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[Xmca-l] Re: XMCA-ers: Help needed finding LSV references to *First*and *Second* Signal Systems



It seems that side-by-side translations of the two documents merit archival
publication, David. JREEP is an obvious repository. In addition to which at
present we have a good deal more evidence about children, chess boards, and
the issues vexing Vygotsky than he had access to. The non/difficult
chronology of the texts complicates an already complicated process of
interpretation as we have long witnessed here.

Perhaps as a separate thread, it would be nice to put together a discussion
of the core linkages between Vygotsky and Halliday in your work..... one of
those chains of discussion that come and go. Perhaps a mini-course devoted
to the following, to me, essential idea:

 It seems to me that ALL of these are signalization systems (not
signifying systems, because they do not have lexicogrammar and cannot
convey ideal values)

Providing a "cheat sheet" for autodidacts, might it be possible to create
some
"field of interest" in the xmca discussion for dealing with this idea?

I have in no way forgotten the issue of the relation of microgenesis and
ontogenesis. It seems another "key point" as most of us go about using CHAT
ideas in the course of the teaching/learning activities that pay the bread
and butter. As matters stand, I offer Franklin in the blocks as an example
of microgenesis in a preschool classroom involving play as an example of a
zone of proximal development where childre are a head taller than
themselves. That discussion is for the microgenesis/ontogenesis thread if I
recall.

I would be VERY interested to learn of ways that feminist, queer theory,
critical disability studies theory, neurodiversity theory, and others can
help me to understand these categories and the theories that purport to
account for them.

If they need to be re-thought, might as well be here. Ain't goin nowhere.

mike

On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 2:28 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:

> I'm working with two versions of one of Vygotsky's last lectures (the
> second version is given exactly five days before he was brought home with a
> throat haemorrhage to die, the first about a year earlier). There are
> passages that are almost word for word repetitions. There are passages that
> are semantically the same and but quite differently worded (the earlier
> Vygotsky is quite modest and tentative; the later Vygotsky is much more
> critical and also more confident). Then there are passages that say pretty
> much the opposite of what was said a year earlier: for example, in the
> early lecture Vygotsky says that a child faced with a chessboard who
> doesn't know how to play will see it structurally and sort the pieces by
> color (black pieces on black squares, white on white) but in the later
> lecture it is the child who does know how to play who sees it structurally,
> because the child sees a black knight in a "structure" with a white pawn.
> He's a genius, and geniuses tend to think things over a lot, turning them
> this way and that, and never looking at anything as final, not even when
> they are about to die.
>
> HDHMF has to be read the same way. Vygotsky cannot quite seem to make up
> his mind whether there are three stages of higher behavior (instinct,
> habit, intelligence) or four different stages of higher behavior (instinct,
> habit, intelligence, and freedom). In Chapter Four, he very clearly argues
> for four or more, but in Chapter Five, which may have been written much
> earlier, he argues for three but then three paragraphs later considers it
> safer to begin as Thorndike does with two levels (unconditional and
> conditional responses). So "signal" vs. "signification" could just be seen
> as the difference between unconditional and conditional responses, or it
> could be seen as the difference between instinct and intelligence, or it
> could be seen as two poles with an almost infinite number of genetic
> variations in between. I prefer the latter view, but I recognize that
> Vygotsky has to package things pretty differently for different audiences,
> and we are not one of the audiences that he has foremost in his mind.
>
> Take bacteria. Bacteria are apparently capable of quorum sensing: that is,
> bacteria don't multiply when there are no other bacteria around, they do
> when there are some but not too many, and they don't when there are too
> many. Now, take ants. Ants have a system of finding new nests that involves
> scouting for potential sites. If the site is extremely good, they go back
> and take other ants there quickly, but if it is not so good they tend to
> dawdle a little, with the result that the best site gets more ants, and at
> a certain point the whole nest "decides" to move there. Now, take
> bees. Like ants, bees go scouting. The scouts come back and they dance; the
> dances attract more or fewer onlookers, and when a quorum is reached, the
> hive moves. It seems to me that ALL of these are signalization systems (not
> signifying systems, because they do not have lexicogrammar and cannot
> convey ideal values) but the difference between the ant system  and the bee
> system is as big as the difference between the bee system and early child
> language. For ants, the scouting and decision making are not
> differentiated, but for bees they are distinct moments--so the ant system
> involves a simple signal system and the bee system involves a second signal
> system.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
> On Sun, Oct 30, 2016 at 3:45 AM, <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > In this discussion The center of this relational exploration is between
> > signalization AND signification and my question goes back to the place of
> > the general term *gesturing*.
> > Is this signalization or is this phenomena signification.
> > The act creating actual*ity (sens) which always includes tendency or
> > orientation towards or away from something.
> > The act is gestural acts and implies *each in the other*.
> >
> > The relation of gestural receiving and responding and this phenomena in
> > relation to signalization and signification.
> >
> >
> > Sent from my Windows 10 phone
> >
> > From: Huw Lloyd
> > Sent: October 29, 2016 9:01 AM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA-ers: Help needed finding LSV references to
> > *First*and *Second* Signal Systems
> >
> > Peter,
> >
> > If by signalisation you mean use of signs to influence behaviour in terms
> > of operational criteria and speech, then yes this is so.  It has been
> > studied quite systematically, but is perhaps less well known. I can
> > elaborate on this if this is your drift.
> >
> > Best,
> > Huw
> >
> >
> > On 28 October 2016 at 22:43, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
> > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
> >
> > > David,
> > >
> > > As usual, your suggestions are both helpful and erudite.  Thanks for
> the
> > > poignant references to Vygotsky and to Marx.  Although Soviet academic
> > > politics may have complicated the issue, there does seem to be some
> > > substance to the argument that the nervous systems of animals and the
> > > speech communication systems of humans share the common property of
> > > *signalization*. Personally, I think there's a lot more to this topic
> > than
> > > meets the eye--or, better yet, there's a lot of opportunity here for
> > > developing the problem further.
> > >
> > > Once again, I owe an intellectual debt to the participants of this
> > > listserv!
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > > Peter
> > >
> > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 5:10 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Peter:
> > > >
> > > > I think Mike's right. The "second signal system" was an attempt to
> > > preserve
> > > > the idea of higher psychological functions in an atmosphere that was
> > not
> > > > that different from what was going on in America at the same time
> (and
> > > > which Mike experienced first hand in both places). When I read
> > Belyayev's
> > > > work on foreign language teaching, he talks a lot about the "second
> > > signal
> > > > system". There, are, however, two places in Vygotsky which MIGHT
> > provide
> > > > some support, if you wanted to make the case that the "second signal
> > > > system" is not completely incompatible with Vygotsky.
> > > >
> > > > One is Chapter Two of the History of the Development of the Higher
> > Mental
> > > > functions. See below. Starting around paragraph 142, Vygotsky likens
> > > > Pavlov's model of the brain as a telephone exchange. The problem, of
> > > > course, is that back then telephone exchanges did require human
> > operators
> > > > to make the connection!
> > > >
> > > > The other is the discussion of "second order symbolism" in the work
> of
> > > > Delacroix, which you can find in Chapter Six of Thinking and Speech
> and
