allows us to proceed. Currently, and partly because the methods this study employs are undeveloped, the evidence this study relies upon is primarily fictional.

My argument, through the first of these interventions, constitutes a critique of the pursuit of knowledge in most of the social sciences. Joseph Tobin and Yeh Hsueh (Tobin & Hsueh, in press) are the other academic scholars of children's play or learning I have found who attempt to create films for analysis and for presentation that are both social-scientific documents and works of art. Although Tobin and Hsueh derive their criteria

for determining what to shoot from the preschools they study, they attempt to create films that include protagonists, dramatic tension and coherence, and that are compelling and inviting.

Tobin and Hsueh (in press) explicitly address the tension between art and science in their video ethnography of education. However, Tobin and Hsueh focus on “trade-offs”, or compromises, that this tension between art and science necessitates, as I will discuss later in this paper. I am, instead, claiming for this tension powers of destruction and construction that do not rely on compromise. Instead, I contend, these powers rely on the inclusion of excluded knowledge, knowers and means of knowing. It is from the discipline of performance studies that I find support for this claim.

Dwight Conquergood writes:

The performance studies project makes its most radical intervention, I believe, by embracing both written scholarship and creative work, papers and performances. We challenge the hegemony of the text best by reconfiguring texts and performances in horizontal, metonymic tension, not by replacing one hierarchy with another, the romance of performance for the authority of the text... Performance studies brings ... into the academy, a commingling of analytical and artistic ways of knowing that un-settles the institutional organization of knowledge and disciplines. The constitutive liminality of performance studies lies in its capacity to bridge

segregated and differently valued knowledges, drawing together legitimated as well as subjugated modes of inquiry. There is an emergent genre of performance studies scholarship that epitomizes this text-performance hybridity . . .

We can think of performance (1) as a work of imagination, as an object of study; (2) as a pragmatics of inquiry (both as model and method), as an optic and operator of research; (3) as a tactics of intervention, an alternative space of struggle. (2002,151-152)

Here Conquergood has tied my explicitly political goal to my methodological argument. To change the language of representation in the academy is to change who is involved in the process of representation in the academy. To avoid belittling children's play, and also to avoid romanticizing children's play, long enough to learn methods of scholarship from children's play, is to open the academy, if only slightly, to those whom it usually entirely excludes.

This project of opening the academy, is, of course, not new. In "A Room of One's Own" Virginia Woolf writes: "Fiction here is likely to contain more truth than fact. Therefore I propose, making use of all the liberties and licenses of a novelist, to tell you the story of the two days that precede me coming here --" (1929, 4) She then writes her essay in the form of a story. And amongst her insights concerning women's exclusion from the academy is the following:

Speaking crudely, football and sports are “important”; the worship of fashion, the buying of clothes “trivial.” ... This is an important book, the critic assumes, because it deals with war. This is an insignificant book because it deals with the feelings of women in a drawing-room. (1929, 77)

In this paper I too will ‘make use of all the liberties and licenses of a novelist, to tell you the story of the days that precede me coming here.’ I will also show a film, as I argue that an academic study which attempts to represent imagination through a playful form of video ethnography is not “trivial”. However, most of this paper is comprised of traditional, print-based scholarship.⁹

La Jetée

Elsewhere (paper in progress) I use a film, Chris Marker’s *La Jetée* (1962), to guide my discussion of imagination. I use *La Jetée* to describe the joint adult-child play of this study as an adult entering a gap in which a child can be creative, can create something novel, and in this way glimpsing the future with which the child is in dialogue. Here I will use Marker’s *La Jetée* to guide my discussion of that quality of film that allowed our video footage, when re-categorized as film, to reveal those qualities of the play we had experienced, but then lost, upon our return to our laboratory. Again, specifically, the disjointed temporality of film is what allowed our video ethnography to reveal to us the disjointed temporality of the embodied imagination that is play.

La Jetée is film about love and a film about film.¹⁰ It has a recursive story line, and is composed of black and white still photographs. The photographs are accompanied by a rhythmic and continuous soundtrack of narration, music and sound effects, without dialogue. For most of the film the audio flows uninterrupted and the images seem to accompany this flow, as in a slide show. At the center of the film is one moment in which the speed of the film creates the customary cinematic illusion of motion.

These are the words with which the film begins (English from the subtitles): “the story of a man, marked by an image from his childhood. The violent scene, whose meaning he would not grasp until much later, took place on the great Jetty at Orly airport, a few years before the Third World War.” The image that marks the child is of “the frozen sun...a woman’s face...the sudden noise, the woman’s gesture, the crumpling body.” The child becomes a man and lives through the destruction of Paris to travel back in time to this woman repeatedly, and finally to run towards this woman across the jetty: “But when he saw the man from the underground camp, he understood one cannot escape Time, and that this haunted moment, given him to see as a child, was the moment of his own death.”

During the scene on which the balance of *La Jetée* rests, the man and the woman he has traveled back in time to visit wander through the Museum of Natural History. The following is the narration of this scene:

On about the fiftieth day, they meet in a museum filled with eternal creatures.

By now the technique has been perfected. Aimed at a given point in time, he can live there and move about freely.

She too seems used to it. She accepts the behavior of this visitor who comes and goes, exists, speaks, laughs with her, is silent, listens, and disappears.

In our study there were moments when, through the use of video, we were aimed at a given point in time and a specific place and, not necessarily “again”, but often for the first time, were able to live there and move about freely. The segment tape that this paper examines was the most useful of all of our tools in the pursuit of these moments of freedom. Because *La Jetée* inspired and resembles this segment tape,¹¹ I have recruited this experimental art film to guide my analysis of our academic video ethnography.

Breath of life, vertigo of time and lived momentum

Catherine Lupton writes (2005) that *La Jetée* breaks film’s most fundamental rule, the rule that images must be projected at a speed that reproduces the impression of natural movement. However, she writes, there is a “breath of life and movement that seems to animate them (the still images) for the length of time they remain on screen.” (2005, p. 91). This is due in part to Marker’s use of the techniques of conventional filmmaking, such as fades and dissolves of varying duration to connect images, establishing shots and eyeline matches, close-ups and counter shots. However, this does

not explain why “the aura of cinema ... clings to the individual images of *La Jetée*.” (2005, p. 91).

Lupton writes that the individual images of *La Jetée* are “like memories of a film, which in our mind seem to be motionless and quantifiable, but if we search through the print never exactly correspond to one individual frame, or to the frozen drama of production stills” (2005, p. 91) She writes that this aura of cinema is emphasized by contrast with images that look more like photographs, that have what she describes as the “fixed, elegiac, self-contained quality” (2005, p. 91) of photographs, and which are described in the film as real: “On the tenth day, images begin to ooze, like confessions... A peacetime morning. A peacetime bedroom, a real bedroom. Real children. Real birds. Real cats. Real graves.” Lupton turns to Roland Barthes’ “The Rhetoric of the Image” to distinguish between “the referentiality of the photograph as a record of ‘having been there’ and the prime illusion of cinema as an impression of ‘being there’.” (2005, p. 93)

Just after the scene in *La Jetée* discussed above, where the man and the woman wander through the Museum of Natural History, the man is finally sent into the future to save the present. Just before the scene in the Museum of Natural History comes the one moment in the film when Marker complies with the filmic rule that images must be projected at a speed that reproduces the impression of natural movement. The woman is shown asleep in bed in a still image and then this still image dissolves into a still image of the woman in a slightly different position. There are more still images of the woman asleep in

different positions and the intervals between the still images are gradually reduced.

Then, for just a few seconds, the woman opens her eyes, looks at the camera and blinks.

Lupton observes that when the woman opens her eyes and looks at the camera there is a rising pitch of birdsong on the soundtrack that, she writes, “heralds this brief flight into life, out of the fixed frames and inexorable logic of the fated narrative” (2005, 93).¹² For Lupton the ‘breath of life’ in the *La Jetée* cinematic stills is flight. For Nora Alter, however, *La Jetée* is cinema because it is about, and constitutes, a falling.

