The Fate of Stages Past: Reflections on the Heterogeneity of Thinking from the Perspective of Cultural-historical Psychology

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This paper touches upon the problem of the fate of the "old knowledge" on two genetic levels, the ontogenic and the cultural-historical, as well as the relationships between the two. The heterogeneity of human consciousness has been acknowledged by many authors (S. Freud, L. Levy-Bruhl, L. Vygotsky, A. Luria and others) but the heterogeneity was mainly discussed in terms of collective consciousness, and has penetrated developmental psychology to a much lesser extent. We argue that one important aspect of the acquisition of knowledge is that the new knowledge does not totally replace old knowledge; the latter, being ousted from the dominating position under the steady pressure of enculturation, is, nevertheless, preserved in a latent form and is able, under certain circumstances, to recover its influence in an individual's mind and to regain control over the individual's actions. Three lines of research are reviewed in which such a recovery of the "old knowledge" presumably took place.

Perhaps the most well known discussion of the heterogeneity of human consciousness is that presented in Freud's monograph, Civilisation and its Discontents (1930). Regarding what he called the "Problem of preservation", Freud rejected the idea that old knowledge is obliterated, preferring instead the hypothesis that in mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish, that everything is somehow preserved. Freud likened the layering of knowledge in the mind to the layers of history in Rome where traces of the most remote epochs are mixed with the remnants of the metropolis of recent centuries and decades. He goes on to examine the applicability of this "archaeological" metaphor to human mental life. After probing various problems with the metaphor, he concludes with the comment that "We can only hold fast to the fact that it is rather the rule than the exception for the past to be preserved in mental life" (Freud, 1930, p. 19).

The acknowledgment of the heterogeneity of mind can be also found in Vygotsky's writings, although Vygotsky seems to have been of two minds regarding the fate of old knowledge. Writing at approximately the same time as Freud, Vygotsky used a geological metaphor, which he attributed to Ernst Kretschmer, a German psychiatrist. Vygotsky applied this "law of stratification" in the history of development both to understanding the ontogenesis and regression of behaviour resulting from brain insults and to the ontogeny of concepts. With respect to research focusing on the brain bases of mind he wrote that "Research has established the presence of genetically differentiated layers in human behaviour. In this sense the geology of human behaviour is undoubtedly a reflection of "geological" descent and brain
development (1930/1971, p. 155). With respect to his well known studies of concept formation he wrote that: "Forms of behaviour that have emerged very recently in human history dwell amongst the most ancient. The same can be said of the development of children's thinking" (1934/1987, p. 160). Vygotsky also cited Heinz Werner, who quite explicitly draws the parallel between ontogeny and cultural history. Declaring that human beings may vary in the genetic level of their thinking from one moment to the next, Werner suggested that "In this demonstrable fact that there is a plurality of mental levels lies the solution of the mystery of how the European mind can understand primitive types of mentality" (1926/1948, p. 39).

The author best known for his claims about the qualitatively distinct nature of thought process in pre-literate societies, is Lev-Y. Brum, whose work provided the most visible source of evidence for claims about cultural differences in thinking. Lev-Y. Brum argued that although the characteristics of "collective representations" reflect a qualitatively different way of thinking than that of the modern European "Considered as an individual, the primitive, in so far as he thinks and acts independently of these collective representations, where possible, will usually feel, argue and act as we should expect him to do. The inferences he draws will be just those which would seem reasonable to us in like circumstances" (1966, p. 63).

We cannot hope to provide a thorough treatment of the complex issue of the extent and nature of the reorganization of mental content and processing brought about developmental change at both the cultural-historical and ontogenetic levels. Our more modest goal is to present findings that seem to demand recognition that developmental reorganizations do not totally obliterate prior forms. In other words, we are going to put under question psychological perspectives based on the idea of steady progress in mental development of the child and the logic of "cultural optimism" that ascends to the great rationalistic theories of the 18th and 19th centuries.

