p. 3) says, after he has explained the meaning of the empirical character of psychology: “Therefore, contemporary psychology often characterizes itself as a natural science about mental phenomena or a natural histoty of mental phenomena.” But this means that psychology wants to be a natural science about unnatural phenomena. It is connected with the natural sciences by a purely negative feature—the rejection of metaphysics—and not by a single positive one.

James explained the matter brilliantly. Psychology is to be treated as a natural science—that was his main thesis. But no one did as much as James to prove that the mental is “not natural scientific.” He explains that all the natural sciences accept some assumptions on faith—natural science ptoceeds from the materialistic assumption, in spite of the fact that further reflection leads to idealism. Psychology does the same—it accepts other assumptions. Consequently, it is similar to natural science only in that it uncritically accepts some assumptions; the assumptions themselves are contrary [see pp. 9—10 of Burkhardt, 1984].

According to Ribot, this tendency is the main trait of the psychology of the 19th century. Apart from this he mentions the attempts to give psychology its own principle and method (which it was denied by Comte) and to put it in the same relation to biology as biology occupies with respect to physics. But in fact the author acknowledges that what is called psychology consists of several categories of investigations which differ according to their goal and method. And when the authors, in spite of this, attempted to beget* a system of psychology and included Pavlov and Bergson, they demonstrated that this task cannot be realized. And in his conclusion Dumas [1924, p. 1121] formulates that the unity of the 25 authors consisted in the rejection of ontologieal speculation.

It is easy to guess what such a viewpoint leads to: the rejection of ontologieal speculations, empirism, when it is consistent, leads to the rejection of methodologi cally constructive principles in the creation of a system, to eclecticism; insofar as it is inconsistent, it leads to a hidden, uncritical, vague methodology. Both possibilities have been brilliantly demonstrated by the French authors. For them Pavlov’s psychology of reactions is just as acceptable as introspective psychology if only they are in different chapters of the book. In their manner of describing the facts and stating the problems, even in their vocabulary, the authors of the book show tendencies of associationism, rationalism, Bergsonism, and synthesism. It is further explained that Bergson’s conception is applied in some chapters, the language of associationism and atomism in others, behaviorism in still others, etc. The “TEtaité” wants to be impartial, objective, and complete. If it has not always been successful, Dumas [1924, p. 1156] concludes, at least the difference of opinion testifies to intellectual activity and ultimately in that sense it represents its time and country. We couldn’t agree more.

This disagreement—we have seen how far it goes—only convinces us of the fact that an impartial psychology is impossible today, leaving aside the fatal dualism of the “ilaité de psychologie” for which psychology is now part of biology, now stands to it as biology itself stands to physics.

Thus, the concept of empirical psychology contains an insoluble methodological contradiction. It is a natural science about unnatural things, a tendency to develop with the methods of natural science, i.e., proceeding from totally opposite premises, a system of knowledge which is contrary to them. This had a fatal influence upon the methodological construction of empirical psychology and broke its back.