Lupton (2005) notes the many allusions, detailed and overarching, to Alfred Hitchcock’s *Vertigo* (1958) in *La Jetée*: the exotic flower arrangements when the man first spies the woman evoke the florist where Scottie first spies on Madeleine¹³, both films are about a man seeking to turn back time by recreating an image of a lost woman, and failing, etc. Alter points specifically to the evocation of *Vertigo* in the scene in *La Jetée* where the man and the woman examine the growth rings and historical markings on a giant sequoia in the Jardin des Plantes. In this scene the woman pronounces an English name, perhaps ‘Hitchcock’ (as the book version of *La Jetée* (1992) suggests in a footnote (no page numbers)), and wears her hair in a spiral bun similar to Madeleine’s in *Vertigo* (the spiral invoking vertiginous experience, according to Alter). In this scene the man gestures to a point outside of the trunk, in the future, and says, “This is where I come from.”

To interpret this scene Alter turns to a film Marker made twenty years after making *La Jetée, Sans Soleil* (1982). *Sans Soleil* also includes references to *Vertigo*. The film contains the statement that *Vertigo* is the only film “capable of portraying impossible memory – insane memory.” (2006, 95) (Words from *Sans Soleil* are Alter’s translation from the French.) In *Sans Soleil* there are shots from the original *Vertigo* juxtaposed with Marker’s own shots of the same locations in San Francisco, taken years after *Vertigo* was made. Furthermore, *Sans Soleil* contains references to *La Jetée*, and it is from these references that Alter derives her description of *La Jetée*.

In *Sans Soleil*, in front of a giant sequoia, these words are spoken: “He remembered another film in which the passage was quoted. The sequoia was the in the Jardin des Plantes in Paris, and the hand pointed to a place outside the tree, outside of time.” (2006, 95-96) Also in this film is the statement that “power and freedom” and “melancholy and dazzlement” were “carefully coded within the spiral so that you could miss it and not discover immediately that this vertigo of space in reality stands for a vertigo of time.” (2006, 95-96) By juxtaposing these self-referential moments in Marker’s work, Alter has provided another description of the quality of film which *La Jetée* both addresses and embodies: the space of the stills in *La Jetée* creates the whirling sensation of vertigo, and a falling in time.

The stills in *La Jetée* draw our attention to what makes film film, to the illusion of time flowing which we, the audience, fall into, even as we are aware of, in fact because we are aware of, the disjointed still photographs that film actually is. This is the same

quality play possesses, the ability to induce the pleasure of losing track of time precisely because one knows that one is never in ‘real’ time when one is in ‘play’ time. Sobchack calls this quality “lived momentum” (1992, 2005), and it is her deep analysis of this “lived momentum” which will help us, here, to better understand first *La Jetée*, and then our own use of video in our study of imagination in work with children.

Glimpsing the future through the lived momentum of film

In *Utopia in Performance: Finding Hope at the Theater*, Jill Dolan claims a similar power in performance:

Part of my project here is to study the ways in which performance lets audiences see as if for the first time or see anew, through an alienation effect that’s emotionally resonant, how to create moments of a future that might feel like utopia in the present of performance. (2005, 33)

She begins her book with an epigraph from Ian McEwan:

There are these rare moments when musicians [or performers] together touch something sweeter than they’ve ever found before in rehearsals or performance, beyond the merely collaborative or technically proficient, when their expression becomes as easy and graceful as friendship or love. This is when they give us a glimpse of what we might be ... (2005, no page number)

In the live performance of the playworld many of us found just this sweet spot. In the characters brought to life by ourselves and others, and in child and adult identification with and distancing from both the characters they played and those they did not play, we glimpsed possible future ways of being. We experienced this wrinkle in time as love, and we were able to extend this quality of the playworld through our filmic representation of the playworld.¹⁴

Sobchack claims that film allows us to glimpse the future because there is a connection between filmic time and “real” time: “The images of a film exist in the world as a temporal flow, within finitude and situation. Indeed, the fascination of the film is that it does *not* transcend our lived-experience of temporality, but rather that it seems to partake of it, to share it.’ (1992, 60) We inhabit the live space of film, and in our new habitat we feel so at home that the fantastic we experience through film lives on in our memories, as a part of our pasts, and in this way shapes both our present and our future. We do not fly into the future through film, but instead, through film we can see the possibility of the future we may soon inhabit.

Sobchack’s support for this claim comes from a distinction between the forward-facing medium of film, film as always in the *act of becoming*” (1992, 60), and the nostalgia of photography. Walter Benjamin wrote of the photograph’s movement into a future that is in the viewer’s past. He describes a picture of a woman whom we, the viewer, know has already committed suicide:

(L)ook at the picture of Dauthendey, the photographer, father of the poet, taken when he was engaged to the woman whom one day, shortly after the birth of her sixth child, he was to find lying with slashed wrists in the bedroom of his Moscow home. Here she is seen standing next to him, he appears to have his arm around her; yet her gaze reaches beyond him, absorbed in an ominous distance. (1972, 7)

Benjamin then explains that when viewing a photograph we look for a glimpse of a future that is already a past. We look for a glimpse, which, because it is a glimpse not of our future, but of our past, can only mark the subject of the photograph. It cannot mark ourselves. He writes:

However skillful the photographer, however carefully he poses his model, the spectator feels an irresistible compulsion to look for the tiny spark of chance, of the here and now, with which reality has, as it were, seared the character in the picture; to find that imperceptible point at which, in the immediacy of that long-past moment, the future so persuasively inserts itself that, looking back, we may rediscover it. (1972, 7)

Sobchack finds in film the same inserted future that Benjamin finds in photography, but claims that where the future of photography is still in the spectator's past, making the photograph about loss, past and death, in film this future is also the

spectator's future, making film about "life and the *accumulation of experience* – not its loss ... (--) a visible representation not of activity finished or past but of activity coming into being and being." (2004, 146) Sobchack describes *La Jetée* as a film about film. She then makes use of that central moment in *La Jetée*, when the woman opens her eyes, looks at the camera and blinks, to add to her description of film as always being in the act of becoming, and therefore being habitable. One can wonder what reality a photograph memorializes, but we can crawl into a film and live there. Sobchack writes of this moment when Marker abides by film's most fundamental rule:

Thus, even as we are seemingly prepared, and even though the photographic move to cinematic movement is extremely subtle, we are nonetheless surprised and deem the movement startling and "sudden." This is because everything radically changes, and we and the image are reoriented in relation to each other. The space in between the camera's (the spectator's) gaze and the woman becomes suddenly habitable, informed with the real possibility of bodily movement and engagement, informed with lived temporality rather than eternal timelessness. (2004, 145-146)¹⁵

Sobchack is arguing that film shows us the frame through which it is created. The paradox of film is that our knowledge of this frame, our knowledge that the movement we experience is just an illusion, is what makes this illusion convincing. Film designates

a space, by drawing attention to the frame of this space, and we, the viewers, then fall into this space and, in falling, glimpse the future.

What Sobchack is describing is the creation of movement in time through embodiment in space. Inside the framed space of film time moves nonlinearly, and because of this a moment of “real” time can take a lifetime to pass, and, likewise, our entire lives can appear before us in a moment.¹⁶ Inside this framed space times moves with its own consistency, its own integrity, but with an unfamiliar rhythm. Like the play within Hamlet, or Gregory Bateson’s description of play as embodying paradoxes of abstraction, *La Jetée* provides us with the sensation of a spiral of consciousness, the sensation that we are looking down on ourselves. Falling into the space of the film’s opening we see our own lives differently when we leave – as, through film, we have glimpsed a future.

Furthermore, because it has a future, a film is alive. Sobchack claims that film has an active life of its own. You can live in film, but film also lives within you. Sobchack makes her point by connecting film’s qualities of being habitable and alive:

Along with its objective existence for us as spectators, a film possesses its own being. That is, it *has being* in the sense that it *behaves*¹⁷ ... Abstract space is dynamized as habitable, as “lived in,” as described in the depth that lived movement, not geometry, confers upon the world. (1992, 61)¹⁸

For Sobchack film is forward facing, hence alive, and also inhabitable because film is created through and creates a certain type of imitation. With film we are able, for the first time, to see another actively looking: “Furthermore, and even more significant, the moving picture not only visible represents moving objects but also – and simultaneously – presents *the very movement of vision itself*.” (2004, 146) Because we become ourselves through the gaze of another that sees us, to see that the other can look as we look, and therefore see us as we see others, is to see ourselves seen through another. It is to finally have that possibility of turning around just fast enough to see oneself.