We are of course not the first to question this optimistic "linear perspective". Many years ago Margaret Mead (1932), in her fieldwork in Manus, reported observations that must seem to be at least anomalous from the "linear" point of view. In their conversations and everyday practices, children in Manus demonstrated notions of causality that resembled physical more than magical causality. For example, if a canoe floated away from a child s/he attributed the mishap to the tide and the fact that s/he forgotten to tie it up. However, as they grew older the children became more likely to give animistic explanations, for example that a water spirit had moved the canoe, in line with the animistic and magical "world outlook" of adults. To round this picture out, recent work by Harris and his colleagues has documented the fact that fear of ghosts and monsters is present among European children and also summarized historical evidence that general belief in magic among adults receded relatively recently beginning in the 17th century in Europe (1991).

To this we should add that such beliefs exist even among educated classes in the international world today (1982). The inferences he draws will be just those which would seem reasonable to us in like circumstances" (1966, p. 63).

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from the “linear” point of view, and everyday experience demonstrated no immediate resemblance to physical reality. For example, if a canoe child self-attributed the property that a water spirit could be present among the trees, then it made sense to attribute a river spirit to the water, as they grew older they were likely to give animistic natures to inanimate objects in line with the animistic outlook of adults. To date, recent work by Harris (1991) has documented the fact that animistic belief in magic among modern societies is present among children and adults in the industrialized and pre-industrialized. Jones (1982).

Lest it be thought that such childish beliefs have no influence on adults, we refer to the problem of heterogeneity proposed by Wertsch (1991). He points out that “The implication of this analysis is that collective beliefs concerning magic find fertile ground with the child’s mind” (p. 140). More than that, the ground is not totally barren with respect to such beliefs even in the adult’s mind. These experimental facts show that fundamental physical laws and their implications for understanding the fate of the object concept and notions of causality. His basic strategy has been to investigate conditions under which children of 4, 5, and 6-years-old might abandon the notions of object permanence and non-magical causality. One simple technique is to begin by asking children if it is possible to change physical reality by direct action of thought. All 5–6-year-olds and 75% of 4-year-olds denied that this could happen.

In one such study the child was then told a story in which a little girl receives a magic box as a gift. If she said magic words, the box would turn drawings of objects into the objects depicted. A few days later the child was brought back and given some pictures depicting a ring, a brooch, a spider, and so on. The child was then left in the room with the box and the pictures while the experimenter was “busy elsewhere.” During the experimenter’s absence about 90% of the children at all ages attempted to transform the pictures into objects (except for “scary” objects such as a spider). Many of the children tried repeatedly to transform their pictures, repeating the magic words and engaging in other “magic-appropriate” actions like rubbing their hands over the box.

Lest it be thought that such childish beliefs quickly disappear, Subbotsky conducted experiments based on the same logic with adults (using, however, transformations of a postage stamp as the potentially magical event). In this case adults initially used the rule of object permanence to explain changes in the postage stamp. However, when, following their spontaneous explanations, Subbotsky asked them to judge the probability that he had learned to change objects at a distance by means of sheer will power, his subjects judged such an achievement to be possible and several expressed something like a need to encounter phenomena that transcend the boundaries of everyday life (Subbotsky, 1991).

As Paul Harris (1991) points out in his commentary on this research, “The implication of this analysis is that collective beliefs concerning magic find fertile ground with the child’s mind” (p. 140). More than that, the ground is not totally barren with respect to such beliefs even in the adult’s mind. These experimental facts show that fundamental physical laws and their in-
interpretation in social and cultural context are not absolutely independent phenomena. Such phenomena cannot be satisfactorily explained from the «linear» perspective; rather, they correspond to the view that magical and nonpermanent beliefs are as «culturally conditioned» as the opposite beliefs in physical causality and permanent object (see Mead, 1932; Tulviste, 1991). They are not absent even in the adult mind, nor are they produced and reproduced solely in "primitive" cultures, but in European cultures as well.

