[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza



Well it surprises me, David, that you support the idea of thought as an attribute of God. We learn something new every day. I am well aware that Spinoza still has many admirers but you are the first one I have met who goes so far as to see thought as an attribute of God, let alone combine this with Vygotsky's cultural psychology!

I accept that my interpretation of Hegel's Geist as activity is not universally shared, but most Hegelians who try to move out of the closed circle of the hermeneutics of old philosophical texts make just this interpretation; but it is generally implicit rather than declared up front, and not thought through.

But you misunderstand my interpretation: actions and projects are units of activity. "Projects" is not another name for "activity" and certainly not another name for Geist (to make sense of anything I write it is important not to conflate mass and count nouns). And although A N Leontyev deserves some credit for the symmetries between his Activity Theory and Hegel (so also does Engestrom), but I think it more likely that the Leontyev-Hegel relation was mediated by Vygotsky and Marx, and Leontyev introduced both novel improvements and unfortunate misunderstandings in his appropriation.

Andy

------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
On 28/07/2017 7:26 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
Actually, Andy, there are people who defend Spinoza's formulation of a
single substance with two modes. Halliday is one. I am another.

Consider the way in which you read Hegel. You don't actually use the term
for an explanatory principle which he chose, namely "Geist" or  "Spirit".
Sometimes you use Leontiev's term, "Activity", and sometimes you use your
own, much more Spinozan, term: "project".

Spinoza actually TELLS us how to read his explanatory principle "Deus Sive
Natura", or "God, that is to say, Nature". So the is one substance, and we
can call it "Nature". Culture has to be understood as an emergent part of
that nature.

The two modes are matter, of course, and a form of organization of that
matter, a kind of countercurrent to entropy, we can call "meaning". Meaning
matter that has been organized in some way to stand for something that is
not itself. Nature is one substance, with two modes: matter, that is
subject to the laws of thermodynamics (laws which do indeed distinguish
between past and future, just as Peter does), and meaning, which is matter
that has granted itself temporary surcease from them.

David Kellogg
Macquarie University

PS: I always thought that the great advantage of "project" over "activity"
was that it demystifies how this temporary surcease might work among
humans. To understand Spinoza's idea of "God"as a semiotic version of
"Nature" all we really have to do is to ask ourselves what "projects" might
look like among non-human, non-sentient, and non-living entities: colonies,
ecologies, and systems.

dk

On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:54 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

Following Wolff Michael’s lead concerning Mead and Schultz and how
*because* and determinism slips in through a posteriori accounts.

I am including  Vincent Colapietro’s voice as he discusses C. S. Peirce as
an exemplary person who saw himself as fulfilling a *role* in an emerging
historical *drama*.

  In paragraph # 11 Vincent describes the way Peirce himself *imaginally*
pursued his life project. Vincent is  clarifying the meaning of *historical
consciousness* as meaning *historical imagination*.

11 Regarding this, he [Peirce] was anything but a spectator. He was
self-consciously an agent who took himself to be responsible, in some
measure, for the development of a practice. Accordingly, a dramatic sense
of his intellectual obligations animated and guided his orientation toward
the past and also his involvement in the disputes of his own day, not least
of all, the dispute between the progeny of the scholastic realists and the
offspring of the Renaissance humanists.  In brief, his understanding of the
past fostered a consciousness of his role in a drama. More than anything
else, this is what I mean by historical consciousness as distinct from
historical knowledge. This is a distinction, not a dichotomy or dualism.
Peirce was convinced that the reality of the past was, to some extent,
discoverable. He was unquestionably a realist, not a skeptic or what is
commonly called a constructivist. But he was also a pragmatist. Whatever
reality (including the reality of the past) means must be spelled out in
terms of habits of conduct bearing upon the future. Part of the difficulty
is giving equal weight to both the realist and pragmatist facets of his
thought, another part showing how they are anything but incompatible.

Vincent’s article describes Peirce’s work as an example that was
exemplary  on the way to creating a paradigm shift [emerging framework]
that guides further inquiry  within historical imagination.

Vincent also adds this insight:

“While Descartes drew a sharp distinction between intellect and
imagination, Peirce returned to the scholastic position [human intelligence
is rooted in and depends on our imaginative capacities].  The Poet Alfred
Tennyson wrote ‘maybe wildest dreams / Are but the needful preludes of the
truth’  to which Peirce responds:
‘ I doubt the word *maybe*? Wildest dreams [or fancies] *are* the first
steps toward scientific investigation.’  [Peirce 1966: 233]



Sent from Mail for Windows 10

From: Wolff-Michael Roth
Sent: July 27, 2017 10:48 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re:Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza

The first part of Peter's statement '*Past* is determined..." is pretty
well how Mead describes the duration we call present.