Sobchack writes this argument in this way: “The perceptive and expressive materiality of the cinematic through which we engage this ironic articulation of desire for a supposedly “impossible” form of intersubjectivity is the very materiality through which this desire is objectively and visibly fulfilled.” (2004, 149-150) In other words, we think we are trying to achieve a “full” intersubjectivity with a subject of a film, whether we make or view this film, because it appears to us that this subject moves in time. And we think that we can never achieve this goal because the camera is always biased. However, as Marker showed with *La Jetée*, film is love. The gaze of the lover makes one real (even if one is a velveteen rabbit), and by seeing that the camera sees, and could see us, we can just turn around fast enough to see ourselves through the eyes of another. Again, for Sobchack, and for me, *La Jetée* is able to show what needs to be said but is unsayable through words alone: “We might remember here the sudden animated blink of a woman’s eyes in *La Jetée* and how this visible motion transformed the photographic into

the cinematic, the flat surface of a possessed picture into the lived space and active possibility of a lover's bedroom.” (2004, 151)

Before turning, with Sobchack's insight's, to our experimental segment tapes of adult-child joint play, I will look to a theorist of film, an artist, who, using *La Jetée*, draws a connection between the “lived momentum” of film and forward-facing adult-child joint interactions.

Entering the museum with a child

Lupton credits *La Jetée* with being “one of cinema's finest meditations on its own nature as a medium” (2005, p. 87), inspiring not only philosophical and theoretical reflections on the nature of cinema in relation to that of photography, but also many creative homages. Closest to Sobchack in his interpretation of *La Jetée*, sharing with her an interest in Marker's creation of a habitable and living moment in which time is nonlinear and the future is glimpsed, but also moving beyond Marker, applying what he has learned from *La Jetée* to a new subject area, to forward-facing adult-child joint interactions, is Arnaud Desplechin. Discussing his film, *Kings and Queen (Rois et Reine)* (2005), Desplechin has claimed: “I have a relationship with all forms of translation ... I am an interpreter.” (interview with Desplechin excerpt from *Le Figaro* in Wellspring promotional material) Whether knowingly created as such or not, the epilogue of *Kings and Queen* is a creative homage to the scene in the Museum of Natural History in *La Jetée*.

Kings and Queen is a film about the past and the future, and about sensations of being stuck and of being free. Two characters, each one portrayed through a different genre, one in a tragedy one in a comedy, each “face the worst” and “remain valiant” (interview with Desplechin excerpt from *Télérama* in Wellspring promotional material) *so that* the last minutes of the movie have a base from which to become airborne. In his director’s statement, Desplechin writes:

A two-part film. Or rather, two films glued together. A woman who lives in her memories, and a man who goes from one absurd adventure to another. Nora, so bright and free, becomes entrapped by what happens to her. Ismael, who feels he’s imprisoned, marches unwittingly towards freedom.

During filming I dreamed that these two films of opposing genre would be able to join to help a fatherless son, Elias. And that’s what happened, like the sun between the clouds. A minor miracle.

A woman’s destiny in an hour and five minutes. Another hour for the labors of Hercules. And ten minutes to save a child. We charge as fast as possible along all the fairy tales from which our lives are woven.

In *Kings and Queen* ten-year-old Elias has been raised for the past seven years by his mother, Nora, and his mother’s lover, Ismael. Now that his mother is to remarry she has asked Ismael to legally adopt Elias. After the death of Nora’s father, Elias’s

grandfather, and after Ismael's release from a mental institution, the film finally arrives at the meeting of Elias and Ismael concerning Nora's proposal. The film's epilogue takes place in the Museum of Man (?) in Paris, and, like the scene in *La Jetée* discussed above, the camera follows the couple in their dance through glass cases and full-sized dioramas of a past.

In the epilogue of his film Desplechin applies Marker's analysis of the medium of film, of love between adults, of spaces of creative imagination, and of memory, to performance and film genre, to the relationship of an adult and a child, to the process of teaching children that sorrow and the pleasure of love are inseparable, and to memory of childhood. At the center of the epilogue is a thirty second scene among the museum's glass display cases. Just before this scene Ismael and Elias are sitting on some steps outside of the museum, their back to a set of doorways with windows, the doorway behind Ismael closed and the one behind Elias open.

Ismael lets Elias light his cigarette. He holds Elias's wrist while the lighter is lit and says, "You won't smoke, will you?" Elias answers, "Yes, I'll be like you." Ismael responds, "No, You'll be better than me." Then there is a shot of Ismael and Elias from afar, and when we are again close Ismael says to Elias, "I can't replace your granddad." Elias looks fierce, straightens his back and says, "(You know) granddad he is dead too." Then Ismael says "I know," brushes back Elias's hair with his hand and kisses Elias on the forehead. (The visuals are choppy, slightly discontinuous, in this last interchange.)

Just after the scene at the center of the epilogue Ismael says to Elias, “I remember your poems in primary school and you’re a true poet.” Then Ismael caresses Elias’s head. And then the otherwise discontinuous editing of the epilogue becomes smooth, as a flashback is shown.

These moments of the flashback are similar to the moment in *La Jetée* when the woman opens her eyes, looks at the camera and blinks. We are taken by a surprise reminiscent of the surprise Sobchack describes. Although we should be prepared for Elias’s exuberant expression of love for Ismael, somehow the colors, the movement and the rain in the flashback make us feel the suddenness of the animation of Elias’s voice more powerfully than expected.

Ismael and Elias are now outside again. Ismael states that he is introverted, like Elias, and says that he could, therefore, offer Elias some advice for school. Elias says, “Really? What?” with a striking enthusiasm. Ismael then takes Elias’s lower arm and leads him over a low chain protecting a totem pole they are walking around, and there is a discussion of loneliness and of finding company in fictional characters. Here the flashback occurs: a series of shots and then a single shot, separated by footage of the present, of Ismael and Elias in a tree in the rain (playing at being the Baron in the Trees (Italo Calvino)). “Do you remember?” Ismael asks Elias. Elias answers with the same striking enthusiasm: “Yes, the tree in Roubaix!” It is this scene that makes us weep, not the sad scene before it.

The scene at the center of the epilogue begins with Ismael resting his head on his hand, which holds the top corner of one of the glass cases. He is leaning down to Elias's eye level and he says, "You see, the past isn't what has vanished. No, it's what belongs to us." At the start of Ismael's words we see Elias's face, and he scratching his head. Then there is a cut to a view of Ismael's face, but we can see the back of Elias's head and he is no longer scratching his head. The sound is continuous but there has been a jump cut in the visuals.

"I don't understand," says Elias, and after these words are said we see Elias's face again. He is leaning in towards Ismael, slightly bent forward, like Ismael is, and holding the glass case. We can see the palm of one of his hands through the glass. Ismael says, "What belongs to us now are the memories we both have." As he says this he takes his hands from the glass case. A beat after he does this Elias does the same, and takes a step toward Ismael.

Next we see Ismael's face again. He says, "It's weird, isn't it? Because there's no name for what we share (what is between you and me)." At "because" Ismael starts to crouch down, moving further from Elias. He lets go of the case and gestures from Elias towards himself, a beckon, and Elias is moving towards him.

Now we see Elias's face again, and he is still standing, and so taller than Ismael. He steps towards Ismael, moving towards the space between two glass cases where Ismael is crouched, and the voice of Ismael begins again: "I looked after you for seven

years.” Midsentence we see Ismael’s face again, and again, although the sound is continuous, Elias is repeating his move forward, towards the space between the glass cases. After the words “seven years” Elias rather abruptly drops into a crouch in front of Ismael. His two hands hold onto the edge of the base of the glass case, as if he is hanging off a ledge, and then he moves his head towards his hands, as if he will rest it on them. One of Ismael’s hands also rests on the edge of the base of the glass case, but around the corner.