Case 2: Syllogistic reasoning in ontogeny and cultural history

In a famous series of studies carried out in Central Asia in the early 1930's, A. R. Luria asked traditional peasants and people who had begun to engage in collectivized, mechanized, bureaucratized agriculture to solve a variety of verbal syllogistic reasoning problems. One of the frequently cited problems was the following: "In the far north, there is snow, all bears are white. Novaya Zemlya is in the far north and there is always snow there. What color are the bears there?". The people who had entered into the new forms of activity and ways of life promoted by the state answered problems of this sort in a manner that appears straightforward to us; the bears are white. Traditional peasants, however, did not answer in his way. Instead they provided some variation of the following response: "I don't know what colour the bears are, I have never seen them."

Despite repeated probing by Luria, his informants refused to speculate about matters they had not themselves witnessed. They responded easily and correctly when the content of the syllogism concerned matters common in their experience, but did so not in terms of the logical figure of the syllogism, but in terms of what "everybody knew to be true". Luria's basic results have been replicated in many parts of the world (see Tulviste, 1991, for a summary).

Luria interpreted these results as evidence that the thought processes of the traditional peasants depended upon concrete, "graphically-functional" thinking, whereas those who had entered into modern economic life responded in an "abstract, theoretical" manner. Scribner (1977) and Tulviste (1991) speak of these same results in terms of distinction between "empirical" and "theoretical" modes of problem interpretation: the more modern, more educated subjects appear to treat the problem as purely hypothetical and respond accordingly while the more traditional, less educated subjects interpret the problems in terms of their empirical truth value.

In line with the theme of this paper we pose regarding this phenomenon is whether the "theoretical" mode of responding replaces the "empirical" mode, or whether the two exist simultaneously, revealing themselves according to the particular circumstances in which the reasoning is evoked. Two lines of work argue rather persuasively that the two modes of interpreting syllogisms exist simultaneously not only among adults from traditional and modern cultures, but among young children in modern cultures as well (and most probably in traditional cultures as well, although data on this point are lacking).

For example, Scribner and Cole (1981) presented logical syllogisms of two kinds to literate and non-literate members of the Vai tribe of north-central Liberia. When using problems of the type studied by Luria they replicated his findings. Vai adults who had attended school were significantly more likely than Vai non-literate people to provide theoretical responses to syllogisms. Moreover, the amount of theoretical responding decreased the longer it had been since the subject last attended school, a finding also obtained by Tulviste (1991). However, when subjects were presented sets of problems half of which had a clearly fantastic content (like, for instance, "All stones on the moon are blue. The man who went to the moon saw a stone. Was the stone he saw blue?"), the level of theoretical responding was increased. Moreover, when the syllogisms were presented following an extended discussion of the properties of language and concepts, the level of theoretical responding was higher in cases where the syllogisms were presented before discussions of language. Such results are clearly inconsistent with the idea that one mode of thinking has replaced another, suggesting instead that the two modes exist side by side, being evoked by different circumstances for different people.

Case 3: The arousal of ol new contexts

Although each of the provides evidence that forms at an earlier time (historically) remain a part of the to be called upon when them appear plausible to difficult to escape the only the nagging feeling, thinking is also consider the pejorative sense of the doubt, for example, the Vygotsky, and other psychological commentaries on this pre earlier was in fact "lesser senses of the word; there matter when the condition way" of thinking are also jury, schizophrenia, or lif

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of these same emotions that the two modes of reasoning about syllogisms are not the same. The differences between the two modes are presented differently in the psychological literature, and the literature is not always consistent. However, the differences between the two modes are generally agreed upon.

A second line of evidence for the co-existence of different modes of reasoning about syllogisms comes from studies carried out entirely in industrialized countries, among college educated people and young children. Even college educated people have now been shown to reason differently about problems presented as syllogisms with varying content (D'Andrade, 1990). Most strikingly, 4-5 year old children have been shown to reason theoretically about problems where the logically correct solutions runs counter to their experience if the problem is presented in a play context (Dias & Harris, 1988; Hawkins et al., 1984).