The second part is not. Peter writes, "there exists opportunities to sway
the forces..." Mead emphasizes *emergence*, which means, there is a
fundamental unpredictability at work. Schütz (1932) distinguishes
*because*-motives
and *in-order-to-*motives, and describes how determination slips in through
a posteriori accounts (because), which does not exist when we orient toward
the future. Lucy Suchman takes this up in her two views on plans, which
orient for but do not determine situated action.

Michael


Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor

------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
Applied Cognitive Science
MacLaurin Building A567
University of Victoria
Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>

New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
<https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the-
mathematics-of-mathematics/>*

On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 10:29 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:

That seems right to me, Peter, in my vast ignorance of the original texts
being discussed.

Your characterization seems to me of a kind with the intuition in the
epigram to the lchcautobiogrphy:

“All experience is an arch wherethrough gleams
that untravelled world whose margin fades
forever and forever when I move. _Tennyson
Might freewill be the name of the experience of an organism living in a
loosely coupled, non-linear, dynamic system? Of course it is a
constrained
world.... it is a living system.. but constraint and determinism are not
synonyms and the conditional in "conditional reflexes" refers to
historical
contingency in the life of the organism..... and hence "choice"  ( i
think
that i think).

mike

On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 9:13 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:

Dear friends,

I am certainly no expert in this area, but I think it might be helpful
to
this discussion to point out the difference between determinism and
pre-determinism. The *past* is determined, but the *future* is not. In
the
future (or the next moment), there exist opportunities to sway the
forces
that are in play, to bend them to our will.

If this conception is correct, then the problem of free will (aimed at
the
future) becomes one of discovering how activities with signs make use
of
conditional reflexes (determination) to forge a different path forward
than
the one that might otherwise have occurred in the absence of sign use.

Hope this helps.

Cheers,
Peter





On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
wrote:
If everything is determined, then all that a human being can do is
whatever is necessary, and if they are enlightened, be aware of that.
In
a
determined world free will is impossible because there is no choice.


At the time Spinoza was making a comeback in Germany around the
1790s,
there was a lot of debate about the seeming impossibility of free
will
(which is of course still a total mystery to the neuroscientists,
which
is
probably what is behind people like Damasio's liking for Spinoza.) In
my
opinion, Fichte made the decisive breakthrough in saying that a
person
becomes free when they were *recognised* as a free being by another
free
being, and called upon to exercise their freedom, by exercising
restraint
and recognising the rights of others (the child development people
will
relate to this). Hegel associated the emergence of free will with the
formation of states in which citizens had rights; without the basic
freedoms enjoyed by citizens of a state, we are reduced to the animal
condition. Nothing to do with the structure of the brain or quantum
mechanics as John Searle suggests, it's just social relations.


If you take the problem seriously - how can flesh obedient to the
laws
of
physics, chemistry and biology, have free will - it is a tough
problem
to
solve.


Andy

------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint.
com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-
2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ
Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC
mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a
oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
On 28/07/2017 1:16 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:

Thanks Andy, I was thinking more *why would determinism ​​imply the
absence of free will* ... In any case, thanks for the link; I too am
just a
student, ​​​only that with quite more left to read yet!


Alfredo

------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
*Sent:* 27 July 2017 15:16
*To:* Alfredo Jornet Gil; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
*Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza

It is true, Alfredo, that the absence of free will (as everywhere
outside
of human life) does not imply determinism. But Spinoza held both
positions.
It is a long time since I studied Spinoza and I don't have notes
from
that
time, so I can't source my own recollections on this.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it thusly:
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__plato.s
tanford.edu_entries_spinoza-2Dmodal_&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh
2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmP
Hilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA
_lU&s=rSGhtQHeOjRw3595HeZIfmyBC98jJkHTjPIm3w7QM68&e=
Andy

------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint.
com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-
2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ
Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC
mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a
oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
On 27/07/2017 10:58 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:

Yes, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza was sustained, though I doubt
he
agreed that this was 'thinly disguised dualism.' It does not sound
like
that when he writes that '[Spinoza is] the antithesis to
parallelism
and,
consequently to the dualism of Descartes' (English collected works,
vol. 6,
p. 122).