During this shot and into the next Ismael says: “A long time.” Again the visuals jump. Elias is now sliding his head along the base of the glass case, his hands creeping under it, as if he will soon slide himself under the case. He looks up at Ismael from the side, his face turned half way away from Ismael.

We again see Ismael’s face, but Elias has not yet crouched and Ismael and Elias are each holding onto the glass with one hand, facing each other, at a corner. Ismael lets his hand drop and says, “But it’s over.” Ismael is leaning slightly towards Elias, who is inclining his head towards his own hand, as it rests on the base of the glass case.

Yet again, we see Elias’s face. Ismael and Elias face each other, directly, both of them crouched between the glass cases. Elias is looking up at Ismael. We see the back of Ismael’s head through the glass of the case. Elias says, “ohhhh,” softly. Then, in the final shot of the scene, there is a jump to a moment in the future. It is the same angle and

scene, but Elias is already under the case, sitting back, falling away from Ismael, his own hand supporting him as he moves to the floor. His face does not look particularly sad.

In an interview with Kent Jones (DVD of *Kings and Queen*, 2004) Desplechin does not mention *La Jetée*, but does say that in the making *Kings and Queen* he was inspired by Hitchcock's *Vertigo*. He says he cried at the new print release of *Vertigo* as he was making *Kings and Queen*. He was inspired by Hitchcock's approach to memory, and longing, and the ways that cinema is the medium that can tell a certain tale of memory and longing that can not be told in other mediums. Specifically, Desplechin explains that when you start your love life there is always a woman who has died before, and whom you mourn all your life, and can never recapture (*Vertigo*). You ask yourself, if you are a man, how you could have let this woman die (*Vertigo*). The opposite of this is for a woman, where you have killed a man in your past (*Kings and Queen*). For our purposes here, what is important is that Desplechin says that this truth about memory is a truth that can only appear on screen, that this is the lesson that cinema has taught him.

Desplechin is searching for the quality that makes film film in the same place as is Sobchack: a lived and alive space in which time is nonlinear. He arrives at this place through a technique which is, in some ways, similar to Marker's. He does not use stills, but he disrupts the usual flow of film by jumping back and forth in time in his visuals.

He maintains the open space into which his viewers can fall through a continuous soundtrack. And, in their exploration and recreation of the spiraling time, both movies use falling as a powerful filmic sign, both directors' having had *Vertigo* explicitly in mind as they created their works.

Desplechin's subject matter is similar to Marker's as well. Both films are stories of two people meeting in their past, affirming their love for each other, but destined to be apart. In fact, in the one scene in *La Jetée* that is most likely "real", not a dream or hallucination, at the very start of the film, the hero is also a child forging and feeling a connection with an adult (who is not a guardian). Also, in both films, the characters meet in a space between and apart, where they live for a while. This is a space alive with the past. And in this space these characters are able to hold onto the past and/or glimpse the future. In both films the characters fall towards and away from each other until they are captured in a mutual dance, mirroring each other's movements.

Both films are about film's "lived momentum," about film as habitable, alive and forward facing. However, between the two films there are three reversals. In *La Jetée*, before the scene in the museum the film achieves a formal break, and after the scene in the museum the film achieves a break in the narrative, the hero is sent to the future. In *Kings and Queen* this order is reversed, the formal break comes after the scene in the museum, and the narrative break comes before the scene in the museum, when Ismael and Elias speak of the body of the film, the death of Elias's grandfather, Nora's father,

and of the future, how Elias will be not like Ismael, but better than him. And while *La Jetée* is about a man who moves forward from being a child, *Kings and Queen* is about a child who moves forward from an adult into an unknown. In *Kings and Queen* a child is launched into the unknown, not left witnessing his own death, and the adult with this child is not murdered, but, instead, glimpses the future.

Glimpsing the future with a child:

In which I describe one of our experimental segment tapes

In the film the camera is almost in amongst the children. There is that close feeling of sitting in a group as a child in school, and watching a performance. (I remember girls braiding each other's hair while *The Hobbit* was read aloud to us as we sat on a rug.) Here the children sit almost on top of each other and the clothes they are wearing are as bright as the painted props around them.

Tiger has been preparing for this day for weeks, even months. He told me that when he found his white fur coat at the Salvation Army he literally wept. And it is a beautiful coat. It has a flair. It reminds me of a coat in *Breakfast at Tiffanies*. (Now the coat is in a box at the lab. I am keeping it for Tiger, because, he said, he somehow can't store it in his classroom or at his house so he needs needs me to keep it for him. I put it on campus because I can't have it at my house, either.)

Sonja and I also prepared for this day. We could only find silver elbow-length gloves at first. So we called different stores and shopped and eventually I found white ones. I was so happy. But Tiger does not care because the coat is all he needs to become the White Witch. (This is not a loss because no effort for Narnia seems excessive and the favor was not for Tiger.) I am nervous that the children will be too scared seeing their teacher enter Narnia without them. This is why Tiger is dressing, transforming himself, in front of them (purely adult logic, and so useless). But Tiger is worried that the children will not think he is scary enough.

Tiger hates his blue wig and the children do giggle at it, but they (and I, when I watch the film) don't remember the wig. All Joey and I see is beautiful Tiger, apologetic to no one, putting on his white fur coat from *Breakfast at Tiffanies*. When Tiger puts on his glove and then his coat he blushes. He looks great.

During the dressing Joey whispers "Girimits, Mr. Tiger is wearing girimits," in teasing awe under his breath. After the whole playworld session is done Joe says in meeting, when it is his turn, "Mr. Tiger embarrassed himself!" And then he says to Mr. Tiger "You embarrassed yourself." Mr. Tiger says, "Why?" – but Mr. Tiger looks like he will cry. He is not yet wearing his shoes and I think, 'Tiger is now going to cry.' I film him but he does not cry. The next morning I ride in the backseat of Tiger's parent's car with Tiger, his own car is broken, to a park he has chosen for the filming of his Post-Witch-Appearance Interview. I am ready to reassure him that the day went well even

though the kids were bored stiff but he is already feeling OK. He says he was horribly depressed about his performance until this morning but now he feels better.

I still do not understand how we could have thought the children were bored stiff. We hadn't seen the film yet. When we did we were in shock.

In the film, when Tiger is moving his gloved hands on the side of the frame, Joey is holding his own right arm as if he knows it will try to tell him something. He holds his arm while his finger points to Mr. Tiger, joining his classmates, although with a delay, in response to Tiger's questions: "So, who do you think is the White Witch?" Then, all of a sudden, Joey's right arm breaks free and starts to point back to Joey. Joey's face moves from bored wariness to a pride so strong it seems painful. It is as if Joey has been doing nothing these whole two years but waiting, waiting for someone to say his name. Tiger has said his name now and while Joey points at himself it seems that Tiger may move far enough towards Joey that he will fall fully into the frame.

Rob, sitting next to Joey, then takes Joey's arm himself and moves it down, ending the pointing. He falls into Joey from the side, embracing him while Elizabeth, next to Rob, also leans in. Heads touching, faces turned upward, the three children turn to look to Tiger. And then Joey, who now has an exhausted, ecstatic look on his face, raises his arm slightly and, with Rob still holding his arm, knocks his chest with his fist, thumb


up. Joey is still Mr. Tiger, but if Rob did not hold him, the weight of Elizabeth on his other side, Joey might float away. Or combust?

In the second scene of the film Tiger reaches down for his coat, which Rob is holding with great pleasure. Joey mirrors the large white hands and arms, his own small hands and arms reaching up, as if he was a much younger child who was asking to be lifted. Then Joey's hands are opening and falling to his lap, palms up. And Joey looks to be at great peace.

As the film ends there is calm on Joey's face, and joy, but also a longing, an aching sadness. Tiger is a like a bride, all in white, and we are all in love with the wedding. We are all aching to be members of this wedding. While the light screams through the windows overhead.

The entire film is in such extreme slow motion that the movements of the children appear jerky. There is no soundtrack. The view is of the children's faces and full bodies as they sit on the floor. Tiger's hands and torso move in and out of the left side of the screen. And the windows behind the children, to their right and in front of our faces, are blown out, white light all above.





