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[Xmca-l] Re: Analysis of Gender in early xmca discourse
We are breaking the slow rule, David.
to keep it short. If you focus on the terms "*capable of applying logic* to
practical application, and then ask "under what conditions is this
capability realized in practice" the answer could great heterogeneity of
human experience vis a vis its logical status.
Two ways of making the same point vis a vis processes, and yes conceptual
blends and other similar approaches are pointing in the same direction.
PS- This is also a short circuit here to Robert's note concerning the
universality of the "chaining" mechanism.
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 9:50 AM, David H Kirshner <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> In Bruner's prolog to the Collected Works (1987), he states:
> For Vygotsky, becoming human implies the "centralizing" or cerebralization
> of mental processes -- whether in development, in cultural history, or in
> phylogenesis. ... Processes go inward, and they are thereby made amenable
> to interaction with other processes. ... The existence of autonomous
> processes is a sign of immaturity, of pathology, or phylogenetic
> primitiveness. Perception operating on its own, for example, yields the
> symptomatology of mental subnormality. Through interaction, human mental
> processes become ordered, systemic, logical, and goal oriented. By the
> achievement of generative order we become free of the immediacy of
> sensation, free of the chaining of associations, capable of applying logic
> to practical application. (p. 15)
> If this is the Vygotskyan interpretation of chaining you're referring to,
> then yes, this would be the same concept of associative reasoning used by
> cognitive psychologists. But if Bruner has this right, Vygotsky, in keeping
> with Annalisa's interpretation, understood logic as not quite natural, but
> as normative for humans. Cognitive psychologists see associative reasoning
> as normative, with logic an esoteric accomplishment.
> I should add that even though actual logical reasoning is an esoteric
> accomplishment, (incorrect) logic-like forms imbue reasoning in literate
> societies. Logical inference is governed by two principles:
> Modus ponens asserts that given the conditional, if p then q, and the
> antecedent, p, one may deduce the truth of the consequent, q. (i.e., p
> --> q, and p, deduce q) and
> Modus tolens asserts that given the conditional, if p then q, and denial
> of the consequent, not q, one may deduce denial of the antecedent, not q.
> (i.e., p --> q, and ~q, deduce ~p)
> But logical misapplications are widespread in literate cultures:
> Asserting the conditional, if p then q, and the consequent, q, people
> incorrectly deduce the antecedent, p. (i.e., p --> q, and q, deduce p)
> Asserting the conditional, if p then q, and denial of the antecedent, not
> p, people incorrectly deduce denial of the consequent, not q. (i.e., p
> --> q, and ~p, deduce ~q) (See Evans, 1982.)
> Evans, J. St. B. T. (1982). The psychology of deductive reasoning. London:
> Routledge & Kegan Paul.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: email@example.com [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole
> Sent: Friday, November 4, 2016 10:44 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Analysis of Gender in early xmca discourse
> Is this equivalent to what Vygotsky referred to as chaining?
> But one of the results that cognitive scientists have clearly established
> is that human reasoning, in general, is associative, not logical. Our
> conceptual structures are associatively linked, meaning that concepts
> conjure up other, related concepts. Our reasoning is a kind of juggling of
> these linked concepts.
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:29 AM, David H Kirshner <email@example.com> wrote:
> > Annalisa,
> > Recognizing that Jacob and others may see it differently, I agree with
> > you that logic is not gendered.
> > I do disagree, though, with your final statement that "Logic isn't a
> > Western invention, by the way. It's very much part of human cognition."
> > What I think is sustainable is the position that reasoning is very
> > much a part of human cognition. But one of the results that cognitive
> > scientists have clearly established is that human reasoning, in
> > general, is associative, not logical. Our conceptual structures are
> > associatively linked, meaning that concepts conjure up other, related
> > concepts. Our reasoning is a kind of juggling of these linked concepts.
> > One of the classical studies that established this perspective
> > concerns Margie the bank teller:
> > Margie is bright, single, 31 year old, outspoken, and concerned with
> > issues of social justice.
> > What is more likely
> > A) Margie is a bank teller, or
> > B) Margie is a bank teller and Margie is a feminist.
> > (If you're not familiar with this problem, take a moment to answer
> > it.) ...
> > The logical analysis holds that Margie is more likely to be a bank
> > teller than both a bank teller and a feminist because choice A
> > includes the possibility that Margie is a bank teller and a feminist
> > as well as the possibility that Margie is a bank teller and not a
> > feminist, but choice B includes only one of those possibilities.
> > But the vast majority of subjects tested select choice B, which the
> > cognitive psychologists take as indicating that we are guided by our
> > associations to people like Margie rather than by the logical
> > conditions of the problem.
> > In my view, logic as a discursive form--a technology of thought--is a
> > Western invention. Whether it is identified as "male" because of
> > historical association or biological predisposition, I don't know, and
> > I should add, I don't care. (Jacob, the science of biologically based
> > sex differences in cognition has not been "debunked." Rather, feminist
> > scholars have rightly pointed out that the data are inconclusive, and
> > that prior assertions of biologically based sex differences in
> > cognition over-interpret the scientific results.) Neither history nor
> > biology is determinative, and logic is too important a part of our
> > cultural legacy to deny any individual or group the opportunity to
> master it.
> > David
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: firstname.lastname@example.org [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
> > mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar
> > Sent: Friday, November 4, 2016 12:28 AM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <email@example.com>; Vera
> > John-Steiner <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Analysis of Gender in early xmca discourse
> > Hi,
> > About logic: to Greg M., Actually, I thought it was Jacob who
> > discussed logic in gendered discourse. Unless you brought it up a long
> > time ago in the group he references. I was under the impression that
> > he had attempted to bring it up a few times in the past. Or am I
> > In his reply on timestamped Nov 03, 08:30:41 he stated:
> > "Not to beat the proverbial dead horse, but several listserv
> > members--including me--have tried to introduce this position re: logic
> > in prior xmca threads. The position has mostly either been ignored or
> > loudly rejected out of hand by more vocal participants on this listserv."
> > So I was responding to that paragraph.
> > I am not clear about Jacob's position but my position is that logic is
> > an intellectual tool, just like intuition can be an emotional tool.
> > Insight might be a combination of both logic and intuition. But
> > nothing about logic makes it male, as I see it, no matter how much men
> > might assert that to be the case.
> > Logic is reasoning in a particular way with the mind, and any human
> > can partake in it if one wants. You can't perform logic with your
> > elbows and knees. Counting has a logic. So does self-preservation.
> > What one does with logic has to do with one's values. If your values
> > are for a pure race, for example, you can certainly use logic to
> > rationalize activities that purify race however you might want to
> > define it. Does that make logic a tool to create meaning that is
> > essentially determined by power? Or is it just abuse of logic to
> > assert one's power (over others, which is actually being powerless,
> > since one who is truly powerful does not require power over others),
> which at its basis, is meaningless?
> > Also, I don't think that Rein was saying gender is fluid. He said it
> > is
> > constructed:
> > "... in other words, what cultures have "naturalized" as divisions
> > into genders are more often than not constructions erected by a gender
> > group in order to dominate others. Such construction, I would argue,
> > can only be taken down with arguments that follow a logic which itself
> > is not gendered, because if it were, it would be a contestant in the
> field, not the referee."
> > I believe if I read him as he wanted to be read, I think he's saying
> > that logic is not gendered, which I agree with. The fact that we can
> > say "a logic" means the application of that logic has a boundary, but
> > it doesn't mean that this logic is different than that logic. It means
> > if I use a hammer on a house, I can also use it to bash in skulls. The
> > tool is the same, the application is different, as are the values
> motivating its use.
> > The boundaries are the objectives for using the logic, not the logic
> > itself. Of course we can bicker over the forms of mallets, claw
> > hammers, or rocks for hitting things and their differences, but the
> > activity of hammering is the same. The values, motivations, and
> > objectives are different, which offer the boundary, however the
> > activity remains the same despite those boundaries.
> > Logic isn't a Western invention, by the way. It's very much part of
> > human cognition. Rationalism I suppose could be Western, but I reserve
> > the right to be wrong about that.
> > Kind regards,
> > Annalisa