> > > > also in Chapter 7 of HDHMF (fifth para). This is a very different
> > > > notion--it's the idea that writing is a set of symbols for speaking.
> > > >
> > > > David Kellogg
> > > > Macquarie University
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >From HDHMF, Chapter Two, Research Method
> > > >
> > > > We know that, as Pavlov says, “the most general bases of higher
> nervous
> > > > activity are ascribed to the large hemispheres, the same in both
> higher
> > > > animals and in people, and for this reason even elementary phenomena
> of
> > > > this activity must be identical in the one and in the other in both
> > > normal
> > > > and pathological cases” (1951, p. 15). Actually, this can scarcely be
> > > > disputed. But as soon as we go from the elementary phenomena of
> higher
> > > > nervous activity to the complex, to the higher phenomena within this
> > > higher
> > > > – in the physiological sense – activity, then two different
> > > methodological
> > > > paths for studying the specific uniqueness of human higher behavior
> > open
> > > > before us.
> > > >
> > > > One is the path to further study of complication, enrichment, and
> > > > differentiation of the same phenomena that experimental study
> > ascertains
> > > in
> > > > animals. Here, on this path, the greatest restraint must be observed.
> > In
> > > > transferring information on higher nervous activity of animals to
> > higher
> > > > activity of man, we must constantly check the factual similarities in
> > the
> > > > function of organs in man and animals, but in general the principle
> > > itself
> > > > of the research remains the same as it was in the study of animals.
> > This
> > > is
> > > > the path of physiological study.
> > > >
> > > > True, this circumstance is of major significance and in the area of
> > > > physiological study of behavior, in a comparative study of man and
> > > animals,
> > > > we must not put the function of the heart, stomach, and other organs
> > > which
> > > > are so similar to that of man on the same plane with higher nervous
> > > > activity. In the words of I. P. Pavlov, “It is specifically this
> > activity
> > > > that so strikingly sets man apart from the rank of animals, that
> places
> > > man
> > > > immeasurably above the whole animal world” (ibid. p. 414). And we
> might
> > > > expect that along the path of physiological research we will find a
> > > > specific qualitative difference in human activity. Let us recall the
> > > words
> > > > of Pavlov cited above on the quantitative and qualitative
> > incomparability
> > > > of the word with conditioned stimuli of animals. Even in the plan of
> > > strict
> > > > physiological consideration, “the grandiose signalistics of speech”
> > > stands
> > > > outside the whole other mass of stimuli, the “multicapaciousness of
> the
> > > > word” places it in a unique position.
> > > >
> > > > The other path is the path of psychological research. From the very
> > > > beginning, it proposes to seek the specific uniqueness of human
> > behavior
> > > > which does take us beyond the initial point. The specific uniqueness
> is
> > > > considered not only in its subsequent complexity and development,
> > > > quantitative and qualitative refinement of the cerebral hemispheres,
> > but
> > > > primarily in the social nature of man and in a new method of
> > adaptation,
> > > as
> > > > compared with animals, that sets man apart. The main difference
> between
> > > the
> > > > behavior of man and of animals consists not only in that the human
> > brain
> > > is
> > > > immeasurably above the brain of the dog and that the higher nervous
> > > > activity “so strikingly sets man apart from the rank of animals,” but
> > > most
> > > > of all, because it is the brain of a social being and because the
> laws
> > of
> > > > higher nervous activity of man are manifested and act in the human
> > > > personality.
> > > >
> > > > But let us return again to the “most general bases of higher nervous
> > > > activity, related to the cerebral hemispheres,” and identical in
> higher
> > > > animals and man. We think that it is in this point that we can
> disclose
> > > > with definitive clarity the difference of which we speak. The most
> > > general
> > > > basis of behavior, identical in man and animals, is *signalization.*
> > > Pavlov
> > > > said, “So the basic and most general activity of the cerebral
> > hemispheres
> > > > is signaling with an infinite number of signals and with changeable
> > > > signalization” (ibid., p. 30). As is known, this is the most general
> > > > formulation of the whole idea of conditioned reflexes that lies at
> the
> > > base
> > > > of the physiology of higher nervous activity.
> > > >
> > > > But human behavior is distinguished exactly in that it creates
> > artificial
> > > > signaling stimuli, primarily the grandiose signalization of speech,
> and
> > > in
> > > > this way masters the signaling activity of the cerebral hemispheres.
> If
> > > the
> > > > basic and most general activity of the cerebral hemispheres in
> animals
> > > and
> > > > in man is signalization, then the basic and most general activity of
> > man
> > > > that differentiates man from animals in the first place, from the
> > aspect
> > > of
> > > > psychology, is *signification,* that is, creation and use of signs.
> We
> > > are
> > > > using this word in its most literal sense and precise meaning.
> > > > Signification is the creation and use of signs, that is, artificial
> > > > signals.
> > > >
> > > > We will consider more closely this new principle of activity. It must
> > not
> > > > in any sense be contrasted with the principle of signalization.
> > > Changeable
> > > > signalization that results in the formation of temporary,
> conditional,
> > > > special connections between the organism and the environment is an
> > > > indispensable, biological prerequisite of the higher activity that we
> > > > arbitrarily call signification and is its base. The system of
> > connections
> > > > that is established in the brain of an animal is a copy or reflection
> > of
> > > > natural connections between “all kinds of agents of nature” that
> signal
> > > the
> > > > arrival of immediately favorable or destructive phenomena.
> > > >
> > > > It is very obvious that such signalization – a reflection of the
> > natural
> > > > connection of phenomena, wholly created by natural conditions –
> cannot
> > be
> > > > an adequate basis of human behavior. For human adaptation, an active
> > > > *change
> > > > in the nature of man *is essential. It is the basis of all human
> > history.
> > > > It necessarily presupposes an active change in man’s behavior.
> > “Affecting
> > > > the environment by this movement and changing it, he changes his own
> > > nature
> > > > at the same time,” says Marx. “He develops forces asleep in it and
> > > subjects
> > > > the play of these forces to his own will” (K. Marx and F. Engels,
> > > > *Collected