The use of Film-Play in the study of imagination in work with children

Just as it is the animated blink of the woman's eyes which gives *La Jetée* its lived momentum, it is Joey's gesture of pointing to himself that gives our segment tape its lived momentum. Like *La Jetée*, our segment tape is "always in the act of becoming" because it is framed by a gesture that draws our attention to the paradox that makes film film. Again, this paradox, the paradox which gives film those qualities of being forward facing, alive, and inhabitable, is that film allows us to see another actively looking: "Furthermore, and even more significant, the moving picture not only visibly represents moving objects but also – and simultaneously – presents *the very movement of vision itself.*" (Sobchack, 2004, 146) When Mr. Tiger asks, "So, who do you think is the White Witch?" Joey points to himself because it is through seeing Tiger in the playworld (or, more specifically, through seeing Tiger seeing himself (Tiger) in the playworld through dressing in the costume of the White Witch), that Joey can see himself. This is also what we, the audience of the film, are doing: we are seeing ourselves through seeing Joey see himself in the film. ¹⁹

When Joey points to himself we are brought into an intimate space, into the film itself, because we are made aware of the frame that encompasses both the film and the us of film and audience. In this way the making-visible of this frame that transforms our video footage into film allows a flat surface to become "lived space and active possibility." This self-reflexive gesture designates a space apart, and in doing so it reproduces the frame that must be continually reproduced if the playworld is to remain

alive, and therefore inhabitable.

Our segment tape reveals the disjointed temporality of the embodied imagination that is play through its own disjointed temporality. When viewing the segment tape we simultaneously experience both the smooth flow of time in the playworld, and the jerk from frame to frame which the extreme slow motion of the tape creates. This contrast reveals the creation of the illusion of a smooth flow of time through jumps in time, which occurs in play. Also, in the segment tape Joey is pointing to a future of himself that he sees not in Mr. Tiger's adult behavior, but in Mr. Tiger's childlike play. This is the same spiral of time which shapes the epilogue of *Kings and Queen*, when Elias is launched into an unknown which neither he nor Ismael can fully anticipate. In play, Lindqvist argues (1995), children are, often, modeling themselves on adults. However, in play children face a future that will be created in part by those who are now children, and within some constraints that those who are now adults cannot even imagine.

Furthermore, our segment tape maintains our respect both for the children we played with, and for the playworld itself. These children had agreed to play with us as intensely and sincerely as they did because we had agreed not to pretend that their play was not real, not to pretend that their play had no internal logic which could be violated. Tobin and Hsueh, Jean Rouch and David MacDougall are the scholars I have found who use video or film ethnography to achieve some portion of the above-stated ends, and I will now briefly describe each of their contributions to this project.²⁰

Tobin and Hsueh explicate their method of video ethnography through a discussion of pleasure. In “The Poetics and Pleasures of Video Ethnography of Education” (in press) they argue that educational video has roots in instructional films and observational analysis. They claim, however, that there are five goals for video ethnography of education which should be added to those of documenting and informing: “provoking self-reflection, challenging assumptions, creating things of beauty, entertaining, and giving pleasure” (in press, 77). Tobin and Hsueh state that these goals lead to the creation of videos that are more aesthetically pleasing, entertaining and compelling than ethnographic videos of education have been in the past.

Tobin and Hsueh describe the method used in *Preschool in Three Cultures: Japan, China, and the U.S.* (Tobin et al., 1989), where “the video functions primarily neither as data nor as description but instead as rich non-verbal cues designed to stimulate critical reflection.” (in press, 77-78) This method is composed of these six steps: videotape a day in a preschool, edit the tape, show the edited tape to the classroom teacher and ask for comments, and discuss the tape with other preschool staff, with staff of other preschools, and then with staff of preschools in other countries.²¹ Gesturing to Michele Fine’s argument (1988) that the discourse of desire is missing from sex education classes, Tobin and Hsueh conclude that what makes these films worthwhile is the pleasures of video ethnography of education, a pleasure that is most often elided.

Tobin and Hsueh argue that tensions between and within the social-scientific and aesthetic goals of their method of video ethnography create the need for what they call “trade-offs”. For instance, teachers, researchers and other audience members have differing and often conflicting needs, the worldviews of insiders and outsiders differ and often conflict, different genres must be melded together, and there are always compromises in aesthetics, content, technical decisions, and decisions concerning methods of providing context in the films (e.g. subtitling and narration). The videos that we made of the playworld were shown to the children and teacher, as well as to us researchers, who were also participants in the playworld, and to other scholars and teachers, to provoke reflection and discussion. However, the primary purpose of our segment tapes was to stimulate the very process of identification that was what interested us in the playworld we were studying, and this recursive quality is not prominent in Tobin and Hsueh’s work.

Tobin and Hsueh’s interest in “provocative issues” is related to their interest in the “guilty pleasures” (in press, 90) of their video ethnography of education. In this paper (in press) their example of these issues is an example from their video work, and they include an impressive still, of a shirtless and strikingly muscled Japanese male aide and bus driver toweling off naked children, which “stimulates discussions (among American viewers) of males working in the field of early childhood education and more generally of the moral panics swirling in the contemporary United States around questions of sexuality, touch, and young children” (in press, 80). However, the ties between our topic of study and our method are more direct. We are studying play and we

play with our video data to bring it back to life. It is in play with children that we have learned to play with our data, and it is in play with our data that we learn about our play with children.

Therefore, for us there are restraints in our video ethnography of education, but no trade-offs. The pleasures we seek, the pleasures of turning around just fast enough to see oneself, are bittersweet; they encompass the contradictory. It is the movement between extremes, between hope and despair, identification and derision, pleasure and pain, reality and fantasy, which is the goal of the play and the goal of our social science. This is what I am discussing at the very start of the paper, when I describe our video ethnography as maintaining a certain creative integrity of the playworld.

According to Tobin and Hsueh (in press) the pleasures of video ethnography of education, for the researcher, include those derived from the experience of “being artistic, an opportunity lacking in our other professional work,” and from engagement with a medium more “visceral” and “immediate” than the written word (in press, 90). For the teachers the pleasure of video ethnography include those derived from a “sense of glamour” and from the ability to show family and friends oneself teaching. And Tobin and Hsueh write of the pleasure the children derive from this process: “they (the children) not only point and laugh but sing along with the video versions of themselves and each other ... the joy on their faces apparent in performing alongside themselves.” (in press, 91)²²

The children we worked with had similar reactions when we showed them the video we made of the playworld. However, we filmed these reactions, because this identification with the selves on the screen was one of our topics of study. The pleasures that Mr. Tiger derived from the beauty of the videos we created was also relevant data for our study because we are interested in the development of the adults engaged in the playworld project. And our own pleasures, as researchers, from our ethnographic videos of this playworld, relate both to our adult development in relation to the playworld and to those questions of representation which this paper attempts to address.

Rouch

Unlike Tobin and Hsueh, but like Jean Rouch, our video ethnography mirrors our topic of study, and increased understanding of one leads to increased understanding of the other. Furthermore Rouch's work is also, centrally, about the reflexive quality of ethnographic research. To employ ethnographic film is to study the researcher as well as the researched. Rouch writes:

For whom, and why, take the camera among mankind? My first response will always, strangely, be the same: "for me". Not because it is some type of drug whose habit must be regularly satisfied, but because I find that in certain places, close to certain people, the camera, and especially the sync camera, seems necessary... what is there is that sudden intuition about the

necessity to film, or conversely, the certainly that one should not film.

