REVIEWS IN ANTHROPOLOGY

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introduction) is not justified. Most attention is given to the structure of bev and issues of language functions receive much less comprehensive treatment. The uses of bev are considered primarily in the analysis of two speech events—ritual insults and narratives. Noting the grammatical similarity of bev as it is spoken in New York City, Detroit, Washington D.C., Philadelphia, and San Francisco, Labov reasons (I think correctly) that this uniformity cannot be maintained by the adolescents themselves. He sees justified also in his inference that the late teens is probably not the upper limit for consistent use of bev.

Instead of concluding that the basic grammar of adults has shifted, we might say that adults have greater practice in shifting their use of the variables toward the standard in semi-formal contexts (285).

This evidence of compartmentalization would seem to warrant more careful attention and interpretation in any discussion of language functions, and the fact that various sub-groups do not show evidence of drifting in different directions would also seem important in attempting to understand the functions of bev. Perhaps a separatist function is being served by the maintenance of linguistic diversity (cf. Mitchell-Kernan 1971).

One drawback of Labov’s strategy of considering a small number of variables is that this approach does not do justice to the variety of ways linguistic and social facts tend to be articulated in a speech community. A more insightful yield is promoted by a consideration of the verbal repertoire of a speech community (cf. Gumperz 1968). A productive approach to the understanding of the social functions of linguistic diversity entails some consideration of code-switching. In their study about code-switching, Blom and Gumperz (1972) treat the psychological and social context of code-switching, and, in the process, bare aspects of the functional load being carried by two different dialects. The functional specialization of the two dialects suggests that they may not be in competition at all. This is a finding that ought to be of considerable importance for the study of language change.

What is most deserving of emphasis, however, is the excellence with which Labov documents the structure of the bev, his successful explosion of a number of myths about the cognitive and linguistic deficiencies of bev and its speakers, and his substantial contribution to a more socially realistic linguistics.

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References

PERSPECTIVES ON LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL CLASS

On Bernstein’s Class, Codes and Control

Sylvia Scribner and Michael Cole


What needs to be clearly seen by anthropologists . . . is that linguistics is essentially the quest of meaning . . . the simple fact is that linguistics’ real concern is to light up the thick darkness of the language, and thereby much of the thought, the culture and the outlook upon life of a given community, with the light of this “golden something” as I have heard it called, this transmuting principle of meaning (Whorf 1956: 73).
Heeding Whorf’s eloquent appeal, many anthropologists, psychologists and linguists in the 1950s joined forces to find new ways of thinking about and studying the role of language in individual development and cultural transmission.

Paradoxically, in the 1960s, Basil Bernstein’s efforts to carry Whorf beyond the inspirational stage and provide an explicit integrative theory for these sciences have thus far failed to have a significant unifying impact. His work has filtered into American scientific journals through selective interpretations of particular disciplines. Each has assimilated some portion of his theory into its own viewpoint and applied it, more or less felicitously, to its own previously defined research “problem.” This selective assimilation has been a cause of concern to Bernstein, who in recent years has protested the deformations to which he feels it has led (Vol. 1: Introduction). But, in a curious sense, the process illustrates one of his basic theses—that in every domain of knowledge there is a meaning potential that is differentially realized by speakers of different codes. If we think of the conceptual frameworks of different disciplines as so many codes for the realization of meaning, it becomes apparent that Bernstein’s meaning in this country has largely been realized by psychologists and linguists concerned with teaching and learning processes in the public schools.

The collection of Bernstein’s theoretical papers in Volume 1 of the series *Class, Codes and Control* should help resituate Bernstein within the social sciences and contribute toward the fuller realization of his theoretical position. Spanning the period from 1958 to 1971, the papers present the increasingly sophisticated and complex way in which Bernstein conceives the reciprocally-determined relations among social structures (class, family, work, and educational institutions) and cultural systems (knowledge, symbolic structures, and modes of communication). Bernstein’s “problem” is in the grand tradition of classical sociology. Durkheim and Marx were also concerned with the relations between social and symbolic (cultural) forms and Bernstein places himself within their “matrix.” But he also works in the grand tradition of anthropology for, like Sapiro and Whorf, he finds language to be the mediating mechanism by means of which social structures and cultural processes perpetuate one another. Thus, Bernstein’s views speak simultaneously to a theory of society, a theory of culture, a theory of language, and a theory of cognitive development! No wonder it is difficult to lay hold of the Bernsteinian network of meaning.