> > > > Works,* Vol. 23, pp. 188-189
> > > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-
> > > > 3A__www.marxists.org_archive_marx_works_1867-2Dc1_ch07.htm-
> > > > 23forces&d=DQIFaQ&c=aqMfXOEvEJQh2iQMCb7Wy8l0sPnURkcqADc2guUW8IM&r=
> > > > mXj3yhpYNklTxyN3KioIJ0ECmPHilpf4N2p9PBMATWs&m=
> > cxiDdHmIrHosSMq59vJlZ4j-S-
> > > > 4h5DSiLaMzqzi2yNA&s=J3sZBxFP1DTk3B8MLGJTyEw-RZmpA347cJfMSUrwSa4&e=
> >).
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 7:50 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
> > > > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Mike,
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks for the Luria references.  From a cursory reading of the
> > > relevant
> > > > > passages in the Luria & Yudovich book, and judging by some of the
> > other
> > > > > sources you listed, I get the impression that there hasn't been
> much
> > > > > theoretical *fleshing out* of the structures of the second signal
> > > system.
> > > > > I hope that the concept of a first and second signal system is not
> > > just a
> > > > > political argument, but instead has some real substance. I find it
> > hard
> > > > to
> > > > > imagine that our *animal* (stimulus-response) system of thinking is
> > > > > developmentally unrelated to our *human* (conversational
> > > > > initiation-response) system of thinking.
> > > > >
> > > > > If anyone else knows of any passages from Vygotsky related to this
> > > topic,
> > > > > please don't hold back!
> > > > >
> > > > > Much obliged.
> > > > >
> > > > > In solidarity,
> > > > > Peter
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 1:56 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Peter-- If you google Luria "second signal system" you will come
> up
> > > > with
> > > > > > several references. There is a copy at luria.ucsd.edu of his
> > little
> > > > book
> > > > > > with Yudovich on twins that uses that language.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > It is not online (so far as i know), but Luria's article on
> "Speech
> > > > > > development and the formation of mental processes" in Cole and
> > > > > > Maltzman, *Handbook
> > > > > > of Soviet Psychology. *Basic Books, 1969 uses this term a lot.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I believe you will find an upsurge of usage associated with the
> > late
> > > > > > 1940's-50's when Vygotskians were under severe attack, there were
> > > > special
> > > > > > "Pavlov sessions" where they had to recant their errors, and the
> > use
> > > of
> > > > > > first and second signal system by Pavlov
> > > > > > allowed them a life line to orthodoxy.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > mike
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 10:43 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] <
> > > > > > pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Dear colleagues,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I don't wish to detract in any way from the very serious and
> > > > absolutely
> > > > > > > necessary discussion about male sensitivity (or should I say
> > > > > > insensitivity)
> > > > > > > to the voices of the women inhabiting this list, but I sure
> could
> > > use
> > > > > > your
> > > > > > > collective help with a small matter of scholarship. I am trying
> > to
> > > > > locate
> > > > > > > any passages in LSV's Collected Works in English in which he
> > refers
> > > > to
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > > *first* and *second* signal systems.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > My understanding is that Vygotsky considers the first signal
> > system
> > > > as
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > > biologically inherited stimulus-response (S-R) system of
> reflexes
> > > as
> > > > > > > described by Pavlov, whereas the second signal system refers to
> > the
> > > > > > > culturally inherited system of initiation-response that is
> > > particular
> > > > > to
> > > > > > > human conversational activity. I am working with the hypothesis
> > > that,
> > > > > in
> > > > > > > ontogenetic development, the first signal system becomes
> > > > *domesticated*
> > > > > > by,
> > > > > > > and ultimately subordinated to, the second signal system. That
> > is,
> > > > the
> > > > > > S-R
> > > > > > > form of thinking becomes developmentally transformed into the
> > > > > > > Initiation-Response form of thinking that is characteristic of
> a
> > > > person
> > > > > > > performing a listening-speaking turn in conversation.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > If any of the wonderful scholars on this list could help point
> > this
> > > > > poor,
> > > > > > > stumbling colleague
> > > > > > > in the right direction, I would be most grateful.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Warm wishes to all,
> > > > > > > Peter
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > p.s. -- Let me take this opportunity to express my heartfelt
> > thanks
> > > > to
> > > > > > Mike
> > > > > > > for creating this list in the first place, and with it the
> > > > opportunity
> > > > > > for
> > > > > > > Vygotskian scholars the world over to share and discuss our
> ideas
> > > in
> > > > an
> > > > > > > open and honest forum. For my part, I pledge to do my level
> best
> > to
> > > > > raise
> > > > > > > my own consciousness where it is deficient so that my
> > participation
> > > > in
> > > > > > this
> > > > > > > forum will be as inclusive and respectful to all of its
> > > participants
> > > > as
> > > > > > is
> > > > > > > humanly possible.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > > > > > > Director,
> > > > > > > Office of Institutional Research
> > > > > > > <http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_> > >
> > > > provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp>
> > > > > > > Fordham University
> > > > > > > Thebaud Hall-202
> > > > > > > Bronx, NY 10458
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243
> > > > > > > Fax: (718) 817-3817
> > > > > > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > --
> > > > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > > > > Director,
> > > > > Office of Institutional Research
> > > > > <http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_>
> > > > provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp>
> > > > > Fordham University
> > > > > Thebaud Hall-202
> > > > > Bronx, NY 10458
> > > > >
> > > > > Phone: (718) 817-2243
> > > > > Fax: (718) 817-3817
> > > > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
> > > Director,
> > > Office of Institutional Research
> > > <http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/
> > > office_of_institutio/index.asp>
> > > Fordham University
> > > Thebaud Hall-202
> > > Bronx, NY 10458
> > >
> > > Phone: (718) 817-2243
> > > Fax: (718) 817-3817
> > > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu
> > >
> >
> >
>