(1974, 55)

In “On the Vicissitudes of the Self: The Possessed Dancer, the Magician, the Sorcerer, the Filmmaker, and the Ethnographer” Rouch addresses the recursive quality of his work. Here he writes about what he has learned both about the Songhay-Zarma, of Niger, and about his use of “direct cinema,” derived from the “cinéma-vérité” of Dziga Vertov, as a research tool for doing ethnography of the Songhay-Zarma. The notion of the self is central to the possession dance, magic and sorcery Rouch analyzes, and “those filmed consider these images (in the films) to be a reflection of themselves and their divinities; that is, part of the “self” of both men and gods.” (1978, 58). The “filmmaker-observer” both modifies what he films and is changed by what he films, and when he shows his product to his subjects, “a strange dialogue takes place in which the film’s “truth” rejoins its mythic representation.” (1978, 58)

Rouch first explains that for Vertov the camera was a new organ for seeing, and cinematic vision was a new way of seeing -- hence his term “ciné-eye” for filmic perception. Moving slightly away from Vertov’s use of the term cinéma-vérité to define his entire discipline, Rouch uses the term cinéma-vérité to mean the particular truth that is filmic truth. Rouch’s direct cinema is combination of a “ciné-attitude” or filmic attitude with Robert Flaherty’s “participating camera”. This is the participation of the subject of the film in the creation of the film, beyond acting, and the incorporation of this technique as “an indispensable part of filmmaking in the field” (1978, 63). Of this aspect

of direct cinema Rouch notes that his subjects “react to this art of visual and sound production in exactly the same manner as they react to the public art of possession or the private art of magic or sorcery.” (1978, 63)

Rouch then draws a detailed parallel between his ethnographic filming and the possession dance, magic and sorcery of the Songhay-Zarma: “it is the “film-trance” (ciné-trance) of one filming the “real trance” of the other.” (1978, 64) He draws the parallel up until the film developing process, comparing the sending of the film to the laboratory for development to the “devouring of a the double by the sorcerer,” (1974, 64), etc. After describing this stage of the filming process, Rouch recounts what I have described as the coming back to life of a golem, and the effect of this process of representation on the audience who were participants in the event filmed (in our case, ourselves as well as the teacher and children).

Rouch writes: “The “stolen” image comes back several months later, and when projected on the screen, recovers life for an instant.” (1978, 64) He adds: “The reflection is bestowed with such strange power that its viewing is enough to make a “horse of the spirit” [*the person who is possessed in the possession dance*] see itself possessed on the screen and immediately enter into trance.” In our video ethnography of the playworld we not only re-experienced the playworld when viewing it. This process itself reflected the processes that interested us in the playworld. We experienced “ciné-play”.

MacDougall

MacDougall continues engagement with some of these same issues when he asks *Whose Story Is It?* (1991). MacDougall asserts that when we cross cultural realities with our ethnographic films we are “on the verge of the surreal,” and that we should take from surrealism the lesson that the “experience of paradox is in itself significant and must be grasped to generate new perceptions” (1991, 348). In our work, also, our films “allow us to confront the intersecting of the worlds they describe” (1991, 348), and generate new perceptions. In this sense they are a form of play, which is the movement within and across the frame of fantasy and within and across the frame of reality. This ‘confrontation of intersections’ leads to the feeling, described by Rouch above, and by Tolstoy by way of Vygotsky above, “of one’s work disintegrating and being pulled back and reclaimed by the lives which generated it.” (1991, 348) Furthermore, MacDougall asserts and Rouch makes clear in his advocacy of “shared anthropology” (1974, 1978), the question of whose story the film tells is a question of both moral and ontological import. The dignity of the subjects is at stake (Rouch, 1974).

To make his point MacDougall turns to Rouch’s *Jaguar* (1954/67), in which three men enact their own story, and recount this story on the soundtrack. He calls Rouch, in his production of this and some of his other films, “a kind of cultural gun-runner” (1991, 355). MacDougall focuses primarily, however, on his own film, *Familiar Places* (1977). This film both reflects Aboriginal narrative and also becomes a part of an implicit Aboriginal narrative of ritual display. He writes of this film that “it becomes possible to say that the film is no longer outside the situation it describes, nor has it merely been

expanded through self-reflexivity or acknowledgement of its fuller meanings. It is inside someone else's story." (1991, 354)

My own argument is not that our video ethnography was inside the story of Tiger and Joey. I believe that it was and that I will need to show this as I expand this paper, but here I am concerned with the effect of this joint ownership of the film. When the subject of the film owns the film, and particularly when this subject is a child, the filmmaker's ciné-trance, or ciné-play, in and with the film can produce the same potential result that I claim for play (paper in progress): a glimpse of the future. And, as in play, this result is a gift bestowed only on those who have faith in its possible existence. As MacDougall writes: "But this kind of film can only exist when filmmakers regard their work as more than a transmission of prior knowledge. They need to approach filming instead as a way of creating the circumstances in which new knowledge can take us by surprise." (1991, 355)²³

MacDougall also writes about films of children. A quarter of his book, *The Corporeal Image: Film, Ethnography and the Senses* (2006), discusses images, in film, of childhood. He writes that most films about children index the filmmaker's lost childhood, search for a key to the filmmaker's destiny. These films look for what they expect to find, "reducing children's lives to formulas, replacing their strangeness and individuality with more comfortable notions of what children should be." (2006, 68) MacDougall states his overriding reason for filming children, and it is my overriding reason for filming children, and, also, the reason I study the play of children: "to

rediscover their complexity – to give them the respect due to persons living in themselves rather than in our conceptions of them, to put ourselves in a better position to learn from them.” (2006, 68) What is at stake is both our responsibility to respect children as all people deserve to be respected, and also our ability to learn from children who, as MacDougall puts it, are often more experimental than adults, and, as I put it, face a future beyond our own.

MacDougall claims that all films about children, by adults, are a record of an adult-child relationship. He criticizes the sentimentality with which children and childhood are represented in film, particularly the way children are portrayed as sexually innocent, and makes a connection between fear of child sexuality and fear of homosexuality. He writes of the genre of school films, and of the many films about children coming of age, becoming adults, but argues that there are relatively few films by social scientists that focus on children and childhood. There are even fewer that try to place children in their complete lives, avoiding the tendency to encourage children to give adults what they are looking for by encouraging children to impersonate “children”.

MacDougall concludes with what he calls a “personal note.” He writes that he learned more about himself as a filmmaker through his work with children, than about himself as a parent or teacher. What he learned was what Rouch has claimed, quoted above: that filming another can create a shared space in which filmer and filmed can meet with more ease than they can elsewhere. This is true, MacDougall argue, in part because filmmaking provides “a strange and intensive mode of access to the world, both more

immersed and more detached.” (2006, 91) This movement between immersion and detachment is both the content of our short experimental segment tapes, and the quality which video brings to our endeavor to represent this process as it occurs in adult-child joint play.

Conclusion

In this paper I have argued that filmic representation can be a form of play. I have shown how, in our study of adult-child joint play, this film-play revealed qualities of the play we had experienced which we could not see without film. Specifically, I have explored the ways that the temporality of film revealed to us the disjointed temporality of the embodied imagination that is play.

Our use of ethnographic film not only as a means of documenting, but also as an object of study, was one aspect of our multiperspectival approach to the process of representing imagination in work with children. Lindqvist, in her study of playworlds, had her work presented on television through artistic documentary videos. She also conducted her analysis, and presented her work in her book (1995), in part through detailed written descriptions of playworlds. However, our method of representing playworlds through experimental segment tapes such as the one I have discussed may allow us to study aspects of playworlds which Lindqvist’s methods could not make visible.

Rouch spends most of his paper, “On the Vicissitudes of the Self,” describing and comparing and contrasting the possession dance, magic and sorcery of the Songhay-Zarma. This is because the analysis of these rituals drives his analysis of video ethnography, as the possession dances, magic and sorcery he studies are, like play, in many ways directly related to the process of making and watching film. The continuation of this paper, the one you are finishing reading now, will involve an in-dept analysis of the adult-child joint play of the playworld for the purpose of gaining insight into the video ethnography that was used to represent this play.²⁴

The continuation of this paper will also involve examination of adult use of the creation of film, from preparing for a shoot through editing, to allow entrance into play with children. This allowance came, finally, from the children, but started with a certain shifting in the researcher’s perspectives. This shift is related both to Tobin and Hsueh’s mention of the academic’s pleasure in taking on, at least in part, the perspective of the artist, and to this claim of Rouch’s: “I find that in certain places, close to certain people, the camera, and especially the sync camera, seems necessary...” (1974, 55) Rouch describes my experience of filming the playworld when he writes:

But, paradoxically, it is due to this equipment and this new behavior (which has nothing to do with the observable behavior of the same person when he was not filming) that the filmmaker can throw himself into a ritual, integrate himself with it, and follow it step by step. It is a strange

kind of choreography, which, if inspired, makes the cameraman and soundman no longer invisible but participants in the ongoing event.

(1978, 63-64)

And, in the continuation of this paper I hope to show that it was, in part, the adult researchers' presences, in our ciné-trances, which made possible the creation of the playworld I am studying, studying how to most fruitfully represent, and studying with. Vygotsky (1978) argues that, in play, the child is in dialogue with her future, not transported into her future, as achievements within play are made possible, but they are not yet freestanding. Play is rooted in a material space, it is here that movement in time occurs, and the playworld is where I must stay rooted if my own dialogue with a past, concerning the potential uses of film in the study of imagination in work with children, is to expand to include a dialogue with the future.

I have asked my reader to think of your favorite love story, or love itself, as you tried to make sense of the argument I have made. I, in turn, promised to close the frame that began in Levitt's photograph of play with another of my favorite love stories – the film described above. Hopefully this frame will give both reader and writer a glimpse of a future that has persuasively inserted itself into the living past of this paper.

Roll film.

¹ I learned this from a novel. In Michael Chabon's *The Amazing Adventures of Kavalier and Clay* (2000) it is 1939 and adolescent Josef is in the process of planning his escape from Prague. He will share a coffin with the famous Golem of Prague, which will be disguised as a corpse. He and his teacher, Kornblum the magician, are carrying the Golem out of its hiding place in a coffin:

...(T)he golem weighed far less than its bulk and nature would have suggested. To Josef, it felt as they were struggling down the hallway, down the stairs, and out of the door of Nicholasgasse 26, with a substantial pine box and a large suit of cloths, and little else besides. "*Mach' bida la nafsho,*" Kornblum said, quoting Midrash, when Josef remarked on the lightness of their load. "His soul is a burden unto him." This is nothing, this." He nodded toward the lid of the coffin. "Just an empty jar. If you were not in there, I would have been obliged to weigh it down with sandbags."(2000, 62)

² One way of presenting the reason that the Golem changes into something other than itself when separated from its soul is given by Sergei Eisenstein (1947) quoting Kurt Koffka (1935): "It has been said: The whole is more than the sum of its parts. It is more correct to say that the whole is something else than the sum of its parts, because summing is a meaningless procedure, whereas the whole-part relationship is meaningful." (1942, 8)

³ Although it is generally understood that there are differences between film and video, this will not be discussed in this paper. Discussion of video as concerning the real and film as concerning the imaginary is of relevance to my argument. However, this discussion is not necessary for my argument, and so I will use the words 'video' and 'film' interchangeably throughout.

⁴ L. S. Vygotsky writes: "In play a child always behaves beyond his average age, above his daily behavior; in play it is as though he were a head taller than himself." (1978, 102)

⁵ Simply think of the last time you entered a great film in the daylight, and left in the evening darkness, feeling unsure: 'Am I now most alive in the day, or the night, or in the light of the film I have just left?'

⁶ The relationship between this child's name and the name of the character in Lewis's novel is a strange coincidence. In published work and conference presentations all names of the children and the teacher's name are replaced by pseudonyms.

⁷ I am here referring to Turner's (1982) use of the word 'communitas' to mean moments of freedom that coexist within structure.

⁸ For instance, in response to our findings that play promotes the development of various literacy skills (Baumer, Ferholt & Lecusay, 2005), play belongs in the classroom primarily because it facilitates a process of identification, and not because this process helps to make reading both pleasurable and profitable.

⁹ Dwight Conquergood writes:

In his critique of the limitations of literacy, Kenneth Burke argued that print-based scholarship has built-in blind spots and a conditioned deafness:

‘The [written] record is usually but a fragment of the expression (as the written word omits all telltale record of gesture and tonality; and not only may our “literacy” keep us from missing the omissions, it may blunt us to the appreciation of tone and gesture, so that even when we witness the full expression, we note only those aspects of it that can be written down).’

([1950] 1969: 185) (2002, 146-147)

¹⁰ Woody Allen’s *Annie Hall* (1977) is also a film about love and a film about film, and for this reason aspects of *Annie Hall* also work to support my argument. For instance, Vygotsky argues (2004) that to understand play we need to avoid making a dichotomy between a real world with real consequences and a fantasy world with no consequences. I argue in this paper that we need to avoid the assumption that science is about truth and art is not about truth. And the final joke of *Annie Hall* contains the same warning, overtly concerning love: “This guy goes to a psychiatrist and says, “Doc, my brother’s crazy. He thinks he’s a chicken.” And the doctor says, “Well, why don’t you turn him in.” And the guy says, “I would, but I need the eggs.”” Woody Allen’s character ends the film with this observation: “Well, I guess that’s pretty much now how I feel about relationships. You know, they’re totally irrational and crazy and absurd. But I guess we keep going through it because most of us need the eggs.” Allen and I are both arguing that this is also the value of film.

¹¹ I came to *La Jetée* before I began to write this paper. I watched the film repeatedly throughout the playworld study, and I screened it for the other adults who created the playworld, not sure of the connection between the two but sure that the connection existed. In this way *La Jetée* has shaped both the playworld and the study of the playworld.

¹² Lupton writes (2005) that the final scene of the film is of the man, in flight, shot down, and that this scene is foreshadowed by the stuffed birds the man and woman looked at in the natural history museum during their final meeting. I will compare the experimental segment tape discussed in this paper to the final meeting in this natural history museum. A week after the episode portrayed in this tape took place, the child featured in this film said to his teacher: “It feels like, um, the classroom’s flying. It feels like that to me.” My own discussion of flying and falling needs to be elaborated upon using Soren Kierkegaard’s *Fear and Trembling and Sickness Unto Death* (1941) and Cathy Caruth’s discussion of falling in *Unclaimed Experience* (1996).

¹³ Alter points out in a footnote that this name also resonates for Marker as the involuntary memory trigger in Marcel Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*. (2006, 127)

¹⁴ Given the nature of her topic of study Dolan also has to revive her golem. She does this in ways that resemble my own, and Woolf's, solutions to this dilemma. Dolan makes her argument in language that is self-consciously evocative, writing about performances with pleasure, passion and texture. She claims that "(w)riting about the effective experience of theatergoing requires evoking the primary "stuff" of a moment of performance." (2005, 33) Dolan explicitly pursues certain political goals. She commits herself not to developing a theory for theory's sake, but to "reanimating Humanism." She pursues this goal by "untangling how these performances "work," how it is that through some formula of form and content, context and time, they formed meaningful, moving, and even transformational moments ..." (2005, 33). And Dolan only makes use of examples of performances that inspired her emotionally, intellectually and politically. She writes, "I make a conscious choice, in *Utopia in Performance*, to write only about productions I liked..." Also, as with the insights in this paper, the insights in Dolan's book often apply to three levels of inquiry at once: to her subject of study, to her method of representing this subject, and to her discussion of this method of representation.

¹⁵ In the world-within-a-world of *La Jetée* we see the discreet and crystallized moments of memory as this memory is liquidized. In Lupton's words, *La Jetée* "evokes the tensions between involuntary memory returning to the past in its entirety, and the experience of memory as a series of images removed from the continuous flow of time" (2005, 96). Lupton turns to Proust to discuss that quality of photographs which reminds us of the discreet and crystallized moments of memory: "Proust himself had compared personal memories to a sequence of photographs removed from the flux of time, which present only single aspects of the remembered person." (2005, 96)

¹⁶ One week after the episode, which is recorded in the experimental segment tape which concerns this paper, took place, and one moment before the comment about flying (see endnote 12, above) was made, I appeared in the playworld as the professor and said these words, taken directly from Lewis's novel:

That is the very thing that makes his story so likely to be true – If there really is a door in this house that leads to some other world (and I should warn you that this is a very strange house, and even I know very little about it) – if, say, he had got into another world, I should not be at all surprised to find that that other world had a separate time of its own; so that however long you stayed there it would never take up any of *our* time. On the other hand, I don't think many boys of his age would invent that idea for themselves. If he had been pretending, he would have hidden for a reasonable time before coming out and telling his story.

¹⁷ In *Annie Hall* Woody Allen's character makes a similar observation about love, while Woody Allen himself is making this observation about contemporary (for the film) Hollywood films. Breaking up with Annie on an airplane flying from Los Angeles to New York City, Alvy Singer (Allen's character) says: "A relationship, I think, is like a shark. It has to constantly move forward or it dies. And I think what we've got on our hands is a dead shark."

¹⁸ Vygotsky discusses the live quality of the novel in a paper concerning imagination and creativity in childhood. First he relates this anecdote:

Tolstoy was once told by a reader that she felt he had dealt cruelly with Anna Karenina, the heroine of his novel, by having her throw herself under an oncoming train. Tolstoy answered:

You remind me of an incident that happened to Pushkin. Once he said to a friend, "Just imagine, what Tanya has done to me, she has gone and gotten married. I never would have expected it of her." I could say the same thing about Anna Karenina. My heroes and heroines sometime do things against my wishes. They do what they must do in real life and what happens in real life, and not what I desire. (2004, 19)

Then Vygotsky explains Pushpin's point, bringing us back to the internal logic discussed at the start of this paper:

We frequently encounter similar confessions on the part of artists, referring to the same kind of internal logic. [Wilhelm] Wundt gave an excellent example of this logic of fantasy when he said that the thought of a wedding could give rise to the thought of a funeral (the joining and separation of bride and groom) but not to the thought of a toothache.

Thus, in works of art we often encounter juxtapositions of features that are far removed from each other and seemingly unrelated, but that, however, are not foreign to each other, like the thought of a toothache and that of a wedding, but rather are united by internal logic. (2004, 19-20)

¹⁹ This paradox of film is closely related to the paradox of play. According to Bateson (1972), play is a paradox because it is metacommunicative. The message that makes play play: "This is play." creates a paradox by drawing a line between categories of different logical types. For instance, the picture frame (the equivalent of "This is play.") is an instruction to the viewer to not extend the premises that obtain between the figures within the picture to the wallpaper behind the picture, and this is a paradox because the frame delineates things that are not of same logical type (Bateson, 1972).

Vygotsky describes a similar paradox: "The primary paradox of play is that the child operates with an alienated meaning in a real situation." (1978, 99) Play is not play if it does not have what Vygotsky calls a "pivot" (1934), an "actual object" (1971) in

which imagination can live. As Vygotsky explains: “the child manipulates external phenomena in the service of the dream and invests chosen external phenomena with dream meaning and feeling.” (1925, 51)

Vygotsky claims that this paradox of play is essential to consciousness (Vygotsky, 1978; Lindqvist, 1995). Bateson makes the slightly lesser claim that this paradox of play is essential to sanity. Bateson discusses the resemblance between the process of therapy and the phenomenon of play, and draws a conclusion that parallels Sobchack’s concerning the result of this paradox. He uses the phrase “evolving system of interaction” where Sobchack would use the phrase “lived momentum,” and contrast this with the rigid, rather than the nostalgic.

(T)he process of psychotherapy is a framed interaction between two persons, in which the rules are implicit but subject to change. Such change can only be proposed by experimental action, but every such experimental action, in which a proposal to change to rules is implicit, is itself a part of the ongoing game. It is this combination of logical types that gives to therapy the character not of a rigid game like canasta but, instead, that of an evolving system of interaction... (1972, 191-192)

²⁰ I will not look at Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson’s *Childhood Rivalry in Bali and New Guinea* (1952). MacDougall (2006) points out that, while Margaret Meade’s research in Samoa and New Guinea does look at how the worldview of children differs from that of adults, in *Childhood Rivalry in Bali and New Guinea* she falls prey to the adult desire to search for a key to adult destiny in childhood, looking, for instance, to the future of the adult in the development of the child, or even to redefine culture through a filmic view of childhood. (MacDougall (2006) also accused Truffaut’s *Wild Child (L’enfant Sauvage)* (1969) of pursuing this goal.) As will be made clear in the discussion of Jean Rouch’s work, below, this makes these films less useful for my argument. Furthermore, as MacDougall points out, the edited films from the work written about in the book *Balinese Character* (1942) are particularly didactic, in part due to their heavy-handed voiceover. MacDougall writes that this work “which had the potential to revolutionize visual anthropology, fell short of doing so. It neither legitimized visual research methods in anthropology nor turned film and photography into a channel of anthropological discourse and argumentation.” (2006, 223) The transcript of the 1977 discussion, really an argument, between Bateson and Meade, which MacDougall (2006) includes moves us directly to the heart of the criticism of these films of childhood: these filmmakers have not resolved to bridge the divide between the artist and the scientist.

²¹ Tobin and Hsueh site as influence for their method the ethnographic film *Jero on Jero: A Balinese Trance Séance Observed* (1981), in which Asch, Asch and Connor show a medium a film they have made of this medium in a trance, and ask her for a response to the film. They write that the method combines “the use of video as a tool for feedback” (Rouch, 1974) and as a “mnemonic divide” (Asch and Asch, 1995) with James Clifford’s (1983) call for ethnographies to be multivocal texts, Jay Ruby’s (1982) admonition that

ethnographic films be considered not objective data but reflexive mirrors, and Mikhail Bakhtin's (1981, 1986, 1990) writings on heteroglossia, dialogism, and answerability." (in press, 78)

²² Tobin and Hsueh end their paper with this story: "When we asked one girl who had not raised her hand what she didn't like about the experience (of seeing the film of her preschool classroom) she told us, "it was kind of irritating and I wasn't in it enough." (in press, 91) Woody Allen's character begins *Annie Hall* with these words: "There's an old joke. Two elderly women are at a Catskill mountain resort, and one of them says, "Boy, the food at this place is really terrible." The other one says, "Yeah, I know, and such small portions." Well, that's essentially how I feel about life: full of loneliness and misery and suffering and unhappiness and it's all over much too quickly." I think this is also what Woody Allen is telling us about film in *Annie Hall*. Film tantalizes you with a glimpse of a better future. You can't experience this future through film, you just get a sense of this future which intensifies the longing, and even Satyajit Ray's *Apu Trilogy* is not long enough. I agree.

²³ MacDougall draws between Rouch and Marker, who made *La Jetée* while completing *Le Joli mai* (1962). *Le Joli mai* refers directly to Rouch's *Chronique d'un été* (1960), also provoking a group of Parisians to talk in depth about their lives and experiences (Rouch is even in this film of Marker's) (Lupton, 2005, 82). MacDougall writes that Rouch celebrates his hosts, "approaching cinema as a way of painting these newfound worlds around (himself), not from an avant-guardist or autobiographical perspective but out of respect for the wholeness and self-sufficiency they have discovered." (2006, 252) MacDougall argues that Rouch's, and also Marker's, films are not polished products of research but are instead an ongoing research processes in themselves. (And MacDougall draws the comparison further, including Nanni Moretti, Andrei Tarkovsky and Dziga Vertov, among others.)

²⁴ Rouch appreciates the value of using film with subjects who cannot read and write but with whom one wishes to collaborate in the ethnographic process. We also worked with subjects who could not, for the most part, read or write. This is another relevant connection between his work and ours that I have not yet investigated.

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Filmography

Annie Hall. 1977. Woody Allen. USA. 94 mins.

Childhood Rivalry in Bali and New Guinea. 1952. Gregory Bateson & Margaret Meade.
USA. 17 Mins.

Chronique d'un Été. 1960. Jean Rouch. France. 90 mins.

Familiar Places. 1977. David MacDougall. Queensland. 53 mins.

Jaguar. 1954/67. Jean Rouch. France. 93 mins.

Kings and Queen (Rois et Reine). 2005. Arnaud Desplechin. France. 150 mins.

La Jetée. 1962. Chris Marker. France. 28 mins.

Le Joli mai. 1962. Chris Marker. France. 123 mins.

Sans Soleil. 1982. Chris Marker. France. 110 mins.

Vertigo. 1958. Alfred Hitchcock. USA. 128 mins.

Wild Child (L'enfant Sauvage). 1969. François Truffault. France. 84 mins.