In any case, I know of no one arguing these days to try to
wholesale
'apply' Spinoza's ontology to psychology either.

I am not sure how you are using the notion *determinist* or why
determinism would be involved in ruling out *free will*.
Understanding
this
would greatly help me see your points.

Alfredo

________________________________________
From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.
edu
on behalf of Andy Blunden<ablunden@mira.net>
Sent: 27 July 2017 14:39
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Отв: Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza

Alfredo, there is indeed clear textual evidence that
Vygotsky maintained an intense interest in Spinoza. My guess
is that it was Spinoza's place in the history of philosophy
as the first person to attempt to overcome Descartes'
dualism by building a monist, material philosophy, based on
Descartes' "geometric" method, which held Vygotsky's
interest and respect. This effort, for which Spinoza was
persecuted, inspired many philosophers despite Spinoza being
banned across Europe for more than a century.

However, I see no evidence that Vygotsky entertained for a
moment Spinoza's "solution", viz., a single substance,
a.k.a., God or Nature, or anything else you want to call it,
with infinitely many attributes, one being extension and
another being thought and the infinitely many others being
God knows what. I see plenty of evidence that Vygotsky
followed the idealist Hegel in conceiving of that one
substance as Activity - for Hegel under the name of "Spirit."

As a free-thinking philosopher, Spinoza's works are full of
insightful aphorisms and so on. His basic project (a monist
materialism) is right. But his solution is hopeless and I
have not met a single soul who has usefully appropriated
this substance with infinite attributes. Apart from its
mysticism, it is (as Vygotsky notes) *determinist* and rules
out free will, and is a thinly disguised dualism: one
substance with two attributes instead of two substances. Any
attempt to deploy Spinozan ontology in experimental
Psychology is a charade.

In the 21st century, Spinoza is no longer a dead dog, but he
is a dead end.

Andy

------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint.
com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-
2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ
Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC
mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a
oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
On 27/07/2017 8:29 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:

Hi Alexander,

a very interesting text, written in brilliant prose. I very much
appreciate your observations that 'the psychophysical (and not the
psychophysiological) ... poses a REAL task akin to that which
arose
in the
course of the evolution of living and mobile beings', and that
'intelligent
action ... is itself ... congruent with the real corporeal form of
some
other body'. These propositions interest me a lot. Indeed, and led
by
W-M
Roth, we did last year co-author a book where we entertained such
propositions with respect to educational psychology (front matter
attached,
link here: ).

Like you, in that book, we are critical to Vygotsky's ways of
writing
about signs, specially in the works you cite. Yet, upon reading
your
article, on the whole, I wondered whether your characterisation
was
fair to
Vygotsky's actual legacy. You describe Vygotsky's position as
this:
'an unfree, essentially mechanical puppet acquires freedom through
overcoming natural determination (the SR reaction, the mechanical
triggering of a response by an external stimulus) in the act of
mediation
by a cultural sign'

I agree that Vygotsky clearly uses the term 'sign' in many
instances
in
the conventional sense you refer to. But this way of writing
sharply
contrasts with other important tenets and arguments in his legacy.
When I
read Vygotsky's characterisations of the 'word' in Thinking and
Speech, for
example, I do not think he 'understands the word unambiguously as
an
arbitrary, conventional sign', as you suggest in your article (p.
40). In
chapter 7, and paraphrasing Feuerbach, he writes that 'the word
is
what
... is absolutely impossible for one person but possible for two.
The
word
is the most direct manifestation of the historical nature of human
consciousness' (English Vol. 1, p. 285). To me, that suggests a
very
different view of words as signs than simply conventional,
arbitrary
(as if
unconstrained and magic) means.

In other places, he also writes that, 'Freedom, as the opposite of
nature, cannot find a place in [Spinoza's system]. Freedom may be
only an
element of that nature, not an opposite to natural necessity but
only
one
of the forms of this necessity' (English Collected works, vol. 6,
p.
172).
Coming from someone who would also write that any higher
psychological
function was first a societal relation (and what is action if not
a
societal relation?), how could he believe that the solution to the
problem
of freedom was arbitrariness, being as he was committed to
social-historical necessity, to human needs?

In our book, we try to address these kind of contradictions by
imagining what a Vygotskyan (educational) psychology would be if
Vygotsky
would have indeed pursued the Spinozist quest he did not finish. I
think
there may be more common ground between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov than
your
article allows, but this is surely not very much explored in
mainstream
uptakes. I am only a student on these matters, and I can not know
in
advance how far we will come with this integrative program, but it
seems to
me that neither discarding semiotics for the primacy of action,
nor
discarding action for the primacy of semiotics are promising
paths.
In the hope to sustain productive dialogue,
Alfredo




From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.
edu>
on behalf of Alexandre Sourmava<avramus@gmail.com>
Sent: 26 July 2017 00:27
To:ablunden@mira.net; Larry Purss; eXtended Mind, Culture,
Activity
Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l]       Отв:  Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza

Hi, Larry!



Thank you for your attentionto the article.
Your retelling of the topic is quite correct.
However, I think it can be useful to add my little comment
concerning
the topicunder discussion.
Bernstein’s position is substantially spinozian and thereby
antisemiotic.
Evidently, he bluntly contradicts to Vygotsky’sattempts to use
arbitrary sign as a magic key designed to solve the problem of
freedom
(independence from mechanical causality).
Thus Vygotsky insisted that
”Looking from the very broad philosophical perspective the whole
realm
ofhistory, culture, and language is the realm of arbitrariness. So
the
method ofconditional reflex acquires a very broad meaning of a
natural-historical methodconcerning human, of a tie that binds
history and
evolution together.”
(«В самом широком философском смысле этого терминавесь мир
истории,
культуры, языка — это царство условности. В этом смысле
методусловных
рефлексов приобретает широчайшее значение
методаприродно-исторического в
применении к человеку, узла, который связывает историюи эволюцию»

ВыготскийЛ. С. Психологическая наука в СССР. В кн.: «Общественные
науки
в СССР(1917-1927 гг.)». М., 1928, с. 30.)

There exists a prejudice that so called “Cultural-historical
theory”
withits arbitrary signs is a sophisticated antithesis to coarse
Pavlov’s
mechanicalapproach. Alas, that is far from reality. In fact, these
two
theories are identical.That is the reason why Nicolai Bernstein
who
was
Vygotsky’s good friend had neverreferred to his ideas.

Sasha Surmava

       вторник, 25 июля 2017 4:29 Andy Blunden<ablunden@mira.net>
писал(а):


    I see.

This is a slightly different context. The original meaning
of "paradigm," before the popularisation of Thomas Kuhn's
work, was a "founding exemplar."
"Exemplar" presumably has the same etymology as "example."

The idea of "an example" as being one of numerous instances
of a process is a different concept, the opposite really.

Andy

------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint.
com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_origins-
2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJ
Qh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0EC
mPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1a
oA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=
On 25/07/2017 2:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote:

Andy,
I will reference where I got the notion of linking
[example] and [framework]. If this becomes interesting
will open another thread.
   From David L. Marshall titled : "Historical and
Philosophical Stances: Max Harold Fisch, a Paradigm for
Intellectual Historians" -2009-

PAGE 270:

"Max Fisch constitutes an alternative to any intellectual
historical method insisting that practiontioners remain
agnostics about the value of the ideas they study.  It is
the chief contention of this essay that he is a 'paradigm'
for intellectual historians, a paradigm in the original
Greek sense of an *example* and in the DERIVED
contemporary sense of a *framework* within which the
community of research can proceed. Indeed it is just such
*doubling* of the philological object qua example into a
carapace for ongoing action and thought that Fisch
explored in a variety of ways during his half century of
creative intellectual work. "


Andy, not sure if this is adequate context, but the
relationality of [example : framework] through the concept
*paradigm* seemed generative??

On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 7:21 AM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net  <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:

       "actions" or "an action" ... no extra word is needed.
       Extra words like "singular," "individual" or "single"
       only confuse the matter. "Examples" is too vague.

       Cannot make sense of the rest of your message at all,
       Larry.

       Andy

       ------------------------------
------------------------------
       Andy Blunden
       https://urldefense.proofpoint.
com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=   <https://urldefense.proofpoin
t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=
aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy
N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA
U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeNoWHbH6u5oCFpI&e=
       https://urldefense.proofpoint.
com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril
l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-
2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW
8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV
vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-
6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=       <https://urldefense.proofpoin
t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_
origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv
EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0
ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea
1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >

       On 25/07/2017 12:17 AM, Lplarry wrote:

       Andy,

       Following your lead it may be preferable to say
       single (individual) to indicate the uniqueness of
       variable  social actions. This doubling  (by
       including both terms) may crystallize the intended
       meaning as you mention.

       Andy is this vein can we also include the term
       (examples)?

       Then the moving TRANS forming from single
       (individual) social acts towards (practices) would
       indicate the movement from examples to exemplary
       actions and further movement (historicity) toward
       (framework) practices.

