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[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'



David, after reading this fascinating 2-page narrative about Ricoeur and the structuralists out of the blue we get the conclusion: "And the power is not in the word, but in the wording." Have I missed something? Is "wording" ineffable?

Andy

------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
On 26/04/2017 7:13 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
I remember Paul Ricoeur. He taught at a seminary at the University of
Chicago when I was an undergraduate. I was a member of the campus Spartacus
Youth Club, and it was the only place that would allow us a public space
for meetings. I tried to sell him a copy of "Young Spartacus" once: I can't
remember if he bought it or not. But I remember him as a French gentleman,
personally quite conservative, but not at all put off by the presence of
a screaming red nineteen year old who for inexplicable reasons had
a Parisian accent and spoke the argot of the Versailles banlieue. Maybe he
bought our French paper, Le Bolchevik.

I have been reading a symposium "On Narrative" that was going on at UC when
I was organizing against Milton Friedman's Nobel Prize (he was also a
professor there at the time--he won the prize the same year that Saul
Bellow, another UC professor, did). Ricoeur, Derrida, and Hayden White all
took part.

It was the heyday of structuralism, and Ricoeur's contribution is
interesting because it's quite ANTI-structuralist: he points out that the
effect of structuralism on narrative studies has been to de-historicize,
de-memorize, dehumanize; to convert stories into exchange values rather
than use values. So the elements that Propp discovers in Ludmilla and
Ruslan (and the Firebird and its variants) can come in any order. In
contrast, even the simplest act of repetition is historicized, humanized,
and memorable. A use value and not an exchange value.

Derrida ignores everybody else and embarks on his usual verbal
pyrotechnics, but Hayden White develops Ricoeur's idea in a way I think I
actually used in my "Thinking of Feeling" paper: human memory goes through
stages: medieval annals, Renaissance chronicles, and the nineteenth century
narrative, each of which adds something distinctive and makes the
meta-narrative that they form together into something non-reversible and
developmental. But now I see that the reviewers made me remove all that (it
is just as well: sociogenesis is one story and ontogenesis quite another).

Ruqaiya Hasan used to say that there is a certain unity imposed on
experience by language, from "the living of life" to the child's first real
morpho-phoneme. If you take the phrase "the living of life" just as an
example, you can see some of what Ricoeur is trying to get at. On the face
of it, the phrase is redundant: the word "life" seems to contain absolutely
nothing that isn't already there in "living". Yet "of life" must mean
something, otherwise it would not enable us to add the specifier "the" to
"living".

I think Ricoeur would say that "life" is a kind of de-historicized,
de-memorized, de-humanized "living", one that is turned from process into
entity, and made synoptical, like the various retellings in different
orders of the four Gospels. Yes, it's a powerful way of speaking, but it is
powerful the way that sculpture is rather than the way that painting is.
And the power is not in the word, but in the wording.

David Kellogg
Macquarie University




On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 4:31 AM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

Mike,
There is a particular example that occurred here when Wolff-Michael
referenced Ricouer’s 3 volume project exploring metaphor and narrativity
and their common unifying theme existing within human temporality
(finitude).
Is there an expectation for ‘us’ to go back and reference Ricouer’s
exploration of this relation in depth? Through reading and re-reading these
works of scholarship.
I myself turned to the preface of Ricouer’s 3 volume exploration of this
particular relation,  metaphor/narrativity:: Temporality.

Without human temporality, narrativity and metaphor would not exist.

On this listserve there was a glance or nod in Ricouer’s direction and
then???.

This month we are recycling themes which already exist in the archive, but
is this recycling just repetition,, or renovation, or innovation?.

Peg’s metaphor of leaving loose threads for others to return to expresses
a temporal sense ability at odds with high impact journals.


Sent from my Windows 10 phone

From: mike cole
Sent: April 25, 2017 11:02 AM
To: Larry Purss
Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'

Right Larry. A lot of high impact journals (not all) are deeply
a-historical.

When my wife and I were writing a textbook, we had, with each addition,
to cut out older refs. To be allow to refer to Gesell, Rousseau in a
serious manner was a constant battle.

But what the heck. In a lot of classes that use the textbook, students are
not required to remember or re-cover material from the mid-term on the
final exam. In a course on development in a field that makes a big deal of
sequence and growth over time. Live for the moment, no need to know the
history of behavior in order to understand it.

Yes, mediation has not gone away, despite its claimed ailments and devious
traps.  :-)

mike

On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 2:00 PM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
So... If more than 10 years old makes thinking and thought anethema WHAT
does that say about the scope of thinking of high impact journals?

When returning to wording, statement, and utterance I hope we also turn
back to ‘mediation’.
I have this definition of mediation to consider: (carrying across -within
back/forth) BOTH (giving/receiving) within a singular relation
This is felt differently than mediation: (carrying over to the other side)
which may imply bridges  required for joining or linking two pre-existing
sides (first one and then the other).


Sent from my Windows 10 phone

From: mike cole
Sent: April 23, 2017 9:54 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'

Hi David et al --

Found my copy of Cole and Scribner! To my relief, it appears that somewhere
along the way there was a misattribution of that quote you posted that
Hasan criticized and that I wanted to disavow (but there it was in black
and white!).

So, apropos, we have a problem of context here.  If you look at p. 25 of
Scribner and Cole, you will find that the quotation was in a paper by Cole
and Gay (1972) (A paper on culture and memory in the American
Anthropologist I had did not recall the date of. If you go just one
sentence above the quotation you find the following:

*For instance, one anthropologist commented, upon hearing about the results
of our first research in this area (Gay and Cole 1967): The reasoning and
thinking processes of different people in different cultures don't differ .
. . just their values, beliefs, and ways of classifying differ [personal
correspondence ].*


We were *contesting *this statement which was the anthropological consensus
at the time. For those interested in our own views at the time,

it is best to consult Chapter 8 of that book by Cole and Scribner on
*Culture
and Thought. *(Its all antiquarian stuff anyway. Its now 50 years since the
first publication of that line of work! References more than 10 years old
are anethema to HIGH IMPACT  journals!  :-) and :-(


mike


Which takes the discussion back to the discussion of wording, stating, and
uttering.

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 1:39 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth <
wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:

Julian,
I suggest reading Rossi-Landi, and Italian Marxist scholar, where I have
taken this:

Like other products of labor, signs, words, expressions,
and messages have use value in communication and are subject to exchange,
distribution, and consumption; the markets within which these
products circulate as commodities are linguistic communities (Rossi-
Landi 1983).

An appreciation of his contributions by Cianca Bianchi states: "Through
his
"homological schema",
material and linguistic production are conceived to be the result of a
single process
that is particular to human beings and that can best be understood in
terms
of work
and trade. "

Cheers,

Michael




------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor
Applied Cognitive Science
MacLaurin Building A567
University of Victoria
Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>

New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
<https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
directions-in-mathematics-and-science-education/the-
mathematics-of-mathematics/>*

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 12:09 PM, Julian Williams <
julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

Michael

As you were - so we are entirely in disagreement, then.

For me the E-V and U-V of a dialogic exchange has nothing essentially
to
do with the sensual and super sensual moments of the 'word' as per
Vygotsky. And I don't see at all how these really confer 'value' in any
Marxist sense of the term on speech/utterance (etc etc).

I am guessing that we are back with analogy of 'commodity' and 'word'
in
dialogue, rather than a holistic understanding of discourse in the
totality of social-economic relations, and so we have made no progress
here.

We can take this up another time perhaps.

Julian



On 22/04/2017 19:47, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:

Julian,
E-V and U-V, but not of the kind that you are talking about, the
abstract
.
. . You can look at it like LSV, who emphasizes that the word has a
sensible (material) part and a supersensual (ideal) part, not in the
abstract, but concretely realized in every exchange. Michael

-----------------------------------------------------------
---------------
------
Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor
Applied Cognitive Science
MacLaurin Building A567
University of Victoria
Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>

New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
<https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
directions-in-mat
hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>*

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 11:38 AM, Julian Williams <
julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

M.

Um, hang on a minute - I agree with everything you said here (I
think..).

So I suppose this means you agree(d) with me; een though I thought I
was
challenging your view. I thought you were trying to find E-V and U-V
in
the dialogue-in-itself, where I think it's value has to be
understood
by
the way it is mediated through the wider field of discourse/practice
(i.e.
In its meaning/sense in terms of the real exchanges taking place in
practice).

So the point is that one can only understand the exchanges taking
place
within the wider context- the worker exchanges 10 hours of labour
for
the
commodities required to keep themselves alive for a day … but this
has
to
be understood within the system that allows the capitalist to
exploit
those 10 hours for a profit, and pay wages that do not allow the
worker
to
purchase the goods they this produce (or their equivalent)…. There
are
obvious analogies in discourse too.

Julian

Ps I see I have raised 'mediation' now - oops.



On 22/04/2017 19:15, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of
wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:

Julian,
My sense is that you are referring to macro-issues, you need to
stand
back,
abstract, and look from the outside at a system, let it unfold in
front of
your eyes.