These results suggest quite clearly that while activities such as formal schooling, (where the logical relations among problem elements are often emphasized as a part of teaching scientific methods of reasoning at the cost of their empirical truth) increase the likelihood that mundane problems will be solved on a purely logical basis, this ability is relatively fragile and coexists with an apparently tenacious tendency to privilege empirical knowledge over hypothetical.

Case 3: The arousal of old leading activities in new contexts

Although each of the previous examples provides evidence that forms of thinking acquired at an earlier time (historically or ontogenetically) remain a part of the cognitive repertoire, to be called upon when circumstances make them appear plausible tools of action, it is difficult to escape the conclusion, or perhaps only the nagging feeling, that the "old" way of thinking is still considered more primitive in the pejorative sense of the word. There is no doubt, for example, that Piaget, Werner, Vygotsky, and other psychologists who have commented on this problem believed that earlier was in fact "lesser" in one of several senses of the word: there is little choice in the matter when the conditions that evoke the "old way" of thinking are associated with brain injury, schizophrenia, or life in the jungle.

Our final example pushes the inquiry one step further to ask whether or not there might be circumstances in which "earlier/older" psychological formations are manifestly instrumental to people's well being and might even be deliberately harnessed as a means of promoting development among people living in modern, industrialized societies.

Instead of a purely cognitive achievement such as object permanence, causal and syllogistic reasoning seem to be, the focus of this example is on what Leontiev (1981) refers to as "leading activities", i.e. activities that are of greatest significance for the individual's subsequent development" at this particular period of life whereas other activities are less important. Some years ago Griffin and Cole (1984) illustrated the utility of the notion of leading activity to characterize variations in children's behaviour as they move from one activity to the next in a specially constructed educational setting. In the course of this work they noted that it became useful at certain times to think of activities in which one or more "type" was simultaneously "leading" for children at a given age. Although they did not remark upon it at the time, they were in fact touching upon the topic of concern here, that at least one of the "leading" activities was, according to Leontiev's formulation, an "old" (and hence non-leading) activity.

Of course the "leading activity" is a notion that refers to a long term scale that is measured in years. On a short term scale in real life situations all sorts of activities are normally present side by side and which of them is said to be "leading" at the moment, is to a large extent, a matter of convention. For instance, you can hardly meet a 5 year old child involved in a play activity without being engaged at the same time in some sort of learning activity or "peer interaction" activity, etc. The "peer interaction" activity of young teenagers often involves play and learning activities. In other words, it is not an isolated action of one selected "leading activity", but rather the joint action of various activities what we observe in real life settings, the psychological development being also the result of this joint action.

In his present work, Cole and his colleagues are extending the research begun with Griffin, using a specially organized activity system in which the activities discussed by Leontiev, El'konin, and others (affiliation, play, study,
The Wizard is also an essential tool in re-ordering power relations between adults and children in the 5th Dimension. This rearrangement comes about in part because when conflicts arise in the 5th Dimension, adults need not confront children directly because it is the ever absent Wizard, not the human participants, who has the power to adjudicate disputes. In such cases, adults as well as children must write to the Wizard to decide how matters should proceed. It is also important that by subordinating themselves to the Wizard the adults can collude with the children in the pretension of the Wizard's existence and thereby play with the child. Finally, since computer technology is not especially reliable and programs or computers often fail to work, adults can offload responsibility onto the Wizard at strategic moments, a possibility that has endeared the Wizard to all adults who have worked in the 5th Dimension.

An important feature of the 5th Dimension is that it is staffed primarily by undergraduate students who participate in the activity as part of a course requirement in the departments of psychology or communication. These undergraduates have generally not worked with computers before and often know less about the specific game activities than do the children. Their assignment is to participate with the children in the role of "older siblings". The normative "rule of thumb" that guides their participation is that they should provide as little help to the children as possible, but as much as necessary so that the children have a good time. After every session of the 5th Dimension they write detailed field notes about their activities with the children, the Wizard, the software, and the life of the 5th Dimension.