       (framework) practices being another doubling.

       So moving (transforming) from single social  examples
       through exemplary social  examples crystallizing in
       social framework practices.

       Is this reasonable?

       Or not

       Sent from my Windows 10 phone

       *From: *Andy Blunden<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
       *Sent: *July 24, 2017 6:57 AM
       *To: *eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
       <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
       *Cc: *Alexander Surmava<mailto:monada@netvox.ru>
       *Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza

       Larry, when you say "Action IS individual," did you
       mention

       to say that *actions* - the individual units of
       *action* are

       individual? In which can it is of course a tautology.

       But *action* is irreducibly *social*, and so is every

       "individual" action. Or better, so is every
       "singular" action.

       A lot of relevant differences are coded in the English

       language by the use of the count-noun or mass noun
       form, but

       on the whole the set of words (action, actions,
       activity,

       activities) and the set of words (practice,
       practices) have

       no systematic difference running across all
       disciplines and

       schools of thought. For us CHATters, "activities" are
       practices.

       If you read Hegel and Marx, there is an added issue: the

       German words for action (Handlung) and activity
       (Tatigkeit)

       are more or less inverted for Hegel, and he doesn't use

       Aktivitat at all.

       Andy

       ------------------------------
------------------------------
       Andy Blunden

       https://urldefense.proofpoint.
com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mir
a.net_-7Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc
2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yW
SMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=kDRs5AA6bAPvKr4UH
G_2qyHJRMr97f8whenHHseziGg&e=   <https://urldefense.proofpoin
t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.mira.net_-257Eandy&d=DwIDaQ&c=
aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxy
N3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zA
U37zePea1aoA_lU&s=KGvfCRWmTxjssBuITnfPM7l1T9qgeN
oWHbH6u5oCFpI&e=
       https://urldefense.proofpoint.
com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.bril
l.com_products_book_origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-
2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW
8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZV
vFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-
6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e=       <https://urldefense.proofpoin
t.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.brill.com_products_book_
origins-2Dcollective-2Ddecision-2Dmaking&d=DwIDaQ&c=aqMfXOEv
EJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0
ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=9yWSMfZVvFB4Onmfd0mAPmxn38zAU37zePea
1aoA_lU&s=G44x-CoqWItWoEukYgCD-6oh7Rt-3QnUioSOV9-RLPI&e= >


       On 24/07/2017 11:42 PM, Larry Purss wrote:

       > Alexander, Mike,

       > Thanks for the article.

       > Moving to page 51 I noticed that when referencing
       Bernstein he contrasted (action) with (practice) and
       did not REPEAT (identity) the thesis about the role
       of practice in knowing).

       > Two formulas:

       > • Knowing THROUGH ‘action’

       > • Verification of knowing THROUGH ‘practice’

       >

       > These two formulas closely RESEMBLE each other but
       do not co-incide

       >

       > Action IS individual

       > Practice IS a social category.

       >

       > Sociohistorical (practice) in the final analysis is
       nothing other than the SUM total of the actions of
       individual who are separate.

       >

       > Individual action is LIKE a single experiment.
       They are alike in that both individual action & a
       single experiment are poorly suited to the role of :

       >

       > A philosophical criterion of (truth).

       >

       > I do not have the background to intelligently
       comment, but did register this theme as provocative
       FOR further thought and wording.

       > And for generating intelligent commentary

       >

       >

       >

       >

       > Sent from Mail for Windows 10

       >

       > From: Ivan Uemlianin

       > Sent: July 20, 2017 11:17 AM

       > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity

       > Cc: Alexander Surmava

       > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ilyenkov, Marx, & Spinoza

       >

       > Yes very interesting thank you! (Ilyenkov fan)

       >

       > Ivan

       >

       > --

       > festina lente

       >

       >

       >> On 20 Jul 2017, at 18:00, mike cole
       <mcole@ucsd.edu>  <mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu>  wrote:

       >>

       >> This article might prove of interest to those who
       have been discussing

       >> LSV's sources in

       >> marx and spinoza.

       >> mike

       >> <Ilyenkov_and_the_Revolution_in_Psycholog.pdf>

       >

       >



--
Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
Director,
Office of Institutional Research
<https://www.fordham.edu/info/24303/institutional_research>
Fordham University
Thebaud Hall-202
Bronx, NY 10458

Phone: (718) 817-2243
Fax: (718) 817-3817
email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu