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[Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal



Cognition in the wild
Distributed cognition
Situated cognition
Everyday cognition
Cognition in practice
Cultural cognition
Embodied cognition
Cognition in context
Outsourced cognition
Extended cognition

…for starters!  :)

Martin

> On Jun 28, 2016, at 7:09 PM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Martin (and others),
> 
> Well, yes, one wouldn't want to leave out what these things accomplish, but
> one might want to leave out the dualistic baggage that a reified notion of
> intellect and cognition bring with them (and as Michael notes, one might
> find this baggage not too burdensome to carry - or at least less burdensome
> than the task of trying to come up with a new language for thinking
> thought).
> 
> So then the question with intellect and cognition, in short "thinking", is
> really: how might we think thinking in ways that do not presuppose the
> separation of thinking from living - as if thinking happens in some
> otherworldly (rational?) realm apart from everyday life?
> 
> How might we instead conceive of thinking as something that dwells within a
> being? How might we return thinking to Being? And by doing so, take hold of
> a notion of thinking-Being as something that can develop across time?
> 
> To put the core question slight differently, we might ask: What is called
> thinking?
> 
> Here is one response (of which I'm sure you, Martin, are quite aware):
> http://hermitmusic.tripod.com/heidegger_thinking.pdf
> 
> -greg
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 1:19 AM, Martin John Packer <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
>> wrote:
> 
>> Greg,
>> 
>> I wasn’t *equating* individual psychological development with the
>> development of intellect and cognition, but one sure wouldn’t want to leave
>> those out, would one?  That indeed would be a costly price to pay! (And
>> there’s no evidence that LSV wanted to leave them out, is there?)
>> 
>> Martin
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jun 28, 2016, at 10:21 AM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Just a minute folks!
>>> 
>>> Is everyone okay with the assumption that the
>>> individual=intellect/cognition?
>>> 
>>> If so, then asking if non-dualism can have a theory of individual
>>> development is like asking if atheists pray to God. It's definitional.
>>> 
>>> Seems like the question should be: can we imagine an individual without
>>> intellect/cognition?
>>> 
>>> Some of you will immediately say, "of course not, that's a dumb
>> question."
>>> 
>>> But some others out there have been trying a different answer to this
>>> question. Paul Kockelman is one. Vincent Colapietro (whom Kockelman
>> cites)
>>> is another. Martin is another. And maybe Vygotsky too?
>>> 
>>> Speaking of which, Martin, can you re-send that Vygotsky piece? I didn't
>>> see it as an attachment.
>>> 
>>> -greg ​
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 12:05 AM, Martin John Packer <
>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> You’re saying there has to be a god??
>>>> 
>>>> Martin
>>>> 
>>>>> On Jun 28, 2016, at 10:01 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> How do you posit activity as developing without a human mind that
>>>> manipulates activity, remaining a constant as the circumstances of
>> activity
>>>> constantly change.  Think Intelligent Design.  I'm not saying
>> development
>>>> is parallel to intelligent design, simply that they are based on the
>> same
>>>> idea.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Michael
>>>>> 
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2016 10:42 AM
>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
>>>>> 
>>>>> your activity
>>>>> 
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 29/06/2016 12:24 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote:
>>>>>> Cognitive or intellectual development.  Because it you are non-dualist
>>>> pray tell, what is developing?
>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer
>>>>>> [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co]
>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2016 9:04 AM
>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Why (on earth) would non-dualism prevent a theory of individual
>>>> development, Michael?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Jun 28, 2016, at 1:20 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> In my view Pierce is not non-dualist because of his ideas on
>> semiosis,
>>>> which are extremely interesting.  He is a non-dualist because he is a
>>>> Pragmatist.  That means their philosophy of human intelligence is based
>> on
>>>> doing not on thinking.  Following James (or perhaps James followed him)
>>>> Pierce did not make any assumptions that posited a human mind inside of
>> the
>>>> head.  The fact that semiosis is non-dualist is I would say an
>> outgrowth of
>>>> this and not a cause.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> What I think Pragmatists understood is that you have to give up a
>>>> great deal when you avoid dualism at all costs.  I would suggest there
>> is
>>>> no theory of individual development in Pragmatism (although there is
>>>> societal and community development).
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Years ago I struggled with whether Vygotsky was willing to make the
>>>> same type of sacrifice.  He did have a theory of individual development,
>>>> was is possible for him to be a non-dualist.  Not that I want to have
>> that
>>>> argument.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> MIchael
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, June 27, 2016 9:09 PM
>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Exactly! which is what is so marvellously non-dualistic about Peirce!
