science (the characteristic example is Russian reflexology). The veil of natural science which was, according to Petzoldt,18 thrown over the most backward metaphysics, saved neither Herbart nor Wundt: neither the mathematical formulas nor the precision equipment saved an imprecisely stated problem from failure.

We are reminded of MUnsterberg and his remark about the last decimal point given in the answer to an incorrectly stated question. In biology, clarifies the author, the biogenetic law is a theoretical generalization of masses of facts, but its application in psychology is the result of superficial speculation, exclusively based upon an analogy between different domains of facts (Does not reflexology do the same? Without investigation of its own it borrows, using similar speculations, the ready- made models for its own constructions from the living and the dead—from Einstein and from Freud). And then, to crown this pyramid of mistakes, the principle is not applied as a working hypothesis, but as an established theory, as if it were scientifically established as an explanatory principle for the given area of facts.

We will not deal with this matter, as does the author of this opinion, in great detail. There is abundant, including Russian, literature on it. We will examine it to illustrate the fact that many questions which have been incorrectly stated by psychology acquire the outward appearance of science due to borrowings from the natural sciences. As a result of his methodological analysis, Shchelovanov comes to the conclusion that the genetic method is in principle impossible in empirical psychology and that because of this the relations between psychology and biology become changed. But why was the problem of development stated incorrectly in child psychology, which led to a tremendous and useless expenditure of effort? In Shchelovanov’s opinion, child psychology can yield nothing other than what is already contained in general psychology. But general psychology as a unified system does not exist, and these theoretical contradictions make a child psychology impossible. In a very disguised form, imperceptible to the investigator himself, the theoretical presuppositions fully determine the whole method of processing the empirical data. And the facts gathered in observation, too, are interpreted in accordance with the theory which this or that author holds. Here is the best refutation of the sham natural-science empiricism. Thanks to this, it is impossible to transfer facts from one theory to another. It would seem that a fact is always a fact, that one and the same subject matter—the child—and one and the same method—objective observation—albeit combined with different objectives and starting points, allow us to transfer facts from psychology to reflexology. The author is mistaken in only two respects.

His first mistake resides in the assumption that child psychology got its positive results only by applying general biological, but not psychological principles, as in the theory of play developed by Groos [1899]. In reality, this is one of the best examples not of borrowing, but of a purely psychological, comparative-objective study. It is methodologically impeccable and transparent, internally consistent from the first collection and description of the facts to the final theoretical generalizations. Groos gave biology a theory of play created with a psychological method. He did not take it from biology; he did not solve his problem in the light of biology, i.e., he did not set himself general psychological goals as well. Thus, exactly the opposite is correct: child psychology obtained valuable theoretical results precisely when it did not borrow, but went its own way. The author himself is constantly arguing against borrowing. Hall, who borrowed from Haeckel, gave psychology a number of curious topics and far-fetched senseless analogies, but Groos, who went his own way, gave much to biology—not less than Haeckel’s law. Let me also remind you of Stern’s theory of language, BUhler’s and Koffka’s theory of children’s thinking, BUhler’s theory of developmental levels, Thorndike’s theory of training: these