ence at this moment, what is the meaning and nature of the crisis it experiences and what will be its outcome? Let us proceed to the answer to these questions. When one is somewhat acquainted with the methodology (and history) of the sciences, science loses its image of a dead, finished, immobile whole consisting of ready-made statements and becomes a living system which constantly develops and moves forward, and which consists of proven facts, laws, suppositions, structures, and conclusions which are continually being supplemented, criticized, verified, partially rejected, interpreted and organized anew, etc. Science commences to be understood dialectically in its movement, i.e., from the perspective of its dynamics, growth, development, evolution. It is from this point of view that we must evaluate and interpret each stage of development. Thus, the first thing from which we proceed is the• acknowledgement of a crisis. What this crisis signifies is the subject of different interpretations. What follows are the most important kinds of interpretation of its meaning.

First of all, there are psychologists who totally deny the existence of a crisis. Chelpanov belongs among them, as do most of the Russian psychologists of the old school in general (only Lange and Frank have seen what is being done in science). In the opinion of such psychologists everything is all right in our science, just as in mineralogy. The crisis came from outside. Some persons ventured to reform our science; the official ideology required its revision. But for neither was there any objective basis in the science itself. It is true, in the debate one had to admit that a scientific reform was undertaken in America as well, but for the reader it was carefully—and perhaps sincerely—concealed that not a single psychologist who left his trace in science managed to avoid the crisis. This first conception is so blind that it is of no further interest to us. It can be fully explained by the fact that psychologists of this type are essentially eclectics and popularizers of other persons’ ideas. Not only have they never engaged in the research and philosophy of theft science, they have not even critically assessed each new school. They have accepted everything: the WUrzburg school and Husserl’s phenomenology, Wundt’s and Titchener’s41 experimentalism and Marxism, Spencer and Plato. When we deal with the great revolutions that take place in science, such persons are outside of it not only theoretically. In a practical sense as well they play no role whatever. The empiricists betrayed empirical psychology while defending it. The eclectics assimilated all they could from ideas that were hostile to them. The popularizers can be enemies to no one, they will popularize the psychology that wins. Now Chelpanov is publishing much about Marxism. Soon he will be studying reflexology, and the first textbook of the victorious behaviorism will be compiled by him or a student of his. On the whole they are professors and examiners, organizers and “Kulturträger,” but not a single investigation of any importance has emerged from theft school.

Others see the crisis, but evaluate it very subjectively. The crisis has divided psychology into two camps. For them the borderline lies always between the author of a specific view and the rest of the world. But, according to Lotze,42 even a worm that is half crushed sets off its reflection against the whole world. This is the official viewpoint of militant behaviorism. Watson (1926) thinks that there are two psychologies: a correct one—his own—and an incorrect one. The old one will die of its halfheartedness. The biggest detail he sees is the existence of halfhearted psychologists. The medieval traditions with which Wundt did not want to break wined the psychology without a soul. As you see, everything is simplified to an extreme. There is no particular problem in turning psychology into a natural science. For Watson this coincides with the point of view of the ordinary person, i.e., the methodology of common sense. Bekhterev, on the whole, evaluates the epochs in psy