The purpose of bringing this somewhat unusual activity system into the present discussion is that data collected in the 5th Dimension bear directly on the issue of what happens to prior leading activities when they are superseded by later ones. Is the "leading" nature of leading activity context-independent in the sense that belief in object permanence or forms of reasoning were once thought to be? Or can it be shown that in some contexts currently non-leading forms of activity (for instance, play activity or affiliation) will become dominant? And if the latter is the case, does the reappearance of an earlier form of activity represent a "regression" or "primitivisation"? Or might such occasions provide a resource for personal development?

An example of how a deliberately created context that reorders the relationships between "leading activities" can be used to illuminate the issue of "old forms' preservation" we present a filed note written by a 20 year old undergraduate student immediately following her participation in a session of the 5th Dimension.

Fieldnotes by Jill Strickstein
Site: Library
Date: 2-14-90
Child: Jamie (8 yrs old) and Lisa (6 yrs old)
Activity: Mystery House

Right away I was anxious to get started since I knew that Jamie had been looking forward to working with me again after last Thursday. But this day was special . . . it started out different and ended up being one of the greatest experiences of my life. Never before have I learned so much energy in the fifth dimension . . . leaving the library I was wiped out but really felt like I made a difference in two beautiful children's lives. Actually I went home to sleep for hours. WOW was it worth the extra energy!

And the reason for this sudden burst of energy came from the fact that Jamie requested me as her partner. I don't know why this meant so much to me but I guess it was because I wasn't quite sure the kids were liking me. [Appearance of affiliation as central motive]. First thing Jamie tells me that Lisa her sister was going to play with us "A LITTLE" since she really was not in the mood to play full out. Jamie acted very motherly and quite protective of Lisa. She made sure that I understood that Lisa would not be a big part of our team. This was a great opportunity to give Lisa, only 6, freedom to do or not to do. As we got started with Mystery House, Lisa sits back and observes, but the minute I explained to them the purpose of the game, the objectives and strategies, she piped up her ears and got into it. After the first five minutes of so, Lisa was full-fledged into the game and we couldn't have progressed through the different rooms of the house without her help. [Play becomes the leading activity for children].

All three of us were stunned when we realized that the reason we couldn't go and look in the refrigerator was that the computer would not eat our command to "Look Refrigerator" - UNTIL we wrote "GO TO REFRIGERATOR". This made all three of us stop and think, "HMMMM, why can't we look there! AHHAA! We must GOOOOO there first, then can we look. [Adult enters into play with children].

Here are some of the goals we had, when we started the game . . . We should try to get through as many rooms of
the first floor of the house and collect as many objects on
our way as possible, while at the same time, staying away
from the "masked killer" who was somewhere roaming the
house. But we were also looking for the killer at the same
time, so this in turn affected our decisions about what to
gather as we ventured through the house. For example, when
a knife was lying in the kitchen sink, we grabbed it (or
for protection of course).

The children really rely on the pictures on the screen.
I say this because two times, the picture affected our next
step. For example, Lisa saw the stove in the kitchen as one
that was "never looking" and thus, didn't need to be lit by
matches. Rather she informed me that it was "not an old
fashioned stove and that her mom doesn't have the kind
that needs matches any more". So, when I suggested that
we light the stove for some light, the first reaction Jamie
had was that it was a bad idea because the house could catch
on fire if we lit the stove and then left the kitchen to search
other rooms. Lisa also thought my idea wasn't a good one
because of the fact that the stove looked like an electric
range (as opposed to gas). [Logical reasoning and inference
by six year old in context to play]

So we went with Lisa's idea and kept our eyes open for
a candle. When that candle finally burned up, you wouldn't
believe how excited they got!!! It was as if they accomplished
so much. [Children are now deeply involved in play]

The game doesn't count matches, and we couldn't actu-
ally go through the whole day lighting matches time that
the lights shut off, but they both realized that there was
more efficient way of doing things, and they could save a
lot of time with a permanent time source. Plus, I think Lisa
was getting really scared. She said, "But I hope that lights
don't go out again, I hate the dark. And what if the killer
snakes up behind us when the lights go off??" [Border be-
tween fantasy play and real life becomes obscure]

I could really go on and on about the amazing interaction
that took place between all tree of us. But I want to illu-
nicate one more incident that took place which really
stood out in my head. We are outside in the back patch
of the "Mystery House" and we are busily risk going
through the gate. It was as if we were actually trying to
get through this scary place always in the lookout for the
killer. Lisa was so scared but having fun at the same time. Any-
ways we find ourselves in the graveyard and instead of there being
a dead body lying there, as we had found in most of the
other rooms, there was alive person digging graves!!!

Lisa and Jamie were terrified. We stood at the gate
(although there is no figure on the computer which
represents the player - we imagined ourselves standing at
the entrance to the graveyard) and decided what to do about
this strange person who was mysteriously alive and digging
graves.

But as we are thinking about what to do with the
gravedigger - should we kill him with the knife we got or
should we sneak away without him seeing us and get the
dagger and come back later and kill him?? - I ask them
why they think he is the killer and not just an innocent
bystander.

Jamie: Well, why is he alive if he's not the killer?
Lisa: Plus why won't he talk to us?

Jamie: He looks pretty suspicious to me.
Lisa: You can't always tell things that easily. He may be in-
ocent.
Jamie: What if it is the killer? He obviously
knows that six people will die and he's preparing to bury
them.
Lisa: That has to be him. UNLESSS, the killer asked
him to dig the graves as a favour!!!
Lisa: That would mean that Joe (gravedigger) knows who
the killer is!
Jamie: Maybe Joe's friends with the killer.
Lisa: We should kill him.
Jamie: Yeah either way he's bad.

[Logical reasoning in the midst of the fantasy]

So they both took to me to final approval and I made sure
they understood that they were rising getting killed since
all they had to kill him was a butter knife. So we decided
to get another weapon and come back.

Here's the moral of the story. We developed goals as we
grew, and each new peace of information lead to new ideas
and strategies. There aren't too many limits to this game,
and it is complex enough to keep a child busy for a week
straight. But what was really educational in all three of us
was realizing that the computer needs to be almost taken
by the hand and led through the motions. That is, the com-
puter needs specific (super specific) instructions in order
to do what you want it to do... Lisa and Jamie both agreed
that the computer was "stupid" and this made them feel su-
perior to this grandiose, complex, technologically ad-
vanced, somewhat frightening machine. This learning ex-
perience for the girls was really valuable. They recognized
the potential to master the machine... but at the same
time, realized that in order to do this, they needed to be
very careful with their word choice for the commands, and
in choosing the right moves. They learned the differ-
ce between a computer and a human being. And what's
REALLY amazing is that they informed me about this
very new acquired information. We discussed how a real per-
son doesn't need to stop and think about every little detail
of everyday actions before doing them. The computer does.
It needs detailed directions. For instance the fact that the
computer can't look somewhere for an object before commanding
the computer to "GO THERE" proves the point. Or that
we couldn't open a door until we said "GO DOOR" taught
them that there are steps that everybody in real life goes
through but don't have to think about it first in such struc-
tured terms. [Both the children and the adult are induced
to reflect on the nature of computer programs; in addition
the adult gains insight into basic process of goal formation, on
educational goal of the professor teaching the class.]

Concluding Remarks

In the era when it was popular to use stratification
or "geological" metaphors to describe the
developmental relations between older and new
psychological functions it was also popular to
think of human history as the story of progress
and to see the appearance of industrialized Eu-

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popular to use stratification metaphors to describe the no between older and new it was also popular to it as the story of progress of industrialized Eu-

ropean societies as the triumph of reason and civilization over irrationality and nature. At present there is much deeper scepticism about the possibility and the desirability of triumphing over nature or attaining complete rationality as the everyday norm of human thinking.

Parallel to the increased scepticism about the extent to which "newer, bigger, more rationalized, more technologized" means "better" is a growing belief that "older, smaller, less rational, less technologized" have their virtues too, not least of which is that they were present first. In place of the belief that a lower, more primitive, more "natural-biological" form of mind is replaced by a higher, more developed, cultural form of mind it now appears essential that both nature and culture deal with a human mind of the same complexity, but they deal with it differently. The role of culture vis à vis phylogeny appears more to be the restructuring and enrichment of already existing systemic elements than a substitution of "primitive concepts" by "advanced ones".

As some authors argue, "skeletal" protosystems of many adult concepts can be found under highly structured and simplified conditions in early infancy (Carey and Gelman, 1991). In Leslie's (1986) phrase, these skeletal protosystems help to get development off the ground. For example, one can see how a "causality module" would help children to form their initial discriminations between causal and non-causal events while the "cultural context" would later draw upon this initial structure to elaborate a mature notion of causality. One possible way to put this is that at a certain point in development children are not only able to perceive causal events, but to understand that they perceive them, that is they become aware of them. This becomes possible with the children's acquisition of language. Through the intertwining of the "natural" and the "cultural" streams of history (to use Vygotsky's terminology) the "causality module" is transformed into the "causality concept" giving rise thereby to children's theories of causality. The awareness is not, of course, the only result of speech acquisition. As Vygotsky stressed, the appearance of language enables children eventually to come into possession of their own mental functions, bringing the isolated functions of pre-speech thinking into a certain degree of systemic unity.

It is at this point that cultural variability begins to exert its differentiating effect on mental development, amplifying some of the child's "protoconcepts" and inhibiting others. It is the historically particular cultural configuration into which children are born that determines whether their theories of causality will be dominated by science or mythology and therefore whether children are seen as little scientists or little magicians.

We hope that we have also made the case for the co-existence of scientific-logical and magical-emotion-fused forms not only in society but inside one and the same individual mind. That a tribal person living in the African veld may employ the two thought genres in different circumstances than an industrial chemist in a laboratory should come as no surprise, given what else we know about such modes of life. But that both genres are available to both as a real life practice appears highly probable, as Levy-Bruhl long ago pointed out.

In Figure 2 (that we take from Subbotsky's recent book, 1992) we have sought to contrast the two views, one in which mode of thought A replaces mode of thought B in something like a homogeneous stage shift. To this "either or" vision we have added the kind of heterogeneity which seems minimally necessary to encompass the phenomena that we have been discussing.

No visual representation can capture the full diversity and complexity which we know to characterize human behaviour in its daily production in culturally organized events. In particular, we would not insist that the relationships between "new" and "old" structures are perfectly reflected by the "layer" metaphor or by metaphors similar to it (such as the "geological" or "onion" metaphors). What we argue for merely is that the "old" structures conserve their significance inside the developing mind, they conserve their structure and identity, although the "cocktail" of the "new" and "old" in the course of mental development undergoes drastic changes. Parts of this vastly complex system of relations are available for analysis, and we hope we have shown one path to this forms of analysis.
In addition, we also hope that we have brought attention to the possibility that self-conscious use of the different modes of activity is a worthwhile possibility to consider. As some of Subbotsky's adults remarked, they would like to be able to believe in magic. As the behaviour of both Subbotsky's and Cole's subjects indicates, when circumstances afford it, they will revert to it when possible. And as the widespread existence of institutions supporting the experience of fantasy and magical thinking, or those supporting the use of alcohol and psychotropic drugs attest, such forms of thinking manifest no signs of disappearing before the onslaught of rational modern life.

This is not bad news. It is the same systems properly that allows a scientist to solve formulas during the day and attend a theatrical performance at night. To overgeneralize virtues of the scientific-rational mode of thinking is to fall prey to the predicament of a hero in Milan Kundera's "Book of Laughter and Forgetting" whose lover accuses him of making love like an intellectual. The heterogeneity of human consciousness is inescapable; the problem is to come to understand this fact and learn make use of it for our own survival.

References


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