I am concerned with the actual constitution of society in
individual
exchanges, actual relations between two or more people, the
"ensemble"
of
which constitutes society (Marx, Vygotsky, Leont'ev). I am thus
concerned
with actual exchange relations, the kind Marx refers to in the
first
100
pages of das Kapital, where he has the tailor exchange a coat with
the
weaver receiving two yards of cloth . . . The tailor exchanges
his/her
cloth with others, like the farmer, for 40 bushels of grain . . .
In
my
work, I am following them around, concerned not with "meaning" or
"ideal"
in the abstract but as realized in every THIS occasion of a social
relation.

My sense is that the differences you point out (attempt to) lie
there---perhaps.

Michael

-----------------------------------------------------------
---------------
------
Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor
Applied Cognitive Science
MacLaurin Building A567
University of Victoria
Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/
faculty/mroth/>
New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
<https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
directions-in-mat
hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-mathematics/>*

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 10:24 AM, Julian Williams <
julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

Michael

Going back many, many posts now: almost 24 hours worth, I think.

When I wrote this:

'Thus, I suggest, the 'exchange/use value' of an
utterance/dialogic
exchange maybe ought to be examined in the ideological context of
its
relationship with the 'whole' of social re/production where class
power
becomes visible. I don't know how to do this, but the argument is
there
in
Bourdieu: the power relations between people are part of the
capital-mediated structure of relations in a field (including the
field
of
opinion/discourse), and this explains the forms of discourse that
express
these power relationships and help to hold powerful positions in
place
in
the field. In this view it is not possible to identify the
'value'
of an
utterance or a sign outside of this wider analysis… and an
analysis
of
the
particular discursive/cultural field within its wider sociality.'

The sort of thing I had in mind was this
'word/utterance/statement'
of
yours (I care not at the moment which of these is chosen - in
this
context
I am not clear it matters, though I recognise that every work was
once
an
utterance and a speech act… and that parsing into words is a
relatively
recent cultural artifice):

'…. My personal inclination would be to take Ricœur as more
authoritative
on the subject than any or most of us' (see below)

I think the 'value' (i.e. exchange value) of this statement of
yours
in
my
frame has to be understood in the context of its function/workthe
academic field (or this section of it), how power is exerted here
through
reference to 'authorities' like Ricoeur (NB not just 'authors'
like
the
rest of us? ), whether this is really useful in helping the
community to
progress its understanding of the issue for practical purposes
(e.g.
How
many of the readers of this post have seriously read Ricoeur
enough
to
get
the point?).

How our community of discourse comes to be structured so that
power
'works' like this - that is a wider issue - and  here it does get
hard
for
us academics to see ourselves as we perhaps could or should be
seen.
Michael: I hope you don't take this cheeky affront too
personally:
I
could
do the same to most of the posts that one reads on xmca, and
probably
my
own-  I don't mean to suggest that they have no use-value, and
certainly
not that the collective dialogue has no use value. Yet still… we
should
recognise that there is a power game in this field of
discourse/opinion,
if we are to understand one another well. It may even be argued
(with
some
merit?) that a quote appealing to Marx - or even Ricoeur - has
some
use
as
well as exchange value (or lets say merit) in linking ideas to a
body of
previous revolutionary work.

Hugs!

Julian



On 21/04/2017 16:53, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf
of
Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf
of
wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:

Ricœur (1985), in *Time and Narrative 2*, uses the following
distinction
for the purposes of theorizing the difference between narrated
time
and
time of narration. Accordingly, "narrative posses" "the
remarkable
property" "of being split into utterance [*énociation*] and
statement [
*énoncé*]."
To introduce this distinction, it suffices to recall that the
configurating
act presiding
over emplotment is a judicative act, involving a "grasping
together."
More
precisely, this act belongs to the family of reflective
judgments.1
We
have
been
led to say therefore that to narrate a story is already to
"reflect
upon"
the event
narrated. For this reason, narrative "grasping together" carries
with
it
the capacity
for distancing itself from its own production and in this way
dividing
itself in two. (p. 61)

My personal inclination would be to take Ricœur as more
authoritative
on
the subject than any or most of us.

Michael


-----------------------------------------------------------
---------------
------
Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor
Applied Cognitive Science
MacLaurin Building A567
University of Victoria
Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <http://education2.uvic.ca/
faculty/mroth/
New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
<https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
directions-in-mat
hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-
mathematics/>*
On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 10:38 PM, David Kellogg
<dkellogg60@gmail.com>
wrote:

I think that "statement" is too tight, and "utterance" is too
loose.
A
statement is an indicative-declarative wording of some kind:
we
don't
usually refer to commands (imperatives), questions
(indicative-interrogatives), or exclamations as "statements"
because
their
primary purpose is not to state facts (that is, if there are
facts,
they
are ancillary, and not constitutive: we can have a command, a
question,
or
an exclamation without any statement of any state of affairs,
e.g.
"Look
out!" "Why?" "Oh, no!"). So "statement" is too narrow.

An utterance, as Bakhtin defines it, is simply the stretch of
language
we
find between two changes in speaker (this is why a book is a
single
utterance). This is an entirely descriptive unit: if I give
you
a
tape
of
listening test dialogues for the Test of Proficiency in
Korean,
you
will be
able to tell me exactly how many utterances there are in each
dialogue,
and
even whether the speakers are men or women, without
understanding
any of
the language. As a link between thinking and speech, such a
unit
is
beside
the point. So "utterance" is too broad.

And linking thinking and speech IS the point. I think you and
Vygotsky
are
using the word "holophrase" somewhat teleologically, like a
fond,
but
expectant, grandpa. You both think that the baby who says
"mama"
really
means a holophrase like "Mama, put me in the high chair". It's
not
the
case
that "Mama" is a reduction of a full sentence (like "Fine,
thanks,
and
you?"). It's more like the Ur Wir, or "Grandwe", the "we" that
pre-exists
"me" and "you" the way that my grandpa pre-existed me. I am
also
using
the
word "wording" teleologically, you notice: "Mama" is, from the
child's
point of view, meaning and sounding, but not wording at all.
But
teleology
is very useful here; indeed, I think that teleology in speech
ontogenesis
is a more useful principle than evolution: there is, after
all,
a
"complete
form" right there in the environment.

The problem with Thinking and Speech is that, unlike Capital,
the
author
died in the middle of writing it, and it had to be eked out
with
his
old
articles. So although Chapter One and Chapter Seven really do
use
wording
and not word as a unit of analysis (and the "phoneme" is
really
the
morpho-phoneme, e.g. a Russian case ending, something Vygotsky
probably
learned all about from his old professor Trubetskoy and his
classmate at
Moscow University Jakobson). you also have Chapter Five, which
our
late,
beloved friend Paula Towsey loved so much.

She had reason: Chapter Five is Vygotsky, and so it's
brilliant.
But
it's
OLD Vygotsky, 1928-1929 Vygotsky (that was the year that
Trubetskoy
and
Jakobson left Moscow for Prague and set up the Prague
Linguistic
Circle
which eventually became systemic-functional linguistics).
Chapter
5
is based on something from the German idealist psychologists
Reimat
and
Ach, who really DID believe in one-word concepts. And so we
have
this
weird
block-like model of word meaning. Vygotsky tries to disenchant
and
de-fetishize the blocks by saying the concept is really the
process
of
relating the word meaning to the block, but that still means
that
a
concept
is an abstraction and a generalization of some block-like
quality.
Chapter Six is better, because here the "model" of word
meaning
is a
RELATOR, like "because" or "although". Notice that these are
the
kinds
of
words that preliterate children do not consider words. And in
fact
that's
why Piaget got the results he did--the kids really couldn't
figure
out
what
he meant when he asked them to explain what the word "because"
meant
in
a
particular sentence--they assumed he wanted to know what the
sentence
meant, because asking what a word like "because" means in a
sentence
without the rest of the sentence is really a little like
asking
if
there
are more white flowers or more flowers in a bouquet of red and
white
flowers. But suppose (over a period of some years) we give the
kid
the
following

utterances-cum-statement/wordings-cum-wordgroup/wordings-cum-words.
a) A rational, designed, and planned economy is possible in
the
USSR.
(Why
is that, Teacher?) Oh, it is just because all the means of
production
belong to the workers and peasants.
b) Planned economy is possible in the USSR because all the
means
of
production belong to the workers and peasants.
c) All the means of production belong to the workers and
peasants
so
economic planning is possible in the USSR.
d) Workers and peasant's ownership of the means of production
means
socialist construction is possible.
e) Public ownership of production enables social construction.
f) the proprietary preconditions of construction
g) socialist property forms
h) socialist property
i) socialism

By the time the child is the age when children beget other
children,
this child will see that the clause wording "all the means of
production
belong to the workers and peasants" has become a nominal group
wording
"public ownership", and the nominal group wording "a rational,
designed,
and planned economy" has become a single, block-like word
"socialism".
And
because for Vygotsky the "internal" really means the
psychological,
while
the "external" really just means the interpersonal, and
because
wording
is
inversely proportional to the internalization of inner
speech, I
think
we
can see that e) is a kind of internalization of a) and I) is
an
internalization of e).

But neither tight knickers nor baggy trousers will show this.
We
will
need
a theory of grammar that can make fine distinctions between
clause-level
wording, group-level wording, and word-level wording in order
to
describe
and explain it, much less intervene in it and promote it.
Otherwise,
not
only will our model of the concept look like a wooden block,
our
model
of
"internalization" will look like a "suture" or  an "ingrowing"
(c.f.
end of
HDHMF Chapter Five). No fond, expectant, grandpa wants a
grandchild's
mind covered with scars.

David Kellogg
Macquarie University






On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 10:47 AM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu>
wrote:
Choosing your wording carefully, David, you come up with
"wording"
to
describe what I think of as the holophrases in question. To
help me
clarify
your point for myself, and to use your way of communicating
about
it,
how
does the wording "wording" relate to the wordings
"statement"
or
"utterance" offered by Michael in the first case and by
others
in
the
group
on behalf of Bakhtin?

is there a holphorastic rendering/wording that might help us
out
here?
Mike

PS- As an afterthought, the examples feel like an utterance
to
me.
But
that
might make a liar out of me too :-)

On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 4:33 PM, David Kellogg
<dkellogg60@gmail.com>
wrote:

In English, the number of syllables or morphemes in a word
is
often
unclear, while the number of words in a sentence is always
fairly
clear.
This isn't true for preliterate children, who have a hard
time
understanding that "a" and "of" are actually words. It's
true
enough
for
people who can read and write, but its really an accident
of
orthography (notice that "it's" appears to be one syllable
but
two
morphemes, and it's not really clear, even to the normally
quite
overwheening "wordcount" function in Word, how many words
are
actually there.

Other languages are not like English. So for example in
Chinese
(a
non-alphabetic language), the number of syllables and
morphemes
is
always clear, but the number of words in a sentence is
quite
unclear
(when
you read a page of Chinese, there are no spaces between
morpho-syllables
that mark out "words". Chinese poetry, and classical
Chinese,
plays
with
this a lot: the unit is the morpheme rather than the word,
and
the
overall
effect (at least on me) is a stream of syllables and
morphemes
and
meanings
but not words.

So I think the place to look for Vygotsky's unit of
analysis
is
not
in
the
actual word "word" or "word meaning" (slovo or znachenie
slova).
Holbrook
Mahn has proposed translating "znachenie slova" as "verbal
meaning",
and
although this isn't exactly an accurate way of presenting
how
Russian
grammar really works, it IS a good way of getting around
the
trap
set
for
those who are only going by the English word meaning of
"word
meaning".
I think the place to look is in Vygotsky's examples. In
the
first
part
of
Thinking and Speech, for example, Vygotsky agrees with
Stern
that
the
child's first "word" has to be construed as not a word
but a
whole
wording.
He goes even further: he says it's a whole
"wording-in-context",
that
is, a
meaning. (And remember, Vygotsky NEVER agrees with Stern
about
ANYTHING
unless he absolutely has to!) And in the LAST part of
Thinking
and
Speech,
Vygotsky gives many examples: 'the clock fell", "the tram
B
is
arriving",
"Would you like some tea"? What all of these examples have
in
common is
that they are not single words but they are single
wordings.
Remember that Russian has no articles; this is something
that
Andy
himself
points out with respect to whether "perezhivanie" should
be
"a
perizhivanie" or just "perizhivanie". I think Andy's
observation
is
essentially correct (although of course we undo part of
his
insight
when
we
insist that all languages must "really" have an article of
some
kind).
But
it needs to be generalized: Vygotsky could NOT have ever
written
that
the unit of analysis is "a" word meaning, simply because
"a",
as
any
preliterate child will tell you, is not a word (and
certainly
not a
Russian
word).

David Kellogg
Macquarie University


On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 5:19 PM, WEBSTER, DAVID S. <
d.s.webster@durham.ac.uk
wrote:
Re the development of punctuation and the origin of
'words'
see
http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?3.61

-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
[mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole
Sent: 20 April 2017 01:45
To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' & 'value'

"the word" in Russian, Andy, has shades of meaning
tending
toward
the
biblical from current common understandings of the term
as a
sort
"lexical
object."  The Vai didnotmakethesamedistinction when
writing
and
neithr
did
the Greeks.
I believe there are those who would include the
utterance
in
its
meaning
as used by Vygotsky. Slippery these translation
problems!
But
discussion
of
them often reveals clarification of the various concepts
involved
as
they
appear in different peoples' vocabularies. Mediation has
some
of
those
properties.

The polysemy of just one language is enough for one poor
translator
to
deal with! The polsyemic playing field when you cross
language/cultural
systems is what gives academics something to do.  :-)

mike

mike

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:26 PM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net>
wrote:
and as a further note of caution, the unit in
"Thinking
and
Speech"
is
a word, not an utterance, and yet it is utterance
which
seems
to be
analogous to "commodity."

Andy


------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/
book/origins-collective-
decision-making
On 20/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:

Michael/all

I  go back a few posts (as ever being a bit slower
than
this
list-serve demands - let me do this before the
discussion
moves to
'binocular
vision') and challenge the metaphor of
commodity/utterance:
I
can
see
it has merit but also I want to look at the
limitations.
You say: 'the sign is to the verbal exchange what the
commodity is
to
the Commodity-exchange' … But I think I was asking
for
a
characterisation of the larger totality involved -
e.g.
The
'economy/mode of production and its
contradictions/collapse'
and
'what
- dialogue?'
And I think Andy B agrees with you when he says 'both
take
an
artefact-mediated relation between individuals as the
unit'…
But
suggests he recognises my problem when he refers to
'its
language'
(or I might say 'consciousness', 'discourse'  or
maybe
'intercourse').
But - as I argued in critique of the metaphor
'labour =
learning',
this mapping only goes so far, and has certain
dangers.
The
relation
between commodity/economy (and the mode of
production)
and
utterance/discourse (and the ideological
super/infra-structure) is
much more interesting in the concrete relations of
history.
I
refer
to Marx (the German ideology) and Volosinov.

In reality the relation between commodity production
and
'sign-related/mediated' discourse (Marx calls
'intercourse') is
dialectical. Each 'mediates' the other in historical
development,
and
even in collective production-and-dialogue.

Thus, I suggest, the 'exchange/use value' of an
utterance/dialogic
exchange maybe ought to be examined in the
ideological
context
of
its
relationship with the 'whole' of social re/production
where
class
power becomes visible. I don't know how to do this,
but
the
argument
is there in
Bourdieu: the power relations between people are part
of
the
capital-mediated structure of relations in a field
(including
the
field of opinion/discourse), and this explains the
forms
of
discourse
that express these power relationships and help to
hold
powerful
positions in place in the field. In this view it is
not
possible
to
identify the 'value' of an utterance or a sign
outside
of
this
wider
analysis… and an analysis of the particular
discursive/cultural
field
within its wider sociality.
Sorry this is a bit prolix and so likely to provoke
tangential
responses:
I did not have time tonight to write a shorter more
focussed
post.
Best wishes

Julian

Ps The separate discussion on mediation: this might
be
another
thread. I only want to note here that the mediation
of
the
'intercourse' through its 'other' in the material
form
of
'production' (I call the economy above) and vice
versa
does
not
involve a mediator 'between' the two, but is purely
hegelian in
seeing the mediation of 'x' through 'not x' in a
totality.



On 18/04/2017 16:34, "xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.
edu
on
behalf
of
Wolff-Michael Roth" <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
on
behalf
of
wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:

Larry, do not be confused. Take it with Bateson (Mind
and
Nature),
and see
Andy and Michael as two eyes. You then get this:

It is correct (and a great improvement) to begin to
think
of
the
two
parties to the interaction as two eyes , each
giving a
monocular
view of what goes on and , together , giving a
binocular
view
in
depth. This double view is the relationship .
(p.133)
What is gained by comparing the data collected by
one
eye
with
the
data collected by the other? Typically , both eyes
are
aimed
at
the
same region of the surrounding universe, and this
might
seem
to
be
a
wasteful use of the sense organs. But the anatomy
indicates
that
very considerable advantage must accrue from this
usage.
The
innervation of the two retinas and the creation at
the
optic
chiasma
of pathways for the redistribution of information is
such
an
extraordinary feat of morphogenesis as must surely
denote
great
evolutionary advantage . (p.69)

Michael


------------------------------------------------------------
--------------
------
Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied
Cognitive
Science
MacLaurin Building A567 University of Victoria
Victoria,
BC,
V8P
5C2
http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth <
http://education2.uvic.ca/
faculty/mroth/>
New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics

<https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
ections-in-mat

hematics-and-science-education/the-mathematics-of-
mathematics/>*
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 8:18 AM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net
wrote:
different trajectories, Larry.
a


------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden
http://home.mira.net/~andy
http://www.brill.com/products/
book/origins-collective-
decision-maki
ng On 18/04/2017 11:44 PM, lpscholar2@gmail.com
wrote:
Andy, Julian, Michael,
My learning curve at this moment is in the way of
Michael
describing the back and forth double movement.
That
is
both
giving/receiving, both
(expressing/listening) occurring WITHIN our
relationship.
This
prior to or more primordial then taking the
individual
stance
as
primary and the relation as derivative.

So... In this ‘spirit’ I will pose a question?

Andy says: ‘artefact mediated relation BETWEEN
INDIVIDUALS
as a
unit.
Michael says: You remain with back-and-forth
movement
that
is
NEVER action but IS transcation. Here the
back-and-forth
‘relation’ is the UNIT, and the individuals emerge
from
WITHIN
this primordial double relation.

Are Andy and Michael on the same trajectory,
shifting
the
accent,
or are imdividuals situated differently in the
comtrasting
notions
of units.

In particular does Andy ‘figure’ bridges whereas
Michael
‘figures’
gaps in the notion of BETWEEN.

Pursuing my growing edge, going out on a limb

Sent from my Windows 10 phone

*From: *Andy Blunden <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
*Sent: *April 17, 2017 11:54 PM
*To: *xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
<mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
*Subject: *[Xmca-l] Re: Contrasting 'use-value' &
'value'
Julian/Michael,

I remember getting very excited back in the early
'80s
when
I spotted the symmetry between the first chapters
of
Capital
and Marx's critique of algebra in his Mathematical

Manuscripts. That lasted about a week. The
symmetry
between
Vygotsky's analysis of speech and Marx's analysis
of
production is a strong one because both take an

artefact-mediated relation between individuals as
the
unit.
There is a symmetry at the level of the molar unit
as
well,
which, so far as I know has been neglected. But
this
structural symmetry cannot usefully be taken too
far.
The
"point" is that the unit is a unit of a whole, and
the
productive activity of a community is not the same
as
its
language, which as Marx said "the philosophers are
bound
to
make into an independent realm." Concretely,
speaking
is
not
producing. But like all human activities, both are
subject
to analysis by units of artefact-mediated actions.

Andy

------------------------------
------------------------------
Andy Blunden

http://home.mira.net/~andy

http://www.brill.com/products/
book/origins-collective-
decision-mak
ing

On 18/04/2017 7:01 AM, Julian Williams wrote:

Michael
In principle I am Ok with the idea of the unit
that
contains
the
essential

contradictions… but of what?
For Marx the whole point of commodity
exchange/value
is
that
it
is

the

beginning of an explanation of the 'economy',
capitalism,
and
the
labour

theory of value is the key to its collapse …
What is the equivalent 'point' of sign exchange
in
dialogue?
And
where
is

the equivalent of the theory of value? I think the
sensuous/supersensuous

is a distraction from the 'point'.
That’s my puzzle.
Julian
On 17/04/2017 21:49,
"xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.
edu
on
behalf
of Wolff-Michael Roth"
<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
on
behalf
of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Julian,
the sign is to the verbal exchange what the
commodity
is
to
the
commodity
exchange--both the sensuous and supersensuous
parts
are
there
that
Marx
and
Vygotsky are writing about. :-)
Michael

------------------------------------------------------------
--------------
------
Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor Applied
Cognitive
Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of
Victoria
Victoria,
BC, V8P 5C2 http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
<http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics

<https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-dir
ections-in-mat
hematics-and-science-
education/the-mathematics-of-
mathematics/>*
On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 12:11 PM, Julian
Williams
<
julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote:

Michael and all
I am coming late to this discussion and maybe
have
been
missing
some
important thingsŠ but I want to see a few issues
addressed
by
the
Functor:
Commodity => Sign: my skepticism follows to
some
extent
the
critique I
wrote of the mapping 'labor = learning' that you
are
familiar
with:
but
in
some ways I am even more skeptical of this
metaphor.
So:
Commodity to sign, is a unit of a totality as
in
'economy'
to
..
'Š?
Š '

What ? Maybe 'dialogue/discourse'?
What is the 'value' that is exchanged in
discourse,
and
how
does it ultimately realise its 'use value' in
some
sort
of
dialogic 'consumption'
of useful understanding?
How does the producer of value 'labour' to
produce
it,
and
how
is

the
'labour time' related to the 'exchange value' of
the
sign
that
results?
[Bearing in mind that the labour theory of value
is
Marx's
essential
contribution.]
Then how does this work relate to devious
studies:
we
already
have

the
work of Bourdieu who assigns cultural
capital/value
to
symbolic
power
in

the cultural fieldŠ is there a connection here?
Best regards as ever
Julian
Ps I need to come back to you about Hegel (I am
far
from
happy
with reading the 'Ideal' as a straightforward
negation of
the
'Real'
implicit
in what you sayŠ) when I have thought about this a
bit
more
-
maybe in
2018Š we should pick up!   :-)
On 17/04/2017 18:22,
"xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
on
behalf
of Wolff-Michael Roth"
<xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
on
behalf of wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Larry,
things become easier to think through if you
do
not
take an
individualist

starting point but a relational one---not "she
has to
produce
. .
."
but
look at what is happening in the exchange,
where
each
giving
also

is
taking, such that in a commodity exchange, you
have
double
giving-taking;

in a verbal exchange, each speaking also
involves
listening
and

receiving,

and the receiving is for the purpose of giving
(speaking,
replying).
As

soon as you do this, you remain with
back-and-forth
movement,
no
longer
action but transaction.
The other interesting thing is that the
Russian
word
znachenie,

translated

as "meaning" (really, signification) also
translates
as
"value"
and
"magnitude," and Il'enkov (2009) parenthetically
adds
"function"
and
"rôle". I am quoting from p. 178:
Marx joins Hegel as regards terminology, and
not
Kant or
Fichte, who tried to solve the problem of
Œideality¹
(i.e.,
activity)

while
remaining Œinside
consciousness¹, without venturing into the
external
sensuously-perceptible

corporeal
world, the world of the palpable-corporeal
forms
and
relations
of

things.

       This Hegelian definition of the term
Œideality¹
takes
in
the

whole
range of phenomena
within which the Œideal¹, understood as the
corporeally
embodied

form
of
the activity of
social man, really exists  as activity in the
form
of
the
thing,

or
conversely, as the thing
in the form of activity, as a Œmoment¹ of this
activity, as
its

fleeting

metamorphoses.
       Without an understanding of this state
of
affairs
it
would be

totally

impossible to fathom
the miracles performed by the commodity before
people¹s
eyes,
the commodity-form of the product,
particularly
in
its
dazzling money-form, in the form

of
the
notorious Œreal
talers¹, Œreal roubles¹, or Œreal dollars¹,
things
which,
as
soon

as
we

have the slightest
theoretical understanding of them, immediately
turn
out
to
be
not

Œreal¹

at
all, but Œideal¹
through and through, things whose category
quite
unambiguously
includes
words, the
units of language, and many other Œthings¹.
Things
that,
while
being
wholly
Œmaterial¹,
palpable-corporeal formations, acquire all
their
Œmeaning¹
(function
and
rôle) from Œspirit¹,

>from Œthought¹ and even owe to it their
specific
corporeal
existence.
Outside spirit and
without it there cannot even be words; there
is
merely a
vibration of
the
air.
Michael
------------------------------
-----------------------------
---------------

------
Wolff-Michael Roth, Lansdowne Professor
Applied
Cognitive
Science MacLaurin Building A567 University of
Victoria
Victoria, BC, V8P 5C2
http://web.uvic.ca/~mroth
<http://education2.uvic.ca/faculty/mroth/>
New book: *The Mathematics of Mathematics
<https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/new-
directions-in-mat

hematics-and-science-
education/the-mathematics-of-
mathematics/
* On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 8:31 AM,
<lpscholar2@gmail.com>
wrote:

I am attempting to follow Wolff-Michael¹s
trajectory as
presented in
his
article (A Dialectical Materialist Reading of
the
Sign). On
page
149
he
attempts to clarify the difference between
sign
complex
Œuse-value¹
&

sign
complex Œvalue¹.
His methodology is to read Marx
Œsubstituting¹
the
word
ŒSIGN¹

(implying
sign complex) FOR Œcommodity¹ and intuites
this
method
will
be
generative.
Here is his realization through the method of
re-reading
as
(trading,
translation, transposition) as I am carried along.
a) USE-VALUE: Œnatural signs¹ such as animal
footprints
are
useful/functional to the hunter inherently;
they
do
NOT
have
Œvalue¹
(exchangeble value) though they do have use-value
for
the
hunter
or
hunting
party in finding game.  Similarly a sign
complex
can be
useful

and
the
product of human labour without being Œvalue¹
(exchangeable).
Someone
who
satisfies HER needs through her product
produces
Œuse-value¹
but

NOT
Œvalue¹.
b) VALUE: (exchangeable). To produce SIGNS
(complexes),
she
has

to
produce
not only Œuse-value¹ but use-value FOR
others.
She
has
to
produce Œsocietal¹ use-values.... To be/come
(exchangeable)
SIGN, the

product
HAS
TO BE TRANSFERRED to another, FOR whom the
SIGN
complex
Œconstitutes¹
use-value.
The production of signs that produce no
Œvalue¹
that is
exchangeable
FOR
others leads to personal notes often having NO
use-value to
others.
To
trans/form use-value to BE come Œvalue¹
requires
exchangeability
under
lighting various forms of SIGN (complexes).
Apologies to Wolff-Michael if my echoing his
re-reading
methodology
garrbled the trans/mission?
I offer this because it helps clarify my
reading
of
Œuse-value¹ & Œvalue¹
(exchangeable)
My morning musement
Sent from my Windows 10 phone