Difficulties are compounded, as Bernstein himself points out, by his failure thus far to achieve a unifying theory; his views constitute only a series of “interpretive frames” (20). In this form, inconsistencies, if not seeming contradictions, thrive alongside of ambiguities. Moreover, the frames themselves have been in a constant state of flux, as central constructs and relations among constructs have been successively reformu-

lated and redefined. Nonetheless, Bernstein’s contribution to the social sciences is a major one, for he is among the few proposing specific mechanisms relating social processes to individual processes, and these are, in principle, amenable to investigation.

For the fullest, and in some ways clearest, presentation of Bernstein’s present frame, we follow his recommendation to turn to chapter seven, originally prepared in 1965, which he describes as the “penultimate paper” on social class, language and socialization. While this chapter does not represent the last word, it is a good point of departure for our consideration of Bernstein’s specific hypotheses as to the ways in which language functions as the link between societal processes and individual psychological processes.

Since we want to argue against “selective interpretations” of Bernstein, we will begin with an explication of some of his central constructs, as they are presently understood. It seems preferable to run the risk of a too-schematic, and perhaps “dogmatized” version of Bernstein’s theoretic domain than to rely on one more personal sampling from it. Each of the terms in the chapter title is a crucial node in the network: social class, socialization, language.

**Social Class**

In establishing the relations among society, culture and language, Bernstein follows Marx’s example in the latter’s treatment of Hegel and stands Whorf on his head. In contrast to Whorf, who held that “fashions of speaking” determine social relations through their role in shaping the culture, Bernstein’s view is that “the form of the social relations . . . generates distinct linguistic forms or codes and these . . . transmit the culture” (122). Whorf’s approach, which assumes that speakers within a society who share a common language also share a common culture, leads to an analysis of differences between societies. Bernstein’s emphasis on the different “fashion of speaking” that may be generated within a common-language community leads to an analysis of cultural differences within societies.

The sub-cultural differences with which Bernstein is concerned are differences that he believes obtain between the working and middle classes in Western industrialized societies such as England and the United States. These differences cannot be automatically extrapolated to the “poor,” or to ethnic and racial minorities, or to the allegedly “culturally disadvantaged” and “deprived.”

According to Bernstein, the distinctive characteristics of the working class (the group differences that “make a difference”) are shaped by both the division of labor and the division of knowledge within capitalist society. The division of labor separates work tasks requiring physical manipulation and control from those requiring symbolic organization
and control, and establishes work relations for manual labor that call for collective rather than individual decision-making. As a result of common occupational function and social status, the working class develops strong communal bonds in which the "we" takes precedence over the "I" and a form of family organization in which social roles are defined by status and authority.

In addition, the working class has restricted access to knowledge and especially to the "symbolic symbols through which man can extend and change the boundaries of experience" (172). As a class, workers are deprived of knowledge of the changeability of the world and of principles by which change is achieved: "Historically and now, only a tiny percentage of the population has been socialized into knowledge at the level of the meta-languages of control and innovation, whereas the mass of the population has been socialized into knowledge at the level of context-tied operations" (174, 175).

Socialization

While Bernstein at times enumerates four basic agencies of socialization in contemporary societies—family, peer group, school and work—he limits his analysis to socialization processes within the family since it "should be obvious that the focusing and filtering of the child's experience within the family in a large measure is a microcosm of the macroscopic orderings of society" (174, 175).

Having thus made the family bear the brunt of the socialization process, Bernstein is required to map class differences into different family systems. This conversion process has resulted in a number of schemas in which working-class and middle-class families are characterized by sets of bi-polar oppositions. A persisting distinction is made between positional families in which relations among family members are determined by status and authority (the "modal" type within the working class) and personal families in which relationships are flexibly regulated by the unique interests and attributes of individual members (modal within the middle class).

Within these family role relationships the socialization of the young proceeds in a critical set of contexts—the regulative, instructional, imaginative, and interpersonal.

At this point Bernstein's views can be seen as formally similar to those of early culture-and-personality theorists. They, too, looked to the socializing process to provide the "integrating life experiences" through which personality processes might bind together and perpetuate cultural institutions. They, too, identified critical socializing contexts, but, in the Freudian tradition, conceived of these primarily as training contexts in which the child's impulses were brought under social control. They emphasized the crucial importance and enduring effect of the child's earliest, preverbal experiences.

Bernstein's method of analysis, as well as the content of his ideas, contrasts with that of traditional child socialization theorists. The latter tended to represent causal relationships among variables as linear and operating in antecedent-consequent fashion, whereas Bernstein depicts relationships as mutually-causal. (Social roles, for example, transmit linguistic codes, while codes induct children into their appropriate social roles.)

Language

Bernstein's theory has been most plastic in its characterization of the specific ways in which language functions as the bond between social class and socialization. This variability is undoubtedly a major source of "misinterpretation" as researchers continue to try to identify and count syntactical and lexical features of speech that Bernstein once thought distinguished class-based language codes but to which he no longer gives criterial rank.

The concept code now refers to the deep structural principle that regulates the way in which meanings are realized through "surface" speech variants. Codes are not directly observable; their orders of meaning must be inferred from the characteristics of speech variants in the different socializing contexts. Elaborated speech variants realize universalistic meanings—that is, meanings that transcend a given context. Restricted speech variants realize particularistic meanings, defined as meanings that are dependent on the contexts in which they occur and only partially communicated by verbal means.

At the present time, Bernstein is emphatic in his insistence that both working class and middle class have available both speech variants and that distinctions arise primarily "in terms of the contexts which evoke certain linguistic realization" (144). In addition, social group differences in communication may arise from the differing orientations they take toward the realization of either object or person meanings within any given context (selective realization, in Halliday's words, of "the total semiotic potential"). Bernstein has portrayed relationships among these categories of variables in a number of classification tables, elegantly integrated into a six-way grid by Gumperz and Hymes (1972: 470).

Where do these distinctions lead us? It would seem that we have arrived by circuitous route to a restatement of the Cole hypothesis (Cole, Gay, Glick and Sharp 1971) that cognitive differences across cultures reside mainly in the different situations to which the same skills are applied. But as we see it, this is not Bernstein's final view. The differences in meaning potential realized by different social groups in various con-
texts add up to a significant overall difference. Relative to the middle-class child, the working-class child realizes fewer universal meanings or public forms of knowledge. What he knows is less (he has restricted access to knowledge) and—Bernstein leaves open this possibility, too—some of what he knows may be less well-known (since it has been realized by a particularistic meaning code). As goes the class, so goes the child: limited in his full realization by the characteristics of his linguistic code.

Social implications are evident and made explicit by Bernstein. On the large scale, changes in the social structure and form of social relations are needed to modify linguistic codes. Bernstein points to such diverse movements as upward mobility on the part of individual members of the working class, and social protests such as the Civil Rights movement, as processes leading toward code change. Above all, it is the basic function of the educational system to introduce the working-class child to the "universalistic meanings of public forms of thought" (149). His analysis emphasizes the need for reforms in educational and other social institutions rather than remedial programs aimed at "re-form" of children's language skills.

Psychological implications—those most commonly drawn from the theory—are not evident. Bernstein's papers nowhere present a treatment of the relation between language use and cognition that specifies what consequences different codes might have for a child's conceptual and reasoning processes. Conclusions about language usage are generally drawn in terms of the disabilities working-class children face in the school situation—conclusions that need not rest on any notion of differential intellectual abilities. Nonetheless, there are many nonsystematic observations in the papers suggesting an association between restricted code and restricted intellectual capacities that, while lying outside theory, have propelled its application in a one-sided direction.

C. Wright Mills might well have characterized Bernstein's theory as grand-level in contrast to middle-level theory. It is not clear how "grand theories" are to be tested, and when, as here, they are considerably less than formal and systematic, the movement from concept to datum becomes hard to chart. Up to now, attempts to test Bernstein have been based only on early discarded formulations of the nature of elaborated and restricted communication. On these counts, as well as others to be discussed, it is difficult to assess how theory speaks to fact and fact to theory.

What is the nature of the empirical support that Bernstein and his colleagues have thus far presented? Three major sources of difficulty emerge from the empirical studies in Volume 2 of Class, Codes and Control: 1) the nature of the empirical data base; 2) the kinds of inferences about individuals and groups drawn from the data; and 3) the relation between data and Bernstein's theory.

First, it must be kept in mind that the entire corpus of data in the volume under review comes from interviews with mothers and children. The primary instruments in work with adults are interview schedules (about the uses of toys, the role of language in various aspects of socialization, interpersonal interactions, etc.). Language usage in children is assessed by presenting children pictures, which they are asked to talk about, and by interviews and similar devices designed to elicit children's speech.

The focus in these studies is with the interactions between social class and responses to different interview questions (or tasks) that act as surrogates for various social contexts. For example, in a paper on "Class and Uses of Toys," Bernstein and Young hypothesize a social class difference in responses to the following two statements about the importance of toys: 1) children are important because they will find out about things; 2) children will be helped in their schoolwork. In the papers by Bernstein and Henderson, and by Henderson, the questions concerned the role of language in various social situations (e.g., disciplining children, letting children know what you feel, letting others know what you really mean).

An illustration of the kinds of interaction that are most congenial to the theory can be drawn from the article by Bernstein and Henderson on the relevance of language to socialization. In assessing how middle-class and working-class mothers view the difficulty of teaching children nonverbally, they found that in a set of questions designed to tap "skill teaching," working-class mothers estimated the difficulty of teaching nonverbally to be more severe than did middle-class mothers. But the middle-class mothers emphasized the difficulty of teaching "how things work" relative to "teaching every day tasks," while the working-class mothers did not. This kind of result is taken to simultaneously undo the idea of verbal deprivation (since the working-class mothers emphasize language more than middle-class mothers) and provide support for Bernstein's class-by-situation analysis of the function of language (since the emphasis is context-specific).

There are technical difficulties involving the nature of specific statistical analyses involved in these results that we shall pass over. More serious, we believe, is the question of the validity of the results (a point that Bernstein and Henderson raise in the introduction to their paper).

The authors follow their presentation of results with the following statement:

It is not possible to infer from the mothers' responses what they actually would say to the child, but again we can refer to evidence obtained from the first interview with the mothers two years earlier. This evidence strongly suggests that:

(1) The middle-class mothers are more likely than working-class mothers to
take up the child's attempts to inter-act verbally with the mother in a range of contexts.  

(2) The middle-class mothers are less likely to avoid or evade answering difficult questions put to them by their children.  

(3) The middle-class mothers are less likely to use coercive methods of control.  

(4) The middle-class mothers are more likely to explain to the child why they want a change in his behavior. (Bernstein and Brandis, 1970).  

Thus, we have good reasons for believing that not only is there a difference between the social classes in their emphasis upon language in contexts of inter-personal control, but there is a difference in the meanings which are verbally emphasized (italics ours) (Vol. 2: 39).

Is this evidence seriously intended as a warrant for the validity of their results? Validity is not to be confused with plausibility. Its technical meaning is quite precise: the degree of correlation between a test and a criterion. Since the test in this case is an interview, and the criterion is another interview, only the reliability of the results can be at issue. Nowhere in the work presented is the validity of any of Bernstein's measures (e.g., the relation between interview responses to what mothers actually say) evaluated.

It would not be so important to make this point if the authors' disclaimers about the limitations of the data base were retained in the conclusions and discussion sections of the various papers. Unhappily, the discussions and conclusions read for all the world like descriptions of what mother and child really do.

Closely related to the matter of data base and the relation between "interview response versus real life behavior" is the question of what inferences about individuals, and particularly individual cognitive processes, are warranted by the data presented in these studies. It is our judgment that this is the area where Bernstein's ideas have been most widely abused, but also the area where he and his co-workers are most often open to misinterpretation (if, indeed, they are not guilty of the same abuses adopted by others). The central issue here is to determine what, if any, are the consequences of different codes and modes of control for individual psychological processes.

The procedure of testing a sociological theory of culture transmission by using questionnaires as a data base ought not, on the face of it, to elicit much evidence about individual cognitive processes. As a rule, especially when speaking to this issue directly, Bernstein adopts this position: he claims to be making statements only about patterns of language usage in socialization processes, at the level of sociological inferences. But at several points in both of the volumes under review, his interpretation of the consequences of different patterns of language use seems to involve statements about the cognitive processes of difference code users. By induction, this kind of conclusion is implicit in the citation of evidence that within social class groups, predominately elaborated code users score higher on I.Q. tests than predominately restricted code users (although the correlations are too low that an economist who was interested in prediction, not "significance," would be likely to dismiss the whole affair).

Often, however, indirectness becomes direct, either in studies that involve the use of I.Q. tests or other language measures where inferences about cognition ought to be even more circumspect. For example, the paper by Robinson and Creed purports to deal with codes, perception and discrimination. Correlations between code usage and I.Q. test scores, we are told, "gave clear and strong differentials, attesting to the reliability and validity of the materials used." We believe this statement to be entirely unfounded on the grounds discussed above. But to compound matters, Robinson and Creed go on to tell us,

Whereas the characteristics of the working-class language samples found in earlier studies could be attributed to a preference for certain modes of expression rather than an inability to use other grammatical structures or lexical elements, the results here support the view that group differences are more than matters of selective preferences (131).

This is not an isolated "slip." Turner, in an interesting treatment of children's use of commands, rules, and explanations, tells us that "such [explicit] communication will influence and develop two things in the child simultaneously, his use of language and his power of reasoning" (184); Hawkins claims "important cognitive consequences" for differences in type of speech between working-class and middle-class children (91). Bernstein and Young use I.Q. scores as measures of children's abilities in their paper on conceptions of toys: middle-class conceptions promote intelligence.

We can see no way to interpret these kinds of statements unless we assume that Bernstein and his co-workers believe that code usage influences individuals' cognitive abilities. Without entering the argument over the relation between I.Q. tests and cognitive processes, we want simply to point out that conclusions of the kind we have been citing are not strongly supported by the data and are antithetical to the major emphasis of Bernstein's theorizing as represented in Volume I and summarized in Halliday's preface to Volume 2. It seems that not only confused Americans, but confused Bernsteinians as well, are willing to conclude that cognitive deficits are a consequence of restricted code usage.

Given these difficulties, we have come to the conclusion that little data exist to support the relationships postulated in Bernstein's theory of the social determinants of language use. Yet the disjunction between present state of theory and present state of data should not obscure the value of Bernstein's framework as a guide to sociological and anthropological
research. Gumperz and Hymes (1972) suggest its usefulness to the ethnographer of communication as a guide to selecting what he chooses to observe, and as a means of giving fieldwork a sharper theoretical focus. We recommend it, too, for psychologists concerned with language and cognition, as a serious attempt to characterize how modes of socialization are translated into patterns of language usage. However, cognitive psychologists should approach the theory with a full awareness of their obligations to provide missing links between Bernstein's sociological hypotheses and hypotheses about the individual cognitive processes that are their principal concern.

If one treats it as a problematic framework for the study of the relations between social organization, language use, and cognition, and avoids temptations to select isolated elements from Bernstein's complex framework or to accept uncritically his limited observations, the work in Class, Codes and Control can be useful and stimulating to a variety of social scientists.

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Children's Language and Maternal Control

William S. Hall


This generally fine and important volume speaks to three areas of concern in social science: data, theory, and research method. In the first instance,