>>>> Semiosis is a natural process taking place in the objective world. It
>> is an
>>>> alternative, more general approach than the usual concept of causality.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>>>>>> 
>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 28/06/2016 5:19 AM, Martin John Packer wrote:
>>>>>>>> Hi James,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> You write that "To my mind, Interpretant (Thirdness) is very
>>>> important as it implies a mental concept - in Peirce's words, "sign in
>> the
>>>> mind"."
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Do you know Paul Kockelman's work (ref below)? Kockelman emphasizes
>>>> that the interpretant is *not* necessary mental. For example, a plant
>> can
>>>> respond to sunlight as an Object by turning in its direction
>>>> (Interpretant). It is hard to see how a 'mental concept' could be a sign
>>>> for a subsequent step of semiosis, whereas a plant turning, or an
>> umbrella
>>>> opened, or . more obviously could be.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> This video is in Spanish, but otherwise pretty clear!
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXptyWLJT14>
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Kockelman, P. (2005). The semiotic stance. Semiotica, 2005(157),
>>>> 233-304.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Jun 27, 2016, at 1:54 PM, Ma, James (james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk)
>> <
>>>> james.ma@canterbury.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I like David's elaboration. Just to add a few comments to his and
>>>> others' points:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> For Peirce, any sign is a triad which constitutes three realms:
>>>> Representamen, Object & Interpretant, corresponding to Firstness,
>>>> Secondness & Thirdness as three aspects of the sign. Within the aspect
>> of
>>>> Secondness, there are three forms: Icon, Index & Symbol, relating to the
>>>> three realms - hence, Icon (Firstness), Index (Secondness) & Symbol
>>>> (Thirdness). Through the realm of Interpretant, each of the three forms
>>>> contributes to an understanding of the sign (i.e. Object), although such
>>>> understanding is insusceptible of final proof. To my mind, Interpretant
>>>> (Thirdness) is very important as it implies a mental concept - in
>> Peirce's
>>>> words, "sign in the mind". What's more, Interpretant is in itself a new
>>>> sign for the next triad (i.e. semiosis).
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Peirce's semiosis is an interplay of these three realms - it is
>>>> concerned with sign action in terms of production and interpretation of
>> a
>>>> sign through the representamen-interpretant relation that leads to "a
>>>> discovery of true meaning, the object" (see Mats Bergman's Peirce's
>>>> Philosophy of Communication, 2009, p.114). My take on Peirce's semiosis
>> is
>>>> that any sign is an end in itself - here, "end" means "purpose" or
>> "goal"
>>>> (rather than "closure").
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> The term "sign" was used loosely both Saussure and Peirce. For
>>>> Saussure, sign means signifier, whereas for Peirce it means the form the
>>>> sign takes. The "object" is normally hidden; it would have been
>> otherwise
>>>> pointless to make a sign if the object is already present. Object is
>> absent
>>>> in Saussure's dyad (which is self-contained: signifié-signifiant, i.e.
>>>> signified-signifier). Saussure's "signified" is not quite the same as
>>>> Peirce's "interpretant". In the former, the system of signification
>> which
>>>> bridges the signified and the signifier is fixated, e.g. the sound MIAO
>> as
>>>> signifier resulting in a linguistic concept CAT as signified is
>> determined
>>>> by the system of signification, English language. If the system is
>> French
>>>> language, then the linguistic concept will be LE CHAT. More importantly,
>>>> the idea behind Peirce's interpretant is "dialogical thought" which is
>> also
>>>> absent in Saussure's dyad.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Regarding word-image relations, what's interesting is that both
>>>> modes of meaning are slippery and elusive - which opens up a huge scope
>> for
>>>> semiotic thinking. The approach to written texts is in the form of
>> linear
>>>> itinerary, but the approach to visual images is in the form of
>>>> circumnavigation, which spirals outwards from the centre to the
>> periphery
>>>> and at the same time inwards from the periphery to the centre. In terms
>> of
>>>> meaning potential, I don't think the centre necessarily implies a deep
>>>> structure whereas the periphery a surface structure - both can be
>> either,
>>>> depending on the phenomenon and the person who finds himself in that
>>>> phenomenon.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> James
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>> Sent: 26 June 2016 22:19
>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Noumenal and Phenomenal
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Martin:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Actually, it's the icon that is "first" for Peirce, but it's
>>>>>>>>> sometimes pretty hard to tell what "firstness" means, because it's
>>>>>>>>> not really equivalent to mediacy, which is the way most Vygotskyans
>>>>>>>>> are trained to think. Instead, Peirce uses a set of thought
>>>>>>>>> experiments to distinguish what comes first: "An icon is a
>>>>>>>>> represntamen whose representative quality is a firstness of it as a
>>>>>>>>> first. That is a quality that it has qua thing renders it fit to be
>>>>>>>>> a representament.". (Philosophical writings of Peirce, J. Buchler
>>>> ed., New York: Dover, p. 104).
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Here's the passage of Peirce I find most useful:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> "A sign is either an icon, an index or a symbol. An icon is a sign
>>>>>>>>> that would possess the character which renders it significant even
>>>>>>>>> though its object had no existence: such as a lead pencil streak
>>>>>>>>> representing a geometrical line. An index is a sign which would,at
>>>>>>>>> once,lose the character which makes it a sign if its object where
>>>>>>>>> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no
>>>>>>>>> interpretant. Such,for instance, is a piece of mould (i.e. particle
>>>>>>>>> board--DK) with a bullet hole in it as a sign of a shot; for
>>>>>>>>> without the shot there would have been no hole,but there is a hole
>>>> there, whether anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not.
>>>>>>>>> A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it
>>>>>>>>> a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of
>>>>>>>>> speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being
>>>>>>>>> understood to have that signification." (104).
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> So icons are "first" because they don't need an object to mean;
>>>>>>>>> indexes are "second" because although they need an object, they
>>>>>>>>> don't need an interpretant, and symbols are "third" because in
>>>>>>>>> order to mean they need an object, and an interpretant. What is
>>>>>>>>> confusing to people is that this doesn't create three distinct
>>>>>>>>> categories: a symbol has to also be some kind of index and some
>>>>>>>>> kind of icon, and an index has to be an icon. So a foot is a foot
>>>>>>>>> and it doesn't need any aim or goal or object to mean a foot. In
>>>>>>>>> the same way, a foot print is a footprint, but it it's not just a
>>>>>>>>> footprint: it also means that there was a foot there at one
>>>>>>>>> time,and that's what makes it an index as well as an icon. Finally,
>>>>>>>>> the word "foot" or "pied" or "jiao" is a sound, but it's not just a
>>>>>>>>> sound; it also means that there was a speaking mouth, tongue, vocal
>>>>>>>>> cords, lungs and brain there at one time, and these are what makes
>>>>>>>>> each spoken word an icon and an index as well as a symbol.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>> Macquarie University
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 4:18 AM, Martin John Packer
>>>>>>>>> <mpacker@uniandes.edu.co
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry,
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> I though that Greg was asking whether it was not the case that the
>>>>>>>>>> Ur-sign for LSV was the index, rather than the icon or symbol. I
>>>>>>>>>> took this to be a reference to LSV's frequent mention of the
>>>>>>>>>> infant's pointing - an indexical sign if ever that was one, since
>>>>>>>>>> the gesture is literally done  with the index finger.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> As I understand it, for Peirce the index was basic, the icon more
>>>>>>>>>> complex, and the symbol the most complex kind of sign.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> And for what it's worth, I read Hegel (and many other
>>>>>>>>>> phenomenologists) as aiming to describe the movement in
>>>>>>>>>> consciousness from appearance to reality. Or perhaps better put,
>>>>>>>>>> the movement from what seems real to what turns out to be the mere
>>>>>>>>>> appearance of a deeper reality. For Hegel (for Marx, for LSV?),
>>>>>>>>>> this movement never ends. (Well, there's some debate over that
>>>>>>>>>> claim, but let it stand for now!)
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 26, 2016, at 2:08 PM, Lplarry <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> I hope this topic (noumenal and phenomenal) can continue.
>>>>>>>>>>> Greg's question if objects (and objectives) is the *ur*
>>>>>>>>>>> phenomenon for
>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky, and this model contrasting with Peirce's triadic model
>>>>>>>>>> where the objects ( *ur* phenomenon)  is one element of semiosis.
>>>>>>>>>>> I am going to introduce a quote from Hegel that  may add to this
>>>> topic:
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> "Philosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a
>>>>>>>>>>> cognition
>>>>>>>>>> of what is *true* in them, and further, on the basis of this
>>>>>>>>>> cognition, to
>>>>>>>>>> *comprehend* that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere
>>>> happening."
>>>>>>>>>>> Is this process of truth as the basis for *comprehending*
>>>>>>>>>>> noumenal or
>>>>>>>>>> phenomenal?
>>>>>>>>>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> From: Lplarry
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>> Assistant Professor
>>> Department of Anthropology
>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>>> Brigham Young University
>>> Provo, UT 84602
>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson